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Between the shelling of Fort Sumter and the fall of Richmond, the British 
public followed closely the course of the Civil War in the United States. 
However, the themes of race and popular government typically associated 
with the war were not isolated to the American context. Over the course of 
the 1850s and 1860s, contemporary understandings of such themes were 
continually tested, challenged, and rebuilt in the light of international 
developments.  
In order to better understand these themes, this thesis interweaves 
two historical strands. On the one hand, it explores responses to global 
events during the period: not just the American Civil War, but wars with 
China, rebellions in India, New Zealand and Jamaica, nationalist movements 
in continental Europe, and the transnational independence campaign of the 
Irish Fenians. On the other, it examines the domestic debate about the 
extension of the franchise, from the failure of Conservative and Liberal bills 
in 1859-60, to the eventual passage of the Second Reform Act in 1867.  
Based on a case study of the large, influential and diverse county of 
Yorkshire, the thesis considers the extent to which a national intellectual 
culture existed in Britain at the time. In doing so, it examines the 
mechanisms by which new views of race and democracy were disseminated 
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The mid-Victorian period was one of strange contradictions. Globally-
oriented history views it as one of disruption, as the continued growth of 
European hegemony in Africa and Asia destroyed traditional institutions and 
provoked conflict in response.1 In India, rebellion against British rule led to 
violent repression and the abolition of the East India Company.2 In China, 
European governments trod an uncertain course between encouraging 
Western norms of free trade and rescuing an increasingly ailing government 
from a Christian-inspired civil war that killed millions.3 Civil war rocked the 
American continent, too, as tensions over Federal authority to constrain the 
expansion of slavery were resolved bloodily on the battlefield.4 In New 
Zealand, native Maori and European settlers fought over land ownership; in 
Jamaica, a campaign to redress economic and social grievances was met with 
military force and the abolition of the assembly.5 Nor was Europe itself 
exempt from violence, with movements for national unity leading to a 
successful war of independence in Italy and a suppressed insurrection in 
Poland.6 
 The global picture is of a world locked in conflict. However, in Britain 
itself the period between Chartism and Palmerston’s death is seen almost as 
                                                   
1 Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections 
and Comparisons (Oxford, 2004); Antony Gerald Hopkins, Global History: Interactions 
between the Universal and the Local (Basingstoke; New York, 2006), Antony Gerald 
Hopkins, Globalization in World History (London, 2002); Richard Price, Making Empire: 
Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa 
(Cambridge; New York, 2008); Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, From Slave Trade to Empire: 
Europe and the Colonisation of Black Africa, 1780s-1880s (London; New York, 2004). 
2 Christopher Alan Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism 
and Empire (Cambridge; New York, 2012); Michael S. Dodson, Orientalism, Empire, and 
National Culture: India, 1770-1880 (Basingstoke, 2007). 
3 Tobie S. Meyer-Fong, What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century 
China (Standford, 2013); Philip A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State (Stanford, 
2002); Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London, 
2011). 
4 Bruce C. Levine, Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of the Civil War, Revised edition. 
(New York, 2005); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New 
York, 1988). 
5 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict 
(Auckland, 1998); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English 
Imagination, 1830-1867 (Cambridge, 2002). 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, 1999); Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790-
1870 (New York, 2013); Frank J. Coppa, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence 
(London; New York, 1992). 
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one of stasis.7 The violent disturbances of 1848 were not repeated, with 
leading Chartist advocates transferring their interest to continental 
nationalist movements, and the strength of parliamentary Radicals slowly 
declined over the course of the 1850s.8 The political turbulence created by 
party splits over Corn Law abolition was lessened when the major liberal 
factions unified under Lord Palmerston.9 Agitation for franchise extension, 
meanwhile, was sporadic, leaving reformers bemoaning the people’s 
lassitude.10 
 My thesis re-evaluates these disparate narratives, examining the 
nature of mid-Victorian political culture as a cohesive whole in the often 
overlooked period leading up to the Second Reform Act. It explores the way 
in which views of the world outside Britain interacted with and informed 
attitudes towards key concepts such as democracy, nationality, citizenship 
and race within Britain. Understanding how these concepts evolved over the 
course of the period, and how the communication of ideas and information 
affected this evolution, enhances our understanding of mid-Victorian 
political culture and gives insight into Britain’s subsequent progression 
towards both democracy and imperialism. 
 However, the thesis is also based on the fundamental belief that 
discussions of these concepts have been too abstract to provide significant 
insight. Works examining the extension of the franchise have dealt with 
parliamentary debates, metropolitan newspapers, and national political 
figures – from activists like John Bright to thinkers like John Stuart Mill. 
Similarly, most explorations of the racial debate have tended to focus on the 
scientific community, policy-makers or colonial governors, with additional 
context provided by high-level discussion of cultural phenomena like 
minstrel shows or illustrated magazines. This thesis instead grounds the 
                                                   
7 William Laurence Burn, The Age of Equipoise: A Study of the Mid-Victorian Generation 
(London, 1968); Angus Hawkins, British Party Politics, 1852-1886 (Basingstoke, 1998); 
Angus Hawkins, Parliament, Party and the Art of Politics in Britain, 1855-59 (London, 
1987). 
8 Margot C. Finn, After Chartism: Class and Nation in English Radical Politics, 1848-1874 
(Cambridge, 1993); Miles Taylor, The Decline of British Radicalism, 1847-1860 (Oxford, 
1995). 
9 P.M. Gurowich, ‘The Continuation of War by Other Means: Party and Politics, 1855-1865’, 
Historical Journal vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 603-31. 
10 Kristin Zimmerman, ‘Liberal Speech, Palmerstonian Delay, and the Passage of the Second 
Reform Act’, English Historical Review vol. 118, no. 479 (November 2003), pp. 1176-1207. 
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discussion in a regional study of the county of Yorkshire. This provides a 
firmer understanding of the state of provincial opinion, which reflected a 
much larger proportion of Britain than did that of the elites: it also provides 
an opportunity to consider how ideas spread through Britain’s global and 
national networks of intellectual communication. 
 
The period chosen for this thesis is ideally suited to address the underlying 
motivations behind the mid-Victorian extension of the franchise. It 
encompasses two of the major periods of reform agitation – the fruitless 
campaign of 1859-60, and the 1866-7 gestation of the Second Reform Act.11 
However, it also includes longer interim periods of relative calm and their 
proposals and debates, which allows consideration of the longer evolution of 
the ultimate legislative solution. 
The thesis also covers a vital transitional period in British political 
history. The hypnotic effect of the Chartists and the Palmerston government’s 
limited ideological basis have resulted in most longer studies of the period  
glossing over the late 1850s and early 1860s. The exception to this 
historiographical gap is the high political events leading to the Second 
Reform Act, where historians have examined the cabinet decisions that led to 
Disraeli’s offer of reform, or the political and ideological developments that 
resulted in that reform being accepted.12 Not only will this study reconnect 
these discussions to their regional roots, but it will help to bridge the gap in 
our understanding between Chartist proto-democracy and the fumbling step 
taken in 1867 towards male suffrage. 
Historians influenced by the Marxist focus on class see this period as 
one in which class relations stabilised with the establishment of middle class 
hegemony: the urban, commercial and industrial interest replacing the rural 
                                                   
11 Robert Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848-1867: The Making of 
the Second Reform Act (Farnham, 2011). 
12 For the former, see Maurice Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The 
Passing of the Second Reform Bill. (London, 1967) and F. B. Smith, The Making of the 
Second Reform Bill (Cambridge, 1966); For the latter, see Robert Saunders, ‘The Politics of 
Reform and the Making of the Second Reform Act, 1848-1867’, Historical Journal vol. 50, 
no. 3 (2007), pp. 571-91. 
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aristocracy.13 By expanding the electorate and redistributing constituencies, 
therefore, 1867 reflected this new supremacy. Conversely, historians 
influenced by electoral sociology emphasise continuity rather than 
disturbance. For these historians, the electorate maintained its pre-industrial 
character in essential respects, whether landlord influence in rural elections, 
or voting dominated by social or occupational affinity rather than class.14 
With the rise of the linguistic turn, and the influence of postmodernism 
encouraging consideration of the broader cultural aspects of politics, a new 
school arose which emphasised politics being mediated by language rather 
than socio-economic class. However, this school also followed the electoral 
sociology line of identifying significant historical continuity, tracing 
continuations of earlier plebeian radical themes into mid-Victorian politics.15  
This study brings new considerations into the picture. With the 
breakdown of post-Cold War liberal democratic certainties, increasing 
attention has been paid to the psychological mechanisms of political 
allegiance.16 In this period, local parties were often loose ideological 
coalitions, polarised by the voting system and the partisan requirements of 
registration into two organised and opposing structures.17 Despite this overt 
unity, they continued to contain a wide variety of heterogeneous views, which 
were submerged to a greater or lesser degree depending on the individuals in 
question and the issues at stake. Furthermore, parties were both social and 
political entities, binding their members with ties of friendship as well as 
ideology. I will draw out the diversity of attitudes within parties and, 
                                                   
13 Such historians include E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 
(London, 1963); Royden Harrison, Before the Socialists; Studies in Labour and Politics, 
1861-1881 (London, 1965). 
14 Richard Price, British Society, 1680-1880: Dynamism, Containment, and Change 
(Cambridge, 1999); David Cresap Moore, The Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-
Nineteenth Century English Political System (Basingstoke, 1976); John Russell Vincent, The 
Formation of the Liberal Party 1857-1868 (London, 1966), and Pollbooks: How Victorians 
Voted (London, 1967). 
15 Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 
1832-1982 (Cambridge, 1983); Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment, and Reform: 
Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860-1880 (Cambridge; New York, 1992); 
Taylor, British Radicalism. 
16 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (London, 2013). 
17 Philip Salmon, Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties, 1832-1841 
(Suffolk, 2002), pp. 239-40. 
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recognising the variety of views which existed, explore how contemporary 
political actors balanced loyalty with conscience. 
The thesis goes beyond the limits of traditional approaches via a 
broader definition of ‘political culture’. In contrast to conventional political 
history, this more extensive approach examines the attitudes, beliefs and 
values of those throughout society.18 However, this particular thesis goes 
further: not just in linking political and racial debates which have usually 
been treated in isolation, but in questioning the means by which these 
fundamental concepts could be shaped and how effectively mechanisms of 
intellectual communication transmitted ideas that could affect political 
culture. Yet it also keeps those intellectual concepts rooted in a thorough 
understanding of the events on the ground, and the practical politics through 
which they were filtered. 
By examining the extent to which a coherent view of race, citizenship 
and nationality was consistently applied inside and outside Britain, I will 
firmly link the domestic debate over extending the franchise to the 
controversy about fitness for self-government in both the European 
nationalist and global imperial spheres. Arguments advanced by Catherine 
Hall, among others, focus on the way in which the political nation was 
increasingly defined in racial terms during this period, as rebellions in India 
and Jamaica shook earlier faith in the universal applicability of the British 
model.19 Conversely, Bernard Porter plays down the extent to which imperial 
mentalities took hold within Britain.20  
Beyond the pure questions of British politics, however, there are wider 
considerations of the way in which race as a category was constructed. There 
have been a number of suggestions as to how the Victorians delineated race: 
in gendered terms, differentiating between Western masculinity and Oriental 
effeminacy, or as the representation of the Other, contrasting savagery and 
                                                   
18 Angus Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture: ‘Habits of Heart and Mind’ (Oxford, 2015) p. 
16. 
19 Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, 
Race, Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge, 2000). 
20 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain 
(Oxford, 2004). 
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civilisation.21 The thesis will address the question of how far earlier 
approaches, which saw racial differences in predominantly cultural or class 
terms, had been overcome by a hardening of attitudes – driven in part by the 
development of new intellectual doctrines of ‘scientific’ racism, based on the 
principle of the permanent inherited inferiority of non-Europeans.22 It will 
link these to discussions on nationalism, where the British have been 
portrayed as backward in their thinking by seeing it in predominantly 
cultural terms rather than the racial terms adopted by many other European 
countries.23 
Rather than examining how elite interactions between philosophers, 
government and MPs changed views about race, nationality or the franchise, 
this thesis will consider the effect of ‘bottom-up’ political interactions. 
Involving a range of political actors, from MPs to borough elites and non-
electors, provides a clearer understanding of regional political culture as well 
as adding depth to the national debate. My aim is to take this examination 
beyond the conventional, well-trodden path, to recover and reconstruct (as 
far as the imperfect historical record allows) the minority figures of Victorian 
politics and their views. 
Consideration of the means by which high intellectual concepts were 
diffused through society, and the interaction between national and local 
debates over these concepts, will add a valuable perspective to the discipline 
of intellectual geography.24 In essence, this applies the spatial turn to 
                                                   
21 For the former, Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York, 1978), Ann MacClintock, 
Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in Colonial Context (New York, 1995). For 
the latter, Adam Lively, Masks: Blackness, Race and the Imagination. (London, 1999). 
22 Douglas A. Lorimer, Colour, Class and the Victorians: English Attitudes to the Negro in 
the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Leicester, 1978), Nancy Leys Stephan, The Idea of Race in 
Science: Great Britain 1800-1960 (London, 1982), Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in 
European and American Thought, 1860-1945: Nature as Model and Nature as Threat 
(Cambridge, 1997), Gregory Claeys, Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920 
(Cambridge, 2012), Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London, 1971). 
23 Peter Mandler, ‘“Race” and “Nation” in Mid-Victorian Thought’, in Stefan Collini, Richard 
Whatmore, and B. W. Young (eds.), History, Religion, and Culture: British Intellectual 
History, 1750-1950 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 224-44; see also Linda Colley, Britons: Forging 
the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992), Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: 
English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886 (Cambridge, 2006), H.S. 
Jones, ‘The Idea of the National in Victorian Political Thought’, European Journal of 
Political Theory vol. 5 (2006) pp. 12-21 . 
24 ‘Intellectual Geography: Comparative Studies, 1550-1700’ 
(http://intellectualgeography.history.ox.ac.uk/, accessed 16/02/2015); Alan R. H. Baker, 
Geography and History: Bridging the Divide (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 66-7. 
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intellectual history – not taking the dissemination of ideas for granted, but 
questioning and quantifying their success. Intellectual geography has focused 
predominantly on the early modern period, but an investigation of the 
networks which existed in Victorian Britain through which ideas spread – 
particularly at the regional level – adds context to these debates.  
The sources used in this thesis would be familiar to earlier political 
historians, though I employ new analytical techniques to draw previously 
unstudied meanings from them. The vast quantity of provincial Victorian 
newspapers, their editorial positions, and the wealth of information on 
contemporary life which they hold, provide the backbone of the study in both 
depth and – through analysis of overall word frequencies – breadth. A wide 
variety of archival material, including the correspondence and papers of local 
MPs and letters from emigrants and soldiers, supplements them. This range 
of material supports the thesis in its aim of constructing a broad 
understanding of contemporary attitudes through the linking of the political 
and cultural. 
The focus on the public sphere is critical for this question of popular 
attitudes. In private, no doubt, public  figures were looser with their 
language, more willing to adopt positions that they would have disclaimed in 
front of strangers: from the use of crude racist stereotypes to, in the case of 
Liberal party figures, fears over the expansion of the franchise. However, the 
very fact that these positions could only be revealed in private tells us a 
considerable amount about the way that contemporaries understood the 
boundaries of acceptability. Moreover, individuals could only influence 
public debates through public speech: unvoiced opinions, or those safe only 
for private consumption, enjoyed less impact than the most poorly-attended 
lectures in isolated villages.  
In understanding this public sphere, contemporary newspapers play a 
vital role beyond recording local events and relaying national and local news 
to their readership. Their editors were often influential members of their 
local communities, whose position allowed them to engage in a dialogue with 
their readers. In fact, the tentative floating of a particular opinion, never to 
be repeated or rapidly reversed, may reflect editorials meeting an 
unfavourable reception. This provides another instance of how a focus on the 
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boundaries of acceptability of the public sphere, and the communication of 
ideas as well as their origination, is integral to this study. 
 
The thesis tackles a wide range of themes, which – although vital to our 
understanding of the course of world history – have traditionally been 
addressed in separate studies.25 However, it retains a single question at its 
heart: how contemporaries defined the nation – their own and others’ – 
politically, culturally and racially. The overlapping nature of these concepts 
will help the thesis to maintain conceptual coherence. For instance, attitudes 
towards the potential independence of the southern Confederacy during the 
American Civil War could not be framed in isolation. When people spoke on 
the topic, they invariably revealed other elements of the worldview that had 
brought them to this conclusion: their attitude towards nationalism, their 
opinions of the limitations of a representative system or the universal white 
male suffrage of America, their views on racial differences or slavery’s 
legitimacy.26 The purpose of the thesis is to reunite these concepts, studying 
them together, while retaining a manageable scope via the regional focus.  
To support this, the thesis is structured both chronologically and 
thematically. At the heart of the thesis is its basis in a study of the large and 
diverse county of Yorkshire. As such, the first chapter focuses on questions of 
intellectual and historical geography. It is intended in large part to provide 
the reader with an understanding of the region’s geography – to introduce 
them to the towns and districts which will make up the study, and to explain 
a little of each area’s peculiarities. However, it also considers broader topics 
such as the strength and role of regional identity in mid-Victorian Britain. In 
its facet of intellectual geography, it examines the mechanisms by which high 
political or intellectual concepts – such as race – were diffused through the 
county, from mechanics’ institutes to newspapers and touring lecturers. 
Perhaps most importantly, it also engages directly with significant 
methodological questions such as the role of regional studies in broader 
historiography. 
                                                   
25 One exception being Hall, McClelland, and Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation, which 
explicitly brings together franchise reform and race as well as class and gender. 
26 Mark Bennett, ‘Confederate Supporters in the West Riding, 1861-1865: “Cranks of the 
Worst English Species”’, Northern History vol. 51, no. 2 (September 2014), pp. 311-29. 
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The second chapter deals primarily with questions of race and 
nationality. It considers and re-evaluates Britain’s war with China in 1857, 
and the subsequent electoral defeats of prominent critics of the government’s 
aggressive policy. Beliefs in the conflict’s morality were driven not by a desire 
to see European civilisation triumph over Chinese ‘barbarians,’ as the 
historiography has suggested, but the need to redeem and defend British 
honour. The election, meanwhile, was driven less by national events than by 
traditional and even local factors: Cobden’s opponent at Huddersfield 
decried him not just as ‘un-English,’ but ‘un-Yorkshire.’  
The chapter also considers the effect which the Indian Rebellion of 
1857 had on British racial discourse. It emphasises that the events did little to 
shake the existing British civilizational perspective, distinct from the belief in 
inherent inferiority present in later ‘scientific’ racism. It also argues that 
newspaper reporting focused less on sexual atrocities than has traditionally 
been portrayed. However, by contrasting domestic views with letters and 
memoirs from Yorkshire Anglo-Indians, it shows the disparity between the 
lived experience of the empire and the conceptualised empire. 
Chapter three evaluates the state of the franchise reform debate before 
the American Civil War. It examines the events of 1859-60, where the 
Liberals defeated a Conservative reform bill and won a majority at the 
ensuing general election, only to withdraw their own reform bill and abandon 
the topic for the rest of the parliament. It explores the justifications that both 
Conservatives and Liberals made for extending the franchise, with perhaps 
the most significant finding being the genuine willingness of Conservatives to 
contemplate the extension of the franchise well before Disraeli’s 1867 reform 
bill. 
The central section of the thesis deals with the American Civil War and 
its fallout over three chapters. The first (chapter four), looking primarily at 
the diplomatic sphere, establishes the pattern of loyalties to either North or 
South within the region. It asks whether Conservative newspapers or MPs 
were more likely to support the slave-owning South, differentiating strongly 
between mediation between the two sides, intervention on one side, and 
recognition of the South as an independent nation. It concludes that the 
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overwhelming majority, regardless of political opinion, hoped Britain would 
stay as distant as possible. 
This progresses into a discussion of the role of democracy in views of 
the conflict. The traditional framework has been that the victory of the Union 
made democracy safe for Britain, leading to the subsequent expansion of the 
franchise. Chapter five tests this framework, considering views during the 
war and whether candidates in the 1865 election were more ready to endorse 
‘Americanisation’, or even reform in general, than they had been in 1859. It 
concludes not only that there was no paradigm shift as a result of the Union 
victory, but that the arguments deployed by reformers sometimes directly 
contradicted fundamental American principles. 
Chapter six focuses on the racial and national context of the American 
Civil War. Drawing on themes from chapter two, it highlights the strength of 
British anti-slavery as well as the continued dominance of civilizational 
understandings of race. Though most historiography suggests that Britain 
supported the Confederacy, and links this to a declining faith in racial 
egalitarianism, this thesis differs. Instead, it sets the meagre support for 
Confederate independence in the context of European national movements, 
and links this lack of support to Confederate slave-owning. 
The remaining section focuses largely on the post-American Civil War 
period. Chapter seven brings the topics of race and nationality closer to home 
by looking at British imperial difficulties. Using the Maori rebellion in New 
Zealand, the 1865 Jamaica rebellion, and the Fenian disturbances in Ireland 
as case studies, it evaluates how far these events shook British faith in the 
civilizational perspective. Forced to choose between admitting their own 
responsibility for imperial misgovernment and putting their ‘subject races’ 
into a state of permanent inferiority, which would the British choose? 
Chapter eight, meanwhile, concludes the discussion of democracy and 
the franchise by looking at the abortive Liberal reform bill of 1866 and the 
successful Conservative bill of 1867. It asks how and why attitudes towards 
the franchise changed – particularly among the Conservatives, who 
eventually passed a measure of household suffrage which many of them had 
previously decried. It also examines the phenomenon of Working Men’s 
Conservative Associations and their relationship with franchise extension. It 
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brings the thesis together by looking at how and why the equipoise over 
reform which had characterised the period ultimately collapsed. 
By exploring how Britain’s global role was understood and the local 
political effects of this understanding, the study will provide historians with a 
detailed analysis of specific issues such as race, imperialism and the franchise 
alongside a synthetic view of mid-Victorian politics in one of Britain’s most 
significant regions. 
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Chapter 1: The Political and Intellectual Geography of Yorkshire 
 
Local and national in British politics 
 
Any historian treating Britain regionally, in the hope of delineating local 
peculiarities, must inevitably confront several inconvenient truths. Firstly, 
the four nations share significant common cultural heritage, particularly the 
three co-habiting mainland Britain: ‘united,’ as James I put it, ‘both in 
language, religion, and similitude of manners’.1 As such, when the historian 
seeks to draw out regional differences they must also judge how meaningful 
those are: whether a regional approach represents paddling in the shallows, 
ignoring the great vistas of ocean opened by transnational histories. 
Secondly, borders within Britain have always been highly porous. The 
patterns of even pre-industrial life crossed the artificial lines of a map, 
blurring areas in which regional distinctiveness might be found.2 Even the 
‘reivers’ of the early modern border regions, where violence might be 
expected to draw starker lines, existed in a state of ‘general confusion 
bordering on chaos’ that disregarded regional affiliation.3 We might even 
question whether place has any meaning other than as ‘the sphere of a 
multiplicity of trajectories’, a collection of moments in time snatched from 
individuals almost at random, held together in false coherence only to be 
scattered again.4 
 Thirdly, even those who still believe in the importance of place in 
history must acknowledge that regional borders were increasingly being 
broken down over the course of the nineteenth century. Within Britain itself 
the industrial revolution drove internal migration, from individuals to groups 
like the Heathcoat lace workers displaced en masse from Nottinghamshire to 
Devon. Better means of internal communication within Britain allowed 
                                                   
1 'House of Commons Journal Volume 1: 22 March 1604', in Journal of the House of 
Commons: Volume 1, 1547-1629 (London, 1802), pp. 142-149 [http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol1/pp142-149, accessed 14 March 2016]. 
2 For the Yorkshire context of this, David Hey, ‘Reflections on the Local and Regional History 
of the North’, Northern History vol. 50, no. 2 (September 2013), p. 167; for the general 
intellectual context, Baker, Bridging the Divide, pp. 184, 191-2. 
3 George MacDonald Fraser, The Steel Bonnets: The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border 
Reivers (London, 1995) pp. 7-8. 
4 Doreen B. Massey, For Space (London, 2008), p. 119. 
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individuals to travel more readily between regions – permanently, semi-
permanently, or for holidays and tourism. Improved internal communication 
also facilitated the dissemination of ideas within Britain itself, strengthening 
a common cultural heritage through the growth of a cheap national press.5 
 Moreover, barriers between Britain and the rest of the world were also 
dissolving. Emigration, both to America and British colonies, and 
immigration from a variety of locations added new dynamics to British 
regional thought. Though much emigration was long-term, the steamship 
also facilitated regular and rapid transatlantic travel: less significantly, 
though with implications for the Anglo-American political debate, 
steamships also facilitated a quick escape for those seeking to evade parental 
responsibilities or impending bankruptcy.6 Under the onslaught of both 
nationalisation and internationalisation, one might be tempted to conclude 
that the region has little value as a historical category. 
 
This study, however, defends the value of a regional study on three grounds; 
one general, two relating specifically to the area chosen. Firstly, historical 
methodology is always a trade-off between detail and comprehensibility, 
controlling for certain variables to better understand others. As long as the 
extent to which geographic constructions are artificial is taken into account, 
using the region as one of these controlling variables is an intellectually 
justifiable method of approaching a topic. Far from paddling in the shallows, 
it allows the historian to engage in a focused, in-depth examination of a topic. 
This, in turn, can be guided and informed by both transnational histories and 
similarly focused examinations of other communities both within and 
outside Britain. 
 Selecting Yorkshire as the target also provides two additional benefits 
to the regional study. Though most counties were too small and 
                                                   
5 Humphrey Southall, ‘Agitate! Agitate! Organize! Political Travellers and the Construction of 
a National Politics, 1839-1880’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers vol. 21, 
no. 1 (1996), pp. 177-193. 
6 Sean Dennis Cashman, America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise 
of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1994), p. 81. For two examples among many, George and 
J. Blackburn, manufacturers of Upper-lane Mill, Little Gomersal, and dyers at Mirfield, 
escaped to New York with between £40,000 and £50,000 of their creditors’ money (LT, 24 
June 1865 p. 5) while Mrs Anderson of Bridlington supported three children through sewing 
between her husband’s flight to America and her suicide (LT, 5 March 1864 p. 3). 
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homogeneous to provide a helpful cross-section of Victorian England, 
Yorkshire’s size and diversity enables the historian to identify and highlight 
significant trends without moving outside the region’s boundaries. Equally 
critically, mid-Victorian Yorkshire had a particularly strong sense of identity, 
born of history, culture and significance. This facilitates comparisons 
between different areas within the county, and also allows us to better 
understand the interaction of competing sub-national identities at the time. 
 
The balance of evidence points to sub-national units in general, and 
Yorkshire in particular, remaining a significant locus of loyalty throughout 
the Victorian period.7 Yorkshire’s sense of identity was strengthened by its 
long history of territorial unity, with boundaries substantially similar to those 
of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Deira and the Viking kingdom of York.8 This 
existing sense of regional community, developed through both dialect and 
history, was strengthened by the growing antiquarian interest in local history 
and its dissemination through print.9 More scholarly books could object to 
examinations of ‘Yorkshire’ dialect, as ‘a man living twenty miles from Leeds 
will laugh to hear a Leeds man talk’, but the works of ‘leisured clergymen, 
upon their annual visits to particular watering places,’ and ‘gentlemen… 
visiting their friend the rector of some country parish’ had their effect – just 
as the inaccurate speculations of amateur ethnologists would have their effect 
later in the century.10 
 The significance of Yorkshire identity was noted outside the county. 
When the 1851 census divided the country into thirteen regions, Yorkshire 
                                                   
7 William Marshall, ‘The Creation of Yorkshireness: Cultural Identities in Yorkshire, c.1850-
1918’ (unpub. PhD thesis, University of Huddersfield, 2011), pp. 204-5. 
8 Matthew Townend, Viking Age Yorkshire (Pickering, 2014), pp. 15-18. 
9 For the strengthening of national communities through print, Anderson, Imagined 
Communities. For examples of antiquarianism, Townend, Viking Age Yorkshire pp. 225-6; 
John Bigland, The Beauties of England and Wales: Or Original Delineations, 
Topographical, Historical and Descriptive, of Each County, Embellished with Engravings, 
vol. 16 (Yorkshire) (London, 1812), p. 59; Thomas Baines, Yorkshire, Past and Present, a 
History and a Description of the Three Ridings of the Great County of York from the 
Earliest Ages to the Year 1870; with an Account of Its Manufactures, Commerce and Civil 
and Mechanical Engineering (London, 1870) vol. 1 part 2, pp. 353-481. 
10 C. Clough Robinson, The Dialect of Leeds and Its Neighbourhood, Illustrated by 
Conversations and Tales of Common Life, Etc., to Which Are Added a Copious Glossary; 
Notices of the Various Antiquities, Manners, and Customs, and General Folk-Lore of the 
District (London, 1862) ii-iii, vii; Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (London, 
1997). 
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(like London and Wales) was treated as a single unit.11 Gaskell, one of the 
foremost authors of provincial life, described how even Lancastrians were 
‘struck by the peculiar force of character which the Yorkshiremen display’.12 
Henry Adams explained how: 
More than any other county in England, Yorkshire retained a sort of 
social independence of London. Scotland itself was hardly more 
distinct… To a certain degree, evident enough to Yorkshiremen, 
Yorkshire was not English – or was all England, as they might choose 
to express it.13 
 
Adams’ view of Yorkshire’s social identity was supported by its 
manifestations in the capital. Since 1812 the Yorkshire Society had provided a 
school in Lambeth ‘for educating, boarding and clothing the sons of 
respectable Yorkshire… parents reduced by misfortune or dead,’ an echo of 
the way that other migrant groups formed self-help organisations in new 
homelands.14 By the mid-Victorian period, its annual dinner and ball in 
London was an opportunity for Yorkshire peers, MPs and industrialists to 
gather.15 Within Yorkshire itself, social life at the highest echelons revolved 
around county-wide institutions such as the Yorkshire Union Hunt and the 
annual county ball.16  
Moreover, individuals talked so frequently about their own 
conceptions of regional identity that it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that it played a significant role in their thinking. When votes of national 
                                                   
11 Robin A. Butlin, ‘Regions in England and Wales, c.1600-1914’, in R. A. Dodgshon and 
Robin A. Butlin (eds.), An Historical Geography of England and Wales (London, 1990), p. 
240. Notably, Scotland was divided into Northern and Southern regions: Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys/General Register Office, Guide to Census Reports: Great 
Britain 1801-1966 (London, 1977) 
[http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/travellers/Cen_Guide/19, accessed 17 March 2016]. 
12 E.C. Gaskell, The Life of Charlotte Bronte vol. 1 (London, 1857), p. 10. 
13 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Washington, D.C., 1907), p. 178. London 
thought differently: Robin Gilmour, ‘Regional and Provincial in Victorian Literature’, in 
Ronald P. Draper (ed.), The Literature of Region and Nation (New York, 1989), pp. 51-61.  
14 HP, 18 May 1860 p. 3; Terence Golway, ‘Machine Made: Irish America, Tammany Hall, 
and the Creation of Modern New York Politics’ (unpub. PhD thesis, State University of New 
York, 2012), pp. 145, 147. 
15 ‘Advertorials’ for the dinner were carried in key Yorkshire newspapers: SI 28 April 1860 p. 
6, YH 28 April 1860 p. 10, BO 3 May 1860 p. 5, LI 5 May 1860 p. 5, YG 5 May 1860 p. 7. 
16 For the Yorkshire Union Hunt, YH 9 October 1858 p. 10, 12 November 1864 p. 10, 27 
October 1866 p. 10, YG 6 October 1860 p. 10; for the county ball, YH 12 January 1856 p. 8, 
YG 3 October 1857 p. 9, 14 January 1860 p. 3, 19 January 1861 p. 11, 3 December 1864 p. 7. 
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significance were taken in the House of Commons, the local press provided 
lists of how Yorkshire members had divided alongside the overall totals.17 
Non-partisan causes also sought to mobilise this bloc of Yorkshire MPs in 
their support.18 
Conservatives frequently used county loyalty as an emotional lever. 
Colonel Henry Edwards, standing for re-election alongside the novice 
Christopher Sykes, ascribed ‘the courtesy and kindness we have received’ to 
their being Yorkshiremen.19 However, given the strength of Yorkshire 
regional identity, this was not substantially different from appeals to county 
loyalty elsewhere in Britain. At a Leeds dinner, William Beckett Denison 
introduced a speaker as ‘the type of an Englishman, the type of a 
Yorkshireman, and the type of a Conservative,’ implying at least a degree of 
coherence between the three categories.20 However, there were few attempts 
to conflate Yorkshire identity with a Conservative political identity. 
One of the rare attempts came in 1841, when Edwin Lascelles appealed 
to his ‘Brother Yorkshiremen’ to follow the lead of Leeds, Bradford and Hull, 
‘Shew the Government agitators that Yorkshiremen are too shrewd to be 
cajoled by their Corn Law Cunning,’ and ‘Redeem your Riding from Whig 
thraldom and your country from Ruin’.21 However, it was as much national 
events and superior organisation as Lascelles’ passionate appeal that secured 
the Conservatives both West Riding seats for the first and only time.22 
Though the Conservative Halifax Guardian could complain that Lancashire 
‘sought to destroy the electoral “freedom” of Yorkshiremen’ by sending 
‘consecutive railway trains and strings of omnibuses to cross Blackstone 
Edge, all loaded with voters,’ this was not sufficiently emotive to restore 
Conservative political fortunes in the Riding.23 
Liberals and Radicals generally made more effective use of county 
loyalty, by filtering their national narrative about civil and religious liberty 
                                                   
17 LM 9 March 1865 p. 3, LT 24 June 1865 p. 5, LI 13 May 1865 p. 5, HP 26 May 1865 p. 6, 
HC 18 March 1865 p. 5, YH 11 March 1865 p. 5, YG 11 March 1865 p. 7.  
18 See the efforts of the Yorkshire Schools of Art, SI 16 March 1865 p. 4. 
19 HP, 7 July 1865. 
20 LT, 29 July 1865 p. 3. 
21 WYAS Kirklees, KC174/82 ‘Brother Yorkshiremen’ (Edwin Lascelles, 5 July 1841). 
22 Francis Michael Longstreth Thompson, ‘Whigs and Liberals in the West Riding, 1830-
1860’, English Historical Review vol. 74, no. 291 (April 1959), p. 223-4. 
23 HxG, 7 May 1859 p. 4. 
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through a regional lens. The significant milestones of Liberal history were 
manifested locally, and the current generation were called on to prove 
themselves to their forebears: 
A contest in the West Riding of Yorkshire… carries us back to old 
times… to the years before the Flood of 1832, when the great fight 
between Milton and Lascelles was regarded by all England with 
amazement… when Wilberforce stood forth as its candidate, the 
champion of the negro and the liberator of the slave. These are the 
men, say we, who thrust Henry Brougham into the House of 
Commons to knock with the sledge-hammer of Yorkshire’s decision 
against the gates of the constitution… we see a repetition of the same 
vigorous efforts which carried Lord Morpeth… when the vale of the 
Calder and the moors of Keighley were alike resonant with the voices 
of ardent reformers.24 
This sense of Yorkshire as a Liberal heartland was intrinsically linked to the 
strength of religious Nonconformity, with Wesleyanism becoming ‘a de facto 
second established religion’ throughout the county.25 The 1851 Religious 
Census put Anglicanism and Methodism close to parity in Yorkshire in terms 
of capacity (457,594 sittings to 423,109), and gave the Methodists a 
superiority of 426,960 to 354,507 in actual attendances.26 Methodism was by 
no means as reliably Liberal as other Nonconformist sects, and could on 
occasion ‘let the side down’.27 Nor, however, was it as intrinsically linked to 
Conservatism as was the Church of England. Coupled with the Baptists and 
Independents/Congregationalists, who controlled 148,206 sittings across the 
county, the numerical Nonconformist superiority made Yorkshire fertile 
ground for Liberal appeals. 
 
From the historian’s perspective, we can appreciate that regional identity had 
considerable practical weaknesses. So, too, did Victorian conceptions of race, 
                                                   
24 ECH, 12 May 1859 p. 5; note that this was an East Riding newspaper talking about a West 
Riding contest. See also LT, 24 June 1865 p. 5. 
25 John Wolffe, ‘The 1851 Census and Religious Change in Nineteenth-Century Yorkshire’, 
Northern History vol. 45, no. 1 (2008), p. 75; John Wolffe, The Religious Census of 1851 in 
Yorkshire (York, 2005), p. 5. 
26 ‘Census of Great Britain, 1851, Religious worship (England and Wales),’ Parliamentary 
Papers 1852-3, 1690, cclxxiv (Table G) 
27 See, for instance, BO 8 July 1847 p. 5. 
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though both substantially affected the way in which contemporaries thought. 
However, regional identity developed as part of a complex network of 
identities, in which people cultivated affinities with geographic units both 
larger and smaller than the region. Yorkshire’s subdivisions had a history 
almost as long as the county itself: by the time of the Norman Conquest, the 
division of the county into North, East and West Ridings was already 
recognised.28  
As time passed and population grew, these divisions gained greater 
responsibility: their own commissions of the peace from the medieval period, 
their own lord-lieutenancies from the Restoration, their own county 
members from 1832, and in 1889 full administrative county status.29 Indeed, 
Yorkshire was fortunate that the push for political devolution below the 
county split it along already-existing fault lines.30 The subsequent 
development of commercial networks and infrastructure also supported 
these divisions: for instance, in the way that Leeds, York and Hull became 
local nexuses for joint-stock banking.31 These divisions created alternative 
loyalties and rivalries within Yorkshire, co-existing alongside a sense of a 
county identity. By the twentieth century, when ‘Home Rule all round’ 
offered the prospect of a Yorkshire Parliament, the Hull Daily Mail scoffed at 
‘the spectacle of the East Riding taking its rule and government from Leeds 
or Wakefield’.32 
 Subdivisions below the Ridings also generated their own loyalties, 
particularly in urban areas: Asa Briggs, born in Keighley, noted that the West 
Riding’s history was dominated by the ‘sturdy civic pride of its constituent 
                                                   
28 Baines, Yorkshire Past and Present vol. 1 part 2, p. 392. 
29 Simon Walker, ‘Yorkshire Justices of the Peace, 1389-1413,’ The English Historical Review 
vol. 108 no. 427 (April, 1993), p. 283; Miles Jebb, The Lord-Lieutenants and their Deputies 
(Chichester, 2007) p. 189. 
30 David Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700-1870 
(Basingstoke, 1997), p. 106-7. 
31 Derek Gregory, ‘Three Geographies of Industrialisation’, in R. A. Dodgshon and Robin A. 
Butlin (eds.), An Historical Geography of England and Wales (London, 1990), figure 13.11 p. 
380; see also Cheryl Bailey, ‘Provincial Banking in Nineteenth Century England: York City 
and County Banking Co., 1830-1880’ (unpub. PhD thesis, University of Leicester, 2003), pp. 
53-8, 70. 
32 G.K. Peatling, ‘Home Rule for England, English Nationalism, and Edwardian Debates 
about Constitutional Reform’, Albion vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 78, 80-1; Hull Daily 
Mail, 13 September 1912 p. 4. Leeds, perhaps understandably, looked more favourably on 
the scheme: LM, 14 September 1912 p. 5. 
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parts’.33 National narratives were echoed at both county and local levels, as 
when Bradford Liberals mentally and rhetorically conflated their campaign to 
incorporate the town with the broader campaign for civil and religious 
liberty.34 This was assisted not just by the necessity for local political activism 
to centre itself on the borough through registration and campaigning, but by 
urban geography itself, with the hills that surrounded many Yorkshire towns 
strengthening existing tendencies towards insularity.35 Indeed, it was the 
urban political communities, of which the West Riding possessed so many, 
which would thrive following the reform of local government after the Great 
Reform Act.36 
If we demonstrated the existence of regional identity via its 
manifestations of regional pride, then the existence of local identity is even 
more strongly proven. Towns measured their commercial prosperity against 
one another, sought to match their neighbours in the construction of 
significant urban amenities, and generally jostled for position.37 The tangible 
rewards of this jostling were often less significant than the prestige, and the 
level of disagreement more significant than the rewards seemed to merit.  
For instance, although the removal of West Riding assize business 
from York to Leeds created a certain amount of employment, the dispute 
between Leeds and Wakefield as to which should receive the new assize 
showed a more fundamental battle over precedence which managed to cross 
party lines. The Conservative Leeds Intelligencer criticised its Wakefield 
counterpart for ‘abusive’ language and ‘glaring misrepresentations’; the 
Liberal Wakefield Express accused the Liberal Leeds Mercury of having 
‘spirit of self-seeking,’ while the advanced Liberal Wakefield Free Press 
claimed that the Leeds Liberal MP Edward Baines had introduced a private 
                                                   
33 Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (Harmondsworth, 1990), p. 150; for a more detailed 
examination of Briggs’ relationship with regional history, S.J.D. Green, ‘Northern History 
and the History of the North: Forty Years On’, Northern History vol. 42, no. 1 (March 2005), 
pp. 17-19. 
34 Adrian Elliot, ‘The Incorporation of Bradford’, Northern History vol. 15, no. 1 (1979), pp. 
156-7. 
35 Salmon, Electoral Reform at Work, pp. 11, 13. 
36 David Eastwood, Governing Rural England: Tradition and Transformation in Local 
Government, 1780-1840 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 262-3. 
37 C. Dellheim, ‘Imagining England: Victorian Views of the North’, Northern History vol. 22, 
no. 1 (1986), pp. 223-4; Rosemary Sweet, ‘Local Identities and a National Parliament, 
c.1688-1835’, in Julian Hoppit (ed.), Parliaments, Nations and Identities in Britain and 
Ireland, 1660-1850 (Manchester, 2003), p. 56. 
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member’s bill lowering the borough franchise only as a bargaining chip to 
obtain the assizes, threatening to ‘curiously watch’ his ‘political conduct’.38 
The equally-advanced Liberal Leeds Times called York ‘effete’ and argued 
that the ‘stern business requirements of the present utilitarian age’ should 
prevail over ‘antiquarian and cosy recollections,’ while the Liberal York 
Herald protested at the ‘injustice’ and ‘hardships’ caused by the decision – as 
well as denouncing ‘the Leeds Mercury, and the clique whose opinions it 
represents’.39 When the news of the Order in Council arrived in Leeds, its 
treatment resembled that of a military victory: ‘the Union-jack was hoisted 
from the tower of the Town Hall… in Boar-lane and other principal streets of 
the town flags were displayed, and the bells… sounded merry peals’.40 
Meanwhile, in terms that suggest strong continuity between the Victorian 
period and the modern era, the Hull papers criticised their town’s poor 
reputation and isolation, cast envious eyes towards Leeds and its municipal 
buildings, and suggested that Hull could attract more visitors if it bettered 
itself.41  
In the majority of cases, the press strengthened local identity more 
than regional. Stephen Koss has suggested that ‘the London press was 
tantamount to the national press’: not only did provincial newspapers 
‘increasingly… draw their directives, inspiration, incentives, and capital from 
London’, but schemes were frequently proposed whereby editorials and 
leading articles would be outsourced to London.42 In this period, at least, 
such a characterisation seems mistaken: except for the smallest sheets, for 
whom advertisement was a business and news a luxury, even minor 
proprietors guarded their editorial stances as jealously as did the major 
figures like William Byles of the Bradford Observer, Robert Leader of the 
Sheffield Independent, or Edward Baines of the Leeds Mercury. Whereas in 
1850 95% of US daily and weekly newspapers professed loyalty to a party, in 
1861 only 35 of 67 Yorkshire newspapers (52%) did the same – below the 
                                                   
38 LI, 27 February 1864 p. 5; WE, 4 June 1864 p. 5; WFP, 30 January 1864 p. 5. 
39 LT, 25 June 1864 p. 5; YH, 31 December 1864 p. 8, 12 December 1863 p. 8. 
40 LT, 11 June 1864 p. 5. 
41 HA, 19 January 1861 p. 4, 31 August 1861 p. 4, 8 March 1862 p. 4; ECH, 14 February 1861 p. 
5, 5 September 1861 p. 5. However, Leeds also complained about being a ‘filthy, ill-contrived 
town’: LT, 29 December 1860 p. 6. 
42 Stephen E. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Vol. 1: The Nineteenth 
Century (London, 1981), pp. 21-2. 
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British national average.43 28 proclaimed themselves as Liberals (and only 7 
Conservative), but the remainder announced that they were ‘Independent 
Liberal’, ‘Liberal Conservative’, ‘Independent’ or ‘Neutral’. Moreover, even 
listings for a party-affiliated newspaper could emphasise that it advocated ‘no 
peculiar political questions’ or ‘measures of reform without respect to party,’ 
or was ‘thoroughly independent in politics’.44 Most papers adopted their own 
independent editorial line, focusing on the social and political life of their 
home town, and expressed resentment of those papers with broader 
pretensions– the Doncaster Chronicle sarcastically expressed their gratitude 
to the Leeds Mercury for ‘enlighten[ing] us as to the most fitting person to 
fill the chair of this borough’. 45 Such stances built a sense of local identity, 
though in lieu of rather than in opposition to regional identity. Any decline of 
rural solidarity in the mid-Victorian period must, at least in part, be 
correlated with their reliance on their urban neighbours for organs of public 
opinion.46 
Indeed, the effects of some aspects of contemporary life on identity 
were complex and multi-faceted. Although religion gave Yorkshire a sense of 
identity, the focus of religious loyalty was the parish; though the Reformation 
had swept away traditional participatory forms of worship, the Victorians 
filled at least some of the gap with Sunday schools, church outings and 
lectures. However, the conflict between Established Church and 
Nonconformity meant religion could also be a divisive force locally. When 
Bradford Dissenters stood up for their principles, counting among their 
number the manufacturer, Congregationalist and future MP Robert Milligan, 
it was a Bradford vicar who proposed a rate, the Bradford Churchwardens 
who laid it, and Bradford magistrates who declared that goods be seized from 
                                                   
43 Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics: The American North, 1865-1928 
(New York, 1986), p. 14; C. Mitchell, The Newspaper Press Directory (London, 1861), pp. 
34-84; Martin Hewitt, The Dawn of the Cheap Press in Victorian Britain: The End of the 
Taxes on Knowledge, 1849-1869 (London, 2015), p. 125. 
44 Mitchells Directory (1861), p. 34 (Liberal Beverley Recorder), p. 48 (Liberal Dewsbury 
Herald) and p. 71 (Liberal Richmond and Ripon Chronicle), pp. 54-5 (Liberal Huddersfield 
Chronicle). 
45 DC, 30 October 1863 p. 5. 
46 Eastwood, Government and Community, p. 167. Despite the existence of a local weekly 
(which many other towns were not lucky enough to possess), the Leeds Intelligencer and 
Leeds Mercury ‘circulated widely’ in the Skipton district: CP, 9 March 1861 p. 1. 
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the houses of the recalcitrant and sold.47 Furthermore, it encouraged 
individuals to identify with their co-religionists elsewhere in the country 
through agencies such as the Liberation Society. Religion also provided 
transnational links, with members of the clergy travelling overseas for 
missionary activity and study, and relating their experiences to their 
parishioners.48 Politics, too, enabled people to define themselves in multiple 
ways – as Leeds, West Riding or Yorkshire Liberals, as English or British 
Liberals, or as those who supported ‘the cause of constitutional, or it may be 
democratic, progress all the world over’.49  
It should be remembered that local identity could be just as fluid as 
regional identity, and in some respects more so. Increased population 
mobility often took people around the region rather than outside it, and 
Yorkshire’s coast meant that goods could be manufactured and exported 
without necessarily leaving the county.50 In addition, shifting patterns of 
local government redrew these boundaries over the period. Boroughs were 
extended to reduce or prevent landlord influence, though in Bradford the 
inclusion of outlying townships in the borough led to a mass brawl between 
the Conservatives of Manningham and the radical weavers of Great Horton; 
meanwhile, Harrogate and Knaresborough petitioned to form a joint 
parliamentary borough – the former to gain representation in Parliament, 
the latter to retain it.51 Other attempts to create new identities were less 
successful: when the town of Billingsley applied to transfer between Poor 
Law Unions, the board of guardians jokingly dubbed it ‘the South Carolina of 
the Barnsley Union’ in reference to the recent events in America.52 While 
                                                   
47 BO, 17 March 1842 p. 3. 
48 See Rev. J Bastow: HxG, 15 November 1862 p. 4, 17 January 1863 p. 4, 28 February 1863 p. 
7, 17 September 1864 p. 4; Rev. J.P. Chown: BO, 27 November 1862, 5 October 1865, D.B. 
Milner, ‘J. P. Chown 1826-81’, Baptist Quarterly vol. 25 (1973), pp. 15-41. 
49 LT, 15 July 1865 p. 5, which cited America, France and Spain as justification for its 
optimism. 
50 Hey, ‘Reflections’, pp. 168-9. 
51 Sarah Richardson, ‘Independence and Deference: A Study of the West Riding Electorate, 
1832-1841’ (unpub. PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1995), p. 4; Harry Fieldhouse, Old 
Bradford Illustrated (Bradford, 1889), pp. 71-3; LM, 25 May 1867 supplement p. 1. 
52 BC, 19 January 1861 p. 5. 
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these boundaries shifted, the county itself remained as a significant and 
overriding focus of identity.53 
 
Given the importance of the North-South divide in modern Britain, we 
should also consider the extent to which Yorkshire may have been subsumed 
within a more general Northern identity. On a visit to York, the Liverpudlian 
Gladstone alluded to this idea of the North: 
I have always felt that we of the North have a sort of common interest 
and character, I won’t say as opposed to, but, at any rate, as 
distinguished from, our brethren in the South, but besides the 
character and the common interests of the natives in the North, there 
is also the distinctive character of the East coast and the West.54 
However, as Gladstone suggested, the amorphous North was too large a unit 
and its inhabitants were perceived to be too diverse in character to generate a 
significant sense of loyalty.55 Liberals and Radicals frequently discussed the 
failure of the parliamentary system to represent the manufacturing interests 
of the country, but they did not consistently adopt the Gaskellite shorthand 
of an industrial North confronting a rural South. Antiquarian concepts of a 
‘Northumbrian’ region spanning Northern England and Southern Scotland 
were limited to elite audiences, and were weakened even there by the 
recognition that Danish heritage differentiated Yorkshire from its northern 
neighbours.56 Like many things, antiquarianism proved more effective in 
confirming rather than contradicting existing realities. 
 In fact, the distinctiveness of Yorkshire identity offers us the 
opportunity to challenge a particularly tenacious historical and 
                                                   
53 For instance, although Rifle Volunteer Corps were regimented by Riding, a Yorkshire Rifle 
Association was formed to train them in marksmanship and the papers took pride that 
‘Yorkshire lays claim to a fair share of skill with the volunteer’s weapon:’ YG, 10 August 1861 
p. 4. 
54 YH, 18 October 1862 p. 4. 
55 Asa Briggs, ‘Themes in Northern History’, Northern History vol. 1, no. 1 (1966), p. 3; John 
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historiographical concept. The response of the ‘New British History’ to a 
perception of English dominance was to propose a new model of ‘Four 
Nations History’ in which Wales, Scotland and Ireland played their full part. 
An equally vital component of this should have been the simultaneous 
problematizing of the concept of ‘England’, whose size and diversity resulted 
in regional differences almost as great as the differences between the four 
nations of Britain. Like Wales, the strength of Yorkshire Nonconformity set it 
apart from the theoretical norms of English identity. Like Scotland, language 
and dialect differentiated the elites from the masses with their ‘barbarous 
jargon’: C. Clough Robinson believed ‘if a genuine Yorkshireman begins to 
talk fine,’ it bespoke ‘some design on your pocket’.57 As in Ireland, 
contemporaries acknowledged racial differences and speculated about their 
possible effect on personalities. In 1864 Cornhill Magazine believed that 
‘Yorkshire was, above all others, the chosen place of the great Brigantian 
race,’ with ‘the Saxon type’ that ‘preponderates in the inland dales’ being 
‘fair, tall and stalwart’; ‘the Celtic in the West Riding’ being ‘shorter, 
swarthy… with a fondness for music,’ and ‘the Danish along the coast’ being 
‘bold, dark men’ who ‘cleave to a maritime life’.58  
Though it would be foolish to claim that Yorkshire did not see itself as 
English, Englishness in Yorkshire was certainly different from Englishness 
elsewhere – a fact recognised by contemporaries from the American Henry 
Adams to the ‘Railway King’ George Hudson.59 However, from the historian’s 
perspective, Yorkshire shared enough of the common English identity to 
make conclusions drawn there representative of other parts of the country. 
What matters, then, is whether Yorkshire is large, diverse and significant 
enough to provide a sufficiently wide cross-section of Victorian life to render 
any examination valid. 
 
  
                                                   
57 Robinson, Dialect of Leeds, xxiii. 
58 Cornhill Magazine, volume 9 (January 1864), p. 87. 
59 Hudson commented ‘he thanked God London is not England as Paris was France, but 
might he not rather say Whitby was England’: WG, 24 June 1865 p. 4. 
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Yorkshire in overview 
 
When selecting an area whose study can provide insights beyond purely local 
history, Yorkshire is as ideal a target as could be wished for. It was the largest 
county in Britain, over 3.8 million acres of land from the fells of the Pennines 
to the North Sea. Had a whimsical deity detached the county from England 
and nestled it into the coalescing German Confederation, its population alone 
(just over two million inhabitants in 1861) would have left it rivalling Saxony 
for the status of fourth largest state in the Confederation.  
Within Britain itself, Yorkshire ranked behind only Middlesex and 
Lancashire in terms of population: however, its political significance was far 
greater. Between the Elizabethan period and the extenuating circumstances 
of the Reform Act agitation, only Yorkshiremen by birth or long residence 
could hope to represent the county in Parliament.60 When they arrived in the 
Commons, they were the only provincial MPs to enjoy the privilege of 
designated seating, in an era where rank was closely bound with the rights of 
sitting.61 This pre-eminence was subsequently made more practical with the 
1826 award to Yorkshire of four representatives, more than any other county. 
Until 1861 Yorkshire enjoyed as many county members as its larger rivals 
Middlesex and Lancashire combined; between 1865 and the abolition of 
county constituencies in 1885, it had more than them. 
However, well before additional members institutionalised its 
importance, Yorkshire had developed a reputation for giving a lead to 
national politics in the same way as the Roman centuria praerogitava or the 
US state of Maine.62 Its size made electoral campaigns both logistically 
complex and prohibitively expensive, which meant that between 1742 and 
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Page 31 of 312 
 
1832, the county was only actively contested once.63 However, when a contest 
was held the verdict was unequivocal. The 1807 election was the biggest and 
most expensive election in British history ‘before the democratic era’, and 
viewed as an emphatic endorsement of abolition.64 Even uncontested 
elections for the county could be imbued with significance: the 1830 election 
of the leading reformer Henry Brougham (the first non-Yorkshireman to 
represent the county since the Reformation) and the return of four Whigs in 
the subsequent year were seen as putting the largest constituency in the 
country squarely on the side of reform.65 Though the constituency was later 
divided, this prestige was not lost: Lord John Russell called the 1859 West 
Riding election ‘a great, popular, English contest’.66 
This prestige stemmed not just from the county’s size, but from the 
influential and varied nature of its communities. Stretching from Sheffield in 
the south to what is now Teesside and parts of County Durham in the north, 
the extraordinary diversity of Yorkshire was reflected in its division into 
three sub-districts or Ridings. The West Riding was the heart of 
manufacturing in the county, with a central belt of woollen manufacturing 
towns including Leeds, Bradford, Huddersfield and Halifax; further south, 
beyond the mining towns of the South Yorkshire coalfield, was the steel city 
of Sheffield. The North and East Ridings were more rural, containing the 
agricultural districts of the North York Moors and the eastern Yorkshire 
Wolds, and fishing ports like Scarborough and Whitby along the coast of the 
North Sea. 
 However, there remains sufficient diversity within each area to make 
meaningful comparisons possible. The North and East Riding towns of 
Middlesbrough and Hull were as industrial as any in the West Riding. In the 
West Riding, meanwhile, the established civic centres of Leeds, Bradford and 
Sheffield adjoined burgeoning manufacturing towns like Keighley, Dewsbury, 
                                                   
63 Two 1830 contests were each called off after a single day of polling (Casey, ‘Yorkshire’), 
while the poll of 1807 ran between 20 May and 5 June (Wilson, Great Yorkshire Election, pp. 
212, 254). 
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66 House of Commons Debates, 3rd series 154, c.377, 10 June 1859. 
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and Barnsley, agitating to be recognised by enfranchisement, as well as 
smaller market towns like Pontefract and Wakefield, conscious that the 
industrial revolution was passing them by. Even the most developed towns 
retained a rural hinterland; for instance, when Titus Salt decided to found a 
model village outside Bradford’s smoke and squalor, he only had to travel 
three miles north to find a suitable site. When Disraeli sought a pretext to 
carve out Conservative constituencies from the Liberal West Riding, he found 
it in this diversity: 
In the West Riding we find a great territory seventy miles in length, 
which is purely agricultural. We find another great division studded 
with towns, none of them important enough, or having distinctive 
interests powerful enough to be represented, yet in their aggregate 
constituting a wonderful hive of industry and energy; and there is still 
another portion of the West Riding where there are blended and 
varied interests.67 
Indeed, it is striking how far Disraeli’s proposed constituencies resemble the 
1974 division of the county. His ‘great territory seventy miles in length,’ 
between Sedbergh and Selby, was annexed to the North Riding to form North 
Yorkshire or hived off to Cumbria; his ‘hive of industry’ became West 
Yorkshire; and his area of ‘blended and varied interests,’ where the country 
estates of the Fitzwilliams sat alongside the mining town of ‘black’ Barnsley 
and the notoriously democratic ironworking town of Sheffield was ‘encircled 
by ermine’, became South Yorkshire.68 
It is this range of diverse cohabiting communities, as much as its sense 
of a distinct communal regional identity or its political importance, which 
makes Yorkshire relevant for the historian. The diversity of Yorkshire 
provides an ideal opportunity to examine how the intellectual concepts which 
form the basis of the study differed from community to community and 
whether their reception was affected by occupational, social, political or 
                                                   
67 HC Debs 152, cc.999-1000, 28 February 1859. 
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religious factors.69 This offers a valuable supplement to existing 
historiography on these intellectual topics, many of which have been 





























Figure 1 (overleaf): the administrative geography of Yorkshire
                                                   
69 For an overview of one election, W.L. Guttsman, ‘The General Election of 1859 in the 
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The northernmost settlement of significance in Yorkshire was the town of 
Middlesbrough, which coal and iron had taken from 154 inhabitants in 1831 
to 19,416 in 1861, separated from York by forty miles of agricultural 
territory.96 This belt was more sparsely populated than the agricultural land 
of East Yorkshire, raising sheep and cattle rather than crops.97 It was studded 
with parliamentary boroughs like Malton, Northallerton, Thirsk, and 
Richmond, which were predominantly market towns with small quantities of 
industry. With the exception of Thirsk, all returned Liberals: not just due to 
Liberal inclinations among the local aristocrats, but also from the strength 
throughout the North Riding of a rural Liberalism rooted in Methodism and 
the ‘non-agricultural village’ founded on small-scale mining or 
manufacturing.98 
 Along the coast were a scattering of small ports: Whitby and 
Scarborough in the North Riding, Filey and Bridlington in the East. Poor 
inland communications left tourism in its infancy, and most of their income 
stemmed from serving the agricultural hinterland and traditional non-
trawling fishing.99 The exception was Scarborough, a Liberal two-member 
borough, where local newspapers already offered circulating libraries to 
accommodate visitors to ‘the Queen of Watering Places’ and where 
construction of the immense red brick Grand Hotel overlooking the sea dated 
from 1863.100  
Furthest south was the chief port in the county, Kingston-upon-Hull: 
until the 1820s, the key nexus for commodity flows from the woollen districts 
of the West Riding, travelling down the canal network and along the 
Humber.101 Despite the decline of that trade, the Humber continued to give 
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Hull vessels ready access both to the fishing of the North Sea and to the 
markets of Germany and the Baltic. Fortunes could still be made in the town: 
Zachariah Pearson, mayor of the town in the early 1860s, had worked his way 
up from cabin boy to shipping magnate.102 As well as oil seed crushing and 
tanning, the town had cotton mills, foundries and shipyards – though there 
was some resentment that the town was rarely awarded government 
shipbuilding contracts, which some ascribed to the town’s isolated position 
and lack of amenities.103 
Hull Liberals could feel particularly isolated at times, surrounded as 
they were by the fields of the Yorkshire Wolds and the Holderness and Hull 
Valley: ‘the corner where the old spirit of exclusiveness and intolerance still 
reigns.’104 There was, however, at least some innovation within the district, 
with the last remnants of pastoral farming on the Wolds dying out and new 
techniques being introduced such as the use of bones as fertiliser.105 The only 
other parliamentary borough in the East Riding was Beverley, returning two 
Conservative MPs, where the freeman franchise made bribery and riot 
commonplace.106 
 Further west was York, whose cathedral shared the dignity of ‘minster’ 
with Beverley and whose ancient franchises gave it an unusually high 
proportion of voters (one in every ten inhabitants at the 1865 election), 
though without Beverley’s public order issues.107 As the county town, shifting 
patterns of influence placed York in an awkward position: every 
administrative function devolved to the Ridings, from judicial functions to 
elections, decreased its importance. Unlike Hull, however, York remained a 
key rail junction on the main north-south route from London to Scotland. 
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Both York and Hull had two members, returning one Conservative and one 
Liberal each. 
 
Before examining the industrial heart of the West Riding, we should first 
acknowledge its rural northern area. This strongly resembled the North 
Riding, albeit more mountainous: predominantly pastoral and studded with 
market towns.108 These towns supported some industry – Skipton, for 
instance, possessed three cotton mills – but on a far smaller scale than 
further south.109 As well as settlements like Skipton and the growing spa 
town of Harrogate, it possessed two parliamentary boroughs: Ripon, where 
Lord de Grey and Ripon still played a significant role, returned two Liberals, 
whereas Knaresborough returned two Conservatives.110 
 Though some of the fleeces from the northern district made their way 
south into the woollen district of the West Riding, Yorkshire’s rise to 
manufacturing pre-eminence coincided with a move away from short English 
wool to longer overseas staples.111 The region had held functionally distinct 
specialist sub-areas since the middle of the eighteenth century.112 The middle 
Aire and Calder around Leeds, Bradford and Halifax represented the heart of 
broadcloth manufacture; Huddersfield produced narrow cloths, while 
villages towards the Lancashire border produced superfine broadcloths.113 
Other towns specialised as best they could: Dewsbury and its neighbour 
Batley ground up everything from stockings to carpets to form ‘mungo’ and 
‘shoddy’ which could then be recycled into ‘a low-priced useful substitute for 
more expensive cloth’.114 These specialisations contributed to distinctions in 
the nature of employment, as well as to the political diversity essential to this 
study. A more egalitarian set of relations between employers and workers 
prevailed to the west and south of Huddersfield, whereas Bradford and 
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Halifax resembled the paternalistic politics of Lancashire in larger factories 
operated by industrial dynasties like the Salts, Akroyds and Crossleys – all of 
whom would parlay economic power into political.115  
 The politics of this district were generally Liberal, though with local 
variations. The West Riding had been foremost in the campaign for Corn Law 
reform, with the constituency returning Richard Cobden in 1847 and 1852; 
however, it had also been the heartland of the ‘Tory Radical’ movement of the 
1830s.116 Leeds generally presented itself as the leader of the Liberal 
movement in the West Riding and more widely in Yorkshire, regardless of 
the resentment this occasionally caused.117 In the uncontested Yorkshire 
election of 1826, when the traditional aristocratic Whig member was joined 
for the first time by a representative of the towns, the chosen candidate was a 
Leeds manufacturer and his main sponsor was the editor of the Leeds 
Mercury.118 Political opponents accused the Leeds Liberals of being ‘the 
Lords and Masters of the county,’ but these pretensions were weakened 
somewhat by the way that the Conservatives were generally able to share the 
town’s representation and by the way that a campaign against state education 
could comprehensively split the Liberals.119 To the west, in Nonconformist 
and industrial Bradford – ‘Worstedopolis’ to Manchester’s ‘Cottonopolis’ – 
Conservatism was much less of an effective force, and the representation 
generally included one Radical and one moderate Liberal MP. Bradford had 
also been one of the most significant centres of Chartism, and special 
constables and drilling Chartists had come to blows in 1848.120 
 Though Leeds and Bradford were the most significant cities in this 
area, their neighbours were anything but historically irrelevant. Wakefield 
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enjoyed a certain amount of status as ‘in many civil matters, the capital of the 
West Riding,’ but resented having been overlooked as the site of the 
industrial development that was to become Saltaire.121 Its neighbour 
Dewsbury was a growing industrial town, looking confidently towards 
enfranchisement in the next reform bill – though not prepared to draw its 
boundaries too widely to achieve this.122 
 Further west, towards the Pennine border, lay Huddersfield. The 
town’s industrial development had significantly benefited the Ramsdens, of 
whom it was suggested that they owned the entire town with the exception of 
one house.123 Though this was untrue, and the single Liberal MP the borough 
enjoyed after 1832 remained more or less independent throughout the 
period, rents from the town were sufficient to justify Sir John Ramsden’s 
accession to the prestigious West Riding county seat in 1859. The town’s 
north-western neighbour Halifax, which had been the most significant 
manufacturing town in the North in the eighteenth century, was equally 
staunchly Liberal: Sir Charles Wood, perennial Whig cabinet member, had 
been one of the borough’s two members since 1832.124 Further west, in the 
liminal region of the Pennines, were scattered a variety of towns and villages 
– Saddleworth, Todmorden, Marsden, Delph, Ripponden, Hebden Bridge – 
often located along the canal routes to Lancashire. 
 
The most significant city of the southern West Riding was Sheffield, whose 
prosperity at this time was built on iron. The occupational structure of the 
cutlery trade – small workshops where ‘the artisans were one week masters, 
next week employees, the next self-employed’ – and the high proportion of 
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working-class voters strengthened the town’s radicalism.125 Like Bradford, 
Sheffield had been strongly Chartist; unlike Bradford, Sheffield’s Chartism 
lasted beyond 1848 through an alternative system of town government based 
on ward committees.126 Even mainstream politics was radical: the town’s 
MPs were the Utilitarian John Arthur Roebuck, and the Nonconformist 
George Hadfield. 
Outside Sheffield, however, the potential of radical politics was 
limited. Barnsley handloom weavers were staunch Chartists in the 1830s, but 
the expansion of mining did not compensate for the decline of the linen 
trade; in Doncaster, the works of the Great Northern Railway Company were 
driving urban expansion.127 Both towns were also unenfranchised, and the 
only parliamentary borough in the district outside Sheffield was the ancient 
market town of Pontefract. While one of its members, Richard Monkton 
Milnes had sat for the borough since 1837 despite crossing the floor to the 
Liberals over free trade, the other seat was taken by a succession of minor 
Whig candidates. Although the district may have disappointed the hopes of 
the most radical, it remained reliably Liberal: in the new Southern West 
Riding constituency after the 1865 election, the ‘true cerulean hue’ could be 




By the time that this thesis begins, therefore, the fundamental attributes that 
had made Yorkshire such a significant constituency when Milton, 
Wilberforce and Lascelles went to the polls in 1807 remained true. Still vast, 
despite improvements in internal communications; still diverse, but with 
much more industry by mid-century; still sharing a strong cultural heritage, 
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despite the increasing devolution of power and the changing landscape of 
local administration. However, the mechanisms by which Yorkshire 
interacted with the world had evolved dramatically since the voters of 1807 
had arrived in York in wagons and barges and the state of the poll was 
reported weekly in national newspapers.129 
 The biggest and most obvious change was the introduction of the 
railway. The boom of the 1840s left the county criss-crossed with tracks, 
though the industrial centres of the West Riding often had two or more 
unconnected stations belonging to competing companies, while the 
agricultural towns of the North and East Ridings were much more poorly 
served.130 Paradoxically, the effect of the railways was to strengthen both 
national and regional identity, enhancing the role of provincial cities as 
regional capitals and bringing the country hinterlands closer to the towns.131 
On the intellectual level, their obvious effect was to draw Yorkshire more 
closely into a national framework, with London and Manchester newspapers 
sold in Yorkshire towns. In 1868, on average, London controlled 47% of the 
Bradford daily paper market, with Manchester recording 15% and Yorkshire 
38% (plus almost all of the weekly paper market).132 However, the railways 
also had the effect of empowering Yorkshire’s own newspapers, by expanding 
the variety of news they could deliver to their audience. 
 The 1860s was in many respects the heyday of the provincial press, 
with their combined circulations far outstripping the metropolitan 
newspapers.133 Papers in minor towns like Dewsbury or Barnsley could sell 
three or four thousand copies, large towns like Halifax or Hull could offer 
between five and seven thousand sales, and Leeds and Sheffield could reach 
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twenty thousand copies or more.134 Furthermore, Stephen Koss’s case that 
local papers ‘tended increasingly to draw their directives [and] inspiration’ 
from the metropolis seems to be more true for later periods than this.135 
Some newspapers did buy part-printed sheets of national news and editorial 
comment from London, adding their own local news and advertisements. 
However, as the editor of the Barnsley Chronicle highlighted, it prevented 
Saturday papers from including ‘home and foreign news, to any great extent, 
of a later date than the previous Tuesday.’136 Most papers, therefore, selected 
material themselves from a range of newspapers, and did not do so entirely 
uncritically. 
An excellent example of this local independence is the Tadcaster Post, 
first published in April 1861 by Henry Crossley, proprietor of the Wetherby 
News and Knaresborough Times. Though he sourced a London 
correspondent’s letter, the number of other minor weeklies in which the 
same letter appeared suggests it came from an agency.137 The appearance of 
Tadcaster Post editorials in other newspapers suggests that Crossley also 
sourced these centrally.138 However, not every editorial appears in every 
paper, suggesting a degree of flexibility in the arrangement.139 By mid-1862, 
Crossley had broken this arrangement: his paper favoured non-intervention 
in the American Civil War, while editorials elsewhere backed mediation.140 
Yet Crossley did not wholly abandon his reliance on centrally produced 
                                                   
134 BC, 31 January 1863 p. 2 (3,000); DR, 17 January 1863 p. 7 (4,000); HxC, 29 December 
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137 TP, 11 April 1861 p. 2, Kentish Independent, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Luton Times, 13 April 1861 
p. 2, Louth and North Lincolnshire Advertiser, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Kentish Chronicle, 13 April 
1861 p. 2, Enniscorthy News, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Surrey Comet, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Chepstow 
Weekly Advertiser, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Leamington Advertiser, 11 April 1861 p. 5, Dublin 
Commercial Journal, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Walsall Free Press, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Buckingham 
Advertiser, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Bury Free Press, 13 April 1861 p. 2, Rosscommon Journal, 13 
April 1861 p. 2, Illustrated Berwick Journal, 13 April 1861 p. 2. 
138 TP, 19 September 1861 p. 4, PT, 14 September 1861 p. 1, Luton Times, 14 September 1861 
p. 4, Buckingham Advertiser, 21 September 1861 p. 4, Chepstow Weekly Advertiser, 14 
September 1861 p. 1, Illustrated Berwick Journal, 14 September 1861 p. 4.  
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140 Contrast TP, 24 July 1862 p. 4 with PT, 19 July 1862 p. 1; CP, 19 July 1862 p. 1 
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material, later sourcing at least two editorials from the same place as the 
Scarborough Mercury.141  
These central arrangements seem to have been a prerogative of the 
very smallest papers: the Craven Pioneer had a circulation of only 1,725, 
while the Whitby Gazette’s 2,600 weekly copies enabled it to print sporadic 
but original editorials.142 However, the practice of sourcing materials from a 
central provider may be seen as an indication of ambition, rather than a lack 
of it.143 Minor provincial sheets were determined to give their readers an 
experience to rival bigger newspapers, even if they lacked the resources to do 
this in-house. Where material was reprinted from central sources, we should 
perhaps see this as a dynamic culture of bricolage instead of the traditional 
interpretation of a hierarchical dissemination from metropolis to regions.144 
Nor were provincial editors focused solely on local news. Even before 
the creation of the Press Association, the Yorkshire Gazette was boasting of 
its arrangements with the Electric Telegraph Company, which allowed it to 
receive continental news ‘on terms of perfect equality with the London 
press’.145 Some more minor editors struggled – the Bradford Advertiser was 
forced to steal news reports from the local Mechanics’ Institute’s telegraph 
service – but even the isolated Whitby Gazette was able to arrange to receive 
the text of the Queen’s Speech.146 Like the railway, the telegram empowered 
local agents of information distribution, as much as it subjugated them to 
central and metropolitan organisations. 
 
Provincial newspaper culture was not exclusively dependent on the 
individual subscriber, but also on the institution of the reading room. These 
normally featured a range of national periodicals and a few local ones, 
selected in accordance with location and political persuasion. The Whitby 
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Institute, for instance, took the Manchester Examiner, Liberal York Herald 
and Conservative Yorkshire Gazette; the Whitby Conservative reading room 
took the Yorkshire Gazette and but also the Liberal Leeds Mercury, and both 
offered national periodicals like the Times, Illustrated London News, and 
Blackwood’s.147 
 For most towns, the main agency of intellectual diffusion was the 
mechanics’ institute. Previous studies have focused primarily on their role in 
adult education; however, the institutes also served as a locus for lecture 
tours and presentations.148 Philosophical societies served a similar function 
for the middle classes and upper classes, though the class boundaries should 
not be made too much of. On the one hand, ‘A lover of fair play for all classes’ 
urged the middle classes to patronise ‘the opportunities of improvement 
offered by the Literary and Scientific Society’ as readily as the operatives used 
their mechanics’ institute; on the other, W.J.S. Morritt MP complained that, 
not for the first time, the audience at the Barnard Castle Mechanics’ Institute 
was ‘well-dressed’ and not ‘the rough body of honest working men’ which he 
had expected.149 
 This thesis deals in large part with the dissemination of new 
intellectual concepts of race, and their reception in the provinces. As such, it 
is important to set these institutions in their proper context. Particularly in 
the smaller towns, they lacked the clout to attract prominent speakers. They 
were prone to rely either on the antiquarian interests of the local vicar, as 
when the incumbent Rev. J. Dunman lectured on ‘Our Saxon Fathers,’ or on 
self-improvement homilies, such as the ‘lecture on the evils arising from 
novel reading’ delivered by a member of the Leyburn Young Men’s Mutual 
Improvement Society.150 Larger towns might merit a meeting of the British 
Association, and their societies could attract more prominent speakers. For 
instance, the Leeds Literary and Philosophical Society received lectures on 
China and Japan from the British diplomats Sir Harry Parkes and Sir 
Rutherford Alcock respectively, and from du Chaillu on the division between 
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gorillas and man.151 However, these institutions were biased towards 
hegemonic metanarratives: they favoured the established and the prominent 
over the radical and new.  
Moreover, there seems to have been no great desire on the part of the 
metropolis to evangelise concepts of race, whether old or new. Try as they 
might to mirror the institutional foundations of intellectual life in London, by 
creating museums to house collections of artefacts and holding 
conversaziones at which the elites would gather, it remained impractical for 
provincial towns – particularly in the north – to replicate the kind of tight-
knit intellectual brotherhood that existed in the triangle between Oxford, 
Cambridge and London.152 Robert Knox’s anthropological tour of the 
provinces was a relatively isolated occurrence, and is probably better 
explained by his financial issues after an ill-judged association with Burke 
and Hare forced him from Edinburgh than by any desire to spread his 
doctrines. 
This fact is all the more surprising when we consider the earlier extra-
parliamentary campaigns of the anti-Corn Law League and the concerted 
efforts that metropolitan politicians like Bright made to speak in even 
relatively minor towns like Wakefield.153 What this suggests is that these 
areas had political power through their representation in Parliament, but 
lacked the intellectual significance that would have encouraged the 
intelligentsia to engage with them in the same way. Notably, the Social 
Science Association, which did tour the provinces, had at its heart the 
purpose of influencing the political debate.154 By contrast, newly-founded 
bodies like the Anthropological Society focused far more on procedural 
battles within the British Association than they did evangelising the wider 
public.155 
This reluctance to evangelise had two effects. On the one hand, it 
meant they held no provincial meetings which could spread these ideas both 
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153 WE, 24 November 1860 pp. 2-3. 
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directly to the audiences and indirectly through local newspaper reports; on 
the other, it meant that their periodicals and writings remained of niche 
interest.156 Not only did it limit their circulation, but they were not picked up 
and recirculated or discussed by local newspapers through the process of 
bricolage described earlier. The Anthropological Review, founded in 1863 as 
the journal of this new Anthropological Society, merited only a handful of 
mentions in Yorkshire newspapers over the course of the 1860s – mentions 
which were evidently taken at second hand from other newspapers.157 By 
contrast, periodicals like Cornhill Magazine or Blackwood’s were sold 
directly to the Yorkshire public or purchased by reading rooms, as well as 
excerpted and reprinted by Yorkshire newspapers.158 Similarly, political 
thinkers like John Stuart Mill could enjoy much greater national prominence 
than could the anthropologists because there was a greater appetite for 
engagement with his views. Given that the Fortnightly Review recorded a 
circulation of 1,400 in 1867 – less than the Craven Pioneer – it is clear how 
important this recirculation of ideas through reprinting and word of mouth 
must have been in enabling them to spread.159 
Indeed, the question of intellectual geography in this period needs to 
be considered with nuance. The eagerness with which new political or 
economic ideas were propagated throughout the country, received, discussed 
and evaluated is in stark contrast with the slowness with which new ideas 
about race were communicated. Though the historian can understand how 
concepts of race underlay many of these political ideas, this connection was 
less evident to contemporaries. When noting the evolution of new ideas, we 
should also be aware that the mechanisms by which they could be diffused 
were not equally rapid. 
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During this period, intellectual evangelism had much less significance 
for contemporary views of race than did popular cultural presentations of 
racialized forms. The exact nature and effect of these depictions, from 
minstrel shows to anti-slavery lectures, will be considered in chapter six. 
However, at this stage it is important to note that these were by far the most 
accessible forms of discourse on race in the period, and that they were largely 
disconnected from the intellectual arguments. They either drew from 
religious and moralistic concepts in the case of anti-slavery, or more crude 
burlesques in the case of minstrelsy. In other circumstances, where popular 
representations of any form were rare – for instance, images of the Maori of 
New Zealand – older, more traditional interpretations had a lengthy half-life. 
As such, we should not be surprised if racial ideas that were current in 
London or in high intellectual life were overlooked, dismissed or even 
mocked in the provinces. However, we should not dismiss provincial opinion 
as backward solely because they differed from London. Though these regions 
might have lacked intellectual weight, they did have political power. 
Furthermore, they form a better representation of what might be termed 
‘broader public opinion’ on a particular topic than the views of elites, whether 
leading academics, national newspapers or members of Parliament. Though 
official attitudes might be shaped by the views current in London, history is 
not solely about those in power. When asked to vote on great national issues 
– as they were when Palmerston appealed to the country in 1857 – it was 
these regional approaches which shaped the ultimate response. 
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Chapter 2: India and China, 1857-9 
 
This chapter deals with a series of key turning points in conceptions of the 
political and the racial nation. These turning points are manifested through a 
series of significant events, the first of these being the election of 1857. 
Defeated in the House of Commons by a disparate coalition of Conservatives 
and Radical Liberals over a brushfire war in China, Palmerston appealed to 
the country to support his administration. A sweeping victory followed, in 
which his parliamentary opponents were defeated: in the West Riding, 
Richard Cobden was forced to abandon his prestigious county seat before 
crashing to electoral defeat in the contest for the borough of Huddersfield. 
Palmerston returned to Parliament, as the Morning Post put it, 'as the leader 
of the English people, and as the great designer and administrator of a 
national party.'1 
 In early historiography – and subsequent biographies of Palmerston – 
this election marks a turning point. Domestically, this is purportedly the first 
truly ‘national’ election in Britain: fought on a single issue to vindicate a 
particular leader, rather than the patchwork of local contests previously 
seen.2 Globally, it marked an increasing willingness to interfere violently in 
the affairs of other, ‘uncivilised’ nations for the purpose of expanding British 
trade – a nationally popular policy, as the election results showed, or to 
which the opposition was ‘muted’ without halting expansion.3  
Other historians, however, have been less enthusiastic about the 
election’s significance, claiming the transition between the primitive localised 
political system and a national one was only partially complete.4 After all, the 
addresses issued by candidates focused on their local links as often as far-
flung Canton.5 Furthermore, even if candidates endorsed Palmerston, how 
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far was an endorsement of Palmerston an endorsement of aggression 
towards China? 
 The second key event swiftly followed the election: the Indian 
rebellion of 1857. Attitudes towards Indian governance had veered between 
Orientalist support for despotic government, and a reforming Anglicism 
which diagnosed ‘backwardness’ in Indian civilisation and manifested a 
hopeful expectation that this would gradually decline as European norms 
were exported to Indian society.6 However, the conventional interpretation 
suggests British attitudes towards India fundamentally shifted as a result of 
the rebellion.7 The rebellion, caused by the rejection of modernity (in the 
form of newly-introduced Enfield rifles) due to religious objections among 
Indian troops, was characterised by an outpouring of physical and sexual 
violence towards British expatriates. Lavishly reported in the press, and a 
perennial feature of Victorian literature, these events persuaded the British 
that Indians were incapable of ‘progressing’ and inherently barbaric, and that 
attempts to slowly reform India were doomed to failure.8 As a result, all that 
could be done was to work with and reinforce existing class hierarchies and 
religious and racial divisions, instead of gradually eroding them.  
Peter Mandler has contradicted some of these suggestions, arguing 
that civilizational perspectives were more tenacious than has normally been 
allowed.9 These perspectives saw humanity as ‘linked by the rungs of a ladder 
rather than separated by the branches of a tree,’ thereby offering the 
possibility of progression – even for the societies of India and China.10 
Perhaps more importantly, however, most studies have addressed the ‘official 
mind,’ national newspapers, or popular literature. In light of the already-
                                                   
6 David Anthony Washbrook, ‘India 1818-1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism’, in Andrew N. 
Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 3: The Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 404-6, 415-6. 
7 Hall, Civilising Subjects, pp. 11-12; Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience 
from 1765 to the Present (London, 1996), p. 66; Jill C. Bender, ‘Fears of 1857: The British 
Empire in the Wake of the Indian Rebellion’ (unpub. PhD thesis, Boston College, 2011), pp. 
146-7. 
8 Gautam Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 3-4; Alison Blunt, ‘Embodying War: British Women and Domestic Defilement in the 
Indian “Mutiny”, 1857-8’, Journal of Historical Geography vol. 26, no. 3 (2000), p. 422. 
9 Peter Mandler, The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund 
Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven, 2006), p. 72. 
10 Ibid., p. 60. 
Page 50 of 312 
 
highlighted difficulty in disseminating concepts of race, how far are these 
national and metropolitan conclusions borne out at the regional level? 
 
The 1857 election: the militarism of free trade? 
 
Contrary to the traditional view that MPs who voted against Palmerston were 
isolated, editorial opinion across the county emphasised that the 
bombardment of Canton was wrong, and the vote of no confidence vindicated 
Parliament’s honour. There is very little variation in this opinion, despite 
differing political affiliations. The mainstream Liberal Leeds Mercury 
complaint of ‘criminal blundering’ by ‘ambitious and meddlesome officials in 
China’ harmonised well with the advanced Liberal Leeds Times’ conclusion 
that hostilities were ‘impolitic’ and ‘rash’, and the Conservative Leeds 
Intelligencer’s proclamation that Palmerston was ‘guilty of wrong,’ adopting 
a course ‘erroneous in itself and degrading to the British nation’.11 
 In some cases, there was variation in the intensity of denunciation but 
not the overall conclusion. In Wakefield, for instance, the Liberal Express 
lambasted ‘outrageous and truculent doings’ by men on the ground but the 
Conservative Journal restricted itself to calling Cobden’s view ‘perfectly 
correct… both in law and equity.’12 In Hull, the Conservative Packet and 
Liberal Advertiser were forthright in their endorsement of the vote against 
Palmerston: although the Liberal Eastern Counties Herald admitted that 
‘this Chinese question is a difficult one,’ it still agreed with its neighbours.13 
The balance of editorial opinion, then, was firmly against Palmerston’s 
government when the vote was carried. 
 The Government did find some supporters among Yorkshire 
newspapers, all of them Liberal. Three came from South Yorkshire – 
Sheffield, Doncaster, and Barnsley – and two from agricultural north and 
central Yorkshire (Richmond and York). At first glance, this does not point to 
any great groundswell of opinion in the commercial towns and cities of the 
county in favour of opening the Chinese market, which in turn downplays the 
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economic motivations which have traditionally explained British intervention 
in China. However, local peculiarities may explain this. Yorkshire was a wool 
county, which made China a weaker target for expansion than with 
alternative textiles like cotton. Though it claimed precedence as the third 
port of the kingdom, Hull was tied into the Baltic trade and was unlikely to 
benefit from Chinese commerce as would Liverpool, London or Bristol. On 
the other hand, Sheffield certainly hoped to replace domestic manufactures 
with its own goods: a collection of Chinese tools exhibited at the School of Art 
promoted the comment that ‘unless the celestials are inconceivably stupid’ 
they would be better buying British.14 
Counteracting this logic are the actual arguments used in favour of the 
bombardment. The Sheffield Independent, for instance, argued that the 
situation was ‘very trying’ and merited ‘a candid if not a lenient judgement’.15 
The Doncaster Gazette similarly justified support for ‘servants of the 
country… doing their duty under circumstances of great difficulty,’ while the 
Barnsley Times rather baldly stated that ‘we were clearly in the right’.16 
Taking a broader view of the dispute, the York Herald argued for the 
importance of national honour as a deterrent to conflict, while the Richmond 
and Ripon Chronicle saw the dispute as resulting from ‘inherent opposition 
of free principles with isolated barbarity’: Britain was attempting, consciously 
or not, ‘to free the myriads of China from a thraldom which has crushed them 
into imbecility’.17 While Britain itself might well benefit from the growth of 
trade with China, it was neither an overt nor a significant argument used to 
mobilise support behind Palmerston. 
That most newspapers concurred that the government’s defeat was 
fair is interesting in light of the longer-term trends towards imperialist 
interventionism, as well as the immediate results of the election. It is 
certainly possible that the spread of opinion represents a combination of 
principled Liberal non-interventionism and a Conservative search for 
political advantage, by decrying an act with which they secretly sympathised. 
Alternatively, both MPs and newspapers thoroughly misjudged the public 
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mood. If so, we might well expect a considerable amount of back-pedalling 
over the course of the campaign, resulting from contact with the electorate. 
 
Certainly, Conservative candidates were far more prepared to endorse 
Palmerston’s actions than were Conservative newspapers. Robert Hall in 
Leeds did not consider Bowring’s conduct ‘strictly justifiable, but they could 
not deal with a semi-barbarous people as with a civilised people… at the 
present moment, the war in China was a necessary and inevitable war. 
(Applause).’18 He later endorsed the war as protecting British life, property, 
commerce, and because ‘the honour of the British flag has to be vindicated 
(cheers).’19 In Wakefield, John Charlesworth refused to ‘allow the honour and 
dignity of our common country to be sullied, or permit our national flag to be 
wantonly insulted and outraged (hear).’20 Colonel Smyth in York complained 
of the Chinese ‘intention to insult the British flag’ and said of his support of 
Palmerston that ‘He had never given a more conscientious vote in his life. 
(Cheers)’.21 
However, these endorsements were not endorsements of an aggressive 
policy in China. Instead – like the Liberal York Herald – Conservative 
candidates focused on the need to maintain honour, protect British standing, 
and refuse to accept insults, rather than risk escalation through weakness. 
Indeed, it is suggestive how often the word ‘honour’ appears in Conservative 
election addresses at this point: proportionally, almost twice as frequently as 
in Conservative addresses from 1859 and 1865 and Liberal addresses from all 
three elections.22 ‘Support,’ too, appears unusually frequently in Conservative 
addresses of 1857. Though only a small proportion of the instances of 
‘honour’ (three of twenty two) and ‘support’ (three of twenty four) relate 
directly to the Chinese question, their disproportionate frequency at least 
suggests that these ideas were on the minds of the men writing the addresses. 
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Figure 1: Words used in Conservative addresses at the 1857 election, sized by 
frequency. 
 
Honour in itself did not imply an endorsement of an aggressive policy in 
China, or even necessarily an acceptance of Hall’s distinction between 
‘civilised’ and ‘semi-barbarous’ states. Only a few years later, the Trent Affair 
(in which the United States boarded a British ship) would demonstrate 
British readiness to prepare for war as a result of an insult from even the 
most ‘civilised’ of its neighbours. This defence of honour was certainly an act 
of cultural imperialism, in that it enforced a standard international code of 
behaviour through the threat of violence. However, although Conservative 
MPs were more welcoming of Palmerston’s approach than were Conservative 
newspapers, they certainly did not propose that Britain adopt any imperial 
responsibilities in China. 
On the other side of the debate, Liberal addresses did feature concepts 
related to the topic at hand – ‘honour,’ ‘Canton’ or ‘China’, ‘Lord’ and 
‘Palmerston’ – but in a relatively limited fashion, given the extent to which 
the historiography of the election has focused on them. Though they are 
certainly prominent enough to justify the opinion of some contemporaries 
that the election was particularly focused, the prominence of ‘independent’ – 
much rarer in Conservative addresses – shows that, as historians like Angus 
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Hawkins and Miles Taylor argue, traditional electoral culture still held a 
more significant place than did these national issues.
 
Figure 2: Words used in Liberal addresses at the 1857 election, sized by 
frequency. 
 
The relative unimportance of the Chinese question at this election is 
perhaps unsurprising given the vehemence and frequency with which most 
commentators denounced it as even the potential subject of an election. The 
Conservative Doncaster Chronicle protested that ‘it is not a desirable thing 
that a new parliament should be… elected on a narrow issue,’ and joyfully 
reported that the electorate ‘rejected the false issue they were so artfully 
invoked to try… [choosing] members either by broad distinctions of political 
opinions or by mere personal considerations’.23 There was a certain amount 
of logic to the argument that the new Parliament would ‘have to deal with 
every variety of questions touching the honour and welfare of the country in 
its domestic and foreign relations.’24 However, it was also almost 
undoubtedly founded in the fact that so many editors had opposed 
Palmerston on the issue underlying the dissolution. 
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Faced with the prospect of the Conservatives taking electoral 
advantage, Liberal newspapers rallied round traditional Liberal themes 
rather than Palmerston himself. Of the county’s three most prominent 
newspapers, two had opposed Palmerston. Now the Leeds Mercury urged 
‘Liberal electors’ to ‘ask themselves whether upon the whole Lord Palmerston 
or Lord Derby is the Minister of progress and reform’, while the Bradford 
Observer begged the voters not to let ‘the natural development of a liberal 
policy in England be checked because an impolitic and inhuman act has been 
perpetrated at Canton’.25  
Of course, suggesting that Canton could not possibly be the issue of 
the campaign also gave editors the scope to explain how the real issue was 
their own personal cause celebre. The Halifax Guardian consigned China ‘to 
the tomb of the election Capulets,’ deciding that ‘The Education Question is 
the great question of the present day.’26 The Yorkshire Gazette meanwhile, 
decided that ‘the advocacy of sound Protestant Principles will be the test 
imposed,’ though it did not include this factor in the ‘other more important 
questions [which] have presented themselves’ when the results had come 
in.27 However, it was reform which most editors fixed on, and even those who 
had supported Palmerston voiced their expectations. The Doncaster Gazette 
praised the new ‘generally more patriotic’ House but still expected ‘wise 
measures of reform’ from Parliament, while the Barnsley Times concluded 
that ‘there need no longer be any excuse for delaying liberal measures’.28 
  Similarly, those MPs who supported Palmerston hedged round their 
support with caveats. In Hull, James Clay praised Palmerston for taking 
‘charge of the vessel of the state (cheers)’ ‘when the winds were fiercest,’ but 
followed this by refusing to commit ‘to an indiscriminate and blind support 
of Lord Palmerston or Lord anybody else. (Cheers)’29 On the hustings, he 
even proclaimed his readiness to abandon Palmerston – ‘unusually backward 
in… the most valuable part of a Radical’s creed’ – for Lord John Russell.30 In 
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York, Joshua Westhead made a similar announcement.31 The 1857 election 
may have been associated with Lord Palmerston to a greater extent than 
most previous contests: however, Palmerston’s electoral allure was 
insufficient to entice most candidates to abandon their status as an 
independent local member. 
 This applied also to ‘Palmerstonian’ candidates. Few Liberal 
challengers, as opposed to those already holding seats, made much use of 
Palmerston or China as an electoral asset: most ‘Palmerstonians’, therefore, 
were Conservatives taking the opportunity to fly under vaguely Liberal 
colours.32 In Halifax, Major Edwards announced his support ‘both on general 
questions and on the recent motion by Mr Cobden, of the policy pursued by 
Lord Palmerston’s government’ and distanced himself from Disraeli and 
Derby.33 William Overend did much the same in Sheffield, though neither 
was successful. The Chinese war seems to have been little more of an 
electoral asset for these candidates than was Palmerston more generally, 
though Overend was supported by some relatively crude appeals to reject 
those ‘who would lick the dust from the feet of the Chinese commissioner 
Yeh’.34 When it came to the Halifax hustings, however, Edwards thought 
China had been ‘so much discussed… it would be a wasting of your time to 
entertain it.’35 
 These ‘Palmerstonian’ candidates were less successful than their 
conventional rivals in campaigning on their local connections or personal 
merit. The Sheffield Times, for instance, backed Overend as ‘a man of 
education, travel, experience and ability,’ but also found it necessary to urge 
the voters to ‘unite in the general sentiment of the country, and aid in 
supporting Lord Palmerston by electing Mr Overend’.36 They also struggled 
to reconcile their support for Palmerston with their professions of 
independence. Overend’s profession that ‘Lord Palmerston is the statesman I 
have selected as most nearly representing my views’ was a relatively weak 
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appeal, but the more emphatic statement ‘I stand before you a 
“Palmerstonian”’ was instantly weakened by the vital but contradictory 
profession ‘I won’t be dragged through the dirt by Lord Palmerston or any 
other Lord’.37 
 It is no surprise that the most successful ‘Palmerstonian’ candidate, 
Edward Akroyd, who defeated Cobden at Huddersfield, was also the most 
conventional. Cobden acknowledged that ‘the public will consider that in my 
election at Huddersfield you will have been passing judgment on this 
question,’ and a Huddersfield Liberal reported that, though Cobden 
‘considers his position impregnable… if he could only have an opportunity of 
meeting the electors and stating his case,’ ‘I fear the war question would 
make his prospect of success somewhat doubtful’.38 However, China was only 
one aspect of Akroyd’s appeal: in fact, he accused Cobden of being the one 
who ‘staked the issue of the election on the question of China,’ which 
‘distracted… from other matters more directly affecting the welfare of the 
people at large’.39 He spoke at length about his support for the Liberal causes 
of franchise extension, the permissive ballot and retrenchment, and his prior 
involvement with the anti-Corn Law League.40 Indeed, Akroyd mobilised 
Yorkshire identity against Cobden and his supporters as often as he did 
English national identity: 
Now, gentlemen, I ask you, are you disposed to place your confidence 
– (Cries of “Cobden,” “Akroyd,” and disorder) – Was that man that 
called “Cobden” a Yorkshireman? I don’t believe it. (Applause). Was 
he an Englishman? I don’t believe it. – (A voice- Send him to China) I 
know my country-men are Englishmen, and are not such as to put 
their trust in a man who, at a time of national war, was so dead to all 
sense of honour, that he was disposed to strike the Union Jack to the 
Russians. (Loud cheers, and a Voice- Cobden). I think you come from 
Manchester – go back as quick as you can. (Laughter)41 
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Rather than linking himself directly to Palmerston, Akroyd used the familiar 
formula of claiming ‘the right to use [his] independent judgement’ in 
supporting Palmerston: this was not a mere rhetorical device given that, less 
than a year after his election, he helped to bring down the government over 
the Conspiracy to Murder bill.42 He also campaigned on the familiar theme of 
redeeming the independence of the borough, a theme that was so popular at 
this particular election that both candidates used it.43  
Many factors contributed to Cobden’s defeat, but clearly it was secured 
as much through traditional themes of local politics as through national 
issues or the question of imperialism. While Cobden abandoned his West 
Riding county seat in favour of the Huddersfield borough, the former 
Huddersfield member Lord Goderich transferred to the Riding. Though both 
had voted against the government, Goderich had the local links and history of 
previous service which Cobden lacked. Local magnate Thomas Pearson 
Crosland announced that a private meeting of influential borough activists 
‘thought his general votes so good that it would be ungrateful and unthankful 
to oppose him because he had done wrong once’, despite Goderich’s ‘weak’ 
and ‘unmeaning vote,’ and his ‘coquetting between the Riding and 
Huddersfield’.44 Faced with Cobden as candidate, however, Crosland chaired 
the committee that helped Akroyd to victory. 
Moreover, the dispute over policy towards China was easily isolated. 
In practice, just as the government had felt bound to support Bowring and 
Seymour, Yorkshire was not disposed to see Britain lose an already-declared 
war to the Chinese. The Leeds Intelligencer, for instance, went from calling 
the war ‘erroneous’ and ‘degrading’ to arguing that ‘we have no course left 
but to prosecute the war until the Chinese are compelled to yield, and grant 
our just demands.’45 Had this been a phenomenon limited to Conservative 
newspapers, or to this election, we might have concluded that this was 
political rather than ideological. However, the importance of honour was 
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more than just a rallying-cry: the Barnsley Chronicle, for instance, felt that 
the war in China was a stain on the country’s Christian reputation but 
supported its continuance because national prestige was at stake.46 In the 
relatively simple and polarised world which the British understood, honour 
counted.  
In the light of these two significant factors, the idea that 1857 marked 
a wholehearted endorsement of aggressive war to force open unwilling 
markets must be revised. Firstly, as Angus Hawkins suggests, the result was 
driven more by traditional themes of local politics or standard party rallying 
cries than a specifically Palmerstonian and imperialist campaign. Secondly, 
the war in China was supported for traditional reasons: to defend British 
prestige and honour.47 Just as the China merchants lacked metropolitan 
influence, they also failed to win sympathy outside the capital.48 
 
Beyond this relatively narrow question of whether British honour should be 
protected, views on how aggressively Britain could legitimately treat 
isolationist Asian nations were varied. There was certainly a large swathe of 
opinion which considered British actions against China and Japan ‘uncalled 
for,’ ‘cruelty’, ‘disgraceful alike to our policy and our arms,’ ‘of the most 
reprehensible description,’ and ‘equally unjustifiable’.49 However, even those 
who supported conflict did so with the justification that it would cause less 
bloodshed over the longer term. ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ was not to be a never-
ending system, a source of cheap victories and loot for Britain, but a means of 
establishing and normalising peaceful relations between culturally distinct 
powers. In Japan, the Yorkshire Gazette hoped to ‘inspire the natives with a 
salutary fear of our power, and prevent the recurrence of such untoward 
catastrophes’; in China, it was the ‘Chinese court’ or the ‘corrupt, arrogant, 
                                                   
46 BC, 10 November 1860 p. 4, 1 December 1860 p. 4. 
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besotted Mandarins’ who needed ‘a respectful opinion of British might’ 
delivered ‘with hard blows, not words’.50  
 There is a danger, however, that we conflate the willingness to use 
force against neighbours with contempt for their societies. The British did 
look down on China and Japan, just as they looked down on every other 
country from the United States to Russia. However, attitudes were not 
universally contemptuous: the Japanese attracted more praise, with Sir 
Rutherford Alcock criticising their ‘Asiatic immobility’ but complimenting 
their possession of ‘something of the same energy and industry of character… 
[as] the English people’.51 The Yorkshire Gazette even went so far as to 
describe them as ‘a people highly civilised and of great intelligence and 
pride’, and ‘brave and intelligent’.52  
Attitudes towards the Chinese were less positive, but varied with 
circumstances. Moreover, they were acknowledged to have the same 
fundamental political impulses as other civilisations. The Sheffield Times 
denounced the Chinese in March 1857 as ‘barbarians’ using ‘hieroglyphs… 
like the ancient Assyrians… the most ignorant heathens’ with ‘no regard 
whatever for human life,’ lacking ‘sense of decency or cleanliness’.53 By 
December 1860, it was prepared to argue for the overthrow of the Manchu as 
there was no ‘material difference’ between the Taiping rebellion and the 
Italians, both ‘seeking independence and liberty under native rule’.54 Sir 
Harry Parkes, speaking on China at the Leeds Literary and Philosophical 
Society, concluded that commerce would create a middle class, and ‘the 
feeling which now was seen bursting forth in insurrection might some time or 
other find vent in popular institutions.’55 Before this could happen, however, 
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The Great Indian Rebellion 
 
The rebellion of 1857 is conventionally seen as a turning point in British 
attitudes towards India. It marked the point at which the hopeful ambition 
that Britain could Christianise and civilise India ended, and the emphasis 
passed to non-interventionism in domestic affairs.56 The outpouring of 
violence, which was memorialised in fiction and repeated endlessly through 
the rest of the century, showed that Indians were fundamentally different to 
the British, and proved that European norms could not be implanted in 
India.57 The negative characteristics displayed in the rebellion, such as 
untrustworthiness, bloodthirstiness, and credulous heathenism and idolatry, 
were inherent rather than learned, the British concluded. 
However, we should firmly distinguish between the official reaction 
and the resulting policies, and the popular reaction. Colonial governors were 
recruited from social elites, spent most of their time outside Britain, and 
normally enjoyed considerable latitude from a distant and preoccupied 
government to shape policy on the ground. If the Mutiny challenged opinions 
among the elites who staffed colonial governments, the adoption of new 
policies could mask a wider survival of the civilizational model. 
 Certainly in Yorkshire, there was a recognition that the Indian 
rebellion stemmed from causes other than the racial. Though the Leeds 
Times called ‘Oriental races’ ‘obstinately conservative in their way of 
thinking, and… subject to uncontrollable fits of fanatical frenzy,’ it also 
acknowledged ‘a state of chronic discontent and lax discipline which had long 
existed among the Bengal Sepoys.’58 The Wakefield Express determined that 
the massacre of ‘every European the rebels could find’ showed ‘the deep-
seated animosity against the English as a race… not the revenge of a soldiery 
infuriated against their commanders’.59 However, it later decided that the 
‘deep-seated dislike to Europeans’ came about because ‘aristocratic 
regimental officers refused to associate with the native officers’, and 
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concluded that ‘Both sepoy and Subahdar came to look with contempt upon 
the raw, effeminate, and debauched European youths who were nominally 
their officers.’60 Indeed, this kind of comment mirrored tropes about the poor 
quality of British officers, and the way they had misled British troops in the 
Crimea. 
Though not all would have gone as far as the Wakefield Express in 
condemning army officers, the East India Company’s misgovernment of 
India was universally accepted.61 Even those papers which recognised wider 
discontent among the Indian population ascribed it to the Company’s 
failings. The York Herald argued that the ‘dreadfully defective’ system 
treated soldiers with ‘insolent contempt,’ but that ‘the native population are 
far from being satisfied’ either, while the Yorkshire Gazette blamed ‘a 
permanent system of misrule’ for bringing ‘our Indian fellow-citizens to the 
highest pitch of indignation’.62 It was, after all, much easier for popular 
domestic opinion to acknowledge problems in Indian government than it was 
for officials in India, intrinsically bound up with that system, or even for the 
members of British governments who had helped to uphold it. 
Moreover, reforming antiquated institutions was a popular theme 
along the political spectrum. Pseudonymous Radicals like ‘the Stranger’ 
could rail against the way ‘a lot of gentlemen’ obtained ‘fabulous salaries’ 
under ‘a most rotten and depraved system of government’ funded by Indian 
taxpayers.63 However, even Conservatives like the North Riding MP Colonel 
Octavius Duncombe could endorse reform of the ‘perfect anomaly’ that was 
the East India Company to show their openness to liberalism, safe in the 
knowledge that it would not reflect on the more critical areas of church, 
crown or constitution.64  
It has been suggested that responses to the revolt were divided on 
partisan grounds, with Conservatives blaming the ‘liberal civilising mission’ 
                                                   
60 WE, 18 July 1857 p. 4, 1 August 1857 p. 4. 
61 Elaine Kathleen Musgrave, ‘Shadows of Mutiny: Englishness, Masculinity, and the 1857 
Indian Uprising in the Victorian Imagination’ (unpub. PhD thesis, University of California, 
2006), p. 21. 
62 YH, 1 August 1857 p. 7; YG, 29 August 1857 p. 8. 
63 BO, 8 October 1857 p. 8, 15 October 1857; see also the comments of Thomas Moore, SM, 4 
July 1857 p. 4. 
64 YH, 14 November 1857 p. 8. 
Page 63 of 312 
 
for causing the rebellion.65 At the level of national policy there may be some 
truth to this, but more popular approaches showed a greater degree of 
homogeneity. The most commonly identified flaw was that the Company had 
failed to go far enough in reforming India: more should have been done to 
reduce distinctions of caste and to spread Christianity. More importantly, 
this analysis tended to focus attention on British inaction rather than on the 
implied ‘failings’ of the Indian populace.  
This focus was strengthened by the calling of a Day of Humiliation on 
7 October 1857, whose entire purpose was to beg God’s mercy for Britain’s 
national sins.66 The emphasis on divine agency, with the Indians as an 
instrument of retribution, necessarily reduced the extent to which Indians 
themselves could be blamed for the outbreak. Of course, it was still possible 
to couple divine intervention with criticism of Indians, and it would be 
dangerous to assume that the sole view of the situation was a Christian one. 
Nevertheless, the decline of Days of Humiliation later in the century 
coincides with, even if it does not correlate to, an increased racialized focus 
on the inability of India to adopt Western cultural norms. 
 Though mainstream opinion in Yorkshire acknowledged failings on 
both sides, there was also a section of the public which saw the Rebellion as 
stemming primarily or exclusively from British perfidy. This was particularly 
strong in Yorkshire, thanks in large part to General Thomas Perronet 
Thompson, member for Bradford. Whatever obligation Thompson felt to the 
Indian authorities had presumably been discharged when they sacked him 
for mishandling an expedition against Arabian pirates. Now, he argued that 
the British had broken faith with Indian troops by ‘filling the mouths of the 
soldiers with hog’s lard’ and compared it to forcing the Life Guards to 
trample on the cross.67 This went too far for many newspapers, with the 
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Leeds Intelligencer in particular dubbing him an ‘Anglo-Sepoy.’68 However, 
his sympathy seems to have been shared in his native Hull, where the 
Advertiser protested that ‘not a word is said about the greased cartridges’, 
and thought the ‘wide-spread belief among the Orientals’ that the Company 
wished to ‘compel them to become Christians’ was not ‘unwarranted by 
recent events’: ‘had the religious prejudices of the Sepoys been respected no 
rising would have taken place.’69 Even the Conservative Hull Packet was 
prepared to have an open mind, suggesting ‘there must have been some wide-
spread and almost intolerable grievance, the redress of which seemed 
hopeless, ere such noble regiments as the 16th Grenadiers and the 26th Light 
Infantry would have mutinied’.70 
 Even when failings on the part of the Indian population were 
recognised, they were not understood in racial terms. Instead, they stemmed 
from the civilizational perspective, and particularly from Indian religion. In 
part, this resulted from the Christian lens through which the conflict was 
viewed. The majority of speakers on the topic, and particularly those with 
direct experience of India itself, were missionaries or Churchmen. Reverend 
Canon Trevor considered the events ‘a fearful specimen of the manner in 
which the heathen rage’, while Reverend William Keane, formerly canon of St 
Paul’s Cathedral in Calcutta, considered ‘these accursed abominations… the 
legitimate fruits of heathenism’.71 This was not the result of race as we now 
understand it, of a genetic or heritable component, but simply the result of 
culture. This mirrored earlier narratives about Jewish emancipation: that 
existing cultural differences, stark as they might be, did not override the 
more fundamental equality between all of mankind.72 
That this was the case is shown in two ways. Firstly, the praise for 
Indian converts showed how quickly individual character could be changed: 
while ‘English Christians, coward-like, forsook their master… not one of the 
native teachers played the coward’; ‘where the Bible had been circulated in 
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the South there had been no mutiny’; and without ‘the natives at our 
missionary stations… scarcely one European would have been left’.73 In 
Travancore, it was explained, Christianity tended ‘to civilise their previous 
wild character’, and almost immediately sparked ‘an intense desire for 
knowledge’.74 This belied assertions that the Indian tiger ‘cannot be tamed’.75 
Secondly, Christian ministers repeatedly explained that without the 
Gospel Britain would be no different to India. Reverend W.H. Perkins 
remarked that ‘The Hindoos were a highly cultivated and a civilised people, 
when the inhabitants of this our island were yet worshipping at Stonehenge’: 
the Rebellion was ‘the issue of a long-continued civilisation, when 
unaccompanied by the light of the Gospel’.76 Meanwhile, in ‘a lecture in aid of 
the wives and children of the soldiers serving in India’ the Hon. and Rev. 
Frank Sugden lectured on ‘the early period of British history’: in it, he 
explained how ‘the inhabitants were in a state of barbarity’ before ‘the 
blessings of civilisation, and the benignant influence of religion and 
Christianity’ arrived.77 
Generally, newspapers followed this stance. The Sheffield Times 
pronounced that ‘until Christianity is introduced amongst a people, you 
cannot elevate them in the scale of civilisation’.78 The Richmond and Ripon 
Chronicle ascribed British superiority to the ‘national religion,’ adding that 
‘time and opportunity will continually lessen’ ‘the marked inferiority of some 
races to others’.79 As might be expected, some newspapers were hazier than 
preachers on the exact derivation of the flaws in the ‘character’ of the 
‘Asiatic’. While the Hull Packet critiqued ‘the fiendish nature of the Eastern 
character’ and its ‘character for cruelty and deceit’, its connection to ‘the 
atrocities of the recent Chinese rebellion’ leaves it unclear whether this was 
due to shared heathenism or another racial or cultural factor.80 Similarly, the 
juxtaposition in other newspapers of the ‘strong-willed indomitable 
                                                   
73 BR, 13 October 1860 p. 5; HC, 10 October 1857 p. 5; DC, 9 October 1857 p. 5; see also LM, 
4 August 1857 and YH, 19 September 1857 p. 10. 
74 HP, 23 May 1862. 
75 Musgrave, ‘Shadows of Mutiny’, p. 85. 
76 HC, 12 September 1857 p. 6. 
77 YH, 31 October 1857 p. 10. 
78 ST, 12 September 1857 p. 8. 
79 RRC, 24 October 1857 p. 2. 
80 HP, 2 October 1857. 
Page 66 of 312 
 
Englishman’ with the ‘feebler native of India’, or ‘the European armed with 
his skill and appliances’ with ‘the half-savage hampered with his want of 
inventive capacity’ suggests that the line dividing culture and race was 
beginning to blur.81 Nevertheless, the overall balance of opinion suggests that 
this civilizational premise continued to hold sway. 
Though Indian civilisation was considered to be ‘backward,’ the 
balance of evidence seems to be against Catherine Hall’s suggestion that 
contemporary Britain was ‘in no way prepared’ for Indians to be more 
intelligent than Britons, or to support the superiority of their own culture.82 
Hindus had ‘a curious or inquisitive disposition’, meaning that missionaries 
had to be educated to overcome well-formulated local arguments.83 It was 
mobility that was lacking, not intelligence: as Reverend John Walton 
explained, ‘tied down by his caste’, there was no reason for a Hindu to read ‘a 
book on “self-help”.’84 However, the Sheffield Daily Telegraph could support 
Parsi doctors, combining ‘local knowledge’ with ‘high scientific training’ 
obtained in Britain.85 Though some thought ‘there was nothing to be learnt 
from the Bengalee literature but legends which inculcated… all the worst 
passions of human nature,’ others showed that Hindu religious poetry 
‘showed a singular coincidence of expression and thought with some of our 
scriptural and homely sayings’ or that ‘customs, legends and superstitions’ 
were brought to England from India.86 Moreover, the Temperance movement 
was keen to show that Indian society possessed some advantages over the 
beer-swilling West.87  
The consensus that Indians were not ready for self-government was as 
strong in 1857 as it had been when Macaulay resigned his Leeds seat two 
decades before.88 However, the rationale behind that denial varied. For the 
Leeds Times, it was the mere fact that India was ‘densely peopled by Asiatics’ 
that prevented rule ‘on the British principle of representative self-
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government’.89 For the Sheffield Times, it was incompatible with Britain’s 
superior position: ‘If he be already as good as we are… what business have we 
in his land?’90 The Leeds Mercury refused to empower ‘the compatriots of 
Nena Sahib’, but it also rejected an assembly representing only ‘the few 
thousands of Anglo-Indians’: regardless of any superiority they might have 
possessed over the indigenous population, they were ‘mere sojourners in the 
land, entertaining no idea of perpetuating there their name and race.’91 As for 
the Wakefield Journal, ‘For very many years to come India will have to be 
ruled as all newly conquered countries have hitherto been – by the constant 
display of a vast moral superiority, backed by physical power.’92  
The Journal’s comment highlights an important fact of which the 
inhabitants of Yorkshire were well aware: that Britain itself had been 
invaded, occupied and ruled on various different occasions. Comparisons to 
British history were one method of re-legitimising British rule in India, which 
belonged to Britain ‘as fully and fairly as Britain belonged to William the 
Norman after the battle of Hastings.’93 However, these comparisons also 
emphasised that the process of invasion and tutelage – primarily under the 
Romans, the Saxons, and the Normans – had been an integral part of 
Britain’s route towards its ultimate position at the forefront of civilisation. 
After all, if the pagan Romans had given to ‘the half savage Britons a form of 
religion that was at least merciful and progressive’, why should the British 
not pay this forward?94 
 
Yorkshire papers also justified British rule in India through the acquiescence 
of the wider Indian population. After all, a limited uprising implied a general 
acceptance of British governance – the reason why the British called it a 
Mutiny, and the Indian Government now calls it the First War of Indian 
Independence.95 Readers were continually reminded that ‘neither the native 
princes nor the masses of Hindoo population sympathise with the 
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insurgents’; that ‘the general population of the disturbed districts show little 
disposition to make common cause with the rebels, while the native princes 
cautiously abstain from rebellious acts.’96 If the political diary of J.C. Dundas 
is a reliable guide, this message that ‘the population of the country generally 
take no part’ was effective.97 Moreover, it was considered praiseworthy that 
the Indian Relief fund was destined not just for European sufferers but for 
‘those who had been faithful to England, although they were of another 
nation. (Hear, hear)’.98 
However, this offers a distinct point of difference between opinions at 
home, where it was feasible to make such a distinction, and on the ground in 
India. There, the instinct for self-preservation often led individuals to suspect 
all they encountered. A major of the 6th Dragoon Guards, for instance, wrote 
about ‘how much the European population is at the mercy of the native… I 
felt very unsafe at the idea of sleeping with open doors and windows a mile 
and a half distant from the men,’ while a private soldier explained to his 
sister how ‘every native is up in arms against us, even our own followers’ and 
a second documented the executions of Indians for poisoning meat and 
milk.99 As such, this is a strong argument for the non-existence of a single 
British imperial experience: it was more common in India than in Britain to 
believe that ‘There could be no reliance on the loyalty of either Moslems or 
Hindus.’100 Despite the networks which connected periphery to metropole, it 
was perfectly feasible for differing experiences to result in the simultaneous 
existence of different conceptions of race.101 
It might have been expected that the large numbers of sepoys who 
supported the British would have encouraged individuals at the periphery to 
recognise the reliability of at least some races in India. In reality, if soldiers’ 
letters are an accurate benchmark, the role of these auxiliaries – from 
communities which, as the ‘martial races’, would ultimately form the basis of 
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the new Indian Army – was scarcely valued.102 In private letters, Captain 
Harry Denison of Waplington Hall in the East Riding called the Sikhs 
‘swarthy, fine black bearded fellows… I never saw a finer body of cavalry’; in 
print, a single letter from Edwin Wootton of the 6th Dragoon Guards praised 
them ‘as men of tall stature and exceedingly brave.’103 The limited 
recognition of their assistance percolated through to newspaper reporting. 
Military success did enhance at least some opinions of these troops: the 
Leeds Mercury’s scepticism about Sikhs, ‘Punjabees’ and Gurkhas was 
rapidly followed by descriptions of them as ‘the best soldiers of India’ and 
‘troops which have rivalled the Europeans in valour and loyalty.’104 Yet for 
each description of them as ‘devotedly loyal’ there was another calling them 
‘the most lawless and ruffian races in India’, and for the majority of 
newspapers these troops may as well not have existed.105 It was ‘the 
discipline and bravery of the British troops’ which counted, the ‘matchless 
courage and discipline’ of ‘our few scattered countrymen, both military and 
civil’ ‘against which the hordes of Asiatic savages only break in their attacks 
like water against a rock.’106 Nevertheless, descriptions of Indian civilians 
supporting the British regime – even as passive spectators, instead of the 
active role that some actually played – helped to reinforce the message that 
this was a sectional revolt and not an indictment of the entire Indian 
population. 
 This message was, in theory, strengthened by an emphasis that 
executing ‘the stern mandates of justice’ on ‘the shedders of innocent blood’ 
was also ‘mercy to… the peaceable natives of India’.107 In practice, however, it 
was weakened by apparent accidental looseness in language, and by 
deliberate suggestions that repression would provide a salutary lesson even 
to loyal communities. In the first case, when a Huddersfield meeting in 
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support of the Indian Relief fund heard Joseph Batley talking about ‘beings 
who did not deserve the name of human, who have committed such 
atrocities’ and T.P. Crosland discussing ‘the monsters and oppressors’, or 
when Rev. Henry Batchelor depicted ‘hordes of black demons… thirsting for 
the blood of [the] innocent,’ their words could be interpreted as applying 
either to the wider population of India or to the rebels themselves.108 These 
kinds of remarks generally became clear in context – a reference to ‘Indian 
fiends, who have obliterated the image of humanity in themselves’ might be 
elaborated on by demanding ‘retributive justice’ for armed mutineers and 
‘mercy and protection’ to those uninvolved – but popular speech rarely gave 
opportunities for such contextualisation.109  
 In the second, the suggestion that loyal Indians also needed an 
example of British power implied potential disloyalty. Such suggestions were 
made frequently and widely. In Leeds, the Mercury felt that showing India 
‘the rigor of British justice’ was ‘the dictate of the soundest policy’; the 
Intelligencer thought ‘the whole presidency must be taught that’ Britain 
would ‘not permit the slightest insubordination’; and the Times felt ‘We 
cannot govern India with a rose-water policy’.110 However, the aspiration to 
‘make whole generations of Hindoos tremble’ is more explicable in context.111 
As in China, it was a question of honour: the expectation of swift and certain 
punishment saved suffering among victims and criminals alike. The excessive 
reaction to the garrotting panic of 1862 suggests, however, that this was not 
just an imperial phenomenon but a domestic one as well. 
 In reality, imperial personnel on the ground, with potential rebellion 
all around them, were in no mood to distinguish between loyal and disloyal 
communities. Although those fighting in India thought little of ‘hanging half 
a day and a night for this last three months,’ few in Yorkshire supported 
these kind of reprisals.112 In some cases, the punishment of innocent civilians 
was critiqued; in others, it was the use of excessive punishments against the 
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guilty.113 Even at services on the Day of Humiliation, the arguments made 
were for mercy rather than vengeance: against ‘blowing men from the 
cannon’s mouth’ and for ‘justice and mercy’, and even ‘some allowance for 
men who, having smelt European blood, and been tainted with the vices of 
mutiny, have been carried beyond themselves.’114 We should also be careful 
to nuance the more bellicose suggestions made. After all, the ‘total 
destruction’ of Delhi ‘along with its inhabitants’ was an extreme punishment 
which would affect those who had collaborated with the rebels, even 
potentially unwillingly.115 However, assuming the populace were evacuated, 
the destruction of an enemy fortification would merely mirror the way 
Sebastopol was slighted after the Crimean War, while the symbolism of its 
destruction would mirror the demolition of the Chinese Emperor’s Summer 
Palace as a punishment for the murder of British and Indian prisoners. In 
neither case would this be considered exceptional practice, while, even by 
British standards of cruelty, the massacre of an entire city would. 
Nevertheless, this difference between metropolitan reluctance and peripheral 
enthusiasm towards extreme measures further suggests the variety of 
contemporary imperial experiences. 
 
Perhaps the most significant contribution to this variation was that atrocities 
were far more immediate for those in India than elsewhere. On arrival in 
India, Captain Harry Denison complained ‘it is difficult to distinguish truth 
from fiction’; shortly afterwards, he noted that they ‘make one’s blood run 
cold… nothing which Chinese, Caffres, or Red Indian ever imagined come 
near them’.116 Historiographically, explanations for the significance of these 
atrocities to the British – both at home and overseas – have focused largely 
on gendered expectations, either subverting norms of the patriarchal male 
defending his family, or on the threat of rape and miscegenation.117 However, 
though rape may have become one of the most common tropes of fictional 
depictions of the Indian rebellion, it was conspicuous in Yorkshire by its 
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relative unimportance in this early period.118 Nor was this due to reticence 
about describing the sexual debasement of English women: commentators 
often passed up opportunities to hint about rape, even in the most discreet 
ways. This was perhaps because provincial newspapers at this time were 
intended to be read by the family, and therefore – unlike novels – had to 
appeal to the highest common denominator.119 
Regardless of the reason, the fact remains that Yorkshire newspapers 
focused more on ‘acts of cruelty worthy of Moloch’ than on the ‘orgies of lust 
at which Belial himself might blush.’120 The quantitative framework in which 
this might be studied has not yet been developed, but some crude 
approximations and qualitative judgements can be made. In a lengthy 
editorial paragraph, the Leeds Times was twice as likely to mention violent 
acts such as being ‘hacked to pieces’, ‘impaled on bayonets’ or ‘barbarously 
butchered,’ as it was to describe sexual ones like being ‘subjected to 
unspeakable outrages’ or ‘driven through the streets naked’.121 Elsewhere, 
sexual acts were subsumed in more general descriptions: ‘crimes upon 
women and children too horrible to relate’, for instance, or the mayor of 
Bradford’s mention of ‘outrages… perpetrated upon delicate females and 
children’.122 Moreover, where there was speculation about the role that rape 
played in the rebellion, it was often emphasised that this was an exceptional 
event. The Wakefield Express pointed out that it was ‘unparalleled in Asia,’ 
where ‘the honour of the female’ was ‘dearer than life,’ and happened ‘only 
when men are deemed utterly powerless and incapable of future revenge’.123 
‘Even in the Kaffir war the persons of European women and children were 
sacred,’ the Richmond and Ripon Chronicle noted.124 As such, conclusions 
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that contemporary Britain saw other races as insatiably lustful at this early 
stage seem questionable.  
It did, however, resonate with existing messages about the low value 
placed on women in non-Christian societies: not just in India, but also in 
China, where women were ‘degraded’.125 Observers both civil and military, 
both before and after the war, protested at the state of gender relations in 
India, where the women ‘work harder than the men’ and were ‘drudges and 
slaves’.126 The Sheffield Times interpreted this violence in two ways: firstly, as 
business as usual in a country where ‘it was the habit… to cut a wife’s throat, 
or hack her in pieces with a knife on the most trifling provocation’; secondly, 
as an Islamic attack on the policy of elevating women to ‘equal rank in the 
human family’.127 Though later narratives of the Indian rebellion would be 
used to check domestic demands for social and political equality in Britain, 
the initial reception was to reinforce the existing British policy of making 
slow and limited improvements to female status in India.128 
One of the most significantly gendered elements in the reporting of 
atrocities was the way that they were often presented as deliberately 
subverting the established family unit. The relation of parent and child was 
symbolically reversed when, per Lord Londesborough, ‘children were cut in 
pieces, and portions of their flesh were crammed down their parents’ 
throats’; the protective instinct of the parent was subverted by ‘infants 
snatched from their parents arms’ or ‘from their mother’s embrace’, or when 
the sepoys ‘dash the blood of the infant into its mother’s face’.129 This 
gendered component may have made the events more emotive in an 
exclusively male political and military sphere, but events which did not fit 
this gendered paradigm – such as the description of husbands being 
‘battered… in their heads before the very eyes of their wives’ and a man being 
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stripped before his flogging and murder– were still shocking enough to merit 
publication.130 The fundamental shock was the reversal of the power 
relationship and learning that trust in sepoys and servants had been 
misplaced. 
 
While the need to punish the rebels was a driving force behind continued 
British dominance of India, it was not the sole motivation. The suggestion 
that British rule was better than any possible Indian rule was almost 
universal, as was the belief that there was some form of divine mandate 
behind this position of trust. As for what Britain got out of the arrangement, 
only one individual was prepared to suggest that their gain was monetary.131 
Instead, the gain was primarily in prestige: defeating the insurgents was 
necessary to maintain ‘our position among the nations’, as well as to avoid 
presenting a shameful legacy to posterity akin to that of Lord North.132 
 Prestige was more than a purely hypothetical commodity: its more 
practical effect was to protect Britain from a world of unfriendly or hostile 
rivals. As Lord Brougham explained to the Leeds Mechanics’ Institution 
soiree: ‘if we lose India by being defeated, then our reputation is gone for 
ever, and we shall not be safe from any quarter of the world. (Hear.)’133 
Defeat against ‘a horde of Asiatics’ would be ‘a sure indication of national 
weakness,’ and ‘if England once ceased to be respected for her power, she 
would at no distant day be robbed and pillaged by rival nations’.134 The fact 
that these rival nations actually offered various forms of assistance to Britain, 
from the provision of French and Belgian troops, to a sword and revolver sent 
by Frederic Tudor of Boston to Major General Henry Havelock as a token 
that ‘your acts in defending the rights of humanity are valued and esteemed,’ 
was of little avail.135 British observers responded sceptically to these 
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suggestions: in the case of the Anglophobic New York Herald’s proposal that 
Britain be allowed to recruit Americans for Indian service provided they cede 
Canada and the West Indies in return, they were perhaps right to do so.136 
Regardless, it is clear that British actions in re-establishing control over India 
were framed not only in the imperial context but in that of foreign affairs. 
 
There was a clear distinction between the empire as conceived at home and 
the empire actually experienced. In some cases, the experience of India 
reinforced beliefs which were already present: for instance, the universal 
domestic distaste for caste was strengthened by experiences such as thirsty 
soldiers struggling with taboos around drinking vessels.137 However, outside 
the port cities, the only time a domestic audience might come into contact 
with an Indian might be the appearance of ‘a native Hindoo from Dinapore, 
and a Mahommedan’ at a lecture on ‘India and its people’.138 And no outside 
observer could ever match the experience of India of Edward Stuart Wortley, 
later Earl of Wharncliffe: though a relative subsequently censored what were 
presumably the more salacious sections of the diary, his references to 
‘another beautiful Kashmiri, splendidly dressed and very handsome, smelling 
delightfully of sandalwood,’ ‘kashi’ or ‘khashi bahut kharat,’ and ‘on my 
return found “Tuzhi” waiting in my room – turned in – rather nice’ do not 
leave a great deal of room for speculation as to the nature of his activities.139 
The unequal power relations in India were all too frequently 
manifested among expatriates in contempt for those around them – 
‘despicable,’ with ‘no honesty, industry or mercy,’ or ‘a miserable race of 
people’.140 While it was possible to show contempt in Britain – though it 
seems to have been much rarer than in India itself – it was impossible to 
employ the kind of casual violence that was commonplace in Indian life, as 
when two young officers ‘kicked… away’ a ‘nigger fortune-teller’.141 As such, 
the effects of imperial government should be disassociated from British 
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domestic views on race. The horrors of the Indian rebellion did not overturn 
the existing civilizational perspective, but were fitted into it, ascribed to 
correctable religion rather than race. 
 In India, the potential for the ruled to exert political power was a 
direct threat to those who currently ruled them. In Britain, however, there 
was room to see things differently. For instance, the exiled Sikh monarch 
Maharajah Duleep Singh could live the life of a country gentleman at 
Mulgrave Castle near Whitby. He supplied newspapers to the local reading 
room, gave temperance societies permission to hold functions in his grounds, 
shot with the local MP, and paved a local road with ‘spontaneous liberality’ 
and ‘the munificence of an Oriental prince’.142 In return, the local populace 
purchased jet ornaments as a wedding gift for his wife, wrote poetry to mark 
the death of his mother, and protested when the ‘bigoted Gooroos and 
Brahmins’ considered that her visit to and death in Britain ‘put her out of 
caste’.143 He could even attend the electoral hustings along with his suite and 
be greeted by ‘a round of cheers’.144 Such isolated occurrences, posing no 
threat to the way things were done, were acceptable. 
 As well as the distinction of race, class dynamics also contributed to 
the way in which contemporary Britain defined the differences between India 
and itself.145 Duleep Singh’s adoption of the country gentlemen persona had 
no more effect on the local populace than its adoption by local industrialists 
or other forms of ‘new money’. In India, however, it was the working classes 
who got to experience the gentlemanly lifestyle. Only some cavalry recruits 
adopted foxhunting, but all experienced being ‘seen to like gentlemen. The 
Blacks even come and clean your toes and fingers and shave you while you 
are asleep and bring your meals to you in bed if you are too lazy to get up… 
The barracks in India are like palaces.’146 Under the pressure of co-existing 
class privilege and racial hierarchy, it should not be surprising if attitudes 
towards race at the periphery developed differently from those in Britain. 
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This regional study provides a number of corrective suggestions to existing 
historiography on the key turning points in this era. Firstly, the 1857 election 
reflected the continued dominance of traditional electoral culture, 
prioritising local issues and the independence of MPs. Moreover, those who 
backed Palmerston seem to have done so primarily on the basis of traditional 
Liberal appeals, rather than support for an aggressive stance in China. War in 
China was necessary to preserve British honour, but this requirement to 
preserve honour was common across the range of Britain’s diplomatic 
commitments and not specific to ‘uncivilised’ nations. 
 As for the Indian Rebellion, initial popular reactions do not tend to 
support the suggestions that this was a watershed in British attitudes towards 
race. Its effect on the colonial authorities may well have been startling: 
however, imperial experiences varied dramatically across the empire. It 
seems that provincial opinion was slower to react, filtering the events 
through their existing civilizational perspective rather than shifting to a racial 
interpretation. Moreover, it is insightful to see how the critiques of Indian 
society could be echoed in accusations levelled at the British poor: 
missionaries could hope to civilise and Christianise the working classes as 
much as the Indians.147 In an 1864 speech, the radical MP John Roebuck 
justified his belief that the working classes needed political education by 
referring to their superstitious belief in witchcraft; elsewhere, he referred to 
their poor treatment of women – both critiques which had previously been 
levelled at India.148 While it was clear that Indian society was unprepared for 
the franchise, therefore, the question of what sections of British society could 
be trusted to vote still required further political battles to settle. 
                                                   
147 Alison Twells, The Civilising Mission and the English Middle Class, 1792-1850: The 
‘Heathen’ at Home and Overseas (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 2. 
148 HP, 1 April 1864, 13 May 1864; SDT, 4 April 1864 p. 2. 
Page 78 of 312 
 
Chapter 3: Reform, 1859-60 
 
It is perhaps unfair to expect historians to dedicate much time to discussions 
of two reform bills that were never passed: they did not reshape the 
constitution, or even win the majority Disraeli hoped for. Indeed, the lack of 
historiographical focus on the Conservative reform bill of 1859, the 
subsequent Liberal measure of 1860, and the lengthy period before any 
further attempt was made, may well be explained by the awkwardness with 
which they sit in the topic. Reform in 1859 was important enough to unite 
Liberal factions into a party, topple the Conservative government amid 
continental conflict, and bring Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone into 
government together. Yet the bill they presented roused little active public 
support, and its eventual withdrawal was met with acceptance rather than 
outrage. Only at the 1865 election would grassroots Liberals begin to show 
concern for the introduction of a further reform bill. 
 Some historians have explained this by giving foreign policy, not 
reform, pride of place in renewed Liberal unity, or suggesting Disraeli 
campaigned less on the strength of his reform bill and more on a broad 
‘constitutional appeal’.1 There are also suggestions that Liberal MPs were 
forced to disguise their distaste for reform in order to win support from their 
electorate, despite the difficulty which this caused them later.2 Conversely, 
Robert Saunders acknowledges a greater degree of willingness to see reform 
passed, provided that it protected property and education and offered a 
logical stopping point.3 
 Given the lack of substantial historiography relating to this period, the 
decision to devote an entire chapter to it may be questioned. However, 
understanding the state of the reform debate prior to the American Civil War 
is vital to evaluating subsequent changes. As such, this chapter explores this 
period chronologically. Firstly, it evaluates the county’s reception of the 
Conservative reform bill, both in newspapers and among the wider public. 
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The second section focuses on the parliamentary defeat of the bill and the 
election that followed, attempting to understand what consensus might have 
been established on the nature, purpose and extent of the franchise. The 
third section focuses on the short and troubled life of the 1860 Liberal bill. 
Fundamentally, it seeks to understand why and how reform varied in 
significance at this time. If Liberals had made so much effort to see a reform 
bill passed, why did they acquiesce so readily in the government’s decision to 
defer reform? 
 
January – March 1859: Overture to reform 
 
Disraeli brought forward his reform bill amid growing public agitation. The 
campaign for reform had been fairly low-key since the 1857 election, when 
‘nearly all’ candidates mentioned reform in their addresses.4 Although Bright 
had started to tour Scotland and Northern England in late 1858, the response 
outside the larger towns was ‘muted’ and, indeed, may have weakened the 
reform case.5 By the time Disraeli’s bill was produced, however, agitation was 
beginning to percolate down through the Riding, from minor towns like 
Doncaster to villages like Elland and Lockwood.6 By March, the Bradford MP 
Thomas Perronet Thompson was presenting manhood suffrage petitions, 
while a reform committee ‘appointed at the recent visit of Mr Bright’ was able 
to assemble representatives ‘from Bradford, Halifax, Wakefield, Keighley, 
Heckmondwike, and other towns in the West Riding’ to criticise the bill.7 
Clearly towns felt pressure to be involved: Charles Hall lamented that 
Lockwood should ‘have been the first… to have taken up the subject; but… 
even Delph had had a meeting.’8 Though these meetings did not make many 
new recruits, they did keep the topic in the newspapers.  
These meetings might have achieved more had they been able to agree 
on an alternative lower level for the franchise. An organised extra-
parliamentary campaign could feasibly have pressured Disraeli into a more 
                                                   
4 Hawkins, Art of Politics, p. 64. 
5 Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, p. 108; Zimmerman, ‘Palmerstonian Delay’, p. 1185. 
6 DC, 14 January 1859 p. 7; HxC, 12 February 1859 p. 8; HC, 26 February 1859 p. 5. 
7 BR, 5 March 1859 p. 4; LM, 5 March 1859. 
8 HE, 26 February 1859 p. 3. 
Page 80 of 312 
 
ambitious opening move. Instead, as popular pressure was insignificant, 
Disraeli’s main concern was producing a manageable electorate rather than 
pleasing the public.9 However, this was too ambitious a goal in light of the 
difficulty in achieving consensus. Unable to agree a specific level, their 
emphasis was on demonstrating support for reform in general.  
At Lockwood, William Shaw emphasised that Chartism’s ‘great 
mistake’ was to ‘have what they wanted and nothing else’; urging his fellows 
to ‘meet each other, and make concessions’, he proposed a borough rating 
and a £10 county rental franchise.10 At Elland, the resolutions specified only 
‘a large extension of the suffrage’ and equality between the county and 
borough franchises.11 At Doncaster, the motion urged that the extension 
make the Commons ‘a full and fair representation of the population, 
property, intelligence and industry of the country’; when C. Townsend 
suggested a specific extension to freeholders, householders, friendly society 
members, £50 savings bank depositors, and income tax payers, ‘it was 
proved that this… was embodied in the motion already carried.’12  
Unity would be a recurrent theme throughout the period, as much 
locally as in Parliament. Beyond mere opposition to Conservatives, Liberals 
were brought together by a shared commitment to reform in the abstract. 
However, particular proposals would strain the ideologically fragile Liberal 
coalition – not sufficient to make it fracture irrevocably, but sufficient to 
prevent concerted action. Liberalism as a social and political identity was 
resilient; however, lacking an institutional framework, Liberalism as a party 
could not succeed without a substantial groundswell of opinion for a 
particular measure. 
 
The reception of the reform bill was understandably sceptical, in large part 
because of its author. Disraeli’s reputation as a political chancer was well-
established: at Brighouse, Wright Mellor expressed his belief that he ‘would 
as soon be the prime minister for a chartist cabinet as a tory one’.13 Writing to 
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the Pontefract Telegraph, ‘Arch Willie’ protested that, despite reading both 
the Bill and Disraeli’s speech, ‘I knew no more about it than a child it was so 
in and out’.14 The very premise of a Conservative reform bill was, in itself, 
likely to attract scepticism, but Disraeli’s prominent involvement gave 
Liberals the perfect opportunity to attack the bill as partisan and dishonest. 
The bill’s actual provisions were just as unlikely to inspire confidence. 
Although the details were tinkered with in cabinet, Disraeli’s fundamental 
approach was to carefully manage the enlarging electorate.15 He attempted to 
trade the extension of the county franchise to £10 with the removal of the 
county votes of freeholders in boroughs; compensated for the refusal to 
extend the borough franchise with eye-catching ‘fancy’ franchises based on 
everything from professional qualifications to financial investments; and 
balanced a limited redistribution of seats with a promise of boundary 
commissioners to review and extend borough constituencies.16 However, it 
was not difficult for even provincial editors to see through these 
compromises, and denounce the bill in stirring terms. The Leeds Mercury 
considered it ‘a decided humbug’; the York Herald felt ‘The more the bill is 
examined the worse it seems to become’; while the Eastern Counties 
Herald’s ‘own opinion is simply that the bill won’t do’.17 
Failure to lower the borough franchise was the main source of 
contention, with almost every Liberal newspaper complaining about it. 
Understandably, advanced Liberal newspapers took the opportunity to 
protest on behalf of ‘the men who constitute the bone, sinew and muscle of 
the kingdom’, who were yet ‘politically to be treated as if they were goods and 
chattels’.18 Yet more moderate Liberal papers still saw the maintenance of the 
£10 limit as a flaw in the bill. While acknowledging the existence of workers 
‘so low in self respect, discharging so ill their duties to their families, their 
employers, and society’ that they did not deserve enfranchisement, the 
Sheffield Independent still maintained the claim of ‘hundreds of thousands of 
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the working classes, sober, industrious, careful, intelligent’.19 In some cases, 
papers adopted Disraeli’s own electoral calculus: ‘Ministers might have 
thrown in a £5 borough franchise without any loss to the Conservative 
interest.’20 More common was a general sense that the time had come for 
franchise extension: ‘On this point public opinion is made up’.21  
Liberal support for extension is hardly surprising, in the light of their 
desire for a more active government.22 However, even some Conservative 
newspapers concurred that the borough franchise should be lowered. The 
Sheffield Times was disappointed that there was ‘no proposal for a £8 or £6 
rating or rental suffrage’, which would give ‘a vast preponderance’ to ‘those 
who have an interest in maintaining and conservating [sic] the existing state 
of things’.23 The Doncaster Chronicle, meanwhile, considered it a tactical 
defect: though ‘intelligence and trustworthiness constitute the best claim to 
electoral suffrage… practically the restriction of suffrage to that sort of title 
has become impossible… It is not a logical sequence of the Act of 1832’.24 Like 
Henley and Walpole, the two Cabinet resignations, it supported £6 borough 
and £20 county franchises. The Yorkshire Gazette also claimed to have 
preferred these levels, though only after the dissolution.25 
There was less dispute about the extension of the county franchise, 
with almost every Conservative newspaper supporting the reduction. The 
implication of this support varied in accordance with the location of the 
newspaper. Disraeli’s intention in setting a low limit had been to bring in 
malleable agricultural tenants, a ruse which many Liberal newspapers saw 
through.26 In traditionally agricultural areas like the East Riding, where the 
Hull Packet welcomed the imminent accession of the ‘£10 householder of 
Driffield, Patrington, and Bridlington’ to the franchise, his scheme was likely 
to pay off.27 However, in the industrial West Riding, the extension of the 
county franchise had significant repercussions. It would mean adding ‘all 
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places not boroughs, such as Dewsbury, Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham, 
Holmfirth, and all the large manufacturing villages,’ to the existing 
constituency.28 This influx of new voters was likely to threaten the political 
balance in the West Riding, which had returned one Conservative and one 
Liberal for 17 of the previous 18 years. With a vast influx of new urban voters, 
the Liberal party could hardly fail to capture both seats.29 Yet the 
Conservative newspapers of the West Riding backed the extension. 
It is possible that in private, their editors still expected the move to 
bring in agricultural voters. In public, however, newspapers across the 
county used the rhetoric of ‘apply[ing] that standard throughout the whole 
country,’ of abolishing ‘a distinction always liable to be made the ground of 
discontent,’ of rectifying ‘the injustice of the act of 1832’.30 What is more 
likely is that they saw the measure of 1832 as one which had proved itself, 
and were now willing to see it rolled out across the country. Henley and 
Walpole feared that this step would create a more stark division between the 
enfranchised and the disenfranchised, and thereby increase the severity of 
the agitation for reform.31 Evidently mainstream Conservatism felt otherwise. 
It is tempting to suggest that there was a class basis to this: the middle 
classes pulling up the drawbridge. Certainly, some Conservative papers 
framed it in this way: the Leeds Intelligencer, for instance, argued that ‘The 
question is between constitutional progress, and democracy in the shape of 
Liberalism.’32 Yet Conservatism was a broader ideology than this. Not only 
have we seen that some Conservative newspapers supported the reduction of 
the franchise below the £10 level, but others claimed to be protecting the 
existing rights of the working class. The Yorkshire Gazette, for instance, 
accused Russell of wanting to disfranchise the freemen: ‘nine tenths of whom 
are of the labouring classes,’ giving ‘noble examples’ of ‘independence and 
integrity’.33 
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Furthermore, when it came to the ‘fancy franchises’, the Conservatives 
were enthusiastic about their potential to bring the working classes into the 
electorate. The Wakefield Journal emphasised that the lodger franchise 
would include ‘many thousands of clerks and skilled workmen’; the Sheffield 
Times suggested it would bring in ‘clerks, warehousemen, and superior 
mechanics’ and thought the savings bank franchise would include ‘steady and 
industrious working men’; and the Hull Packet similarly anticipated the 
accession of ‘the most prudent and industrious of our working classes’.34 This 
was not merely a political calculation – except in the case of the Doncaster 
Chronicle, which derided the franchises as ‘very laudable but not very 
practical’ in March but which by April had decided that Liberal opposition to 
them belied their status as ‘friends of the working classes’ and ‘promoters of 
education’.35 Conservative newspapers, on the whole, seem to have genuinely 
felt that it was possible to enfranchise a meritorious sub-section of the 
working classes, and that such a step was preferable to a uniform reduction 
encompassing deserving and underserving alike. 
Liberals were rarely as receptive to ‘fancy’ franchises, though there 
were naturally exceptions. Former MP J.C. Dundas confided to his diary that 
‘educational tests and suffrage founded in personal property cannot be 
objected to.’36 Publicly, the Huddersfield Chronicle was particularly 
enthusiastic: it had already proposed enfranchising provident society 
members, income tax payers, and possessors of ‘certificates of the 
universities for successful local examinations, and the certificates of the 
Society of Arts to members of mechanics institutions’, and urged Disraeli to 
add these to his bill.37 Such fancy franchises also appealed to the Richmond 
and Ripon Chronicle, which argued they would ‘enfranchise all those who are 
fitted… either by good intellect, or industry sufficient to be called patriotic.’38 
Yet the majority of Liberal newspapers disliked them, with the bulk of 
their criticism falling on the savings bank franchise – ‘the single and slender 
exception’ with ‘the remotest reference to… the excluded artisan 
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population.’39 Some papers demonstrated hard-headed Yorkshire practicality 
by pointing out ‘active and intelligent men… can employ their money more 
profitably’ than in Savings Banks.40 Others argued it was paradoxical that 
charity – ‘sympathy with suffering’ – might deprive a man of the franchise.41 
The most consistent component of scepticism, however, related to a 
fundamental lack of faith in the bill: that ‘the whole of this seeming 
liberalism would be found wanting’; that they were solely ‘a churlish and 
grudging extension’ designed for ‘the stragglers and hangers on of the middle 
classes’.42 That it was not so much the principle but the execution of the fancy 
franchises that attracted Liberal ire does, perhaps, suggest that both parties 
acknowledged an underlying principle linking individual merit and the right 
to vote. 
For the Liberal newspapers, the other flaws in the bill grouped around 
the core idea that this was an attempt to secure Conservative electoral 
dominance. Three measures in particular justified this conclusion. Firstly, 
voting papers would strengthen landlord power into ‘a tyranny from which 
there is no escape’.43 Secondly, the revival of non-resident freeholders voting 
in boroughs was ‘alien to the very idea of a municipality’, allowing the 
wealthy to ‘swamp the local constituency.’44 Though the bill has been 
characterised as an attempt to ‘consolidate Conservative strength in the 
counties,’ the Liberals feared it went further: it was not a consolidation of the 
counties, but an invasion of the boroughs.45 
The most vehement complaint, however, was the transfer from the 
county to the borough of the votes of 40 shilling freeholders residing in 
boroughs. Complaints on this measure verged on the hyperbolic. ‘A direct 
invasion of the rights of property,’ it was ‘perfidious’, designed to ‘sacrifice 
the towns to the landed interest’; it even demonstrated that ‘to command his 
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[Disraeli’s] veneration, institutions must… have existed since the times of 
Moses and Aaron.’46 Yet, leaving aside the rhetoric about ‘the most ancient 
portion of the electoral body’ or ‘the most independent class of electors’, the 
reason for Liberal anxiety is clear.47 During the Corn Law crisis, the West 
Riding had been the hotbed of the freehold land societies, which had broken 
the Tory hold over the representation by giving county votes to Liberals. The 
work of local Liberals like Bradford’s Robert Milligan had delivered Lord 
Morpeth a walk-over for the constituency in 1846.48 Moreover, the move 
challenged the symbolic dominance of the towns in which the newspapers 
were printed over their hinterlands. 
It was of little use for the Conservatives to point out the valid 
rationales for this move. It would make all qualifications take effect where 
the property was held: giving ‘the ten-pound occupier and the forty-shilling 
freeholder… equal privilege and similar conditions.’49 This would ‘prevent the 
borough and county constituencies with interfering with or swamping the 
votes of one another’.50 If non-resident voters in boroughs were 
objectionable, why not borough freeholders voting for counties?51 Though 
some Liberal newspapers conceded this logic – that ‘the towns represent the 
trading interests, the counties… those of the land’ – others denied it, with the 
Barnsley Chronicle complaining of an attempt ‘to draw a line of demarcation 
between land and trade’.52 For urban Liberals, the freeholders provided 
‘energy, intelligence and independence to the agricultural element’, a 
‘wholesome corrective of landlord domination’.53 What the Conservatives saw 
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as landlord and tenant in paternalist harmony, the Liberals could see only as 
a relationship of coercion.54 
Other complaints, such as the protestation of the Wakefield Journal 
that ‘thirty three manufactured county votes’ in Volunteer Yard, Kirkgate had 
‘paid towards the last poor rate just 31s 10d!!!’, were similarly rhetorically 
barren.55 Indeed, some Conservative newspapers already recognised the 
weakness of their position. For the Doncaster Chronicle, it was tactically 
erroneous: the public would tolerate the abolition of one property giving 
duplicate qualifications, but not ‘mere tinkering with the 40s borough 
freehold.’56 The Chronicle proved to be correct: the move even brought the 
gentleman banker Edward Tew onto the Wakefield hustings to defend ‘his 
birthright… inherited from his father’ by nominating the Liberal candidate.57 
In the meantime, when popular meetings were held about the bill, it was the 
‘disfranchisement’ of the borough freeholders on which many would focus. 
 
That Yorkshire Liberals organised many meetings to oppose the bill should 
not be surprising: that Yorkshire Conservatives did not organise any to 
support it is more so. Indeed, one of the only occasions that a Conservative 
spoke in defence of the bill was when a Liberal meeting called for a Hull 
Packet journalist to speak, and got rather more than they anticipated.58 As 
the journalist showed, by advocating the claims to a vote of ‘all who could 
properly exercise it’, the silence of Conservatives cannot have been solely 
because they were inherently hostile to reform. They may have been inactive 
because they mistakenly expected the bill to garner enough moderate Liberal 
votes in the House to pass.  
By contrast, Liberal agitation against the bill was widespread, 
stretching beyond the major towns like Leeds, Bradford, Sheffield, York and 
Hull to minor townships like Brighouse, Queenshead, Armley, Hebden 
Bridge, and Holmfirth. The complaints highlighted by the public meetings 
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were many and varied, but it was the ‘disfranchisement’ of the borough 
freeholders that was the most frequently voiced. Disraeli had ‘struck off the 
40s freeholders, and put in their place pensioners’.59  
Evidently, local Liberals had anticipated this being an emotive issue, 
as many registration agents had provided calculations of its effect.60 In 
Bradford, for instance, W.E. Forster claimed 917 freeholders who could vote 
‘for the great West Riding of Yorkshire – for the imperial constituency of the 
kingdom – with some degree of pride’ would be completely disfranchised.61 
At a Wakefield meeting a list of the names of the 600 freeholders to be 
‘disfranchised’ was circulated, while the inhabitants of Keighley were 
informed that although it was not a Parliamentary borough, 500 voters 
would have been affected if it had been.62 The resolution passed by the 
Executive Committee of the West Riding United Reform Registration 
Associations complained firstly about the disfranchisement of freeholders; 
the ‘claims of the working-classes’ came sixth.63 Indeed, the Liberal party’s 
misleading rhetoric – of ‘disfranchising’ freeholders rather than transferring 
them to the boroughs, and ‘fancy’ franchises that, like cloth, were not suitable 
for sustained use – was so effective that the Conservatives found themselves 
using it: it is almost impossible for the historian to avoid doing the same.64 
Like most Victorian political meetings, these were highly local affairs: 
the ‘disfranchisement’ of the freeholders was not the only event to be 
personified and localised. The tripartite division of the West Riding 
constituency and its places of election were ascribed to ‘a certain 
Conservative agent at Doncaster, a certain Conservative agent at Skipton, and 
a certain public officer at Wakefield’.65 The non-resident freeholder vote 
brought to mind ‘127 York freemen, residing in London,’ brought thence ‘to 
vote for an entire cost per head of £27.’66 The effect of redrawing borough 
boundaries was suggested with reference to the ‘agricultural out-townships of 
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Chapeltown and Headingley’ overriding the ‘feelings of the trading 
population’.67 
The savings bank franchise also tended to make an appearance, with 
an interesting spin on its original presentation. It was framed in the context 
of the need for a young man to ‘purchase… furniture for a house, in which to 
receive his loving wife’.68 Although this was undoubtedly a manifestation of 
the gendering of the franchise, and the emphasis on manliness and character, 
its widespread use was not a reflection of support for household suffrage.69 It 
was not proposing that married men were inherently deserving of 
enfranchisement, only that getting married made existing voters ‘more 
respectable and more responsible… worth more to the state by fifty 
percent’.70 If the lodger franchise had once been feared because of its 
potential to bring in homosexuals, this was no longer the case, nor did 
speakers concern themselves about the responsibility or morality of this new 
constituency.71 Moreover, the focus in looking for new voters was not solely 
on character, but on knowledge – hence the large number of speakers who 
qualified their support of extension with the fact that ‘sound political 
knowledge had advanced rapidly.’72 
The wide range of views represented at these meetings generally 
required speakers to call for Liberal unity. The mayor of Bradford, for 
instance, urged that ‘all reformers should act in unison (Hear, hear)… [and] 
not descend to any particular minutiae’; the working man Mr Rawlinson 
encouraged Leeds reformers to ‘not discuss any particular measure, but be 
harmonious in passing their condemnation’.73 Yet this approach proved more 
difficult than it might have first appeared. The Leeds Intelligencer remarked 
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gloatingly on the results of the Bradford meeting, which encapsulated its 
overall suspicion of the reform movement: 
many moderates attended the recent meeting at Bradford. When a 
resolution condemnatory of Mr Disraeli’s bill had been passed the 
majority of them left the meeting and the ultras thereupon adopted a 
petition pledging those who had been present to Mr Bright’s sweeping 
claims. In vain did Mr Lister, one of the principal manufacturers of the 
town, endeavour to oppose.74 
Though the main Leeds meeting passed without incident, it proved almost 
impossible to maintain control of the subsidiary ward meetings. At Holbeck, 
a working man protested at the resolution’s imprecision, to which Mr Carter 
responded that ‘he did not believe they could all agree upon any specific 
franchise’.75 This was proved to be incorrect – as Carter may have expected – 
when the meeting carried an amendment in favour of household suffrage ‘by 
a large majority’. In the North-West ward, where a manhood suffrage 
resolution was passed, Jon Pickles complained about the risk of dividing the 
party and that others refused to follow him in ‘sink[ing] somewhat of his 
private opinion in order to preserve unanimity’; at Bramley, a ratepaying 
franchise motion was passed.76  
Elsewhere in the county, it was broadly possible to maintain a sense of 
unity – for instance, in Hull a motion for manhood suffrage was put and lost 
– but the situation in Leeds and Bradford hardly boded well for the future of 
moderate Liberalism. Zimmerman characterises the breakdown in Liberal 
unity as primarily a function of honest Liberal rank-and-file betrayed by an 
elite who made professions about reform on the hustings only to get cold feet 
in the lobbies.77 Whether this is fair will be considered later in the chapter, in 
the context of the withdrawal of Russell’s bill. Yet in light of the difficulty 
which was found in establishing an overall stance with respect to reform, it 
may be fair to question whether a sense of dissatisfaction and the break-up of 
Liberal unity was the inevitable result of moving from the abstract to the 
specific. 
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Nevertheless, it was clear from both public meetings and newspaper 
opinion that the provisions of the bill were highly unpopular. It was not 
ambitious enough to appeal to Liberals – or even to many Conservatives, 
despite their enthusiasm for ‘fancy franchises’ – and its cornerstone measure, 
the ‘disfranchisement’ of the borough freeholders, attacked a traditional 
qualification which provided Liberal strength. Given the reaction in the 
country, there was little incentive for Liberal MPs to cross the floor to 
support the bill. It was, therefore, in the House of Commons that the bill was 
to receive the first of its setbacks, and it is to the attitudes of Yorkshire’s MPs 
towards the bill which we now turn. 
 
March – April 1859: Dénouements, parliamentary and popular 
 
The Parliamentary climax of Disraeli’s reform bill was the passing of an 
amendment at its second reading which stipulated that the bill had two flaws 
too significant to allow it to pass: its treatment of the borough freeholders 
and its insufficient extension of the franchise.78 Yorkshire MPs voted by 24-
13 to support this amendment: much more of a disparity than the overall 
330-291 result, and more or less what might have been expected based on the 
results of the 1857 election. However, the interest lies not in the broad 
partisan split, but the details: why Liberals like Marmaduke Wyvil and 
Conservatives like Lord Hotham broke party lines to vote for or against the 
bill, and why a Radical like John Roebuck who had previously supported the 
government voted against it. 
 A large proportion of Yorkshire Conservative MPs were unhappy with 
the bill – not because it went too far, but because it did not go far enough. At 
the start of the session, the Leeds MP George Beecroft seconded the address 
to the Crown and praised the prospect of the Commons being made ‘the 
reflection of the population, the industry, the wealth, the worth, the 
intelligence of the people’.79 Yet when the bill came forward, Beecroft 
proposed an amendment to reduce the borough franchise to £8 rental.80 
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John Charlesworth wrote to his Wakefield supporters to announce his 
intention to support a reduction of the borough franchise and to oppose the 
transfer of the borough freeholders.81 A year earlier, Thomas Collins of 
Knaresborough had complained that 1832 had deprived ‘the poorer classes’ 
of representation, and proposed a £5 suffrage – ‘or even household suffrage’ 
– rather than see the equalisation of county and borough franchises.82 
 All of these MPs, however, voted against Russell’s amendment, and 
they seem to have had two significant reasons for doing so. The first was the 
potential for the bill to be amended in committee: Collins, for instance, 
thought it ‘contained the basis of a large and generous extension of the 
suffrage’ if allowed to do so.83 John George Smyth of York similarly 
announced that he agreed with the resolution, but felt its aims could be met 
in committee.84 The second rationale, though less significant, was that it was 
an inopportune moment for a dissolution due to the imminent war between 
France and Austria. Henry Edwards of Beverley warned of ‘factious 
opposition’, as interference with the government ‘would be the greatest 
calamity which could occur in Europe’.85 However, whether a ploy or not, 
most Yorkshire Conservatives seemed resolved to obtain some measure of 
reform rather than just to prop up their party. The sole exception was Lord 
Hotham, whose vote in support of Russell’s resolution caused a degree of 
confusion. ‘An East-Riding Elector’ from Beverley believed he had ‘thought 
the government measure so revolutionary that it ought to be opposed at every 
stage’; the Hull Packet suspected he supported a reduction in boroughs and 
had ‘been caught by the cunning phraseology’ of the resolution.86 In reality, 
Hotham thought the assimilation of the franchise and the disfranchisement 
of county voters too dangerous to let pass.87 
By contrast, no Yorkshire Liberals who supported the bill did so to 
protect the government – perhaps understandably, given that one of their 
                                                   
81 WJ, 15 April 1859 p. 5 
82 HC Debs 149, cc.1835-6, 27 April 1858. 
83 HC Debs 153, c.1194, 31 March 1859. 
84 HC Debs 153, cc.954-7, 28 March 1859. 
85 HC Debs 153, cc.1079-80, 29 March 1859; see also Admiral the Hon. Arthur Duncombe, 
YH, 30 April 1859 p. 5. 
86 HA, 9 April 1859 p. 5; HP, 8 April 1859; Hull Archives, U/DDHO/8/17 (Marmaduke J. 
Grimston to Lord Hotham, 23 April 1859, 30 April 1859). 
87 YH, 30 April 1859 p. 5 
Page 93 of 312 
 
electoral assets was the popularity of Palmerston’s foreign policy.88 The 
Radical John Roebuck, who had been giving ‘a complete and unvarying 
support’ to the Conservative government, had to make a particularly hard 
choice.89 On the one hand, the bill would 'not give one iota of power to the 
working classes' and would 'enhance the power of the landed gentry'; on the 
other, dissolution risked ‘instantaneous war!’ In the end, however, Roebuck 
chose political principle over national security.  
The two Liberals who did cross the floor to support the bill both did so 
on the same grounds: that the bill was good enough. For Edward Stillingfleet 
Cayley, the independent and unorthodox Liberal member for the North 
Riding, it ‘contained everything that everybody asks for, in principle’; 
Marmaduke Wyvil of Richmond ‘was anxious that the question… should be 
settled’ and thought ‘the bill might be amended in Committee,’ but ‘if the bill 
were rejected, it was impossible that any measure… could be passed during 
the present Session’.90 The key factor in Liberal success was not reliance on 
its advanced wing, which already believed that the bill was ‘as false and 
unjust as a bill could be,’ but persuading other moderate Liberals who might 
have supported the bill to abandon it instead.91 Edward Akroyd, for instance, 
had proposed a lengthy series of modifications to the bill including building 
and friendly society franchises, direct taxation franchises, and educational 
certificate franchises.92 He felt that ‘in the absence of any other reform bill… 
[it] may pass the second reading, for the purpose of cutting down the 
borough franchise to £5 or £6 rating’; yet he voted for Russell’s resolution.93 
 What this begins to highlight is both the wide variety of overall views 
within the House of Commons on the nature, purpose and extent of any 
reform, and the extent to which these views shared common ground that 
crossed party lines. On the one hand, Conservatives and Liberals professed a 
shared commitment to protect the borough freeholders and extend the 
franchise; on the other, Liberal MPs could be found denouncing the ‘fancy’ 
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franchises as a snare or proposing extensive additions to their number. 
Would an election draw distinct lines between the two parties? 
 
Linguistic analysis of the election addresses of Yorkshire MPs in the 1859 
general election immediately suggests the importance of reform – all the 
more so when set against those for 1857. Perhaps unsurprisingly, at the 1859 
election ‘reform’ was one of the most frequently used words for both parties, 
though more frequently by the Liberals than the Conservatives. The Liberals 
also talked frequently about the ‘franchise’; ‘Palmerston’ almost disappeared 
from their election addresses, to be replaced by references to Lord John 
Russell. The Conservatives, meanwhile, discussed their ‘principles’. Liberals 
talked less, and Conservatives talked more, about being ‘independent’: this 
correlated with the party that was in government, and was often related to 
the MP explaining how they had offered the government ‘an independent but 
not a servile support’.94 
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Figure 4: Words used in Conservative addresses at the 1859 election, sized by 
frequency. 
 
Figure 5: Words used in Liberal addresses at the 1859 election, sized by 
frequency. 
 
 This overall trend is reflected in a more detailed examination of what 
was said by candidates. Four Conservative candidates broadly denied that the 
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election was about reform, instead arguing – like George Beecroft – that the 
question was ‘How is the Queen’s government to be carried on?’95 The Liberal 
party was ‘a mob… without guide or leaders – perfect chaos’; it was 
important to have ‘that noble straight-forward statesman Lord Derby at the 
head of the government’ at a time when the most important question was 
how ‘this country stood in relation to foreign powers’.96 Three additional 
candidates were of the opinion that reform did matter, but only in the sense 
that the election would determine how far the inevitable measure would go.97 
James Stuart Wortley, contesting the West Riding, argued that there was no 
disagreement on ‘the necessity of substantial reform in Parliament (hear, 
hear). The only question was the extent and nature’ – and he added that he 
thought the government measure insufficient.98 
 Needless to say, this Conservative grassroots commitment to reform – 
or at the very least a pretence of commitment to reform – was not reflected in 
the Liberal press, which argued, almost universally, that to re-elect the 
Conservatives was to sign reform’s death warrant. Whether this belief was 
genuine, or arose from the need to energise the Liberal coalition sufficiently 
to triumph at an election, is unclear. However, it is perhaps notable that the 
Bradford Observer referred to the question which had torn apart Liberal 
parties across the North by urging that ‘the present duty, as accepted by 
State-educationists and Voluntaries alike, is for all Reformers to unite heart 
and hand’.99 Regardless of the rationale, the views were remarkably 
homogeneous: from the Huddersfield Examiner asking voters ‘what reform 
do you require’, through the Halifax Courier calling the Bill ‘a mockery and 
an insult’, to the Leeds Mercury and its view that ‘the point at issue… is the 
great question of Reform.’100  
This line was repeated by Liberal candidates, though primarily in the 
larger cities. In Bradford, the Conservative bill was a ‘delusion and a sham’ 
supported by ‘one of the most deadly foes of popular progress,’ the local 
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banker Alfred Harris.101 In Leeds the situation was much the same, and in 
Sheffield John Roebuck was even more expansive.102 If war broke out, the 
‘old Tory leaven’ would try ‘to put down the parliament of England, the 
liberty of England, the free press of England. (Cheers)’ – a statement which 
was perhaps intended to restore Roebuck’s Liberal credentials after his 
extended support of Lord Derby’s government.103 
 Naturally, Conservative newspapers saw things differently. Some 
characterised the contest expansively: the Leeds Intelligencer saw ‘the home 
and foreign policies, the administration of the law, both civil and criminal; 
the character of the national taxation; the maintenance and prosecution of 
foreign alliances’ mixed up in it all.104 A few even saw it in existential national 
terms, asking ‘Are our time-honoured institutions to be overthrown in order 
that American republicanism may be reared on their ruins?’105 Others 
focused on the risk of war: although this did rebuke the Liberal party for 
causing the dissolution, it did not automatically follow that the Conservatives 
should be returned.106 Indeed, the fact that the Liberal Sir Charles Wood was 
safe to admit (albeit in an uncontested election) that ‘the question of reform, 
which lately was nearly paramount, [is] almost absorbed in the now 
engrossing question of peace or war’ suggests that an appeal to the country 
on those terms was never a winning strategy for the Conservatives.107  
 Yet, as always, the election continued to turn on local issues as well as 
national ones. At a Leeds Liberal ward meeting, both candidates spent much 
of their time refuting the suggestion that one of them had opposed the 
removal of the assizes from York to Leeds.108 In Richmond, Henry Rich’s first 
priority was to exculpate himself from having failed to conduct a personal 
canvass of the electorate.109 A letter to the Pontefract Telegraph from ‘Arch 
Willie’ also suggested that the mid-Victorian electorate refused to be driven 
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by partisan politics.110 ‘Arch Willie’ was a splitter for the Liberal Milnes and 
Conservative Overend: he disagreed with Milnes’ principles but preferred ‘old 
servants and familiar faces,’ and Overend was ‘a good sort of man, a hard 
worker, and as near the right mark as any we shall get.’111 This proved some 
consolation to the Leeds Mercury when it later came to contemplate the 
incomplete Liberal victory: Beecroft’s return ‘was the victory of the 
townsman over the so-called stranger’, muddled in with his ‘half Liberal tone 
upon the question of reform’ which gulled or pacified ‘some of the more timid 
Liberals’.112 
 This half-Liberal tone proved to be the trend across the county. In 
borough after borough, Conservative candidates declared themselves in 
favour of the extension of the franchise to levels which almost matched the 
more cautious of the Liberals. In accordance with their earlier professions, 
Beecroft and Charlesworth (seeking re-election for Leeds and Wakefield 
respectively) came out for £8 rental in boroughs; Arthur Harris in Bradford 
did the same.113 Nor was this solely a phenomenon of the big industrial 
boroughs. In Pontefract, Overend suggested £8 rental in large boroughs and 
£5 in small ones; in York, John George Smyth offered the £20 county and £6 
borough franchise of Henley and Walpole.114 Other candidates proposed 
more esoteric proposals: George Cayley in Scarborough, for instance, 
proposed to enfranchise every man receiving £50 annually in wages, and to 
‘lower the franchise by a sliding scale’, ‘until it was found that labour was 
adequately represented’.115 
 It might very well be argued that these proposals were completely 
insincere, intended only as an exercise in public relations. Certainly, there 
were indications that some candidates were not wholly committed to the 
generous proposals they made on the hustings. Campaigning for the West 
Riding, James Stuart Wortley frequently suggested support for the £6 
franchise, but ‘would not be so foolish as to pin himself to any particular 
amount. (Loud disapprobation; voices: “It’s all humbug;” and general 
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confusion for some minutes.)’116 In Hull, Joseph Hoare’s support for the £6 
rating or £8 rental franchise was undermined by an admission mere days 
before that ‘I have not made up my mind (laughter)’.117 A further blow to the 
reputation of the East Riding’s representatives was delivered when the 
county MP Lord Hotham had to admit, when asked about rating versus 
rental ‘that he was unable to give such an answer to the question as would be 
satisfactory.’118 
 Some Conservative candidates at least were able to justify the stance 
which they took, though in emotional terms. At Leeds, Beecroft argued that 
£8 householders were ‘working men, who… might have been safely entrusted 
with the enjoyment of the franchise (applause)’; however, it would also have 
‘prevented the present possessors of it from being swamped by a new and 
untried constituency. (Hear, hear).’119 At Bradford, Harris thought much the 
same: £8 would ‘include the honest, intelligent, working men of this country’ 
who were as opposed to swamping as ‘the rest above them.’120 Hoare, after 
his late conversion, announced ‘that if a person has a vote for a member of 
parliament that he ought to have some status in society’, for which ‘a house 
rating of £6 is low enough’.121  
It is perhaps churlish to question the calculations of contemporaries, 
who had a better idea of what kind of voter lived in a £10, £8 or £6 house 
than the historian ever can. However, the figure itself – halfway between the 
proposed £6 and the existing £10 – suggests that this was not an evidence-
based position. The £10 franchise was too high; the £6 proposed by the 
Liberals must be too low; therefore £8 suggested itself naturally. In fairness, 
beyond Russell (who had done the calculations), support for the talismanic 
£10 county and £6 borough franchise among the Liberals was scarcely more 
rational.122 It also shows how far the idea of a reforming Conservatism had 
percolated among the most vocal provincial candidates – even if only a 
mercenary, tactical reformism, as when Smyth sought to quiet Conservative 
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complaints about his support of the £6 franchise by saying ‘Their opponents 
wanted it to be said that the aristocracy and the upper classes object to 
reform. That was their game’.123 Far from being ‘highly critical of their party 
leaders… for needless concessions to opponents,’ Yorkshire Conservatives 
were prepared to confront the Liberals on their own terms.124 
 Conservative candidates across the county offered a range of possible 
franchises according to their own personal opinions, very few of which 
correlated to what the party leadership were offering or considering. By 
contrast, the Liberal party had a policy position more or less fleshed out – £6 
in boroughs, £10 in counties – which their candidates signed up to with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. Almost every cautious Liberal like Henry 
Wickham, who ‘thought the working classes ought to be admitted in great 
numbers… [but not] in such numbers as to swamp all the other classes 
(applause),’ or Sir Charles Wood, who wanted ‘those who think, read and 
discuss,’ but not ‘those who are influenced by such considerations as money 
and beer,’ was paired with a Radical stablemate who proudly proclaimed that 
their heart went further but their head led them to support the party line.125 
In Bradford, Wickham was partnered with Titus Salt, who felt ‘if the 
opportunity occurs, I shall go further (applause). But I think the best way is 
to take the most we can get (hear, hear).’126 In Halifax, Wood was returned 
alongside James Stansfield, whose ‘political faith’ was still the ‘old Radical 
principle of Household Suffrage’.127 The Doncaster Gazette praised the 
position for being ‘sufficiently extensive to enable all reformers to take their 
stand upon it.’128 
 In many respects, Russell setting this position was a master-stroke: it 
provided a single position, distinct from the Conservative stance. Yet – as we 
shall see – it would cause difficulty when it came time to frame a measure of 
reform, and it still required continual efforts to hold together the coalition. 
Though proud of their own independence, Liberals were also envious of the 
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unity of the Conservative party. ‘The Conservative majority is not like a 
Liberal majority,’ Layard warned his supporters: they ‘are a compact body, 
and they work together; and if they obtain a majority the Reform Bill would 
be gone.’129 In Leeds, songs were written arguing ‘in union is strength’, while 
a letter from a purported Liberal elector passed on the wisdom of ‘my boy 
Jack’: ‘the Whigs and the Radicals must be like the bundle of sticks in my 
book of fables, and then Beecroft can’t break them’.130  
Radical candidates had to balance the reassertion of their political 
faith with adherence to the common position, a balancing act which 
grassroots supporters did their best to make difficult. Sheffield seemed 
particularly prone to acting up: the Halifax radical Frank Crossley, 
electioneering in the town for the West Riding contest, was asked why the 
middle classes did not redeem their promise of 1832 to the working classes 
by the granting of manhood suffrage.131 Mr Bagshaw, meanwhile, felt that 
John Roebuck ‘did not appear to him to be the sincere reformer now he once 
was,’ because he had ‘begged and prayed Government to agree to a £6 rating 
suffrage in boroughs’.132 Though the party line managed to hold at the 1859 
election, it was clear that much had been staked on the suggestion that a £6 
rating suffrage was entirely achievable. It must be admitted, too, that in 
many cases the stance of Conservatives supporting £8 rental or £6 rating was 
successful in muddying the hoped-for clear blue water between the two 
parties. In Wakefield, the Liberal candidate William Henry Leatham’s choice 
of a £6 rental franchise was depicted by his opponents as ‘another step in his 
downward revolutionary path’ thanks to ‘his extreme friends’: while Leatham 
‘had no fixed ideas,’ Charlesworth’s support for the £6 rating franchise was 
‘as low as it would be safe to go.’133 
 
Indeed, there was often greater variety between different Liberal positions on 
the franchise than there was between the most moderate Conservative and 
Liberal opinions. A range of justifications for the extension of the franchise 
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were put forward, but the majority avoided asserting any inherent right to 
the franchise, whether derived from ethnicity, universal human rights, or 
historical precedent. One correspondent even called such concepts the ‘will-
o’-the-wisp of the uneducated politician… the shadow the leaders of the great 
Chartist movement chased’.134 Instead, the claim advanced was that of 
personal value: the working classes had demonstrated they could be trusted 
with the franchise. 
 There were three key components to the claim of personal value. The 
first, and probably the most often voiced, was that of education. Supporting 
the West Riding Liberal candidates at Selby, Major Waud explained that  
large numbers of the working classes were now better informed and 
more intelligent than were the higher classes fifty or one hundred 
years ago. (Hear, hear). In accordance, therefore, with the genius of 
their constitution, they were justly and fairly entitled to the 
Parliamentary franchise.135  
Abraham Holroyd of Bradford felt that in a comparison between present and 
potential voters, in ‘education, general intelligence, and morality’ the latter 
‘would certainly stand A No. 1’; enfranchising them would ‘wipe away [the] 
reproach’ that the British franchise was based on ‘bricks, not brains’.136 
 The specific claim that voters were independent – the second 
component of personal value – was less frequently offered than education. In 
some cases the two were conflated and combined: the Leeds Mercury felt it 
agreed with Bright in the sense that only those ‘qualified for the exercise of 
the suffrage by intelligence, good character, and circumstances raised 
above poverty and dependence’ should vote.137 Yet we should be cautious 
before we use this evidence to challenge the fundamental position that 
independence occupied in the British political system. Though it was difficult 
to quantify independence, any amateur orator could refer to the number of 
newspapers and mechanics’ institutes as a ready yardstick for intelligence. 
A more frequent justification than independence was patriotism: the 
personal value of the working classes lay in the way they were ‘imbued with 
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true national views’.138 Though they were not philosopher-kings capable of 
detached and rational thought, the choices that they made would be 
influenced by their underlying love of the country. If ‘no hearts have beaten 
more earnestly for England in her struggles with savage mutiny and foreign 
foes than those of the hard-working classes,’ the common weal was safe in 
their hands.139 If the middle classes would ‘trustfully confide the task of 
thrusting back the foe’ to the ‘strong arms’ of the working classes, they had 
no reason to deny them the vote.140 
 Critically, the Conservatives did not challenge these fundamental 
assumptions about the purpose of an extended franchise. The Sheffield Times 
felt that ‘to concede the demand for the franchise by degrees, and in 
accordance with the progress of the people in education and morality, would 
be an act both of justice and wisdom.’141 They differed in only two key 
respects from the Liberals, the first of which was an insistence on practical 
measures. ‘Abstractly the occupier of a £5 house may be as well qualified as 
one of £10,’ admitted the Leeds Intelligencer, but ‘form your judgement from 
actual observation, rather than from philosophical theories’ and it will 
become clear that the majority are not.142 The second was their greater 
concern for managing this change effectively, with the Halifax Guardian 
highlighting the twin needs to maintain effective parliamentary government, 
and to ensure ‘the interests of property and the voice of the middle classes 
shall not be overwhelmed’.143 Reform was acceptable, but it had to be ‘safe 
and satisfactory’.144 
This tends to bear out the traditional image of Liberals as 
‘programme-drafters and preachers’ and Conservatives as displaying ‘good-
humoured realism’ and appalled by ‘disorder’.145 The image is further 
strengthened when we take into account that Parliamentary reform was not 
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solely a project for the elites. The vibrant contemporary print culture meant 
that many amateurs generated and published their own ideas on the 
franchise. Mostly produced by Liberals, these projects litter the archives: 
from Thomas Morgan and John Brooke’s printed pamphlets to informal 
suggestions sent by well-meaning constituents to their MPs.146 Of these 
amateur projects, perhaps the most notable were the suggestions of Sir John 
Eardley Wilmot.147 They received a surprising amount of support: ‘at once 
progressive and conservative,’ a scheme that ‘will recommend itself in every 
quarter where a large and comprehensive bill is desired.’148 The Liberal 
candidate for Wakefield, W.H. Leatham recommended his redistribution 
clauses as ‘by far the best I had seen… especially favourable to Yorkshire’: 
however, Leatham added his own scheme whereby non-electors would 
appoint a proportion of their number to the electoral roll.149 Although 
Parliamentary schemes were always the most prominent and the most likely 
to be enacted, these speculative schemes helped shape and inform local 
debates on the topic. 
  The aspect of Liberal reform which the Conservatives struggled most 
to understand was the concept of the franchise as a means of self-
actualisation. When advanced Liberals talked about reform, they emphasised 
the status of the unenfranchised as ‘goods and chattels… mere things 
politically’ and the right to vote as the vindication of ‘the dignity of their 
manhood’.150 Conservatives, meanwhile, frequently expressed bemusement 
as to why there was agitation when ‘there was never a time when legislation 
was so uniformly directed for the well-being of the working classes’.151 Yet 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which argues that humans seek to fulfil their 
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basic survival requirements before attempting to establish a sense of identity, 
suggests a reason why agitation could continue or even strengthen in times of 
plenty.152 The Conservatives seem to have seen the franchise primarily as a 
tool of government, whereas the Liberals also conceived it as conferring an 
additional sense of citizenship – perhaps linked to their understanding of 
classical history.153 Alternatively, it reflects an underlying psychological 
difference between the left’s focus on caring and fairness and the broader 
focus of the right.154 
 Where both sides both agreed and disagreed most strongly was on the 
issue of good government. A correspondent urged the agitation to focus ‘not 
on the ground of ancient practice, but on modern wants – the good of the 
community, instead of inherent rights.’155 Liberals urged reform ‘to enable 
the people to return men who would check the extravagant expenditure of 
government’; ‘Men who had to pay taxes, had a right to control the 
expenditure.’156 However, the two sides were speaking past one another on 
the topic. While the Liberal Barnsley Chronicle differentiated between ‘the 
tax-paying people’ and ‘the tax-pocketing aristocracy and its minions’, the 
Conservative Leeds Intelligencer worried about ‘the Liverpool merchant and 
the Manchester manufacturer… [who] contribute largely to the direct 
taxation’ being ‘overwhelmed by the thousands who contribute nothing’.157 
Both sought to establish effective taxpayer control over the government, but 
their views of who constituted the taxpayers were irreconcilable. 
 
February – June 1860: Reform revived 
 
Disraeli’s gamble of going to the country failed: in accordance with his 
promises, Russell brought forward his reform bill in early 1860.158 However, 
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the public reaction to it was distinctly muted – even from the major Liberal 
newspapers in the West Riding. The Bradford Observer had predicted its 
terms (£6 borough rental and £10 county occupation) almost to the letter the 
previous year, and perhaps this lack of surprise contributed to the lukewarm 
reaction.159 Though the Sheffield Independent anticipated it making 
‘enormous change,’ the Leeds Mercury considered it well-targeted to the 
state of the legislature but still ‘of a milk and water description’160 Further 
down the Liberal scale, papers were prepared to criticise more loudly: ‘a 
trivial and delusive measure, which settles nothing,’ according to the 
Barnsley Chronicle; ‘such a trifling amendment [of the Conservative bill] 
might have been carried in committee,’ said the Scarborough Mercury.161 
 Where Liberal newspapers did support the measure, it was almost 
entirely on a tactical basis: because it was expected to pass, not from its own 
merits. Though the Eastern Counties Herald ‘believe[d] a bolder measure 
could have made its way through… there seems no reason to believe that the 
bill will encounter serious opposition’.162 The Beverley Recorder, meanwhile, 
accepted it as ‘Conservatives have so little against it’, and although the 
Doncaster Gazette thought it included ‘an important extension of the 
suffrage’ they also felt it necessary to qualify that ‘The Bill is so moderate that 
it cannot fail to pass.’163 
 It should be noted that there were particular problems with the bill in 
Yorkshire, as its proposal to give Leeds three members was almost designed 
to cause the maximum amount of offended civic pride. The Liberal Halifax 
Courier generally supported the bill, but protested loudly that ‘In no sense 
whatever is it [Leeds] the metropolis of the West Riding, neither is it entitled 
to be considered as at all of special importance.’164 The Liberal Huddersfield 
Chronicle saw three members for Leeds as unjust, ‘when Dewsbury, Pudsey, 
Keighley, Saddleworth, Barnsley, and other populous localities of the West 
Riding have none at all!’165 Nor could the Sheffield Daily Telegraph ‘quite 
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understand why a third member should be given to Leeds’, when Sheffield 
had a larger constituency – an issue which John Roebuck raised in the House 
on the first reading.166 The suggestion that this single provision contributed 
to the downfall of the bill is unlikely at best, but it was a distraction that 
reinforced the idea that the whole measure had not been entirely thought 
through. 
 This lack of newspaper support was matched by a wholly 
unenthusiastic popular reception. There were only a handful of meetings in 
the large towns, on a smaller scale than the earlier agitation against Disraeli’s 
bill, and enthusiasm was hard to find. In 1859 Sheffield had seen a mass 
meeting in Paradise Square of between 2,000 and 4,000 people; in 1860, 
only the Town Council was invited to adopt a petition supportive of the bill.167 
Moreover, Dr Holland felt capable of mocking this mercilessly, moving an 
amendment that cited ‘the yearnings which have been manifested in favour 
of sanitary improvements – (laughter) – as reason for enfranchising ‘every 
male who has attained the age of 12 years – (Cries of “Hear, hear”) – and… 
every female who has attained the age of 16 years. (Laughter)’.168 This 
showed how fragile Liberal unity was in the period. Every man found his own 
complaint with Disraeli’s bill, and it was easy to rally behind a general 
platform of £6 and £10, but problems occurred when a specific measure was 
brought in. It was difficult for individuals to resist the temptation to burnish 
their own reformist credentials by taking pot-shots at the bill for being too 
moderate, even when they were supposed to be rallying support behind it. 
W.E. Forster ‘hardly would call it a Reform bill, because it missed out… 
points… of great importance,’ while Councillor Carter refused, ‘because their 
friends were in power, to slur over the defects of the bill they had 
introduced… (Loud cheers)’.169 
When the bill was ultimately withdrawn, Liberal newspapers 
distributed the blame widely, though most blamed other Liberals. The 
Halifax Courier complained about ‘the rapid deterioration’ of radical 
members, caused by the Commons acting as ‘an aristocratic and social club 
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rather than an assembly of honest intelligent politicians;’ the Leeds Express 
blamed ‘the shopkeeping and trading classes’ for not redeeming their pledges 
of 1832; the Bradford Review blamed both.170 However, it should be said in 
their defence that the Parliamentary Liberals had been given very little room 
for manoeuvre by public opinion.  
The adoption of £8 rental by many Yorkshire Conservatives had ruled 
out any slight relaxation in the Liberal position when faced with opposition. 
As rumours began to fly, the Leeds Mercury warned that the £8 borough 
franchise would be an ‘evasion’ which would lower ‘the character of public 
men,’ the Sheffield Daily Telegraph refused to credit it, and the Leeds Times 
warned that ‘earnest and honest reformers’ would ultimately show their 
displeasure with any such ‘ministerial compromise’.171 There was another 
potential opportunity for compromise: adding Disraeli’s ‘fancy franchises’ to 
the bill. Conservative newspapers claimed to be ready to support the measure 
if this were done, and some Liberals saw potential in the suggestion.172 It 
might have been feasible when J.C. Dundas suggested it back in November 
1858, but by the time Sir John Ramsden was supporting the move it was far 
too late: given the heavy criticism of the franchises at the 1859 election, it 
would almost certainly have been seen as an admission of defeat.173 
We should also remember the mercenary aspect: contesting seats was 
expensive, and a new Reform Bill offered the prospect of a third election in 
four years. No Liberals were sufficiently brazen to ask, as did Henry Edwards 
of Beverley, ‘whether, if this Bill became law, it would be necessary to have 
recourse to a dissolution of Parliament’.174 However, J.C. Dundas – with a 
degree of insider knowledge – blamed the resistance to the bill on ‘the man 
who likes to be in parliament and does not like the expense and chance of an 
election.’175 Sir John Ramsden’s desire to pass ‘a measure which would really 
strengthen the institutions of the country—or no measure at all’ may well 
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stem from the haggling which had taken place after the 1859 election about 
how much of the £14,000 bill he would be expected to foot.176 In a 
subsequent letter to a constituent, he expressed his belief that only a 
comprehensive and permanent settlement could justify having changed 
government.177 
 
Unsurprisingly, Conservative reaction to the bill on its first appearance was 
negative. It has been suggested that the Conservative party’s opposition 
hinged on the distinction between a £6 rental and £6 rating franchise, as the 
latter ‘offered no logical resting place’ and ‘failed to connect the franchise 
with taxation.’178 This may have been a phenomenon of informed 
metropolitan comment on the bill, but does not seem to have percolated 
down to the provinces. The Hull Packet considered that ‘A six pound rental in 
all large towns is almost equivalent to household suffrage’ not because there 
was no ‘resting place’ between the two, but because ‘there is scarcely a 
tenement in Hull, however wretched, the occupant of which does not pay to 
the landlord a rent of half-a-crown a week.’179 £6 in itself was ‘a flood of the 
democratic element sufficient in the large towns to swamp the respectable 
classes, and enough in the smaller boroughs to maintain the influence of the 
great Whig families’; the fact that ‘It does not settle the Reform question even 
for a year’ was of only subsidiary importance to the Leeds Intelligencer.180 
The failure to link the franchise with ratepaying was also poorly 
understood by provincial newspaper opinion – and not because this was a 
novel idea. When Sir Francis Crossley had discussed the concept at the 1859 
election, the Sheffield Times had suggested ‘It scarcely seems just to exclude 
a man from the franchise because he pays his poor-rate through the landlord 
[‘compounding’] instead of directly to the overseers.’181 In the same year, the 
Leeds Intelligencer considered Bright’s proposal to enfranchise ratepayers 
who opted out of compounding ‘neither more nor less than household 
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suffrage under a disguise’.182 The Yorkshire Gazette was one of the few 
Conservative papers which did make the distinction, urging Parliament to 
adopt a £6 rating franchise instead of rental.183 However, its scope for 
manoeuvre was limited by its previous support of Smyth and Walpole’s 
proposal for £6 rating in boroughs, which it had described as ‘good order and 
good government’.184 This suggests that the link between personal ratepaying 
and the franchise was still in embryo among the majority of Conservatives. 
When the bill failed, few Conservative newspapers were inclined to 
claim it as a scalp. The Doncaster Chronicle praised Conservative MPs for 
‘rigidly abstaining from anything like factious opposition,’ and later 
disclaimed any ‘desire to triumph over the noble Lord… in his hour of 
affliction.’185 The Sheffield Times complained of the insincerity of Palmerston 
and ‘so-called Liberals’, while the Halifax Guardian announced that 
‘everyone must lament that the session of 1860 passed with the Reform 
question unsettled’.186 Little over a month later, the inaugural meeting of the 
Wakefield Conservative Association saw the speaker announce that ‘they, as 
Conservatives, had no objection to the working classes possessing the 
franchise, so long as it was coupled with intelligence’: ‘he saw many of them 
in that room.’187 
The flurry of different proposals for reform which appeared from 
Conservatives in this period seemed designed to contradict their earlier 
reputation for staid unthinking traditionalism. Some Conservative 
newspapers seemed to be undergoing searching transformations, with the 
Wakefield Journal being converted to ‘The scot and lot suffrage… the old 
constitutional mode, most in accordance with our feelings,’ coupled with a 
three year residential period.188 Adopting John Stuart Mill’s ideas, which 
proposed that extension of the franchise be coupled with multiple votes to 
preserve the hegemony of property and intelligence, the Leeds Intelligencer 
considered that with such a system ‘we should scarcely demur to manhood 
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suffrage’.189 ‘B’ agreed, arguing ‘no other plan is just, or capable of stemming 
the tide of democracy’.190 J.S. of Halifax went further by proposing a 
tripartite assembly presumably modelled on the Prussian estates, divided 
equally between manhood suffrage, ten pound householders, and ‘the 
landed-ocracy’.191 However, the putative sympathy of Conservatives for 
reform has been challenged both contemporaneously and historiographically 
– not just by their actions in 1859-60, but much more concertedly by their 




The ultimate failure of reform in 1859-60 was a complex process, arising 
from a wide variety of small decisions taken in the provinces as well as in 
Westminster. The detailed discussions show that there were substantial 
differences in the way that the two parties conceived the franchise, with 
Liberals appealing to the broader use of the franchise as a tool of civic 
engagement, and Conservatives focusing more narrowly on its role in 
government. However, it becomes clear that Conservatism was not solely an 
ideology opposed to reform, even if its proposals were not as intellectually 
vibrant as they might have been. In fact, it appears that, as Robert Saunders 
suggests, there was sufficient common ground between the two parties to 
make reform possible. 
 However, the election itself demonstrates that partisan politics could 
make capitalising on this common ground impossible. The Liberal coalition 
was strong at times of threat, but surprisingly weak in times of success. The 
endless search for ideological purity prevented any significant 
demonstrations of support for a moderate measure, and ruled out any 
weakening of the existing provisions even when the Parliamentary arithmetic 
made such weakening advisable. As such, we might perhaps share the blame 
between activists and MPs more evenly than did Zimmerman. For the next 
five years, global events would play a significant part in keeping reform off 
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the table; when the question returned to British politics, how recognisable 
would it be? 
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Chapter 4: The American Civil War, 1861-5 
 
The traditional interpretation of Britain’s relationship with the American 
Civil War is tenacious, surviving with remarkably little modification since the 
interwar period. This traditionalist case proposed that Britain’s ruling classes 
were increasingly concerned about the challenge posed by democratic ideals. 
On the one side, ‘the open friends of the South’ proclaimed ‘the failure of 
democracy’; on the other, radicals, anti-slavery activists and the working 
classes fought the cause of liberty and popular government.1 Northern victory 
was a triumphal vindication of democracy: in the 1865 election, ‘not a single 
member who had supported the cause of the North failed of re-election,’ and 
subsequently ‘the Reform Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain from a 
government by aristocracy to one by democracy.’2 
 A brief period of revisionism was overcome by the 1980s, with Foner 
reviving the idea that the working classes supported the Union and Jones 
detecting a general desire in Britain to intervene in the war, motivated by 
concern over bloodshed and realpolitik desires to split Britain’s rival.3 
Modern historians of British sympathies generally see the war and its 
subsequent effect on British politics similarly to Adams.4 A single response to 
this narrative, Campbell’s English Public Opinion and the American Civil 
War, proposed that neither side attracted much sympathy among the British 
public.5 However, it is the traditionalist interpretation which currently holds 
sway, not just in the historiography but also more popularly.6 Indeed, this 
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view has permeated into the historiography of British politics, with historians 
of Liberalism emphasising the alliance between progressive politics and 
Union advocacy.7 Historians of race have also seen British sympathy for the 
Confederacy as illustrating a decline in British sympathy for slaves and belief 
that they could adopt Western norms.8 
Leaving race for later, this chapter will test the validity of the thesis 
that ‘By and large, those in favour of reform supported the Union; those 
opposed, the Confederacy’9. It will consider Confederate support in 
Yorkshire, differentiating between broad sympathy and specific support for 
intervention. It will also recognise that ‘intervention’ (or ‘interference’) could 
take a variety of forms across three broad categories. The first is ‘mediation’: 
an offer or demand that Britain supervise negotiations between the sides 
with a view to agreeing separation. The second is ‘recognition’ – 
acknowledging the Confederacy as an independent state – and the third and 
rarest, generally phrased here as ‘military involvement’, reflects active British 
military support for the South.  
Consideration of support for each measure will be framed through a 
tripartite approach, examining newspaper opinion, MPs’ public speech, and 
popular engagement with the conflict. Establishing the pattern of loyalties at 
the regional level, this chapter will set up the next chapter’s discussion of the 





One of the fundamental premises of the traditionalist thesis is that British 
anti-slavery had declined, meaning Britain was no longer susceptible to 
Union appeals to its better nature. Blackett, for instance, calls it ‘not as 
strong as it had been,’ while Hall claims ‘it no longer dominated the public 
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mind’ and Drescher references its ‘declining strength’ and ‘diminution’.10 Yet 
this premise has been contradicted by suggestions that, though anti-slavery 
institutions atrophied, the ideology itself became institutionalised as a 
fundamental part of British national character.11 When examining Yorkshire 
newspapers, the latter seems to be more accurate: anti-slavery was accepted 
across the political spectrum. 
As storm clouds gathered across the Atlantic, not a single newspaper 
in Yorkshire expressed scepticism about Lincoln’s accession to power. The 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, strongly linked to the anti-slavery movement, called 
the Republicans ‘the wisest and best of the old American statesmen’; 
however, it was scarcely more fulsome than the Conservative Sheffield Times, 
which called the election ‘an immense change in American public feeling’.12 
In the west, the Huddersfield Chronicle suggested ‘the friends of true liberty’ 
would welcome the check to ‘the insolent pretensions’ of Southern slave-
owners, while the Halifax Courier saw it as ‘an immense gain’ following 
‘disgraceful acts of injustice’ and ‘overbearing violence… committed at the 
dictation of the slaveholders’.13 In Hull, the Eastern Counties Herald hailed it 
as ‘a triumph’ for ‘liberalism’; in York, the Herald saw it as ‘a new epoch… 
which shall eventuate in purging that country from this “sum of all villanies” 
[sic]’.14  
Comparisons to earlier periods are difficult, as Lincoln’s accession was 
probably the signal triumph of the American abolitionist movement. The 
Fugitive Slave Law and the Dredd Scott case had given the British press little 
to celebrate in recent years. However, it is difficult to conclude from these 
initial editorials that American slavery mattered less than previously. 
Lincoln’s victory was celebrated across the county and across the political 
spectrum – a rare degree of unanimity. 
 Most papers, however, thought the victory heralded a long-term shift 
rather than an immediate change. The Conservative Leeds Intelligencer 
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referred to Lincoln’s ‘very moderate views’, and the York Herald denied he 
would take ‘any very strong federal action against slavery’.15 Ambitions in 
some cases were insultingly low: the Halifax Courier’s idea of ‘an immense 
gain’ was that ‘the foes of slavery… will be strengthened in some degree by a 
fresh distribution of offices’.16 These low expectations perhaps reflected the 
lack of progress American abolitionism had made in the late 1850s, which in 
turn suggests that British anti-slavery may have grown more realistic rather 
than weaker. 
 When Southern states began to secede, Yorkshire newspapers were 
slow to understand the crisis’s true scale. They reacted with apathy: the 
Wakefield Free Press considered ‘threats of a disruption’ ‘merely party 
cries.’17 For the Beverley Recorder, a state leaving the Union would ruin not 
the Union, but the state.18 This belief that secession doomed slavery was 
widespread: the York Herald felt dissolution would ‘demolish it [slavery] 
altogether’, while the Pontefract Telegraph claimed ‘slave states cannot 
stand alone…only the leaven of freedom in the North… holds America 
together.’19 
 In early 1861, these newspapers clearly favoured one side. Even 
Conservative newspapers backed the North: ‘the sympathy of all Englishmen 
is with them now’, ‘by far the better portion of the Anglo-American 
community’.20 The prospect of a Southern nation was a source of derision, 
with the Malton Messenger describing it as a ‘bowie-knife oligarchy… whose 
chief men fight in the streets with six-shot revolvers,’ and the Hull Advertiser 
even calling its women ‘fiends in human shape… in rebellion against God for 
having in His Word represented the negro as in His pure sight the equal of 
themselves.’21 However, in the majority of cases this failed to translate into 
support for war: instead, secession freed the North. 
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This early period of unorthodox attitudes towards the Civil War has 
largely been overlooked. One exception is D.P. Crook, who acknowledges 
early British sympathy for the Union but claims it ebbed away due to the 
‘disenchanting march of events,’ not ‘Lincoln’s refusal to make war on 
slavery’.22 However, Crook overlooks several points highlighting anti-
slavery’s underlying importance. For instance, he argues that the concept of 
the North rapidly outstripping its ‘independent but decadent rival... became 
something of a cliché in the next year or so.’23 This had much deeper roots: in 
the 1830s the American abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison had urged the 
North to ‘Let them [the South] separate… and the liberation of their slaves is 
certain’, feeling that the preservation of the Union was not worth ‘treading 
upon the necks, spilling the blood, and destroying the souls of millions of 
your race’.24 
While this Garrisonian concept was common throughout the war, it 
was in the first few months that it gained currency.25 Many papers agreed 
with the Wakefield Free Press that the North ‘partakes of the guilt of the 
system and assists in maintaining it’: without its support, ‘slavery would 
become more and more untenable’.26 The experience of the 1858 boarding 
dispute, and the desperate attempts of the Democrats to compromise with 
slavery to avert secession, perhaps strengthened this belief that disunion 
would advance abolition.27 
Most importantly, papers broadly endorsed the war only when anti-
slavery measures would be advanced. The Leeds Mercury preferred ‘strife 
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between freedom and slavery’ to any other type of war; by May, it hailed the 
conversion of the ‘timid compromisers which practically supported all the 
evils and iniquities of slavery’.28 The Bradford Observer, meanwhile, hoped 
that Bull Run marked ‘the beginning of the end… of the North fighting for the 
Union and slavery.’29  
However, it became extremely difficult to maintain this belief when 
Northern representatives accused Britain of lacking sympathy. This forced 
many papers to rebut Northern abolitionism in self-defence. In response to 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, the Leeds Mercury pointed out that the ‘dread of 
emancipation’ which prompted secession was ‘declared by the President and 
the North generally to be perfectly futile… English philanthropists must be 
excused if they feel little interest in a quarrel in which their own special 
subject occupies such a subordinate situation’.30 Its Conservative neighbour 
the Leeds Intelligencer, meanwhile, pointed out to Cassius Clay that ‘the 
North was ready to give all needful guarantees for the security of the 
“domestic institution”,’ though they felt it necessary to disclaim ‘advocating 
the cause of the South.’31 
General Fremont’s confiscation of slaves belonging to rebels 
challenged Lincoln to consider his views on the role of the executive, the 
Constitution and the nature of liberty, ultimately leading him to overrule the 
measure.32 Unfortunately, it also forced the British to confront the same 
issues, and they were much less sympathetic to Lincoln’s view.33 Many 
papers initially lavished praise on Fremont, seeing him as the harbinger of a 
true Union commitment to emancipation. The Hull Packet argued that 
Fremont had overcome previous Union blunders: ‘if it be not disavowed, but 
generally followed, the North will not long have to complain of want of 
sympathy from England.’34 Its Liberal neighbour the Advertiser called 
emancipation ‘the best and sharpest arrow in their quiver’ and argued that 
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Britain could not remain indifferent to such a war.35 The West Riding was 
generally more sceptical, but the Doncaster Gazette suggested Fremont made 
‘a practical connexion’ between the war and abolition, which was now ‘up on 
the cards’ if not certain of adoption.36 
Lincoln’s action rapidly reversed this opinion. In Hull, the Advertiser 
called the war ‘unprincipled’ and the Packet announced the North had ‘never 
been earnest’ in its anti-slavery, while the Doncaster Gazette concluded that 
they fought ‘against slaveowners but not for the emancipation of their 
coloured bondsmen.’37 Most other newspapers saw things in the same light: 
an initial flourishing of enthusiasm for the North was choked off by the 
Lincoln administration’s conservatism.38 This perhaps explains British 
scepticism about subsequent moves towards emancipation. 
Indeed, most newspapers specifically cited Northern insincerity on 
emancipation as a reason for withholding sympathy. The Barnsley Chronicle, 
for instance, felt that at the start ‘the sympathies of the great majority of 
Englishmen’ were with the Union; however, events demonstrated ‘only a very 
small proportion of the inhabitants of the North have a true sympathy with 
the slave.’39 The Harrogate Advertiser made similar complaints, which it 
linked to the decline in British sympathy for the North.40 The war crisis that 
resulted from the Union’s boarding of the British mail ship Trent in late 1861 
would further distance Britain and the Union. However, the most important 
steps had been taken already: for domestic reasons, the Union was unable to 
follow through on initial British hopes for an abolitionist campaign. 
It may be said that Britain favoured the South for reasons of 
commercial or geopolitical self-interest, and subsequently cast around for an 
acceptable excuse. If so, it is telling that the most acceptable excuse they 
could find was in anti-slavery, and that the public ranked it above 
commercial prosperity and the preservation of British hegemony. 
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Alternatively – though we must be cautious in taking evidence at face value – 
anti-slavery was the lens through which Yorkshire newspapers viewed the 
conflict, and their allegiances were determined primarily on that basis. Either 
of these interpretations tends to contradict the belief that anti-slavery no 
longer dominated the British public mind. 
 
The question which then arises is: if anti-slavery was so dominant in 
contemporary British attitudes, what effect did Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation have? Revisionism tends to suggest that it shifted views little or 
even negatively, requiring intervention to prevent ‘imminent servile 
insurrection and ultimate race war.’41 Conversely, the traditional narrative 
credits the Emancipation Proclamation with shifting public opinion 
decisively behind the Union cause: ‘a watershed in attitudes’.42 
 Across the county of Yorkshire, however, its effect fell somewhere in 
between. There were certainly many newspapers which argued that its goal 
was to spark a slave rebellion: some even felt it would accomplish this. The 
Conservative Halifax Guardian called it ‘a direct and open invocation… to 
rise and murder their masters’, while the Liberal Sheffield Independent 
warned that it risked making ‘the South a desert’.43 However, other papers 
differentiated between the Proclamation’s intention and its result, with the 
Doncaster Gazette contrasting Lincoln’s object (‘a bloody insurrection’) with 
its likely effect (‘nothing at all’).44 
 Many Yorkshire newspapers looked beyond the Proclamation’s 
immediate purpose to its ulterior meaning. The Bradford Observer felt it 
offered ‘to give up the blacks to the tender mercies of their masters’ as long as 
the latter swore fealty to Washington, and the Wakefield Free Press saw it as 
more ‘a means of winning back the South to its former allegiance, than 
intended as a death blow to slavery.’45 These were echoes of the kind of 
reconciliation with slavery that most had earlier condemned. Other papers 
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set it in the context of Lincoln’s domestic difficulties, with the Huddersfield 
Chronicle acknowledging that ‘it was necessary to keep the Abolitionists in 
the Republican ranks’.46 Still more understood it as a foreign policy move to 
appease Britain: the Malton Messenger asked ‘Why the antislavery sensation 
in London just in the nick of time?’47 Understanding it as ‘a threat to the 
South, a concession to the Abolition party… a measure of war policy and 
nothing more,’ they withheld their sympathy pending further 
developments.48 After all, such a measure could be withdrawn when no 
longer useful. 
 For some newspapers, the Proclamation’s favourability grew over 
time. The Leeds Mercury could not initially ‘see what effect, for good or for 
evil, this proclamation can have,’ before deciding it ‘ought to secure for the 
Northern arms the friendly wishes of all lovers of human freedom.’49 Its 
neighbour was no less changeable: the Leeds Times at first called it ‘one of 
the most miserable State manifestoes ever published’, but by early February 
was praising the North for ‘identifying its cause with the destruction of 
slavery’.50 Yet the majority of newspapers were highly sceptical about the 
Proclamation, and did not see it as a reason to support the North. 
 This might, on first impressions, be seen as an indication of the 
weakness of British anti-slavery. Yet the poor reception of the Emancipation 
Proclamation is in stark contrast to the overwhelming support from across 
the political spectrum for schemes of domestic emancipation. While the 
Liberal Hull Advertiser suggested Lincoln ‘deserves the universal 
commendation of every friend of human freedom’ for his domestic scheme, 
the Hull Packet also praised it – albeit with the muted terms ‘would that it 
had been made earlier’.51 The Barnsley Chronicle, meanwhile, heavily 
criticised the Emancipation Proclamation – ‘a mere political trick… without 
any real regard being felt for the Negroes in bondage,’ ‘no doubt to promote a 
revolt of the slave population’ – but also suggested that ‘if such a 
proclamation had been issued previous to the commencement of the war, 
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President Lincoln would have had the sympathy of all liberal-minded men’.52 
This could be the result of a lack of critical thinking on the part of the 
Chronicle, but is more likely to reflect three underlying beliefs that most 
contemporary British newspapers shared. They felt firstly that the North 
could not win the war; secondly, that the only significant gain it offered was 
the furthering of anti-slavery; and thirdly, that abolition, like any significant 
change, should be accomplished in an orderly fashion wherever possible. 
 
While the Emancipation Proclamation was not a magic bullet for British non-
intervention, neither did it push Britain towards interference. However, this 
should be unsurprising given the overall paucity of British support for even 
the mildest forms of intervention. This, of course, excludes the Trent Affair, 
in which almost every newspaper supported war against the Union if they did 
not make sufficient reparation. At this time, some newspapers advocated 
recognition as a war tactic, while others accepted Southern independence as 
the price of a war they did not want, but would not shrink from.53 
Judging when a paper advocated intervention is difficult, as editorials 
often hedged their bets. The Tadcaster Post’s October 1862 announcement 
that ‘it is high time to talk of an armistice and separation’ was weakened by 
the subsequent coda that ‘A few weeks more’ would prove ‘whether we are to 
have two powerful nations or one weak empire in the west.’54 Hints and 
suggestions that interference might soon be required have not been grouped 
with actual suggestions that Britain should intervene. Instead, they have been 
counted separately: the former as ‘contemplating,’ the latter as ‘proposing’ 
intervention. Similarly, hypothetical scenarios – as when the Doncaster 
Chronicle bemoaned Britain’s inability to mediate because the Conservatives 
were in opposition – or calls for action not involving Britain – as when the 
same paper urged the Emperor of the French to resolve the conflict – have 
generally been discounted.55 
The early period following secession but before the Trent Affair saw a 
number of offers of mediation. Generally, these were pious or friendly, like 
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the Pontefract Telegraph’s suggestion that ‘the points in dispute are capable 
of settlement,’ and the Harrogate Advertiser’s appeal to consanguinity and 
trade links.56 They were also generally short-lived, lasting only a month or 
so.57 The exception was the Hull Advertiser, which opened 1861 by hoping 
that ‘some of the representatives of the Powers at Washington will try their 
hand at mediation’ and held this view through the rest of the year.58 The first 
aggressive suggestions that the blockade should be broken came from the 
advanced Liberal Leeds Times in October 1861, as ‘Cotton we must have’; 
however, by November it advocated ‘an energetic attempt to do without 
American cotton’.59 Early in the New Year, the Pontefract Telegraph and the 
stable of newspapers which shared its editorials renewed this demand for the 
blockade to be broken, but gave it up shortly afterwards.60 
The renewal of the campaigning season in 1862 saw the greatest 
number of newspapers advocating intervention, though not always for long. 
‘The recent undoubted success of the Federal arms’ in spring 1862 led the 
Leeds Times to renew its call for mediation, but only for a fortnight.61 The 
Beverley Recorder advocated mediation at the end of June, yet called 
recognition ‘premature’ the next week and abandoned mediation in the 
middle of July.62 In July, citing the interests of Lancashire and ‘the civilised 
world,’ the Pontefract Telegraph supported ‘mediation – spontaneous, 
voluntary, and without and [sic] odious ultimatum,’ though specifically as ‘a 
very different thing to intervention.’63 It abandoned this in August, yet 
revived it in September, and maintained this stance until the Emancipation 
Proclamation led it to declare that such schemes ‘must now, under the new 
state of things, fall to the ground.’64 
 The most changeable newspaper was perhaps the Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph. In March, it had argued that intervention ‘would reflect a deep 
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stain upon this country’.65 In May, however, both sides would ‘gladly 
welcome the intervention of the Western Powers’ and ‘a peaceable 
intervention… aided by France’ would ‘best serve our cotton manufacturers, 
and the nation at large’.66 At the start of June, intervention would do no 
good; by July, the Confederacy had proved itself worthy of being 
recognised.67 In August, mediation would unite the North behind the war 
effort; later that month, the paper argued that France and Russia should 
mediate.68 In October, delaying recognition ‘betrays a sort of cowardice’; in 
November, ‘we should ourselves be disposed… to wait until the spring’.69 
 Two newspapers were more steadfast in their arguments. The 
Yorkshire Gazette was prompted by the actions of General Butler in New 
Orleans to call for mediation in June, and continued to urge mediation, 
recognition, or both until the end of November.70 In July the Wakefield 
Journal decided that the Confederacy was ‘entitled to be recognised as an 
independent sovereignty,’ which would be both the quickest solution and the 
best for both sides.71 This resolve lasted until October, when no intervention 
(other than armed intervention, which was unthinkable) would do any 
good.72 
 Indeed, the autumn of 1862 was to be the peak of newspapers 
advocating intervention, just as it was to be the high point of cabinet 
consideration of the topic. The Halifax Guardian came round to recognition 
in September 1862 and ‘wise and merciful mediation’ in October, but gave 
these up as futile in November.73 The Sheffield Independent, meanwhile, 
came to support recognition in response to Gladstone before rejecting it 
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shortly afterwards.74 In total, six newspapers advocated intervention in 
October, though not all at the same time. 
Subsequent instances of such advocacy were far more sporadic, and 
most previous supporters abandoned the cause. Though the Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph recommenced advocating recognition in the summer of 1863, it 
increasingly began to suggest that the price of such recognition should be 
Southern emancipation.75 The Halifax Guardian, meanwhile, claimed ‘an 
overwhelming majority’, ‘Whig, Tory or Radical,’ for mediation and 
recognition, but finally abandoned intervention in November 1864.76  
 Newspapers which advocated intervention for the first time tended to 
be the more minor provincial papers. In early 1863, the Scarborough 
Mercury advocated either recognition or mediation to end ‘this fearful 
bloodshed’, though it opposed forcible intervention because ‘it is not in the 
character of an Englishman… to fight a man who is blind’: any request would 
have to come from the Union.77 It subsequently supported recognition in the 
event of the Union refusing mediation, and maintained this stance into 
1864.78 The Pontefract Advertiser urged ‘members of peace societies, or 
advocates of legitimate arbitration’ to attempt arbitration in September 1863, 
but disavowed it in November as ‘honest neutrality is the only honourable 
course’.79 The Whitby Gazette, meanwhile, printed a single editorial in favour 
of ‘European intervention… offered in a friendly manner without menace.’80 
The fact that only the least important papers were converted to interference 
in this period suggests the limitations of Confederate diplomacy and the 
activities of pro-Confederate pressure groups. 
 
Beyond these advocates of mediation was a larger group of newspapers which 
talked in generalities about mediation, but which never actually committed to 
endorsing it. Many newspapers agonised over this decision, drawing close 
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before backing away – in some cases, with excessive frequency.81 That these 
papers flirted with intervention is significant, perhaps, but not so much as 
the fact that they never actually endorsed it.  
There was, however, a solid bloc of predominantly Liberal newspapers 
into whose heads mediation never appears to have entered. In some cases, 
such as the Bradford Review and Huddersfield Examiner, loyalty appears to 
have been guaranteed by their advanced Liberal stance and a local MP firmly 
on the side of the Union: W.E. Forster in the first case, E.A. Leatham in the 
second. In others, a combination of non-intervention, anti-slavery and broad 
favourability to America were sufficient to preserve their neutrality – the only 
exception being the Huddersfield Chronicle, which saw no reason to join the 
war because it was so obvious that the South would win its independence.82 
Twelve newspapers in total were prepared to contemplate 
intervention, with a remarkably even split: two Advanced Liberal, four 
Liberal, four Conservative, and two neutral. A similar split was shown among 
those which actually proposed intervention: one Advanced Liberal, five 
Liberal, five Conservative, and two neutral. At the October 1862 peak, six of 
the thirty-four studied newspapers advocated intervention (two Liberal and 
four Conservative). However, the relative proportion of partisan affiliations 
among Yorkshire newspapers meant Conservative papers were more likely to 
advocate intervention. Of the nine Conservative newspapers, five supported 
intervention and four more considered it, compared to forty per cent and 
thirty per cent respectively of the thirteen Liberal newspapers. As such, it can 
fairly be said that Conservative newspapers were more likely to openly 
advocate support for the South. 
However, some caveats must be applied. Firstly, only forty per cent of 
newspapers ever advocated any form of intervention: even fewer did so 
contemporaneously. As such, British intervention must be treated as the 
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fringe opinion which it was – a treatment supported by the paucity of 
parliamentary discussions of the topic.83 Furthermore, the changeability of 
newspapers – proposing intervention in one issue, and then recanting it in 
the next – suggests that support for secession was not primarily dependent 
on the course of events or underlying political attitudes. Instead, it relied on a 
complex calculus which included the likely reaction of the local readership. It 
may be no accident that the most changeable newspaper, the Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, was a penny daily aimed at working men: perhaps its editor 
believed its large readership fluctuated sufficiently for such shifts to go 
unnoticed.84 
Secondly, neither recognition nor mediation was necessarily framed as 
a hostile act. In some cases, recognition was seen as a matter of fact, like 
Britain’s earlier recognition of Confederate belligerency. The Yorkshire 
Gazette suggested:  
We have not sufficient respect for either side to wish to interfere, but 
we have a great interest in the application of international law, which 
requires that every nation that is independent ought to be treated as 
such. Let us not treat the South as a diplomatic nonentity, and let us 
offer mediation only when acceptable, and meanwhile protect our 
commerce from any illegal pretence of blockade, but beyond this none 
of us would go[.]85 
It would repeat this language a year later: ‘We have no wish to interfere… 
but, even to compliment the North, we cannot refuse to recognise the plain 
fact of Southern independence forever.’86 It is perhaps telling that even the 
Yorkshire Gazette, whose proprietor James Lancelot Foster was later a 
member of the Southern Independence Association, found the need to soften 
and reframe its proposals for intervention. However, these proposals were 
often coupled with harsh anti-Union language – the October 1862 piece 
criticised the ‘cowardice, division and even treachery’ in the Union, argued 
the war was ‘one of revenge, and of private peculation and speculation,’ and 
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complained of their tendency ‘to hang and plunder private citizens, and treat 
their wives and daughters as prostitutes’.87  
The implications of this particular difference, between readiness to 
critique American democracy and unwillingness to intervene, even via low-
risk and hands-off diplomatic methods, will be considered in the two 
upcoming chapters. However, it suggests that a stark distinction should be 
drawn between language and action: that there remained a significant step 
between criticising the Union or praising the Confederacy, and advocating 
that Britain should do something other than look on. 
 
The conclusions drawn from Yorkshire newspaper opinion contradict several 
key aspects of the traditionalist case that the primary determinant of British 
loyalties in the conflict was attitudes towards reform. Firstly, anti-slavery was 
the most ubiquitous factor across the political spectrum when considering 
the conflict: the issue was not that Britain no longer opposed slavery, but that 
the Union was insufficiently anti-slavery to excite British sympathy. 
Secondly, support for intervention was more of a fringe opinion than 
scepticism about reform. Furthermore, the hesitant and faltering tone 
characterising most proposals for intervention suggests that these were 
speculative and event-driven rather than rooted in fundamental ideological 
principles. But how far do these conclusions also apply to the potential 
Parliamentary supporters of intervention? 
 
MPs’ public speech 
 
As the war was drawing to a close, Professor Henry Fawcett told a non-
electors’ demonstration in Bradford that 95 per cent of the ‘governing classes 
sincerely sympathised with the Southern Confederacy (Hear, hear, and cries 
of “Shame”)’.88 Though it is generally suggested that most MPs supported the 
South, the MPs of Yorkshire by no means bore out this calculation.89 Of those 
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MPs who spoke openly about the conflict, the overwhelming majority backed 
the government’s stance of neutrality. This should perhaps be unsurprising, 
given the predominantly Liberal composition of the county’s representation. 
Twelve of the fourteen who spoke in favour of neutrality were Liberal MPs, 
including the secretary of state for India Sir Charles Wood and the attorney 
general Sir Roundell Palmer – though cabinet membership did not prevent 
Gladstone breaking ranks to talk favourably about intervention.90 One 
Conservative who praised neutrality, Basil Woodd of Knaresborough, did so 
at the 1865 election in the context of supporting non-intervention in 
Denmark; the second, his running-mate Thomas Collins, urged it in mid-
1863.91 
 The other Liberal MPs who openly praised neutrality included 
significant future names such as W.E. Forster and H.C.E. Childers, as well as 
prominent backbench Liberals Robert Monckton Milnes and George 
Hadfield, and more minor figures like Harry Stephenson Thompson of 
Whitby and John Greenwood of Ripon.92 The presence of Radicals like 
Edward Baines, E.A. Leatham, James Stansfeld, and Frank Crossley also fits 
the traditional narrative that it was the working class and Radicals who were 
foremost in preventing Britain from intervening in the conflict.93  
However, certain reservations should be noted. For a start, the radical 
Dissenter George Hadfield appears to have been very close to joining his 
Sheffield colleague John Arthur Roebuck in supporting the Confederacy. In 
February 1862, he ‘felt sure that if America were left to herself the disasters 
which at present afflicted her would work their own cure’.94 Yet in August, at 
a Sheffield civic occasion attended by Lord Palmerston, which Roebuck had 
used to plead with the premier to recognise the Confederacy, Hadfield 
commented that ‘the sentiments just expressed deserve the most serious 
consideration’. He followed this up with the hope ‘that some expression of 
opinion will shortly be given by the whole country, which will have some 
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effect upon the present war.’95 This uncertainty did not last long, as the next 
month Hadfield announced his support for ‘that policy which Lord Russell 
and the Government of Lord Palmerston are now carrying out – (Hear, hear) 
– non-interference, non-intervention, [and] good-will to America’.96 
However, it demonstrates that some MPs who would appear natural 
supporters of the Union were actually tempted to promote intervention. This 
presumably applied not just to Hadfield, who spoke, but to others who 
remained silent. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that not all of those who endorsed 
neutrality were wholehearted Union supporters. The Liberal MP Harry 
Stephenson Thompson had ‘aforetime laboured in the anti-slavery cause,’ 
and was in correspondence with Garrison.97 However, despite supporting 
non-intervention, he was not shy of pointing out the fact that the war 
stemmed in part from the Union’s ‘unchristian spirit of revenge’, caused by 
‘want of a closer adherence to… the Bible.’98 
Consideration of those who supported intervention does more to 
weaken this automatic connection between domestic reform and Union 
support, as well as ‘governing class’ Confederate support. Only eight MPs 
advocated or contemplated intervention, the foremost of whom was the 
Utilitarian John Arthur Roebuck of Sheffield, who moved for intervention in 
the Commons in mid-1863.99 Three other MPs who could be described as 
Liberal joined him. At a Lancashire distress meeting in Malton, Charles 
Wentworth-Fitzwilliam felt there was ‘little doubt’ recognition would come 
‘at some future time’.100 At a meeting of the South Myton Reform 
Association, James Clay of Hull was ‘entirely content to trust the present 
government (applause), or any other government’ to take ‘the earliest 
opportunity of offering any mediation which can afford a reasonable chance 
of restoring peace to that wretched country (Hear, hear)’.101 
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Joshua Westhead, MP for York, had argued in February 1861 that 
everybody ‘did hope most heartily that slavery would receive a fatal blow in 
this land (hear, hear).’ 102 By February 1862, however, Westhead was 
prepared to argue that ‘The Southern States had interests quite irrespective 
of the slave question, which might induce them to say to the North, “We wish 
to separate from you.”’103 Though non-interference was ‘the sound policy 
(Applause),’ if Britain was ‘called on to interfere… we shall interfere as 
friends, and in the best interests of humanity (Applause)’. By October, ‘We 
should be glad to throw oil on the troubled waters. God grant that the 
statesmen of Europe might have wisdom to act’; in January 1863, ‘possibly it 
might be their duty, ere long, to tender their best offices as mediators’.104  
There were also four Conservative MPs who supported or considered 
intervention, though none as vociferously as Roebuck. In October 1862, John 
Charles Dalrymple Hay, MP for Wakefield, stated that ‘if to be successful in a 
long war against a powerful neighbour is the proof of nationality, then is the 
South deserving of recognition’; he restated this in October 1863, concurring 
with Gladstone ‘that the Confederate states have earned their 
independence.’105 Colonel John George Smyth, MP for York but residing at 
Heath Hall in Wakefield, also argued for mediation – though ‘from France, 
whose motive could not be suspected, [rather] than from us, whose every 
word was misconstrued (Applause).’106 The two representatives for the North 
Riding also advocated intervention, though at different stages. In early 1863 
William Morritt had announced his willingness to support a motion for 
recognition of the Confederacy, while William Duncombe spoke in the House 
of Commons in early 1864 to say 
More than a year ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the 
Southern States had “made themselves a nation.”… he desired to ask 
how long this was to continue before we should recognize their 
independence? He hoped that the Government would lose no 
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opportunity of offering their friendly advice in conjunction with that of 
other Powers107 
To these four should also be added Admiral Arthur Duncombe, Conservative 
MP for the East Riding, who joined the Southern Independence Association 
but apparently never publicly campaigned for intervention.108 
As forty-six per cent of the county’s Conservative MPs considered 
intervention, but only fifteen per cent of Liberals, this appears to be further 
evidence for the suggestion that there was a link between those who opposed 
reform and those who supported the Confederacy. However, Conservative 
support for intervention seems to have been relatively soft. Morritt, for 
instance, said he wished ‘it depended on the House of Commons to make 
them at peace and independent of each other’, and would ‘most certainly’ 
support recognition there.109 However, he subsequently failed to speak in 
support of Roebuck’s motion in the summer, never spoke on America in the 
House, and denied it was ever his intention to vote for Lindsay’s mediation 
motion in the summer of 1864.110 This suggests that the traditional picture 
overstates the importance to Conservatives of the survival of the Confederacy 
and the humiliation of the Union. 
It should also be noted that the Liberal MPs who endorsed or 
considered intervention were not generally recalcitrant Whigs or Liberal-
Conservative Palmerstonians waiting for an opportunity to defect. Westhead 
believed that the 1859 election demonstrated ‘the people of York were 
entitled to a large extension of the franchise (Applause),’ and reiterated his 
commitment to enfranchising ‘those of my fellow countrymen whose 
intelligence and loyalty to our institutions entitle them to a just share of 
political power’ in his 1865 election address.111 Clay was a radical, who had 
condemned the ‘overgrown aristocracy’ at the 1859 election and proposed an 
educational franchise which ‘a working man of ordinary intelligence might 
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master by the sacrifice of his leisure hour at night for, say, six months’.112 
Wentworth-Fitzwilliam, too, advocated an educational test, and the 
enfranchisement of lodgers as well as property owners.113 Even Roebuck 
professed to ‘have endeavoured to the best of my ability to give you power in 
the state’.114 
If the supporters of intervention are surprising, there are also some 
notable absences from the list. Contemporary views of democracy will be 
addressed later, but in this diplomatic context it is important to note that 
some of the most prominent sceptics about democracy endorsed non-
intervention. Thomas Collins of Knaresborough, for instance, ‘denied the 
right of a number of people whose stake in the country was next to nothing, 
to put their hands into the pockets of the wealthy landowners’.115 He also 
criticised John Bright and the tendency ‘to Americanise the institutions of 
this country.’116 However, he was also ‘happy to say that the conduct of the 
government had in North America been that of non-interference… The longer 
we could keep out… the better it would be for us whether the interference was 
moral or material. (Hear, hear).’117 Similarly, Major Henry Edwards of 
Beverley was highly critical of the Union, contrasting its history – ‘held up to 
us, as the paragon of good government, for our imitation’ – with its current 
state – ‘Taxation of the heaviest kind… personal liberty subjected to martial 
law, and the detestable tyranny of provost marshals.’118 Yet this criticism did 
not spill over into support for interference, which was ‘too wide a field to 
enter upon.’119 
On the Liberal side, Sir John Ramsden is often cited as one of the 
main examples of British apathy towards the Union’s struggle. His comment 
in the 1861 reform debate about ‘the bursting of that great Republican 
bubble… so often held up to us as the model on which to recast our own 
English Constitution’ has been taken as an example of the approach of British 
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Whigs towards the conflict.120 However, Ramsden was adamant that Britain 
should avoid interference. Even speaking at Sheffield, the heart of 
Confederate activism, Ramsden expressed his belief that ‘any intervention on 
our part would but serve to embitter the strife – (Cheers)’.121 
The views of the county’s MPs bear out the conclusions drawn with 
respect to its newspapers: there was no automatic connection between 
support for reform and support for the Union, and there was a greater 
distance than has traditionally been portrayed between distaste for 
democracy, or belief that the war was unwinnable, and support for British 
intervention. However, the Liberal party was not shy of claiming at the 1865 
election that their opponents would have plunged them into war with 
America. If, as has been suggested, the Conservative party leadership shied 
away from the South in the hope of using the war ‘for their own political 
benefit,’ they had little success in Yorkshire.122 In constituencies from 
Richmond to Scarborough, Liberal candidates and newspapers made the 
same accusation: ‘the opposition party in this country would have involved us 
in a war with America.’123 These accusations were particularly frequent 
against MPs who had been most outspoken on the issue: in the North Riding, 
where both sitting Conservatives had supported intervention, the Liberal 
challenger Frederick Millbank spoke repeatedly of ‘the wars which the 
Conservatives would have led us into in America, in Austria, in Prussia, and 
France’.124 In Wakefield, Sir John Hay was accused personally on the 
hustings of supporting war with America.125 
However, there are a number of indications that this was as much a 
party move as a matter of fact. When Millbank had contested the 1862 North 
Riding election in the immediate aftermath of the Trent Affair, his seconder 
had praised the way that the Liberal government had ‘jumped down Brother 
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Jonathan’s throat with their spurs on.’126 In February 1862, the Wakefield 
Liberals were already accusing Sir John Hay and the Conservatives of being 
‘anxious to embroil us with our American brethren of the Northern States, 
and to ally us with the slave-holders of the South’; in 1865, one of the Liberals 
who shouted at Hay that he wanted war with America had previously 
confessed his belief that the war was ‘almost purposeless... [with] nothing in 
it to attract the sympathies of mankind’.127 Indeed, some of those who 
accused the Conservatives of a plan to intervene had themselves considered 
or spoken in favour of intervention. The Leeds Times, Joshua Westhead at 
York, and Charles Wentworth-Fitzwilliam at Malton all criticised the 
Conservatives for abandoning the neutrality they themselves had expected to 
fall by the wayside.128 We should, therefore, seek evidence that Conservatives 
supported the Confederates from their own words and not those of their 
opponents. 
Moreover, the claim that Confederate activism was a prerogative of the 
governing classes may be dubious. Roebuck persuaded a 10,000-strong 
meeting in Paradise Square to back his pro-intervention stance; in June 
1864, William Duncombe presented a petition ‘from the inhabitants of 
Arkengarthdale, in favour of the recognition of the Confederate States’; and 
William Morritt’s announcement that he was willing to recognise the 
Confederacy received either applause or ‘applause and hisses’.129 As such, we 
should consider how far we can detect popular sympathy on either side of the 




If the ultimate expression of British sympathy for either side was to take part 
in the conflict, then Yorkshire appears to have been on the side of the Union. 
The overwhelming majority of communications printed in newspapers across 
the county came from or referred to Union soldiers, and even a small sample 
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of these communications illustrates the scope of such participation. From the 
North Riding, George Nettleton, formerly of Scarborough, was hit on the 
head by a shell at Antietam and killed at Fredericksburg with the 5th New 
Hampshire.130 From the East Riding, John Coverdale, a grandson of a 
licensed victualler from Hull, was killed at Cedar Mountain with the 5th 
Ohio.131 The West Riding, meanwhile, as the most populous district in the 
county, saw a large number of participants, from Joseph Harrop, killed at 
Bull Run with the 1st Rhode Island, to Edwin Bulmer, killed in North 
Carolina with the 129th Illinois.132 Other surviving evidence is similarly 
skewed towards the Union, from the prisoner of war certificate of John 
Pearson of the 18th Wisconsin, to the presence of Charles Wood in Wakefield 
Asylum due to epilepsy developed in Libby Prison.133 
 Crucially, barely any Confederate soldiers featured in the Yorkshire 
press. James Weadley, formerly of the Bull and Sun Inn at Bridlington, was 
killed at Shiloh with the 2nd Tennessee Infantry.134 When Lt. Col. Thomas 
Beaumont, a relative of a Huddersfield Tory, was killed at the head of the 
14th Tennessee, the local paper printed his obituary.135 Some ex-
Confederates also made their way through Yorkshire, either to settle like 
Joseph Taylor of the West Riding Constabulary (late 5th Louisiana), or to 
pass through like Louis Poletti of Switzerland.136 However, the weight of 
communications was always overwhelmingly on the side of the Union.  
 There are multiple reasons for this imbalance. Although some of the 
disparity resulted from the relative difficulty of communicating with the 
blockaded South, the contemporary anxiety for news from the South should 
have counteracted that. The more significant factor is that there were more 
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Yorkshire emigrants in the North than the South, because it offered greater 
economic opportunities. Indeed, the number of Yorkshire emigrants who 
served alongside family, friends or neighbours reinforces this impression. 
Thomas Pitchforth, formerly of Salthebble, joined the 7th Iowa with his wife’s 
cousin Feargus Hanson, formerly of Elland; William Baxendale of the 42nd 
New York wrote to his brother that ‘there is a young man in my regiment a 
native of Halifax named Thos. Ramsden, who knows you’; Mrs Bowman of 
the Salutation Inn, South Fencote, had one son killed and a second wounded 
in the conflict.137  
 It should, however, be noted that Union soldiers did not always speak 
out loudly in support of the war, either domestically or internationally.138 
Letters to friends and relations in Yorkshire were often sceptical or 
concerned about what was going on, particularly in the early years when the 
Union struggled to achieve military success.139 Furthermore, some of the 
letters received in Yorkshire reflected a broader Northern belief that Britain 
was betraying them through its Confederate sympathy. A letter from George 
Baildon to his brother and sister, on his return from serving with the 
Pennsylvania militia during the Gettysburg Campaign, was hardly designed 
to bring the two sides closer together. He called England ‘the Grate Humbug,’ 
blamed the New York Draft Riots on ‘lump heads… just come over from the 
old sod’ and encouraged Britain, if it was willing to intervene, to ‘pile in, and 
then you will pile out again’.140 The British desire to see the conflict brought 
to an end was influenced by personal ties towards the combatants, and the 
sense that the Union was by no means a natural friend of Britain may have 
been enhanced by personal as well as public and official statements. As the 
Tadcaster Post argued, Southern sympathies could be ‘more apparent than 
real… the reaction of the antipathy which Northern insult and brag have 
engendered.’141 
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 The only sizeable contingent of Yorkshire Confederates was in the 
maritime sphere. Running the blockade of the Southern coast, to bring 
weapons and rare commodities in and cotton out, was particularly attractive 
along the Yorkshire coast. Whitby newspapers reported multiple voyages by 
Captain Pickernell, of the Flora and the Mary Ann, and George Page, of the 
Old Dominion.142 The Southwick, lying at anchor in Hull’s Queen’s Dock, 
hoisted the Confederate flag to celebrate a successful voyage.143 
 The most notable occasion of blockade running, if not the most 
profitable, was Zachariah C. Pearson of Hull. He had risen from cabin boy to 
owner of a minor shipping line, but at the opening of the American Civil War 
found himself overextended thanks to the credit-based purchase of a rival’s 
ships.144 For Pearson, the logical response was to start blockade running; 
however, he had a string of vessels captured and condemned despite appeals 
to the Supreme Court.145 Compounding earlier commercial problems, such as 
the loss of ships in the Baltic trade, this resulted in bankruptcy.146 Pearson’s 
motives are unclear: at least one of the newspapers saw his activities as a 
philanthropic measure, on behalf of ‘the spinners in our Hull and Kingston 
cotton mills.’147 Hull itself suffered from the effects of the blockade, with over 
a thousand people out of work and two cotton mills closed: at one stage, 
‘some hundreds of unemployed working men’ paraded ‘through the principal 
streets, carrying flags and banners’.148 At the bankruptcy proceedings, 
however, Pearson himself admitted the Federal authorities ‘knew I was a 
sincere sympathiser with the Confederates’ and Pearson’s lawyer referenced 
his personal financial position.149 Pearson was considered by some of his 
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fellow townsmen to be ‘the greatest kite-flyer we ever had’.150 However, other 
merchants in Hull were also prepared to deal with the South.151 
 The second significant facet of the Confederate maritime war effort 
was the use of commerce raiders to attack Union merchant ships, and in this 
the Yorkshire coast also played its part. Some of these participants sought 
public recognition by writing to local papers, such as a sailor of the 
Confederate cruiser Rappahannock and the son of ‘a professional gentleman 
in Hull’ who sailed with the Confederate commerce raider Alabama.152 
Others, less literate or less publicity-seeking, limited themselves to a local 
reputation – like John Tallentine, who returned to a fishing career in 
Bridlington claiming to have served aboard the Alabama.153 The fact that the 
brother of a Hull butcher was accused of decoying men aboard the 
Rappahannock suggests that the prospect of Confederate service was not 
universally popular.154 Nevertheless, men certainly served in the Confederate 
navy, though in much smaller numbers than in the Union army and (despite 
the difficulty of quantification) probably in similar numbers to the Union 
navy.155 
 Perhaps the most significant aspect of this enlistment is that the 
numbers serving in the Confederate cause bore little relation to the pattern of 
Confederate activism. As has been seen above, the bulk of identifiable 
Confederate recruits came from the Yorkshire coast. However, the hope of 
the Hull Advertiser that Hull, as ‘a great British port,’ would take the lead in 
campaigning for recognition was unfulfilled. The total number of Southern 
Independence Association (SIA) activists in the East and North Ridings, five, 
was as many as in the growing but still minor West Riding town of 
Doncaster. Moreover, the SIA itself seems to have seen better prospects in 
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Sheffield, Halifax and Bradford than in the more distant reaches of 
Yorkshire.156 This may be because those towns held more political influence, 
but it seems hard to imagine that the SIA would have passed up the 
opportunity to hold a successful meeting in a town like Hull, the third most 
significant port in the country, if it could have done so.157 The failure of an 
attempt by two Aldermen to have the Town Council petition the Queen to 
bring the war to a close also suggests that support was limited.158  
As such, it would seem likely that we can disassociate at least some 
pro-Confederate activity in Britain from a deeper and more meaningful 
support for Confederate independence. The fact that Liverpool was both the 
centre of blockade running activity and a hub of Confederate activism may 
have presented an incorrect picture of the links between the two.159 
Elsewhere, the element of sympathy behind blockade running seems to have 
been outweighed by opportunism. We may assume that this motive also 
applied to those serving aboard Confederate commerce raiders. 
 
If the strength of Confederate sympathy was not strongly correlated to the 
numbers serving in the wars, it is also important to note that it seems to have 
been disassociated from the strength of Conservatism in the county. The 
West Riding was the heartland of Liberalism, with 90 per cent of its MPs in 
1865 belonging to the party; the North Riding was marginally less strong, 
with 70 per cent Liberal MPs in 1865; the East Riding was the only area in 
which Conservatives held a majority, holding 83 per cent of the seats. 
However, it was the West Riding which was disproportionately represented 
among Confederate activists: with 74 per cent of the population, it had 86 per 
cent of Southern Independence Association (SIA) members, whereas the 
North and East Ridings with twelve per cent of the population each had two 
and three per cent of the activists respectively.160 The most disproportionate 
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was the city of York, historically disassociated from the Ridings, which had 
two per cent of the population but nine per cent of activists: it returned one 
MP from each party. The disparity is even greater when we consider pro-
Confederate meetings, all of which were concentrated in the West Riding. 
This suggests that the link between Confederate sympathy and Conservatism 
was by no means an automatic one.  
If it was Conservative mistrust of democracy which motivated British 
support for the Confederacy, then it is among the ranks of the SIA that we 
should expect to see the most staunch anti-democrats and opponents of 
reform. Of its ninety-three Yorkshire members, thirty-two have left sufficient 
evidence for their political viewpoints to be categorised with an appropriate 
degree of confidence: twenty were Conservative, and twelve were varying 
degrees of Liberal. However, the implications of this statistic depend largely 
on whether the observer accepts the fundamental principle that 
Conservatives supported the South. If so, the most significant fact is that the 
SIA had a majority of Conservative members in a county whose 
representation was overwhelmingly Liberal. However, those prepared to test 
this principle a little more would highlight that representation under simple 
majoritarian electoral systems is not always an accurate reflection of the true 
political makeup of an area, particularly among the elites from which the 
SIA’s membership was drawn.161 If so, and if the political balance among the 
target population was closer to even, then the statistical significance of the 
Conservative majority decreases. 
Looking into the background of individual members helps to clarify 
these broad classifications. Certainly, Conservatives like James Robinson 
Pease fitted all the stereotypes of the typical Confederate supporter. He felt 
that Catholic emancipation meant ‘Goodbye to England’s glory,’ Free Trade 
was ‘a further carrying out of the Democratic Infidel Spirit of the Reform 
Bill,’ and America was filled with ‘intense hatred and jealousy of Old 
England’.162 He also chaired Conservative committees at the 1859 election, 
viewing the contest of that year as a question of ‘Americanising or 
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revolutionising England’.163 However, other members of the SIA identified as 
Conservatives were much less active in the party. Charles Winn, for instance, 
had contested Beverley in the Conservative interest in 1832, when he had felt 
it necessary to announce that he held ‘slavery in every form… in the utmost 
abhorrence’.164 The evidence for the Conservative leanings of Reverend 
Abraham Smith, meanwhile, comes from a single comment in a letter to Sir 
John Ramsden, when Smith was angrily disclaiming Sir John’s imputation 
that he was soliciting a bribe to vote Liberal.165  
It is relatively easy to identify an individual with a party; dramatically 
less so, except in the cases of the very vocal, to determine their political 
beliefs. Many of the Conservatives who did talk about their political 
sentiments disclaimed what might be termed radical American principles: for 
instance, John Swann hoped ‘the North Riding will never return an advocate 
of… universal suffrage and vote by ballot.’166 However, because reform was 
also Conservative party policy in this period, Swann had earlier argued for ‘a 
good reform bill… that would satisfy all classes’ in opposition to ‘Bright and 
universal suffrage.’167 Where exactly his views lay are unclear, but this should 
act as a reminder that Conservatives were not necessarily opponents of 
reform – a factor which will be addressed, along with Liberal attitudes 
towards ‘democratisation,’ in the next chapter. 
That Confederate support was more multipolar than the mere 
question of extending the franchise may be seen in the backgrounds of the 
SIA’s non-Conservative members. Rev. Canon Trevor, for instance, has not 
been grouped as a Liberal because he lacked institutional affiliation to the 
party: however, he proclaimed himself a supporter of Gladstone and 
universal suffrage in 1864.168 His first involvement with anything that might 
be considered Confederate activism was when he moved an amendment at a 
meeting of the Union and Emancipation Society (UES) suggesting that the 
Union was insincere on abolition, and that ‘a separation between the North 
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and South would prove a great step towards the freedom of the slave’.169 
Whether his rough handling by Northern supporters pushed him further into 
Confederate activism is unclear, though his Huddersfield counterpart 
Thomas Heelis Broadbent joined the SIA after being bodily thrown out of a 
UES meeting. 
If Conservative members of the SIA were on the fringes of their party, 
the Liberals were fewer in number but more integral to Yorkshire politics. 
This seems to have been particularly the case in the county’s rural areas. 
Major Thomas Elwon of Redcar, for instance, acted on the Liberal committee 
for the North Riding in 1865.170 George Sergeantson of Bedale played a key 
role in both the North Riding and West Riding registration associations.171 
Matthew Wilson of Eshton Hall of Gargrave, meanwhile, was a former 
Liberal MP for Clitheroe who acted in the West Riding’s Northern division.172 
The traditional understanding of the effect of the war is that it 
brokered an alliance between pro-Union radicals and the mainstream of the 
party. This will be considered in more detail in the following chapter: 
however, the Liberal members of the SIA suggest that it was the ability to 
forget allegiances that had been held during the American Civil War that was 
critical. Far from being ostracised by a radicalising Liberal party, these 
former SIA members were welcomed back. Major Elwon was with the Liberal 
candidate at the declaration of the North Riding poll in 1868, and 
Sergeantson stepped down as the chairman of the North Riding Liberal 
Registration Association in the same year after ‘a long life in promoting 
Liberal principles’.173  
It was Matthew Wilson who would have the most active post-
American Civil War career, however. In 1866 he supported the Liberal reform 
bill; he chaired the Northern West Riding committee in 1868 and 1872; in the 
latter year he was proposed as a candidate for the Riding, almost beating out 
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the former Chartist sympathiser Isaac Holden.174 He held a Northern West 
Riding seat until 1885, and was a firm opponent of the Liberal Unionists, 
arguing that they were ‘deserting Whig[s], who had no principles at all… 
[and] ought to be kicked out of Parliament (Laughter, and hear, hear).’175 
The exact motivations of this particular sub-set of SIA members are as 
unclear as their Conservative rivals. However, their long careers in the party 
suggest that they were sufficiently supportive of reform to survive within it. 
What they do demonstrate is the range of motivations behind those who went 
to the length of signing up to campaign for Confederate independence. In the 
case of Rev. Canon Trevor and others like him, it seems to have been a lack of 
faith in the Union’s anti-slavery credentials. In the case of Matthew Wilson, 
who owned cotton mills, it may have been economic.176 Regardless of their 
exact motivations, however, their subsequent careers make it clear that the 
American Civil War was not so great a watershed in British politics as it has 




In America, the memory of the Civil War was repeatedly reinvented to serve 
various domestic political purposes.177 So, too, was the memory of British 
involvement in the Civil War reinvented to better fit the evolutions of popular 
politics – as well as to save the blushes of those who had mistakenly 
predicted its outcome. For instance, by early 1866 the Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph was mocking ‘Speeches and articles in newspapers enough to 
cover the American continent’ anticipating Southern victory, as well as 
protesting ‘ignoble lovers of mischief’ who had been ‘itching to push us into 
collision with the people of the United States,’ without mentioning its own 
contribution to the Confederate cause.178 Having supported the Union 
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became more of a litmus test of ‘true Liberalism’ over time, but this should 
not be allowed to confuse the contemporary situation. 
In reality, support for British interference was a relatively fringe 
proposition, even among the governing classes and newspaper opinion. 
Those serving with the Confederate navy and running the blockade seem to 
have been motivated as much by opportunism and profit as by genuine 
sympathy for the Confederacy. Though anti-slavery has long been supposed 
to have been declining in importance, the study of Yorkshire supports 
revisionist suggestions that it was the fundamental basis of British attitudes 
towards the conflict. However, scepticism about the strength of the Union’s 
anti-slavery convictions strengthened British instincts towards neutrality. 
This scepticism had its proximate cause in Union actions in the early months 
of the war, but its longer roots were in the perceptions of American racism 
which will be detailed in chapter six. 
The suggestion that Britain remained true to its anti-slavery roots is 
strengthened when we consider American opinion. The stereotype of 
aristocratic Britain abandoning its anti-slavery convictions to support the 
South was only one contemporary American narrative. In some cases, 
Northern newspapers which opposed the war criticised it as a British 
abolitionist plot to split the Union and denounced the Republicans as 
pawns.179 Others who supported the war argued it was critical to emancipate 
the slaves to keep Britain neutral, as a means of silencing anti-abolitionist 
opponents.180 Not all those in the US, therefore, felt that the weakening of 
British anti-slavery might lead them to intervene. However, though Britain 
was never close to intervention in the war, we should also consider how the 
war, and the example of America more generally, affected the reform debate 
in British politics. 
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Chapter 5: Democracy and Reform, 1861-5 
 
In the winter of 1863, when dedicating the cemetery at Gettysburg, President 
Lincoln gave the Union war effort a lucid, concise statement of purpose. The 
‘great civil war’ they were fighting was to test whether ‘any nation,’ ‘conceived 
in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal’ 
‘can long endure’.1 This belief that the victory of the Union was integral to the 
survival of free institutions of self-government was a common one in 
contemporary America. It was particularly strong among German emigrants, 
who hoped the American example would encourage democracy in their 
homeland.2 In it, we may also see elements of the historiographical argument 
that it was those who opposed reform in Britain who hoped for Confederate 
victory. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, however, we must look more closely 
into Britain’s relationship with democracy and reform between the outbreak 
of the American Civil War and the 1865 election. In the historiography of 
British views on America, there is broad acceptance that the relationship was, 
at best, inspirational: there was no real prospect of replicating American 
institutions in Britain even had this been desirable.3 There is also a 
substantial body of literature which emphasises that Union victory gave new 
strength to a reform coalition, bringing together intellectuals and trade union 
activists.4 However, the widespread acceptance of ‘democracy’ as a concept 
seems not to pre-empt the 1867 Reform Act, but to follow it.5 
 This chapter seeks to ground these various high-level debates in an 
understanding of how the concept of ‘democracy’ was received more 
popularly within Yorkshire. It evaluates attitudes over the course of the Civil 
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War, but also the broader framework in which American democracy was 
contextualised. Furthermore, it considers what the results of the 1865 
election tell us about the significance of both reform and democracy – two 
concepts which were not necessarily identical. The examination of this 
relationship will fall into two broad sections: the first considering British 
views of democracy in the American and global context, and the second 
bringing the question home to examine the state of the reform debate over 
the course of the period. 
 
Democracy in the world 
 
Though Lincoln felt that ‘government of the people, by the people, for the 
people’ was under threat, it appears to have been only a small contingent of 
Union activists who felt the same way. For instance, George Tatham argued 
to a Leeds audience that the North felt that ‘popular self-government, if 
allowed now to break down in their case, could never again be tried on the 
same scale… it would be a triumph for despotic over free institutions’.6 In 
some cases, these activists were arguing directly from Union sources: Charles 
Ernest wrote to his local newspaper citing a letter he had received from a 
former townsman, now in New Hampshire, who argued that separation 
would destroy ‘the best form of government for the benefit of the whole 
people’.7 Yet even some of these activists were less than consistent. The 
radical General Thomas Perronet Thompson, anti-Corn Law activist and 
former MP for Bradford, claimed that ‘the rebellion in America was under an 
official declaration that it was in support of slavery and the propriety of 
reducing the working class in England to the same condition.’8 Though 
Lincoln would have happily endorsed this sentiment, he would have been 
perturbed by Thompson’s earlier claim that the Constitution was ‘a fraud, not 
upon Americans alone, but upon all of unfortunate humankind’.9 
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 Mainstream opinion was substantially more sceptical about the claim 
that popular self-government was under threat. In Lincoln’s famous ‘house 
divided’ speech, he had raised the prospect that the Union might be 
dissolved; much Yorkshire commentary was unclear as to why this was such 
a significant problem.10 In the event of separation, the Leeds Mercury was ‘at 
a loss to see how either America or the cause of freedom would seriously 
suffer.’ 11 Nor would there be an issue of prestige: ‘America will be a great 
nation even if it cannot win back, or force back, its rebellious states.’12 
Furthermore, the choice between Union survival and abolition was no choice 
for the British. ‘If the American union can only be kept together by 
encouraging slavery, perish the union,’ thundered the York Herald.13 
 There is a more fundamental reason for this difference in attitudes 
towards the Union. 1860s Britain saw international geopolitics as a conflict 
between ‘a successfully inclusive British political community… at odds with 
an overwhelmingly autocratic Continent.’14 Though Conservative newspapers 
were much more focused on Britain itself, Liberal opinion tended to see the 
United States as either a potential or an actual ally in this broader conflict. 
The Wakefield Free Press, for instance, looked back to ‘troubled times, 
when… England and America alone… gave a refutation to the sneers of the 
abettors of despotism that popular government was a failure.’15 
Before the outbreak of the war, the visit of the Prince of Wales to the 
United States had provided an opportunity for both sides to express their 
kinship.16 The York Herald argued that ‘the last pang of jealousy had fled 
forever’ and Britain and America ‘could calculate on mutual assistance, in 
defence of the rights and liberties of the Anglo-Saxon race.’17 The Leeds 
Times located Britain’s allies among ‘emancipated and liberty-loving nations’ 
rather than ‘mouldy or mushroom despotisms,’ and hoped for ‘cordial 
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friendship between the two most progressive and liberty-loving nations’.18 
The Beverley Recorder warned that ‘France and Despotism will take their 
advantage whenever they find a schism between us and our brothers in the 
West.’19 
 However, hopes for this progressive alliance were generally thwarted 
by the propensities of the United States. The Sheffield Daily Telegraph 
complained that ‘America was the bully of the world… to none more so than 
England, with whom she ought from affinity of principles and of blood, to 
have been on terms of amity and alliance… she is ever an unsafe reliance for 
liberty and a sure friend to such despotisms as Russia’.20 The Sheffield 
Independent remarked that the pro-Northern MP W.E. Forster’s vision of a 
‘great alliance of the Anglo-Saxon race’ was only a dream: 
our community of blood, of language, of ideas, is quite inadequate to 
overpower in the American mind that jealousy of our commercial 
greatness, that hatred of our influence in the world, that bitterness 
which was left behind by the revolutionary war, and of which the 
embers are sedulously blown into new life every 4th of July… The 
Americans have far more readiness to fraternise with Muscovite 
despotism and barbarism than with a free, peace-loving, commercial 
people, all whose successes they regard as detractions from their own 
greatness.21  
 
The Civil War’s upheaval offered the prospect that the US would change its 
ways, however. In a culture which saw the hand of Christian providence in 
international events, it was common to predict that the ordeal would improve 
America. Even radicals could hope for a more minor version of this moral 
renaissance: a prize essay produced by a working man for the Bradford 
Review’s competition ended on the hope that ‘America may lose nothing but 
dross in the fiery furnace… flourish side by side with England… and that both 
may become… the champions of freedom’.22 There were, therefore, two 
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reasons that Britain was less concerned about the ramifications of a Union 
defeat in the Civil War. Firstly, ‘whatever may be the issue… the fundamental 
principle on which the political institutions of the States have hitherto rested 
– that of self-government – will not be overthrown’; secondly, ‘the public 
morality of her citizens will be improved, and her free institutions will have a 
better opportunity of developing those national virtues which are always 
associated with genuine liberty.’23 
 Across the Atlantic, however, a dramatically different perspective held 
sway. The (perhaps stereo-) typical American self-image was of ‘the “last best 
hope of earth” for free government,’ an isolated power whose allies were 
individuals rather than countries.24 Britain, rather than a kindred spirit, was 
an envious rival monarchy looking favourably on the prospect of America’s 
failure. The Californian Adjutant-General regarded with dread a ‘foreign 
government based upon principles antagonistic to our own… upon our 
northern frontier… ever jealous… unscrupulous as to the means which her 
statesmen adopt to crush out all’.25 The North saw only evil from the 
disruption of the Union; the British saw the potential for good. 
 Hugh deBrulle has suggested that ‘Conservative-minded people,’ in 
reaction to urbanisation, industrialisation, and egalitarianism, constructed 
‘an Anglo-Saxon Confederacy, a romantic image that served as a model for 
England’s regeneration.’26 However, this case is supported largely by 
selective quotation. Rather than believing that ‘a gentry similar to that of 
England held the balance of power’, the British were under no illusions about 
the nature of Southern institutions – as the very source he cites makes 
clear:27 
of aristocratic government there is no trace… In the South popular 
suffrage really prevails... [and] the South has been getting more and 
more democratic… admirers of democracy are very short-sighted in 
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not taking the part of the South… they might take up a stronger 
ground than they have hitherto done if they would… bring themselves 
to say – “You who are afraid of a slight extension of the franchise, look 
at what is being done by a people of English origin under a system of 
universal suffrage.”28 
 
At the start of the Civil War, the Confederacy was expected to fulfil the most 
heinous stereotypes associated with America. The Conservative Halifax 
Guardian found it remarkable that ‘The legislature of the Southern 
Confederacy has, so far, not had one single bowie-knife transaction’.29 The 
Sheffield Independent explained that in the South, ‘life is so cheap, and the 
revolver and the bowie-knife are so constantly in hand, that the slightest 
quarrel suffices for a pretext for bloodshed. Such things do not agree with our 
more advanced civilisation.’30 
Although attitudes towards Southern manners later softened, 
Yorkshire opinion seemed generally to concur that the South was, and would 
remain, a democracy.31 Sagar’s prize essay for the Bradford Review, which 
might have been tempted to play up the South’s aristocracy for its radical 
audience, concluded that ‘both North and South will cling to their 
democracy.’32 ‘But for the article [on]… slavery,’ the Hull Advertiser 
explained, ‘this constitution of the Confederates would be all that the most 
Democratic among our countrymen could desire.’33 As such, for many there 
seemed to be no realistic prospect of Southern independence inherently 
resulting in a significant blow to free institutions. 
Instead, the most significant risk to free government came from the 
actions which the North was taking to win the war. Britain was aware of the 
fragility of liberal institutions, particularly in a state at war or under threat, 
basing this on more than domestic precedent. As the Wakefield Express 
pointed out, ‘Caesar, Cromwell, and Napoleon respectively arose out of the 
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ashes of a republic’.34 Moreover, the North’s direction was disheartening: ‘the 
press is shackled, private property is seized, numbers are imprisoned without 
crime or trial, and passports (the most hateful feature of European 
despotism) are imposed at once by the mere fiat of President Lincoln.’35 As 
Alexis de Tocqueville concluded, setting the British experience alongside that 
of continental Europe suggested that democracy – or, at least, the liberal self-
government of the North which most in Britain would have endorsed –could 
not survive except on the foundation of a thriving civil society.36 As such, it 
was threatened more by the continuation of the war than by the Union’s 
dissolution.37  
Indeed, even victory posed a significant challenge to democracy. It 
seemed to the British fairly clear that a Union based on respect for a shared 
constitution could not be held together by force. This was not a question of 
two nationalities having to go their separate ways, but an observation about 
the functioning of a democratic system. The Leeds Times pointed out that the 
Federal Constitution lacked ‘any powers enabling a dominant majority or a 
victorious military commander to govern a conquered province.’38 The Hull 
Packet made the obvious point that the South could not be forced to 
participate in free institutions, and the Wakefield Express pointed to the fact 
that a ‘large standing army’ risked becoming ‘a tool in the hands of a 
designing man’.39 Such behaviour made no sense in the American context: it 
would ‘merely enable it to hold the South as Russia now holds Poland, or as 
we ourselves held Ireland a century ago.’40 British belief that the South was 
unconquerable hinged not just on perceptions of the Confederacy’s military 
prowess, but a more fundamental understanding of how a liberal society 
should treat dissent. Indeed, when we consider the failure of Reconstruction 
and the extraordinary restrictions which Southern elites placed on voting 
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rights among white and black alike, it seems only fair to acknowledge that the 
British were at least slightly prescient in foreseeing problems for peace.41 
Opinion seemed more divided, however, on the question of whether 
the war had exposed existing fault lines within democracy. Few went to the 
extent of James Lee of Delph Hall, who announced at the Saddleworth 
Mechanics’ Institute that democracy had been tried and found wanting, and 
there were often counterpoints to be made.42 Though the Halifax Guardian 
was of the opinion that the war had ‘demonstrated the inherent tyranny of 
democracy,’ and the Halifax Courier broadly concurred, G.B. Browne 
thought that ‘Republican principles… had been tried and glorified (cheers).’43 
There were a variety of other elements to which individuals could take 
exception whose prominence increased in the course of the war: ‘tyranny of 
the mob, ruffianism of the press, corruption of the judicial authority, 
weakness and vacillation of the executive, peculation in the administration of 
the federal finances.’44 However, as the date of the comment shows, these 
objections interacted with and overlapped criticisms of democracy which pre-
dated the war. 
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the democratic system was 
the way it reduced standards. The Sheffield Daily Telegraph complained that 
‘intelligent men who… should have had a decided voice… have been 
overridden,’ replaced by ‘very inferior men… [who] descended to low, 
grovelling arts, adapted to the prejudices and passions of the unenlightened 
masses.’45 The neighbouring Rotherham Advertiser demonstrated that the 
presence of Macaulay, Disraeli and Bulwer in Parliament and the absence of 
Irving, Emerson, and Prescott from the Senate showed how the ‘intelligent 
portion of the country’ did not participate in American government.46 The 
Huddersfield Chronicle, meanwhile, reported a brawl in Congress as if it had 
occurred in the House of Commons, with local MPs M.T. Baines grabbing 
Disraeli round the throat, J.A. Roebuck kicking Lord Russell’s shins, and 
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General Thomas Perronet Thompson brandishing ‘a heavy stone spittoon’.47 
Not all drew such a sharp distinction between the two systems, however: the 
Hull Advertiser criticised Palmerston for ‘adopting the stump style of 
American oratory’ and later blamed Gladstone for doing the same.48 The 
Sheffield Independent, on the other hand, argued that Derby and Disraeli, 
with their ‘rancour of spirit, and indecency of language,’ were bringing down 
debate standards ‘to something approaching those which have been 
witnessed at Washington.’49 
In some cases, the comparison was made between Britain’s success in 
the Crimea, thanks to the responsiveness of the Parliamentary system, and 
American failure to defeat the South.50 The Leeds Mercury even mused as to 
whether Confederate success demonstrated the advantage of the ‘aristocratic 
South’ over the ‘democratic North’ in finding out merit, though it did point 
out that the Union’s failure was as much down to the task’s difficulty as 
Confederate ability.51 This criticism was intensified by the way that 
appointments to government were made ‘on account of party considerations’ 
rather than ‘fitness or unfitness for office ‘.52 This also meant that office-
holders formed a partisan voting bloc, a factor which both parties could unite 
in disliking: the Liberals because of its similarity to Old Corruption, the 
Conservatives because they favoured an unpaid administration staffed by 
natural leaders, and had railed against the ‘Russell justice’ of the 1840s, 
‘raised from the stool of his counting-house to a seat on the bench’.53 
Yet America was not the only example of democracy which the British 
looked to. For a start, there were the ancient democracies: the advanced 
Liberal Bradford Review even complained that ‘Greek like English history 
has been written by party men – men who disliked democratical 
institutions.’54 Cobden may have been the ‘member for America,’ but dubbing 
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John Bright ‘tribune’ instead linked him to the Roman tradition of the 
Gracchi. There was also Napoleonic France, where universal suffrage and the 
ballot sat incongruously with autocracy – or perhaps not, given republican 
America’s affinity for Tsarist Russia, and the announcement of Prince 
Napoleon that ‘democratic principles constitute the glory of Napoleonism.’55 
Even the advanced Liberal Huddersfield Examiner, local supporter of pro-
Northern E.A. Leatham, found only one difference between their censorship 
of the press – ‘in France the Emperor does all the work himself, while in 
America the President finds ready helpers among the democracy.’56 
Thoughts on the likely functioning of democracy could also be gleaned 
from Britain’s own colonies.57 In 1865, the Examiner could use Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand as an argument for unfettering the British 
working man, without needing to refer to America.58 Some radical causes 
could gain little from America: for instance, advocates of the ballot had to 
look outside America to support their case for a ‘shield against 
consequences’.59 There the ballot was a partisan tool – ‘distinctively printed 
or coloured,’ intended to flaunt rather than disguise allegiance.60 As Childers 
explained in the House, it was Australia from which ballot advocates drew 
their inspiration.61  
Others, however, found these colonial examples somewhat less than 
compelling, with the Halifax Guardian criticising Australia’s ‘political 
degradation’ and the Leeds Intelligencer arguing that, just as in America, 
‘men of standing, wealth and intelligence are driven out of Parliament’.62 In 
one case, colonists themselves argued against democracy: the Whitby 
Gazette received frequent communications from John Mewburn, formerly of 
Skinner Street but now in Canada West, who criticised the ‘jobbery, robbery, 
chiselling, lobbying, office-hunting, land-granting, bribery-and-corruption-
                                                   
55 TP, 6 March 1862 p. 4. 
56 HE, 14 September 1861 p. 4. 
57 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity 
(London, 2003), p. 5. 
58 HE, 21 January 1865 p. 5. 
59 YH, 19 February 1859 p. 5. 
60 McGerr, Decline of Popular Politics, p. 29. 
61 HC Debs 156, cc.771-93, 9 February 1860. 
62 HxG, 15 February 1862 p. 4; LI, 4 May 1861 p. 4. 
Page 156 of 312 
 
in-broad-daylight openly justified’ of democracy.63 He and his son Harrison 
sent pro-Southern commentary on the war until the complaint of ‘an 
Englishman’ that the information was ‘drugged by prejudice and 
misrepresentation’ ended the communication.64 The sympathies of other 
colonists in respect of the American Civil War were similarly mixed, with a 
letter from Halifax, Nova Scotia noting that ‘Her Majesty’s most loyal 
province’ mostly supported the South, ‘partly from principle, and partly… 
[because] our trade… has been with the South.’65 As such, favourable colonial 
examples of democracy were, at best, a case of interpretation.  
Similar examples of scepticism towards democracy could be found in 
letters from America itself. Sixteen years of correspondence showed that 
Joseph Wainwright remained intensely sceptical about his new home in 
Pittsburgh. He complained at the ‘intolerable spirit among us which in 
France is called red republicanism that is a wish among the lazy poor to 
obtain their living without labour… we have plenty of worthless demagogues 
that flatter these evil propensities for the sake of office… stick to your little 
queen your house of Lords and your house of Commons’.66 He even thought 
that his fruit being stolen by unruly youths was evidence ‘that boys are not so 
well brought up under democracy than under Victoria.’67 ‘Anglo-Saxon’ wrote 
from Philadelphia to explain that ‘democracy is beautiful in theory; - but, 
alas! How different in practice,’ citing the ‘rowdy, assassin, and rag-and-bob-
tail of creation… forc[ing] himself in front of the man of industry’ and ‘the 
sorrowful specimens of humanity boring Mr Lincoln and his cabinet for 
offices’.68 An Episcopal clergyman, meanwhile, complained of the ‘despotism 
of popular opinion’ which made the US less free than Britain, and ‘a 
quondam manufacturer’ and ‘thorough radical’ from Huddersfield was 
claimed to have found his democratic views ‘completely altered’.69 As such, it 
must be remembered that this was not solely a question of the British 
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dismissing an overwhelming weight of positive evidence in favour of 
democracy: opinion was divided on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Indeed, the letters of emigrants show that Lincoln’s ‘government of 
the people, by the people for the people’ – literally, democracy – tended to be 
more important for British observers than emigrants. Emigrants’ letters 
focused on economic opportunities, and negative liberty was more important 
than the opportunity to participate in institutions of self-government. James 
Holliday wrote to his relatives in Drax to urge them to come and ‘find plenty 
of everything you want to eat, drink and wear… A poor man can soon become 
a farmer… and live as he pleases, and work as he pleases and play when he 
wants.’70 Edmund Alderson informed his brother that ‘we have no crown, no 
duty no Bishops’; emigrants ‘are their own boss they can work when they 
please’.71 In some cases, however, emigrants recognised that this prosperity 
was as much due to the country’s natural resources as its system of 
government. Joe Kay wrote to his father to say that  
in my opinion it is the worst governed [country] in the world… the 
majority of working people are no better off than at home… it is 
trodden down by speculators… the damndest fools can give or rather 
sell a vote and every office is sought for the sake of the dollars now I 
was once a Chartist but I say that one half of working people have no 
right to vote for a vote gets them crazy.72  
It is clear that British emigrants who came from an already-free society were 
by no means as awestruck by the operation of democracy as were those from 
Germany and other more autocratic continental societies. 
One further element should be noted. The traditional picture of the 
war is that it vindicated democracy and the American vision of popular 
government throughout the world. Though the difficulties of Reconstruction 
are beyond the scope of this piece, it should be noted that the struggles to 
hash out a framework for the post-war settlement left plenty of scope for 
scepticism about whether democracy had, in fact, been vindicated. In 
September 1865, a Leeds debating society split 4-4 on whether America’s 
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state was ‘additional proof of the rottenness of democratic institutions’.73 
Under such circumstances, we should not be surprised that America 
remained a contested topic. 
Furthermore, even after the war, there remained a significant anti-
democratic streak within American politics. The Imperialist newspaper and 
its praise for monarchy may have been a Manhattan prank, but its Southern 
supporters took it more seriously.74 In New York, meanwhile, the 
‘Swallowtail’ Democrats’ scepticism about the potential of mass democracy 
led them to propose schemes of municipal reform that would leave civic 
government in the hands of urban elites.75 Crucially, these schemes were 
based on British examples. If the legacy of the Civil War was contested even 
in America, therefore, we should consider how unambiguous an endorsement 
of Union victory could ever be for the British. What is clear, however, is that 
the Union’s trials were only one part of a larger perspective on democracy, 
and that victory or defeat could only do so much to affect British views on the 
conflict. 
 
Reform in Britain 
 
The suggestion that the Civil War in some respect made democracy 
respectable, which in turn defanged the Conservative allegations of 
‘Americanising British institutions’ and made reform possible following the 
1865 election, is weakened by the use that was made of the topic during the 
campaign. Liberals almost universally disclaimed any intention of bringing 
American institutions to the UK, before, during and after the war, regardless 
of their Union or Confederate sympathies. The Halifax Courier felt that the 
suggestions that advanced Liberals preferred ‘either American 
Republicanism or any other form of republicanism to the mixed constitution 
under which we live is either a gross blunder born of ignorance or an 
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outrageous calumany [sic]’.76 The Leeds Express made its feelings similarly 
clear: ‘We do not want the republicanism of America any more than we want 
the despotism of continental Europe. We want our growth as a nation to be 
regulated by the conditions of our own political life.’77 The Bradford Review 
emphasised that it was not ‘recommending Republican government for this 
country, or maintaining the perfection of American political institutions.’78 
 The Leeds Mercury showed a slight evolution in its attitudes. In 1861, 
they were ‘not, and never have been, advocates of American institutions… We 
enjoy a more thorough liberty, a better government, and a better class of men 
in the government than the Americans do.”79 In 1864, it argued that ‘the 
friends of Reform have never advocated Americanising anything; but they 
want the working classes to have some share in the representation of the 
country’; it buttressed this by discussing the ‘abstract twaddle about the 
rights of man’ on which the US Constitution was built, and its belief that the 
Constitution’s checks and balances were its most significant weaknesses.80 In 
1865 it did remark that ‘we see a great deal to admire… in the working of 
democratic institutions in the Federal States… our fear is, not whether 
democracy would work as ill in England, but whether it would work as well’.81 
However, it later emphasised that ‘we are no great admirers of American 
institutions… they would not answer if introduced into this country.’82 
 There were a handful of advocates who were prepared to speak out in 
favour of Americanisation: Alderman Carter, of the Leeds Working Men’s 
Parliamentary Reform Association, for instance, who said that ‘if to give 
every man a vote was to Americanise England he was in favour of it’.83 
However, most reformers rejected the claim that they wanted to make Britain 
more like America. Perhaps one of the most surprising individuals to have 
done this was Edward Aldam Leatham, Radical, Northern advocate, and 
brother-in-law of John Bright, who argued that ‘we do not seek to make these 
institutions American; we only seek to make them more thoroughly 
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English.’84 Leatham’s words do not quite fit with Biagini’s suggestion that 
refusal to ‘Americanise’ was solely a celebration of the Saxon roots of 
manhood suffrage.85 Although Leatham expected to see ‘the forms of 
government under which we live assimilate to the American,’ this was to be a 
mutual process: ‘the American harking back as it will do from the abyss of 
democracy, and the English advancing as it will do’.86  
We must allow for the fact that these statements were made in 1862, 
possibly the nadir of Union fortunes. Nevertheless, they are supported by 
Liberal speech in the immediate aftermath of Union victory, at the 1865 
election. Thomas Dunn of Sheffield, speaking on behalf of Lord Milton at 
Wakefield, said that American government was ‘suitable for the Americans I 
believe (loud cheers). But we don’t want it here. We envy them not… We are 
free – nay, perhaps, I may say, more free under our institutions than we 
should be under theirs (cheers).’87 At Malton, meanwhile, ED Taylor of 
Kirkham denied that the introduction of the £6 borough franchise would be a 
‘step towards democracy… similar arguments were used against the 
introduction of the £10 franchise.’88 If Union victory validated American 
institutions, it seems odd that Liberal activists should have been no more 
enthusiastic about them in 1865 than they were when the result of the war 
was in doubt. 
Further evidence that the concepts of ‘America’ and ‘Democracy’ were 
not transformative at the 1865 election may be seen in an analysis of election 
addresses. Conservative mentions of ‘Southern’ related not to the vanquished 
Confederacy, but to the newly-created Southern Division of the West Riding. 
The Liberals were even less likely to discuss reform in 1865 than they had 
been in 1859, generally referring to ‘support’ for the ‘present’ ‘Government’. 
Even the 35 mentions of ‘honour’ referred less to the Government protecting 
the ‘honour’ of the nation through foreign policy, and more to the personal 
honour of the candidates. 
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Figure 7: Words used in Liberal addresses at the 1865 election, sized by 
frequency. 
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The other significant suggestion in respect of the Union’s victory is that it led 
to a coalition of Radicals and Liberals which resulted in electoral success.89 
This may, perhaps, have been true at the national level. However, at the local 
and provincial level – which was, after all, where the election campaigns were 
fought and won – the nature of political life was very different. In provincial 
politics, as well on the fringes of the empire, heterogeneity was a significant 
weakness. In 1859 the Hull Advertiser fervently hoped the election would 
show such linsey-woolsey politicians as Mr Anthony Bannister that 
such freaks as his will no longer be tolerated – that, Radical at heart, 
as he is known to be, he must either submit to the regulations adopted 
for the orderly and safe guidance of the Liberal party, or he must 
endeavour to form some notion of the line of conduct required from 
him as a nominal Conservative.90 
It was possible for an academic to stand aloof from party politics, or for an 
independent or an ex-Chartist to make a living on the national stage through 
lecture tours, writing and journalism without linking themselves too closely 
to a political party. In the provinces, however, things were harder: John 
Snowden of Halifax, ex-Chartist and Union advocate, was reduced to selling 
nuts from a stall in the market to supplement his meagre pension.91 The 
annual demand of the registration also encouraged polarisation between 
Liberal and Conservative: independent Radical registration organisations 
were almost unknown as of 1865.92 This made a ‘progressive alliance’ a more 
essential component of local politics than it was at the national level. 
 As well as the organisational alliance, in most constituencies an 
ideological coalition between Radicals and Liberals had been in place for 
generations. The approval of the non-electors association for whatever 
candidate the mainstream Liberal parties chose was almost inevitable, and 
there were few Radicals who were prepared to argue that it was better to vote 
for an ideologically pure candidate and risk a Conservative being returned 
than to overcome ideological scruples and back a moderate Liberal. The only 
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exception was perhaps Edgar Brefitt, contesting Pontefract in 1865, who 
promised that ‘more good [would] come out of an advanced liberal 
opposition party in the House’ than ‘a Government who trim their policy to 
keep office.’93 However, Brefitt was an unusual candidate, who stood 
primarily on a stance of criticising the surveyors of taxes, and withdrew 
before the poll rather than ‘be dabbed down at least £2,000 extra’.94 
 Moreover, this alliance of Radicals and Liberals was not an automatic 
recipe for success. In Leeds, the coming together of the Liberals (as 
represented by Edward Baines) and the Radicals (as represented by 
Alderman Carter) has been presented as one of the archetypal manifestations 
of this new unity, healing an earlier breach over education.95 However, in 
1859 the Liberals had brought forward W.E. Forster as the candidate of the 
radical element in the town, just as they would subsequently bring forward 
Lord Amberley – Lord John Russell’s son – in 1865.96 Although for practical 
rather than ideological reasons, the Leeds Express, speaking for the town’s 
radicals, backed this arrangement.97  
As the second, more radical candidate was unsuccessful in both cases 
it is unclear what exactly the benefit of this reunion between Liberals and 
Radicals is supposed to have been – particularly as the losing margin was 
greater in 1865 than it had been in 1859.98 Wright suggests that it was mostly 
non-electors who were radicalised by the Civil War, and that ‘the effects of 
the war on the restricted electorate were much more limited.’99 Pushing the 
electorate in a more conservative direction seems a very odd type of victory 
for the ideal of democracy. The alliance also threatened to be an extremely 
short one, leaving the Leeds Express raging that the Liberal committee, who 
promised ‘a majority of from 800 to 1000,’ ‘will have to justify themselves to 
the public.’100 
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Across the county, it is extremely difficult to identify areas where there 
were actual tangible benefits from a political realignment of the kind that has 
been suggested. It is possible that this may be an artefact of Conservative 
weakness in the county, and in a more evenly balanced area it might have 
been possible to see this realignment in action. However, its absence in 
Yorkshire must call into question its significance overall. In Hull, the Liberals 
captured the town’s second seat by a considerable margin of 600 votes; 
however, in 1864 the Liberal organisation in the town was moribund, with 
the Holderness Ward Liberal Association concluding that ‘of the leaders of 
the Liberal party in Hull… the majority of them were dead, while the 
remainder were advanced in age’.101 In York, although the radical alderman 
George Leeman was elected, it was in the place of the old Liberal member 
Joshua Westhead: James Lowther, the Conservative, topped the poll, as 
indeed did George Beecroft in Leeds.102 Although it is dangerous to 
generalise from so few results, it is possible that the end of the war saw a 
process of electoral polarisation in which some Liberals became more 
inclined towards radicalism while a larger proportion of Liberals and many 
existing Conservatives became more determined to oppose excessive 
reform.103 
 In the industrial boroughs which formed the Liberal heartland, this 
Liberal-Radical alliance seemed more likely to break down in 1865 than to be 
consolidated. In Bradford, an attempted coup by the Radicals almost 
replaced the town’s long-serving MP Henry Wickham, formerly a 
Conservative but now a moderate Liberal, with a local Radical alderman. 
Despite the alderman begging to be refused a nomination ‘to which he had 
never aspired… and was also quite unfitted… by inclination, by the demands 
of business, by habits, and by taste,’ he was selected by a meeting of Liberal 
electors and non-electors as the town’s second candidate.104 The problem was 
resolved only by ignoring the public vote and having Wickham stand as if 
                                                   
101 HA, 2 March 1864 p. 2. 
102 Matthew Roberts, ‘Currents of Electoral Independence: James Lowther and Popular 
Politics in York, c.1865-1880’, Yorkshire Archaeological Journal vol. 78 (2006), pp. 225-6. 
103 That the Liberal proportion was larger may be inferred by the results of the Liberal 
canvass of Leeds in 1865, in which ‘very few indeed… favour an extension of the suffrage; the 
great body promise for our candidates in spite of their convictions’: Green, ‘Politics in Leeds’, 
pp. 241-2; Vincent, British Liberal Party, p. 283. 
104 BO, 13 July 1865 p. 2. 
Page 165 of 312 
 
nothing had happened. In Sheffield, meanwhile, disagreements on a variety 
of topics from the American Civil War to the local water company’s rates led 
to a Liberal schism.105 Ultimately, four candidates went to the polls, all of 
whom professed to be Liberal and three of whom represented various 
flavours of Radicalism. This reiterates, if reiteration were necessary, the very 
great difficulty of projecting a national model onto what were intensely local 
elections. 
 The only contest in which it seems possible that the radicals were 
flexing their new-found muscles was that in the newly created Southern West 
Riding constituency. Sir John Ramsden had been returned for the West 
Riding in 1859 with more votes than any other candidate in the House of 
Commons. On first glance, his failure to be reselected for the 1865 election 
seems likely to be linked to his comments in early 1861 about the Civil War 
representing the ‘bursting of that great Republican bubble’ and his decision 
not to support measures of reform – particularly when it is also borne in 
mind that his running mate of 1859, Sir Francis Crossley, was returned 
unelected for the Northern West Riding constituency. Yet an examination of 
the behind-the-scenes correspondence reveals that the plan for the contest 
went through several very different stages. 
When the Liberals began to select their candidates, the Conservatives 
had already offered a compromise of one member each.106 At a private 
meeting held in Doncaster, the ‘gentry’ were keen to stand Ramsden as their 
single candidate while the ‘extreme party’ were ‘anxious for a contest,’ though 
there would be ‘great difficulty’ finding a second candidate.107 This led to the 
suggestion to stand Ramsden alongside the Hon. Charles Wentworth-
Fitzwilliam, currently M.P. for Malton.108 This failed, largely because both 
candidates were similarly sceptical about the £6 borough franchise: a 
subsequent attempt to have one of the two accepted broke down due to the 
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refusal of both candidates to participate.109 Wentworth-Fitzwilliam was 
publicly reluctant ‘to supplant an old Representative, who has so long 
enjoyed the confidence of the constituency’ and privately ‘much annoyed at 
the pressure that has been put upon me to leave Malton’, while Ramsden was 
annoyed that the Machiavellian string-puller behind the arrangement, Sir 
Charles Wood, appeared to be favouring Wentworth-Fitzwilliam as 
candidate.110 Though Wood felt he could not return Ramsden alone, there 
might have been an arrangement through which Ramsden stood a second 
time.111 
However, although Ramsden felt that his personal reluctance towards 
the £6 franchise was the most significant obstacle to his re-election, others 
seemed to think differently. Thomas Dunn felt that though ‘much 
dissatisfaction was expressed… at the course you took on Mr Baines’s bill,’ it 
‘would have been passed over – but then comes the paper question – there it 
was felt to some extent the policy of Free Trade was involved’.112 When Sir 
Charles Wood was buttonholed in the House of Commons by a Liberal county 
court judge from Huddersfield ‘very uneasy at the effect on the politics of the 
S[outhern] Division’ of Ramsden’s actions, it was not his political conduct 
but the lengthy and ill-tempered ‘tenant right’ case fought over his 
Huddersfield property that ‘might be fatal in the event of a contest’.113 
Ramsden noted that Sir Roundell Palmer had spoken to him about much the 
same topic.114 Though his current stance on reform was a more prominent 
objection than his earlier comments on America, there were many objections 
to a renewed Ramsden candidacy – yet even these might not have ultimately 
prevented him from standing. 
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It is also worthwhile noting the resilience of the core Liberal coalition, 
held together not just by political ideology but by a general sense of affiliation 
to the cause of civil and religious liberty as well as by links of socialisation, 
acquaintance and affinity. Ramsden, for instance, sat on Liberal committees 
in three constituencies in 1865 and donated £500 to the Southern West 
Riding election – a quarter of his own expenditure six years earlier, despite 
the constituency being smaller and easier to manage.115 He was also more 
than happy to throw his weight behind the Huddersfield pro-Northern 
Radical Edward Aldam Leatham. He kept alive the Huddersfield Examiner, 
the advanced Liberal paper which supported Leatham, with both injections 
of capital and professional advice from the editor of All The Year Round.116 
Ramsden was wary of using his influence, but he was prepared to ask 
whether it was possible ‘by any public expression of my sympathy with Mr 
Leatham [to] promote his success’ without breaking this rule.117 As the 
election wore on, he advised individual voters seeking clarification that ‘My 
political sympathies are entirely with Mr Leatham, and I wish him every 
success,’ and instructed his agent to inspect the canvassing books and, if ‘my 
assisting Mr Leatham will win his election… spare no pains to do so.’ 118 
Following the unfavourable results of the election, the pair exchanged notes 
of condolence on their enforced exclusion from the House of Commons.119 As 
was the case with the members of the SIA, the key to the effect of the 
American Civil War was not that it enabled new alliances to be formed, but 
that the Liberal party was able to overlook its differences to put more or less 
the best men it could in Parliament. 
In the run-up to the 1865 election, the Liberal party, and liberal 
politics in general, appeared to be on top of radical demands. At a Halifax 
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meeting, George Webber stood to claim his ‘political right’; ‘nothing short of 
a large and comprehensive measure of reform, including universal manhood 
suffrage’.120 However, Councillor Hutchinson responded by saying ‘he 
clamoured for that which was as yet utterly impossible’, and Webber’s 
motion was lost with only six votes in its favour. At a lecture on the 1832 
reform act, a motion for manhood suffrage received no supporters, but 
Baines’ £6 borough franchise bill was ‘almost unanimously’ supported.121 The 
victor of the Bradford Review’s essay competition, Benjamin Sharp, 
announced himself to be ‘in favour of Mr Baines’s bill and also that of Mr 
Locke King’.122 An increasing number of radical organisations were set up, 
like the Working Men’s Parliamentary Reform Associations: the National 
Reform Union’s Bradford branch had 250 members, 90 more than the old 
Political Union.123 However, as of 1865 these do not appear to have had a 
significant influence on the electoral process. Indeed, the former Chartist 
John Brown of Colliergate protested at the seeming ‘falling off’ of the two 
York Liberal candidates: 
They both, with one accord, have come to the conclusion that if we are 
to have any representative reform at all, it must be a £6 borough, and 
a £10 county franchise, unaccompanied by any other remedial 
measures. Why, gentlemen, a very little while ago the creed of a 
moderate man was a £5 or £6 franchise, the ballot, three years’ 
parliaments, and a considerable redistribution of seats.124 
 
However, as it turned out, York was in many respects in advance of Liberal 
ideology in the other large boroughs of Yorkshire (those with an electorate of 
over 4,000). In Leeds, Baines and Amberley matched Westhead and 
Leeman’s commitment to the £10 county and £6 borough franchises. 
Elsewhere, other borough candidates were more reticent. Although W.E. 
Forster came out for household suffrage and the inclusion of lodgers, his 
Bradford stablemate Henry Wickham endorsed ‘a comprehensive reform bill’ 
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but refused to say to what extent.125 Though it was this reluctance which led 
to his reselection troubles, many other MPs either shared this reticence or 
coupled it with a desire to supplement newly enfranchised artisan voters with 
more trustworthy, reliable and predictable classes. In Hull, James Clay spoke 
in favour of an educational franchise, while Charles Norwood advocated 
reduction coupled with ‘a lateral movement, bringing within the pale of the 
Constitution lodgers and others who are perfectly qualified to exercise the 
right of voting… [but] don’t happen to be householders. (Cheers).’126 James 
Stuart Wortley in Sheffield was ‘unwilling to give any distinct pledges’ other 
than that he supported an extension, while Roebuck was ‘not in love with 
what they call the fancy franchises, but even them I would accept, because 
they would increase the number of voters’; he felt that in the current climate 
the fancy franchises were the most that could be achieved.127 It was only his 
liberal adversary Thomas Campbell Foster who would ‘go for more than 
fancy franchises’, though his announcement of this fact resulted in hooting 
and his subsequent elaboration was drowned out by people shouting 
Roebuck’s name.128 His aim was for equalised suffrage in boroughs and 
counties at a lowered limit, and income-tax paying and educational test 
franchises.129 
In the West Riding’s medium boroughs – those containing over 1,000 
electors – candidates seemed happier to support a specific level. In 
Huddersfield, T.P. Crosland ‘had no objection to a £5 franchise’, but felt 
there was ‘no chance of carrying’ it and would therefore ‘vote for a £6 rating’ 
plus lodgers and income tax franchises – though he would not ‘swamp all 
interests by the admission of one interest alone’.130 His rival Edward 
Leatham felt the £6 borough and £10 rental franchise, plus the ballot, was a 
minimum; by contrast, his brother William Henry Leatham told the electors 
of Wakefield that although he supported a £6/£10 franchise by default, he 
would prefer a means of indirect election in which the non-electors would 
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choose a proportion of their best men to be placed on the electoral roll.131 In 
Halifax both candidates agreed to the £6 franchise, though Akroyd hedged 
his approval round with the need to avoid swamping the existing 
constituency, the requirement for it to be a government bill, and the advocacy 
of fancy franchises including income tax, savings bank and education from 
college degrees to the Society of Arts mechanics’ institute qualifications.132  
In similar boroughs in the East and North Ridings, candidates tended 
to be vaguer. In Beverley, this was because David Keane claimed ‘I will go 
each time for what I can get. If I can get a £6 suffrage, I will take it to get 
more. If I can get £8, I will take it… you cannot get it all at once (hear, 
hear).’133 In Scarborough, however, both candidates seemed to hedge their 
bets: Sir John Vanden-Bempde-Johnstone wanted to give ‘full recognition of 
the increasing intelligence of the industrial classes’ and John Dent argued for 
‘a large and liberal’ government measure, but neither specifically endorsed a 
level to which the franchise should be reduced.134 
In the very smallest boroughs, with fewer than 1,000 electors, the 
Liberals were even less specific about their plans. In Knaresborough, Isaac 
Holden proposed ‘a moderate and gradual extension of the suffrage, and at 
once and always zealously [to] prepare all classes for its safer exercise.’135 In 
the Ripon election, John Greenwood talked about ‘a mere lowering’ being 
‘neither wise nor sufficient’ and having ‘grave apprehension [of] any measure 
calculated to bring about a very extensive change.’136 However, he supported 
those ‘who from their education, intelligence, and good order were fully and 
entirely entitled to the franchise,’ while his rival Robert Kearsley proposed 
that ‘the intelligent and the industrious of the working-classes must be 
gradually admitted to the franchise… but not so as to overpower’ existing 
electors.137 At Pontefract, Hugh Childers ‘repudiated anything like great 
changes’ and MacArthur supported the £6 franchise, plus income tax and 
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votes for Oxford and Cambridge graduates.138 Although the Hon. Charles 
Wentworth-Fitzwilliam’s Malton running mate James Brown argued for the 
£6 franchise, and Wentworth-Fitzwilliam’s seconder argued that ‘as we could 
not hope for a universal suffrage now we must take the most liberal measure 
we can get,’ Wentworth-Fitzwilliam himself seems unlikely to have supported 
a £6 franchise.139 Not only was it an objection raised to his standing for the 
Southern West Riding, but he opposed Baines’ bill – allegedly because it 
would have enfranchised the Conservatives of Malton’s neighbouring town 
Norton.140 
 In the counties, the Liberals were more open about committing to 
franchise reduction. In the uncontested Northern West Riding, both Liberal 
candidates endorsed the £6 borough and £10 county franchises: Sir Francis 
Crossley also supported lodgers paying 40 shillings per year in tax having the 
vote, while Lord Frederick Cavendish opposed the ballot.141 In the Southern 
West Riding, Lord Milton argued for a reduction proposed by government, 
and Henry Beaumont would have ‘no hesitation in voting for the £6 franchise 
in towns’.142 The single North Riding Liberal candidate, Frederick Milbank, 
would ‘readily accord his support’ to a £10 county and £6 borough 
franchise.143 These were strong, radical professions, particularly in light of 
the higher property qualification in the counties when compared to the 
boroughs, although the large number of 40 shilling borough freeholders 
qualifying for county votes may have affected candidates’ willingness to 
commit themselves.  
However, what is clear is that the stances of candidates were not 
substantially beyond the proposals made in 1859. If the American Civil War 
had a significant effect on Liberal candidates’ views of reform, it was not 
evident from their public speech. What had changed, however, was that the 
Liberal government no longer had the benefit of the doubt – as reflected in 
the Bradford Radicals’ attempt to deselect Wickham for refusing pledges on 
reform. Even without the American Civil War, the strategy of Palmerstonian 
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delay seems unlikely to have been viable: Liberals would have had to commit 
one way or the other.144 
 
Unlike 1859, the Conservatives were no longer committed to a government 
measure. However, there were still Tories prepared to endorse reform – or, 
at least, to make encouraging noises about reform in the hope of attracting 
moderate voters. Generally, this was coupled with rhetoric against 
indiscriminate debasing of the franchise. In Leeds, for instance, George 
Beecroft opposed ‘such a violent and extensive lowering of its amount as 
would give to mere numbers a preponderance of political power,’ but pointed 
out that ‘Lord Derby’s bill would have brought to the franchise a greater 
number of people than Mr Baines’s (Cheers)… why should not lodgers have 
votes?... And why not the clerk, with his £150 a year’.145 In York the new 
candidate James Lowther amended the relatively liberal stance of his 
predecessor, objecting to ‘so abstract a proposition’ as the £6 franchise and 
asking for the revision of all the ‘anomalies which now exist,’ such as ‘the 
exclusion of lodgers from the franchise’.146 In Hull, Joseph Hoare was not in 
favour of lowering the borough franchise but was prepared to extend it 
through savings bank and income tax franchises, while his nominal running 
mate John Somes hinted about a taxpaying franchise.147 
In the medium and small boroughs, Conservatives were equally 
opposed to the £6 franchise while making similar vague hints towards the 
prospect of an expanded electorate. In Beverley, Colonel Henry Edwards 
hoped for the enfranchisement of ‘all men who can save £50… all clerks in 
banks and offices, clergymen resident in houses paying perhaps 8s a week, all 
overseers of factories and warehouses, in fact, all those men who shew the 
slightest degree of intelligence’, while Christopher Sykes simply praised ‘well-
considered improvement’ in general.148 In Scarborough, George Cayley 
argued as a ‘Conservative reformer’ that the £10 rental should be retained, 
but admit the working classes to around a third of the electorate through 
                                                   
144 Zimmerman, ‘Palmerstonian Delay’, pp. 1179, 1194 
145 LM, 24 June 1865 p. 8; LI, 4 July 1865 p. 3. 
146 YH, 8 April 1865 p. 10, 15 July 1865 p. 10. 
147 HP, 30 June 1865, 7 July 1865. 
148 HP, 7 July 1865; BvR, 17 June 1865 p. 4. 
Page 173 of 312 
 
taxpaying franchises.149 In Thirsk, Sir William Payne-Gallwey was opposed to 
Baines’s bill; in Pontefract, Samuel Waterhouse had voted against the bill but 
was in favour of the £6 rating franchise if coupled with lateral extension.150 
Most Conservative county candidates adopted a similar stance. In the 
North Riding, the Hon. William Duncombe opposed the £10 county franchise 
as ‘crude theories’ which would ‘swamp the present constituency’, but was 
prepared to endorse savings franchises.151 In the East, Admiral the Hon. 
Arthur Duncombe ‘would be very glad to see the franchise extended, but not 
degraded’; his colleague Lord Hotham believed that ‘there are numbers of 
individuals who might without impropriety be admitted to the exercise of the 
electoral franchise… provided that they shall not be in such numbers as to 
entirely swamp the existing constituencies, providing that they shall be of a 
class which has shown itself possessed of intelligence and feeling of good 
order and moderation’.152  
Even in the Southern West Riding, the most heated of the contests, 
Walter Stanhope and Christopher Denison were still prepared to pay lip 
service to the need for some sort of reform. Though Stanhope believed ‘that 
the House of Commons as at present constituted fairly represents all classes 
and interests in the United Kingdom,’ he would support ‘any well considered 
measure for admitting to the Franchise persons fitted by intelligence and 
education to its due exercise’.153 Denison, on the other hand, felt that ‘True 
Conservatism… implies a readiness to modify our laws so as to meet the 
growing requirements of the age,’ and was ‘quite ready to admit to the 
privilege of the franchise all who have acquired a stake in the stability of the 
State and all whose education enables them to appreciate the franchise as a 
trust to be exercised for the common weal’ without swamping or giving 
predominating influence to any one class.154 Indeed, though the two 
disagreed on its level, Denison’s conception of the franchise as ‘an object to 
be sought after by honest and sober men’ does not appear to have differed 
substantially from that of Gladstone, who wanted the franchise ‘dangling just 
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above the heads of most artisans, and encouraging them to save that little bit 
extra’.155 
The idea of opposing ‘Americanisation’ of British politics was a 
relatively common one among both the Conservative candidates and their 
supporters, particularly in the larger boroughs. George Beecroft’s seconder 
argued that ‘It was democracy Mr Baines wanted, and when they got 
democracy where would free trade be?’156 James Lowther announced himself 
as ‘opposed to the wild Democrat, who would reduce our glorious 
Constitution to the level of American institutions…. [but] no advocate for a 
stand-still policy, or a retention of acknowledged abuses.’157 In Beverley, 
Colonel Edwards opposed those who would ‘swamp the present constituency, 
and hand over the ruling power of the State to a democracy.’158 
Yet, as we have already seen, the Liberals were just as anxious as the 
Conservatives to disclaim any intention to make Britain more like America. 
Isaac Holden believed ‘the perfecting of the Constitution was not the work of 
hours, but of ages, consequently any extension of the suffrage must be 
gradual and moderate, by a just and cautious policy characteristic of true 
Englishmen.’159 ‘A True Liberal’ claimed that T.P. Crosland, Edward 
Leatham’s Liberal rival, was ‘opposed to Toryism as much as to Brightism.’160 
They were also alive to the potential of ‘swamping’: in Wakefield, Edward 
Leatham’s brother felt ‘it is not the want of intelligence, it is not the want of 
honesty, but the numbers we have to deal with.’161 They were more polite 
about America than the Conservatives, but there was no indication on either 
side in 1865 of the kind of paradigm shift that we might have expected as a 
result of Union victory. Indeed, George Beecroft, celebrating topping the poll 
in Leeds, thought ‘The greatest losers by the election are the “advanced 
Liberals” and the “Yankee Radicals”– (laughter) – men who love America 
more than England’.162 
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The fundamental point of the evidence considered in this chapter should be 
to underline the point made by Robert Saunders, that broad support for 
‘reform’ is less significant a topic than ‘who’ and ‘where’.163 Conservatives 
were not inherently opposed to reform as an abstract – indeed, it would have 
been highly awkward for them to recede from the earlier promises made in 
1859. However, their main concern was for reform to be measured and 
limited. Though the Liberals were broadly optimistic about reform, even they 
were conscious of the risk of going too far. Moreover, they grounded their 
support for the extension of the franchise not in the broad, sweeping 
universalist language of the American Revolution, but in a narrow, particular 
argument about the upper echelons of the working class. Comparing the 
Declaration of Independence with Edward Baines’ speech in favour of his £6 
borough franchise bill, with its long litany of details about the number of 
members of friendly societies and mechanics’ institutes, co-operative flour 
mills and weekly papers, children at Sunday School and miles of railway and 
telegraph, makes it clear that the two are basing their arguments on 
fundamentally different premises.164 Victory or defeat in the American Civil 
War could not have challenged the statistics that Baines marshalled to 
support his case, only their interpretation. 
Not only did the Liberal justification for reform differ from the 
American context, but when British radicals were called on to describe their 
politics they used language that was startlingly different from that found in 
America. During the American War of Independence, there had been a 
tension between those claiming their traditional rights as Britons and those 
who grounded their arguments in fundamental philosophical principles.165 
However, it was the latter argument that would win out. Even before the Civil 
War, the future President Lincoln was clear that American liberty was not 
based on English heritage, but was an offer to all: ‘We have… perhaps half 
our people who have… come from Europe – German, Irish, French, and 
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Scandinavian… when they look through that old Declaration of 
Independence… they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the 
blood, and flesh of the flesh, of the men who wrote that Declaration’.166  
However, for the British radicals, the theft of Saxon liberty by the 
Norman aristocracy was too effective an emotional lever to abandon 
altogether.167 During the 1866 reform agitation, a leaflet published in Leeds 
proposed the holding of a ‘Great West-Riding Folk-Mote’ (or meeting) under 
the Headingley shire-oak, which it linked to Edwin the Great, and denied the 
right of Registration courts to ask ‘all sorts of degrading and insulting 
questions’ to ‘free men of Saxon blood’.168 Unlike Lincoln, the anonymous 
author was clear that free association was a very particularly English 
characteristic: ‘This was no gathering of Rogue and Thief, Bondman, Serf, 
Briton, Pict or Scot’. As such, although the victory of the Union might have 
vindicated one of the arguments which some of the advocates for reform 
used, the two campaigns were not as closely intertwined as has sometimes 
been suggested. Indeed, this focus on liberty as a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon 
characteristic suggests that we must also attempt to understand the 
American Civil War in its racial and nationalistic context. 
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Chapter 6: Race and Nation, 1861-5 
 
In viewing the American Civil War, contemporary Britain had to balance the 
Confederacy’s right to self-government against the morality of their 
‘cornerstone’ institution of ‘negro slavery’. However, the combination of 
racial and national factors affected Britain’s responses to many 
contemporaneous international events. Public opinion was excited by 
German and Italian unification, and fledgling nations like Poland and 
Hungary. In addition, the ongoing question of Britain’s racial and national 
status, and the global role of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ race, also invited comment. 
To understand this period, we must understand the evolution of 
British attitudes towards nationality, and the consequent links between racial 
categories and political and geographical arrangements. The aftermath of the 
European revolutions of 1848 left the British with two significant 
assumptions. The first was that Anglo-Saxon self-governing communities 
were unusually successful in almost every field; the second, that liberal 
Britain would inevitably find itself opposed to Continental autocracies.1 As a 
result, Britain tended to look favourably on nationalist movements while 
insisting on seeing them in libertarian terms.2 
However, it is in the racial sphere where the greatest change has been 
perceived. Catherine Hall is one of the foremost historians to argue that 
British thought began to move towards ‘a racial vocabulary of biological 
difference’ in the 1850s, coalescing as a result of the Indian Rebellion and the 
American Civil War, and emerging in its full form as a result of the 1865 
rebellion in Jamaica.3 This confirmed distinctions between ‘the “excitable,” 
which meant black, population’ of British colonies, who ‘needed strong 
government,’ and white populations able to manage representative 
institutions.4 She also emphasises that cultural explanations for this differing 
treatment were just as racist as those of scientific racism based on inheritable 
differences, and ‘in many situations… both were in play’.5  
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Other historians broadly concur that racial attitudes hardened over 
the course of the 1850s. Christine Bolt saw this period as the one in which 
‘the aggressive assertion of white superiority… prepared the way for the next 
great phase of British expansion towards the end of the century.’6 Douglas 
Lorimer argues that scientific racism overtook a class-based understanding 
of racial difference during this time.7 There have been some attempts to 
contradict or amend the fundamental basis of this theory. Bernard Porter, in 
the context of theorising on imperialism, has pointed out that colonial 
attitudes towards race ‘were more often moulded by the relationships these 
expatriates were placed in with other peoples, than by any cultural baggage 
they brought with them from home.’8 Peter Mandler, in arguing that the 
English were somewhat backwards in their thinking about nationality, argues 
that civilizational perspectives were more common than racial ones in this 
period, even among those who argued for ‘paternal repression’ of ‘Negroes or 
Indians’.9 However, by and large it is the view of hardened racial attitudes 
which dominates.10 
As such, this chapter will begin by considering how Yorkshire reacted 
to the treatment of other races by its ‘American cousins’. It will then examine 
the most significant forms of discourse on race in the county at the time, and 
the effectiveness of the mechanisms by which new concepts could be 
transmitted to and disseminated within the provinces. It will then consider 
the Confederacy in the context of views on other nationalities and of the 
legitimacy of British intervention in their affairs. Finally, it will consider the 
concept of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ race, on which putative British affinity for the 
Confederacy is sometimes predicated.11 
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Race in America 
 
The relative extent to which Britain’s views of the race question in the 
Northern United States were shaped by the views of escaped slaves on anti-
slavery lecturing tours, letters from emigrants, and books of pre-war travel 
commentary will forever remain unquantifiable. However, wherever the 
British drew their views from, there was an extraordinary consensus on the 
topic. From across the political spectrum and across the county, they 
condemned the Union’s racially-motivated mistreatment of its black citizens. 
It is important to emphasise how universal this condemnation was. In 
the hub of the industrial West Riding, the Liberal Leeds Mercury might well 
have been expected to critique ‘the disgraceful prejudice against colour still 
reigning in the North’.12 The stances of the advanced Liberal Leeds Times, 
which complained that ‘so-called free “niggers” were habitually treated by the 
white-skinned Republicans as… inferior and unclean creatures who had no 
just claim to the dignities and privileges of human beings,’ and the Leeds 
Express, which summed the Union’s view up poetically as ‘libbaty’s a kind 
o’thing/That don’t agree with niggers,’ may also fail to surprise the 
historian.13 However, the Conservative Leeds Intelligencer also protested 
against their treatment: unable to ‘ride in a street omnibus, nor in an 
ordinary railway car, nor worship in a public church… He is hustled out of 
the labour market, and any honest livelihood is grudged to him, as filched 
from a better man.’14 
The criticism also extended beyond the West Riding to the more rural 
North and East. In Hull, the Liberal Eastern Counties Herald refused to ‘look 
upon the black man as inferior to his pale-faced brother in any respect… 
[though] The negro is regarded, even in the North, as an inferior being’.15 The 
Liberal Hull Advertiser considered Northern segregation ‘more detestable 
than slavery,’ because segregation asserted that ‘neither freedom, nor 
intelligence, nor wealth can raise the blacks to the level of even Christian 
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fellowship and association with the whites.’16 The Conservative Hull Packet 
justified its scepticism about Union emancipation with the rhetorical 
question; ‘how could we believe that men who would neither eat, drink, nor 
travel with those who had the slightest taint of negro blood… were earnest in 
their love of freedom?’17  
Moreover, these editorial views seem to have largely been shared not 
only by correspondents to the newspapers, but more generally and publicly. 
Harrison Mewburn, writing from Canada to Whitby, complained that Illinois 
made ‘all negroes, black or coloured, runaways or free citizens’ pay a bond, 
and that those who could not pay were sold: ‘Is this, let me ask, freedom to 
the negro?’18 Another adopted Canadian, William Howard Day, explained 
how ‘colour was a crime’ while Rev. J.R. Balme, an American Baptist 
clergyman, reported that ‘there could rarely be seen more than half a dozen 
coloured faces… at any of the white men’s chapels;’ even Republicans refused 
‘to acknowledge the equality of the black man, to ride with them in the 
railway carriage, to sit with them in church, to vote with them at elections, or 
to serve with them on juries’.19  
Balme’s focus on the social, religious and occupational exclusion of 
black people was typical of the more broad British emphasis. The Yorkshire 
Gazette criticised the way that ‘they are treated as outcasts, with every mark 
of contempt,’ citing railways and churches to support this case.20 In an 
altercation following a pro-Northern lecture in Sheffield, the Confederate-
supporting Mr Wheatman asked ‘whether blacks were allowed to sit with the 
whites at the public hotel tables in the North, to travel in the same railway 
carriages, and enjoy the social and electoral privileges of the whites? (Hear, 
hear).’21 In response, Mr Jackson ‘maintained that as great distinctions were 
preserved between the rich and poor here as between the whites and blacks 
in North America. (Laughter)’; Wheatman, unperturbed, responded that ‘He 
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had travelled much in America… in Massachusetts and other states the blacks 
were not allowed to associate with the whites, or enjoy the same privileges.’ 
The fact that the British seemed more offended by the social exclusion 
of black people in the North than by their political exclusion tends to support 
the argument that the British did not necessarily see voting as an integral 
component of membership of a particular community. In a society with a 
limited franchise, the social sphere was the only one where its members 
could establish their fundamental equality. Despite Jackson’s arguments, 
echoed by other pro-Union activists, mainstream public opinion broadly 
disagreed that Britain was more divided by class than America was by race. 
 As described above, the historical debate has focused primarily on the 
increasing discrimination in British thought on race over this period. 
However, if racial discrimination was seen by contemporary observers either 
as a positive good or a necessary evil, attitudes towards North America 
become almost impossible to understand except as mass hypocrisy. There is 
no way to reconcile criticism of the Union segregating black people with the 
belief that black people were innately incapable of participating in civil 
society. Moreover, much of the scepticism about Union motivations during 
the war stemmed from this critique of a racially segregated society. 
 Lincoln’s modern status as the great liberator of the slaves can make it 
difficult for us to understand contemporary British mistrust of his motives, 
when he was an unknown politician from a state with some of the harshest 
Black Codes in the North. Though Lincoln rejected the exclusionary white 
supremacist ‘Herrenvolk democracy’ theory of the Confederacy, which many 
Northern Democrats shared, he still insisted on linking emancipation to 
schemes of repatriation long after they had been shown to be impractical.22 
These public acts seemed to confirm that he shared Northern racism, and 
therefore made him unsound on slavery. 
 Not only were the British public well aware that Lincoln supported 
colonisation, but the newspapers were clear that they disagreed with him. 
The Wakefield Express felt that his view ‘that white and black can never be 
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equal’ ‘sounds strangely into the mouth of the President of a Republic,’ and 
later cited it to justify their expectation that race relations would be slow to 
improve.23 The Bradford Observer used it as an example of Free State 
‘prejudice against the negro’, while the Halifax Courier suggested that 
‘Lincoln’s own declarations’ ranked alongside the Black Codes in ruling out 
‘any intention on placing black and white on a footing of political or social 
equality.’24 The Sheffield Independent considered it ‘the most miserable 
exhibition of imbecile weakness’, because ‘America is as much the native 
country of the men of African, as those of English, Irish, or German descent’: 
it later referenced it in casting doubt on the manifesto of the National 
Coloured Convention.25 The Doncaster Gazette complained that Lincoln ‘still 
harps on the impracticable scheme’ of colonisation, while the Chronicle felt 
the slaves could expect nothing but ‘cool advice to seek emancipation in the 
best way they can, and when they have it, “take themselves off”.’26 The 
Yorkshire Gazette, meanwhile, felt that the only reason that the two races 
could not live together was ‘the Northerners’ detestation of the negro’.27 
Nowhere could there be found support for Lincoln’s belief that black and 
white were incompatible, despite the theoretical rise of racial discrimination 
in the period. 
 This broad belief in equality extended to the military sphere, where 
Union disagreements over whether to arm freed slaves were seen as further 
evidence of their racism. The British had been arming black people, slave and 
free, since the mid-seventeenth century, and by 1861 amateur black militias 
were more welcome in the British world than the American.28 The Leeds 
Times and the Sheffield Independent noted that white troops refused to serve 
with black ones and Union officers resigned to support a white-only army.29 
‘If the Irish and German refuse,’ the Doncaster Chronicle concluded, ‘and 
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prejudice runs so high against the negro that white men will not even fight 
side by side with them, the war must collapse.’30 Moreover, the practice of 
using black troops as ‘a cover or shelter… behind which the white troops may 
advance with greater safety’ was also criticised, perhaps because white troops 
were expected at the very least to share equally the peril of battle.31 Indeed, 
the Hull Advertiser – perhaps ironically – hoped for the appointment of 
black officers, as ‘They evidently have men among them more competent to 
command an army than ever was General Hooker’.32 
 One of the most significant outbursts of criticism came with the New 
York draft riots of 1863, where British newspapers noticed that much of the 
violence was directed against the black community. Indeed, several months 
before, the Doncaster Gazette had predicted ‘a series of bloody riots and 
conflicts’ provoked by ‘the enmity of the whites towards the race for whose 
freedom it is in some quarters asserted the war is carried on.’33 However, this 
predictive achievement is weakened by the earlier ‘violent outbreak against 
the coloured race on the occasion of the turn-out of [New York] dock 
labourers for an advance of wages… soon after the onslaught against the 
negro population of Detroit,’ coupled with the ‘attack made by a mob on a 
factory at Brooklyn where negroes were employed,’ motivated by ‘growing 
antipathy to negroes.’34 
 The Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, which might have been 
expected to focus on the mob’s defiance of law and order, claimed that ‘All 
other excesses… become insignificant beside the savage outrages… 
committed upon the unhappy negroes.’35 Other newspapers, too, highlighted 
that the mob’s primary target was the black community: it was ‘both 
symbolical [sic] of the antipathy of the white labourers to their black 
competitor, and of their additional hatred to him at the present time as the 
cause of the war’.36 It was ‘an atrocity of which the most degraded savage 
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would be ashamed’ or ‘circumstances which ought to have been sacred to the 
kingdom of Dahomey.’37 The Leeds Times went furthest, calling New York 
‘the great reservoir into which the moral sewage of Europe was emptied and 
accumulated,’ finding its only historical parallel in ‘the Middle Ages, when 
the besotted populace, at the instigation of ignorant and fanatical priests, 
were in the habit of setting upon the inoffensive Jews’ and proposing that 
Lincoln punish the culprits, ‘as foul a gang of irredeemable Yahoos as ever 
usurped the form or disgraced the name of man,’ with enslavement on 
Southern plantations.38 The only real defence that Union apologists had was 
to blame the riots on someone else: ‘BB’ claimed that ‘the chief actors in that 
dreadful riot’ were ‘from our own Islands,’ while the Wakefield Free Press 
blamed the Irish.39 In total, however, the effect of the riots was to confirm 
existing British prejudices about the state of race relations in the North. 
 Confederate advocates were just as likely as mainstream outlets to 
emphasise the lacklustre state of Northern race relations. James Lee of Delph 
Lodge spoke repeatedly of his belief that ‘The white Republican American 
would not travel in the same railway carriage, or eat at the same table with a 
black man’.40 Thomas Broadbent, interrupting a Union and Emancipation 
Society meeting at Huddersfield, complained that ‘an industrious negro… 
robbed by a white man… went to no fewer than 60 magistrates in 
Washington, but… being a black man he had no redress.’41 Samuel Mills 
challenged the Union advocate Rev. Mr Wheatley with, among other 
questions, ‘Does the North recognise the negro as the equal of the white 
man?’42 Mr Padman, supporting Southern recognition at the anniversary 
meeting of the Boston Spa, Clifford, and Bramham Wesleyan Training 
School, argued that ‘A Northerner would not ride in a railway car with a 
negro… would sooner have his horse at table with him than a man of colour… 
would not worship in the same house of God with him.’43  
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The Confederate activist James Spence complained that ‘There was a 
party in the North who regarded… the negro as they did the red Indian, to be 
improved away’.44 Ironically, one of the firmest believers that ‘wherever 
civilization advanced the red man retired’ was John Arthur Roebuck MP, who 
simultaneously believed that black people were preserved from this fate by 
their ‘buoyancy of nature’.45 However, he was emphatic about their poor 
treatment – ‘in the North the feeling against the black man is stronger than 
in the South (Hear, hear)… tomorrow, if the States were re-united, slavery 
would be fixed more firmly than ever (Applause)’.46 He criticised President 
Lincoln, who ‘quietly advised them to retire from America. “Take yourselves 
off”. (Hear, hear).’ He also emphasised the social exclusion experienced in 
the North – ‘he is treated worse than you would treat a dog… there are fights 
constantly taking place in Washington and other cities because the poor 
black man wishes to ride in an omnibus (Hear, hear).’47 More importantly, he 
contrasted this unfavourably with British racial egalitarianism: 
[when] we admitted as a member of the English bar one of our black 
fellow subjects in Africa… the American people… were horrified at the 
idea… we have no sympathy with that sort of feeling (Hear, hear). We 
hail a human being, whether he be black, brown, or fair. (Hear, 
hear).48 
This commitment to egalitarianism even among advocates of the 
Confederacy makes little sense in the context of a Britain that sees race as the 
immutable determinant of human capacity. Even if the advocates were using 
the topic of racism solely as a talking point, to discredit the Union in the eyes 
of the British public, this would only be effective if they were aware that 
Britain remained committed to egalitarianism. A more rational explanation 
can only come through a deeper understanding of why the British of the 
1860s opposed slavery, and why they might see social exclusion as an equal 
evil. Nevertheless, it is clear that racism is an ineffective explanation of 
British attitudes towards the American Civil War. 
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 Some felt that the condition of black people in the North was 
improving, or that it might do so. The Wakefield Express hoped 
Reconstruction would ‘ensure to the negro his just rights,’ while the Leeds 
Mercury claimed that ‘The free black of the North has risen indefinitely in 
social position since the war began… no longer persecuted and despised.’49 ‘L’ 
claimed untruthfully that Illinois ‘like the more Northern States now gives 
full recognition of the rights of the coloured race,’ ‘Truth’ argued that the 
black citizens of New York ‘have all the rights of white men and are protected 
in the enjoyment of those rights by the strong arm of the law,’ and 
Washington Wilkes asserted that emancipated slaves ‘were now as free as any 
white man.’50  
However, it was far more common for newspapers to portray the lot of 
Northern black people as deteriorating: even the pro-Northern Huddersfield 
Examiner was forced to report that Free States had ‘passed laws excluding 
them from the very soil of the country, and Wendell Phillips has been 
mobbed at Cincinnati for daring to preach the gospel of freedom’.51 Without 
understanding that Britain deeply mistrusted Northern motives towards the 
black community, and expected to see progress in race relations across the 
country before revising these views, it is impossible to understand why 
Britain might be sceptical about events such as the Emancipation 
Proclamation. The pro-Confederate Yorkshire Gazette perhaps summed it up 
best: ‘Before we believe in the Northern sympathy for the negro, we should 
prefer to see the abolition of the state laws against his admission into 
Indiana, Illinois, and other Northern States’.52 
 
It is hard to conclude that ‘Britons were of a divided heart about the fate of 
Southern slavery’: in reality, support for slavery clearly remained a fringe 
proposition.53 The overwhelming majority of newspapers were clear: 
slave breeders… are as hateful to the best portion of the English people 
as the cannibals of the Fijean Islands. Only let a breeder or seller of 
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slaves be recognised in the Strand… and his reception would be of the 
same sort as that which Marshal Haynau experienced at the hands of 
Messrs. Barclay and Perkins’ draymen.54  
The Conservative Halifax Guardian considered domestic servitude ‘even 
more debasing to the slave-owner than the slave’ and complained at ‘the 
Scriptural authority blasphemously claimed for this’, while the Sheffield 
Daily Telegraph grumbled that ‘any ruffian who has the money may buy at 
the auction block a better man than himself’.55 The Conservative Yorkshire 
Gazette picked up this theme of slave-owners being inferior to their slaves 
and put a gendered spin on it, protesting at  
the degradation of women to prostitution which is the more certain 
the more she is fitted for a high and noble grade… imagine the 
corruption of their masters, who may go forth from the company of 
the most honoured ladies of the land and buy their equals in look, 
intellect, and even manners, in the next slave-market56  
 
Even where attempts were made to moderate this criticism, it was generally 
restricted to revising the level of harm caused, rather than claiming slavery 
was a moral good in itself. For instance, the Conservative Wakefield Journal 
claimed that slave-owners ‘on the whole treat them well, because injury to 
the slaves is an injury to the slave-owner, inasmuch as they probably 
constitute his whole property’.57 The advanced Liberal Leeds Express 
regretted Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which ‘seized hold of a few exceptional cases… 
and made their depravity apply to the whole… Speaking of the masters as a 
body, they were kind, attentive and considerate to their slaves.’58 However, 
this was in part because it blamed the book for preventing the ‘conciliatory 
and compromising policy’ of Buxton and Brougham from ‘bringing the 
planters themselves to adopt their emancipation views by a gradual 
scheme’.59 In light of the immense popularity of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and 
Beecher Stowe’s attempt to drum up support for the North, perhaps there 
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was some element of a backlash against the book in comments like ‘There are 
Legrees in the Southern States. It would be ridiculous to deny a fact so 
patent: but Legrees are not so common in the South.’60 
 In large part, the British were predisposed to critique slavery in the 
South because they had an existing complaint there. The practice of 
imprisoning coloured British merchant seamen during their stay in Southern 
ports had highlighted the issues of race relations in a way that encouraged 
the extension of the protections of British liberty regardless of race.61 This 
issue was still live at the time of the Civil War: the Sheffield Daily Telegraph 
considered it ‘the most systematic indignity it [our flag] has ever suffered,’ 
connecting it with the fact that ‘they lately tarred and feathered an English 
captain for dining at the same table with a coloured stevedore’ and the Leeds 
Times complained about ‘outrages of the most cruel description by those 
same “chivalrous” [Southern] gentlemen’.62 Union advocates such as ‘RS’ and 
Russell L. Carter used it to contrast the South’s desire for freedom: ‘these 
men, whose corner stone is slavery, are fighting for liberty!’63 It was also used 
to moderate attitudes over the Trent Affair, as ‘in Southern ports coloured 
men have been torn from the protection of the British flag with just as little 
ceremony as Messrs. Slidell and Mason’.64 Moreover, the coloured seamen 
issue was cited as one of the many areas in which the weakening of the Union 
offered the potential for Britain to act more effectively against slavery. 
‘England will no longer tolerate the imprisonment of her sailors, men of 
colour, at Charleston’; ‘hitherto they were screened and sheltered by the great 
power and greater name of the Federal Republic… when broken up into 
hollow and jealous sections, the case will be very different’.65 
 Although the British were convinced that slavery should be ended, 
they were also emphatic that it should be gradual. With an institution ‘so 
widespread and extensive… it is most perilous to attempt the destruction of it 
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suddenly.’66 Though apprenticeship failed in the West Indies, it was 
sometimes proposed as the best solution for the American issue – and was 
even made a quasi-ultimatum: ‘to such an emancipation, as the price of their 
recognition, the Southern States of America would not object. If they do… let 
them be left to the natural retribution which will inevitably follow.’67  
However, this support of caution was not due to ‘widespread 
stereotypes about black immaturity and savagery’: preparation for liberty was 
a universal need.68 The Wakefield Express explained that ‘Men must be 
educated to freedom ere they can be safely entrusted with all the privileges of 
those who have for centuries enjoyed political liberty,’ adding ‘We have 
instances nearer home than America of failures for that reason.’69 The moral 
and intellectual degradation suffered under slavery could simultaneously be 
‘a very strong reason unquestionably why he should be free but no argument 
in favour of immediate emancipation’: while ‘legal disabilities must be at 
once and entirely removed… social degradation… must be left to the 
operation of time and better teaching.’70 This approach was rooted in decades 
of anti-slavery messages about the deprivation which the slaves had suffered, 
but was also consistent with the domestic emphasis on an educated and 
independent electorate and Tocquevillian observations on the failure of 
French self-government, as much as it was inspired by racial factors. 71  
In America, the Republican critique of slavery was often based on ‘the 
economic superiority of free to slave labour’, using ‘Elaborate statistical 
comparisons’.72 Though this economic criticism did feature in British anti-
slavery, it was more often based on moralistic, religious grounds. This is 
unlikely, however, to reflect Seymour Drescher’s belief that the relative 
efficiency of slave labour had led the British to see West Indian emancipation 
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as a failure.73 As we have seen, the popular press welcomed Lincoln’s 
compensated domestic emancipation but lamented its duration. This was the 
polar opposite of the ‘slow death for slavery’, which gradually withdrew legal 
protections for slavery without compensating the slave-owners, and which 
Drescher argues had superseded the West Indian model by the 1860s.74 
More simply, the moralistic argument was easier to understand and 
more forceful – indeed, the words used have retained much of their force, 
despite the passage of a century and a half. The Tadcaster Post, for instance, 
considered it  
a violation of all just and moral law… to breed, buy, feed or sell men 
and women as we do horses, dogs, pigs and sheep, and to sneer at all 
conjugal and domestic purity and virtue as if lust and vice were 
virtuous, is a state of society which must, as a natural consequence, 
corrupt and debase any people, and slowly yet surely bring down the 
judgement of Heaven.75  
This association with sexual immorality was an integral part of the British 
critique: every ‘Southern gentleman’ could be suspected of ‘being a trafficker 
in his own flesh and blood – of leading a life of unmentionable pollutions – of 
being addicted to crimes and habits which combine the cruelty of fiends with 
the filthiness of swine’.76 The most emotive point of Dr Cheever’s lecture was 
when he announced that ‘In selling children like cattle, it was often the 
slaveowner’s own children that were thus disposed of (sensation).’77  
As well as the sanctity of marriage, both the Protestant work-ethic and 
the belief that it was God’s plan for everybody to maximise the talents given 
to them were also directly opposed to the institution of slavery. As the 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph put it: 
They say that the African slave is not a man, because where he is 
suffered to know nothing he is shockingly ignorant – because when 
treated as cattle are treated, he does not exhibit that manliness which 
freedom alone can import – and because, when held in a helpless, 
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hopeless, mind-killing bondage, which denies him his own will, his 
own children, and his right to defend either his virtue or his life, he 
becomes a stupid, sluggish, brainless sort of creature, whose actions 
betray more of the animal than of the man.78 
Yet the social exclusion which black people experienced in the North also 
impeded the development of these characteristics. By denying them the 
ability to work freely, through restrictive hiring, residence exclusions, and 
restrictions on public transport, it also denied them the ability to become the 
head of a respectable working class family; by barring them from church, it 
prevented them from living a fulfilling spiritual life through Christian 
worship. Although the British may have disagreed on whether the working 
classes merited the extension of the franchise, there was little dispute over 
whether work and faith were valuable.79 As such, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that they condemned Northern segregation almost as frequently and 
vehemently as they condemned Southern slavery. 
 
Racial discourse in Britain 
 
This criticism of segregation and slavery, and the fundamental equality 
between black and white on which it was based, suggests there may be an 
opportunity to re-evaluate the effect of scientific racism. Catherine Hall, 
speaking for the mainstream, argued that the 1849 publication of Occasional 
Discourse on the Negro Question 
marked the moment when it became legitimate for respectable, 
influential men publicly to profess a belief in the essential inferiority 
of black people… By mid-century, it had become the fashion within 
scientific discourse to aver that distinct and fixed racial types provided 
the key to human history.80 
What a detailed examination of popular contemporary opinion tends to 
suggest, however, is the remarkable persistence of a religiously-motivated 
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belief in foundational racial equality. In the provinces, where the spread of 
any new scientific dogma was restricted by the limited networks of 
intellectual diffusion, references to fixed racial types were outnumbered by 
references to Acts 17:26, to the effect that God ‘hath made of one blood all 
nations of men’.81 Importantly, the fundamental attitude of Christianity – 
that all are imperfect and striving to improve – provided a basis for 
sympathy. As the Quaker Wilson Armistead noted, black people were ‘by no 
means perfect, but subject to all those infirmities incident to our fallen 
nature.’82 
 Perhaps the most prominent enunciation of the doctrine of scientific 
racism was Dr James Hunt’s speech at the British Association’s 1863 
Newcastle meeting. However, Hunt’s reception was highly sceptical: even the 
newspapers which were prepared to entertain his opinion still tended to 
disagree with him.83 Moreover, although this scientific belief might have 
circulated effectively in the capital, there was almost no infrastructure in the 
provinces through which it could be disseminated. There was only one 
lecture which communicated Hunt’s views, delivered at the Hull Literary and 
Philosophical Society by C.C. Blake FGS, secretary to Hunt’s Anthropological 
Society of London.84 However, his attendance was undoubtedly related to the 
fact that the chairman of the meeting and president of the society, Dr 
Kelburne King, was honorary secretary of the Anthropological Society’s local 
branch. For the most part, however, the Anthropological Society was an 
institution against which Yorkshire identity could be mobilised: 
A Yorkshireman who had attended a meeting of the Anthropological 
Society was asked by a friend what the learned gentlemen had been 
saying. ‘Well… they believe that we have come from monkeys, and I 
thowt as how they were fast getting back again to where they came 
from.’85 
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In contemporary discourse about race, it was the traditional anti-slavery 
lecturers and missionaries who held sway, and these were committed – at 
least in principle – to equality. In the words of Rev. T. Llewellyn, ‘God’s 
image in ebony was as precious as in ivory’; as Rev. Mr Gedge explained, in 
the Niger mission ‘there had not been a white man engaged in it, all native 
clergymen… with human hearts and human feelings, with minds and souls, 
like ourselves.’86 This also applied to the education provided by the churches: 
‘A Reader’ ‘beg[ged] to refer sceptics to the coloured students of Wesley 
college, in this town, for some examples of the intelligence of persons of 
colour.’87 
More importantly, these persons of colour often had the opportunity 
to speak for themselves about the situation in America. One of the most 
significant features of the anti-slavery lecturing circuit was the use of escaped 
slaves as lecturers. On the one hand, this gave them the opportunity to set the 
agenda; on the other, it also directly contradicted the allegation that black 
people were inherently inferior to white people.88 The structure of lectures 
forced the speakers into a quintessentially Western format, which let them 
prove ‘the African race is something more than mere goods and chattels’ or 
‘remove the groundless prejudice against [their] downtrodden race’.89 The 
reach of the anti-slavery movement was far greater than that of the academic 
community. While the Anthropological Society barely ranged outside 
London, escaped slaves could be found lecturing in minor towns like Settle, 
Mirfield, Malton, Saddleworth, Holmfirth and Barnard Castle.90 These 
escaped slaves also published books, which were generally more accessible 
than the academic texts in which the new doctrines of scientific racism 
circulated.91  
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If anti-slavery managed to reach into even the smallest of Yorkshire 
towns, so too did minstrelsy. Minstrelsy featured white performers who 
blacked their faces with burnt cork to present burlesque parodies of what 
were, at least in part, intended to be scenes of slave life in America. Though it 
was an American invention, it rapidly spread in Britain: not only to 
professional troupes like Christy’s, Templeton’s, Rumsey and Newcomb’s, 
but also to performances by groups like the Pontefract Amateur Ethiopian 
Troupe and the Bowling Coloured Minstrels.92 
The general image of minstrelsy has emphasised that these 
performances presented a wholly negative stereotype of black people, and 
that the image portrayed by the minstrels bled over into broader cultural 
perceptions of the behaviour and attributes of the race.93 Although both 
propositions are fundamentally true, we must be prepared to nuance our 
assumptions about how readily theatrics were conflated with real life. For a 
start, although minstrelsy included scenes intended to represent plantation 
life, it also jumbled and blended a variety of cultural forms.94 For instance, 
some performances included ‘a Tyrolean solo… a singular combination of 
sounds – without words – resembling alternately the tones of a German 
fiddle and a flageolet.’95 The ‘Female Christy’s Minstrels,’ meanwhile, 
appeared ‘in full Indian costume’ featuring ‘Songs, Duetts [sic], Glees, 
Dances, etc. peculiar to the Indian and Negro races.’96 Blurring racial lines so 
overtly necessarily distanced the depictions from reality. This air of unreality 
may have been facilitated by the fact that amateur groups were familiar to 
their audiences, and that even in professional groups some of the minstrels 
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were visiting their home towns.97 In this light, minstrelsy may have echoed 
earlier ceremonies of misrule which incorporated face-blacking.98 
Furthermore, some of the aspects of minstrelsy which have been 
characterised as specifically black could more accurately be depicted as 
generally American. For instance, one of the characteristics of the minstrel 
show was the stump speech – a humorous monologue parodying academic or 
political public speaking.99 However, stump oratory was more a prerogative 
of white Americans than the disfranchised black populace: it was the Yankee 
who was the fons et origio of ‘stump oratory and bunkum’.100 Indeed, when 
the ‘coloured citizens’ of American produced a manifesto, the Yorkshire 
Gazette argued that ‘The first sentence has such a genuine ring of American 
stump oratory that we cannot believe that any black has written it.’101  
Other characteristics of minstrelsy were also generic stereotypes about 
Americans at large, such as the creation of neologisms. The most famous line 
from the play Our American Cousin, one of the blockbusters of the 1850s and 
1860s, was when the title character denounced the villainess of the piece as a 
‘sockdologising old mantrap’. Characters like Artemus Ward (created by the 
American humourist Charles Farrar Browne) produced pieces so thick with 
dialect and neologisms as to be almost incomprehensible.102 This makes it 
difficult to conclude which aspects of minstrel characters the audience 
understood as stemming from them being black, and which from them being 
American. 
The heavy use of dialect was a characteristic of minstrelsy, and must 
be considered not just in terms of generic British views on America, but also 
in terms of the role of dialect in provincial life. Almost all forms of Victorian 
drama, and many forms of literature, used dialect as a means of easily 
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conveying a character’s origin and status.103 However, this function of 
defining groups had different implications at a metropolitan, national and 
elite level than it did in the provinces. At the centre, dialect was an 
aberration, a deviation from the norm: at the fringes, dialect was an 
important facet of regional identity. Whether political or otherwise, letters 
and poetry written in Yorkshire dialect were as important a part of local life 
as were interjections at public meetings, recorded in their dialect forms by 
local newspapers. The Conservatives, as a largely English party of the elites, 
might be expected to champion a generic English nationalism: however, on 
occasion they too found use for dialect.104 The use of thick American accents 
by minstrels undoubtedly set them apart from their audience. However, it 
seems plausible that, in the provinces, the emphasis lent by the use of dialect 
was less on inferiority and more on difference.  
 In most cases, dialect performed the important function of speaking 
truth to power. This, too, seems to have been the case for at least some of the 
stump speeches which formed a significant component of the practice of 
minstrelsy. Some speeches presumably mocked the pretensions of 
intellectual black people – for instance, in Quambo’s ‘absurd jumbling of 
time and place,’ accompanied by antics with an umbrella.105 Others, however, 
seem to have played a similar role to the medieval jester, whose lowly 
position enabled them to mock and humiliate their social superiors. One of 
Templeton’s speeches included ‘severe criticism’ for ‘great European 
potentates,’ while Rumsey and Newcombe’s minstrels ‘brought down the 
house’ by mocking Sheffield councillor Isaac Ironside.106 
 It is impossible to ever know exactly what contemporaries understood 
by minstrelsy, and what proportion of the audience drew some or all of their 
views on the behaviour of different races from the performances. However, it 
is important to highlight that there do seem to have been a variety of possible 
interpretations of the performances. Furthermore, there was always the 
countervailing influence of the escaped slaves to demonstrate that not all 
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black people were clowns. However, the American Civil War resulted in the 
effective dissolution of the transatlantic anti-slavery network. When slavery 
ended, so too did the supply of escaped slaves who were both visibly 
Westernised and able to talk in emotive terms about the plight of others like 
them. Appeals by the Freedman’s Aid Society would never have the same 
inherent motivational quality as would the plight of human beings treated as 
property and denied the fundamental rights of marriage and religion. During 
the American Civil War, the anti-slavery message seems powerful enough to 
have counteracted the pressure of both ‘scientific’ racism and minstrelsy. 
Without it, the progress of ‘scientific’ racism seems to have been inexorable. 
 
Nationalism and noninterventionism 
 
That Britain was so hesitant about supporting the Confederate right to 
national independence is perhaps surprising when set in the context of their 
support for European nationalism. The British looked favourably on almost 
every national movement available, from the Hungarians to the Circassians, 
generally on the utilitarian basis that these national movements best 
promoted constitutionalism and libertarianism. On some occasions, national 
independence was seen as an inherent right or appropriate aspiration in 
itself; for instance, a Bradford councillor explained at a meeting for Poland 
that ‘it was unquestionably the first right of a people to decide on his own 
government (hear, hear).’107 However, support for nationalities was often 
correlated with oppression by some form of multinational despotism. 
 In the case of Hungary, almost all newspapers highlighted traditional 
constitutional privileges that they were striving for. The Sheffield 
Independent rooted Hungary’s claim to ‘independent self-government’ in its 
‘ancient constitutional rights’ as well as its size and history.108 The Yorkshire 
Gazette praised the Hungarians for defending ‘their solemnly guaranteed 
constitutional liberties,’ while the Eastern Counties Herald argued the 
Hungarians merited special treatment as ‘an ancient kingdom’.109  
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This constitutionalist perspective on Hungarian liberty was 
strengthened by the parallels drawn with British circumstances. The Leeds 
Times, for instance, explained how ‘The Obergespans (lord-lieutenants) are 
superseded, and the Comitats (county assemblies) are supressed… the rights 
they claim to exercise are no new-fangled pretensions, the offspring of 
political fanaticism, or theoretical constitution-mongering. They take their 
stand upon the ancient laws of their country.’110 It is unclear whether the 
British willingness to connect overseas national struggles to their own 
reflected a teleological sense that liberation always followed the same path, 
or simply the prioritisation of English constitutional history. Nevertheless, 
they continued to do so: for instance, the conflict between King Wilhelm I 
and the Prussian Landtag was frequently interpreted as a re-enactment of 
the precursor to the English Civil War.111  
 There was also a tendency to refer to Polish aspirations in 
constitutional terms, with the Conservative Doncaster Chronicle suggesting 
that Britain, France and Austria should demand ‘for the Poles a 
constitutional government, and that form of national autonomy guaranteed 
by treaty in 1815.’112 The Rotherham Advertiser argued that the Poles hoped 
‘to enjoy those laws, institutions and privileges which they regard as 
peculiarly their own.’113 The Hull Advertiser felt that Polish independence 
was more necessary than Italian on the grounds that ‘in central and Southern 
Italy… the cities and towns were always in the enjoyment of an excellent 
system of municipal government… [whereas] in Poland, the iron heel of the 
barbarian conqueror is as crushingly visible in the government of the 
municipality as in the command of the imperial fortress’.114  
Perhaps because the question of Polish independence was less firmly 
constitutional than the Hungarian example, there was also a romantic 
nationalist element in British opinions of the struggle. The Harrogate 
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Advertiser felt they were ‘in every respect more noble, chivalrous, and 
virtuous than their oppressors’; James Law praised the transfer of ‘national 
sentiment from the present patriots to their children’; and the Sheffield 
Independent highlighted how ‘The Poles cling with an ever-growing tenacity 
to their national existence, which it has ever been the object of their Russian 
oppressors to efface.’115 More so than in the Austrian case, some newspapers 
emphasised Polish racial and cultural superiority: the Scarborough Mercury 
contrasted Poland, possessing ‘intellects capable of the grandest 
development’ with Russia, ‘the fatherland… of barbarity, of religious 
fanaticism and superstition’.116 Yet, even in the Polish case, a liberal 
constitutional system was expected to ensue: ‘peoples and nations will no 
longer allow themselves to be crushed under the iron heel of tyranny.’117 
 That British support for nationalism was intrinsically bound up with 
constitutionalism may be seen in the case of the joint Prussian-Austrian 
attack on the Danish province of Schleswig-Holstein. In this case, British 
support for a union of nationalities was overridden by contempt for German 
despotism, resulting in support for the Danes. The Leeds Times, which also 
doubted just how German the Holsteiners were, felt the annexation would 
‘exchange a fair and constantly-increasing measure of constitutional freedom 
for all the rigours of a contemptible and malignant despotism,’ highlighting 
how Austria ‘champions the principles of nationality in the Duchies of 
Schleswig-Holstein, but strangles it in Venice, Hungary, and Gallicia [sic].’118 
The Keighley News felt ‘The appeal to the nationality principle is a strange 
one to be raised by Powers that send Poles, Hungarians and Venetians to 
slaughter the Danes in the name of German rights,’ and that ‘the Germans of 
Schleswig had no more right than the Germans of Bradford to carry their 
pretensions of nationality into a country never included in the German 
Empire.’119 Even the Bradford Review, which supported the Germans rather 
than the Danes, felt continued German disunity was preferable to European 
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war serving ‘the interests of despots’.120 Similarly, the Yorkshire Gazette 
might ‘sympathise with the desire of the Great Germanic nation to unite their 
divided elements more fully’, while also feeling that ‘the spoliation of 
Denmark is written in the blood of a free and brave people.’121 It was not 
merely the right of peoples to set up their own systems of government, but 
the potential to expand the sphere of liberal constitutional powers which 
interested the British. 
 If the British lacked enthusiasm about the nationalist movement as 
applied to Schleswig-Holstein, their support of Confederate nationality also 
appears much more muted when set in context. ‘On this particular question 
of Poland… there is no difference of opinion’ the Leeds Times confidently 
averred, subsequently advocating their recognition as belligerents.122 The 
Bradford Observer had an answer for those who asked why recognise Poland 
but not the South: Poland had ‘a proven nationality… a name and a place in 
history.’123 There also seems to have been far more support for Italian 
independence than for Confederate. The Halifax MP James Stansfield 
expressed his belief that ‘the Italian movement is no question of party 
politics. I do not know the English party which does not desire the freedom, 
the independence, and I may add the unity of the Italian people.’124 The 
Leeds Mercury agreed: ‘Never did any nation watch the course of events with 
livelier emotion and more unselfish good-will’ than did Britain with Italy.125 
Yet enthusiasm rarely overcame the tendency to hold aloof. The Sheffield 
Times asked why Poland should not ‘succeed as well as the Confederates’, but 
also felt that ‘Any encouragement or aid which the voice of the English 
people… can give, ought to be afforded. Further than this the nation has no 
call to go.’126 The Hull Advertiser supported Polish and Southern 
independence, but still felt that ‘The lives of Englishmen are too valuable to 
be flung away in contests of this description’.127 
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 If we look away from sympathy and towards active support, there was 
greater unanimity about going to war on behalf of Denmark than the 
Confederacy. At first glance, we might assume these were Conservative 
newspapers seeking to support Conservative efforts to dethrone Palmerston 
using foreign affairs. However, newspapers across the political spectrum 
backed war on behalf of the Danes: from the Conservative Leeds Intelligencer 
who rejected the suggestion that Britain could abandon Christian IX without 
dishonour, to the advanced Liberal Leeds Express which argued that Britain 
must risk war to maintain its great power status. Even the Leeds Times 
backed war, though only if the other signatories to the Treaty of London 
joined in.128 The Malton Messenger claimed that ‘There never was an 
occasion when the people of this country… more sincerely and thoroughly 
sympathised with a nation in distress… the almost universal impulse in 
England was to draw the sword’.129 The Sheffield Daily Telegraph made the 
comparison clear: Denmark was more worthy than the Confederacy.130  
This greater support for action may be explained by the suggestion 
that the European balance of power was more immediately relevant to 
Britain than the result of the American Civil War. However, it is not possible 
to reconcile these relative levels of support with the assertion that ‘No other 
event… had as decided an effect on British life as did the Civil War.’131 Once 
again, by setting the Confederacy in its broader context we see that the levels 
of support they attracted were by no means exceptional: in fact, they 
attracted less enthusiasm than many other comparable causes. 
In many cases, Confederate supporters compared their cause to other 
national movements, in the hope of matching their levels of support or 
success – something that it seems unlikely that they would have done, if the 
Confederate cause was without equal. The Pontefract Telegraph considered 
that recognition ‘would be as much warranted by international law as was the 
recognition of Italy’.132 Though the Halifax Guardian opposed the 
recognition of Poland, it used it to press the Confederate case: ‘If we 
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recognise this skeleton, with what grace can we refuse any longer to unite 
with the Emperor of France in recognising the Southern Confederacy?’133 
Father Conway of Oldham ‘asked why it was that England was so long in 
recognising the Southern States. Victor Emmanuel was recognised in Naples 
and Tuscany in half the time’134 ‘A Lover of White Freedom,’ meanwhile, 
pointed out that ‘Whether the Polish nobles treated their peasants well or ill 
did not lessen European sympathy’ for them.135 In Sheffield, Henry Turner – 
like the pseudonymous correspondent ‘Locomotion’ – felt that if Hungary or 
Poland had ‘maintained a two years’ war with the same success, those who 
were crying out against the South would have been the strongest advocates of 
immediate recognition (Cheers).’136  
It is evident that many Confederate supporters perceived their cause 
to be somehow treated unfairly or differently from mainstream opinion. 
Despite years of informed commentary in Britain on the sectional divisions 
within America, the Confederacy simply could not garner support for its 
independence.137 This had a clear cause. If British support for national 
movements was dependent on their likelihood of producing a more liberal, 
constitutional society, then the deep scepticism of the Southern economic 
and political systems necessarily militated against enthusiasm for 
Confederate independence. The ‘antislavery wall’ was not created by the 
Emancipation Proclamation: it existed from the very beginning.138 
Mainstream opinion often saw Confederate independence as inevitable, or 
had faith in God turning the victory against the South by making its result the 
end of slavery. However, there is little to suggest that Yorkshire – and by 
extension Britain more generally – was enthusiastic about an independent 
Confederacy, or was turning against earlier attitudes of racial egalitarianism. 
 
Although the British sense of satisfaction with their position in the world 
bordered on smugness, we should accurately reflect their beliefs as to how 
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they had arrived at it. In particular, we should understand to what extent 
they considered self-government a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon prerogative, and 
from what causes this stemmed. If contemporary Britain traced its origin to 
primarily racial factors, the prospect of other nations and races managing to 
mimic the British was limited; if it came from cultural factors, there was the 
potential for other countries to do the same, albeit with a transitional period. 
Given the widespread support for liberal constitutional nationalist 
movements and the opposition to hasty enfranchisement of American 
freemen, it seems more likely that they believed the cultural thesis. 
 This interpretation is strengthened by the answers most settled on 
when asked to describe the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxons. These were 
less often detailed specifically as the capacity for self-government than as a 
grab-bag of personal attributes.139 The Leeds Times considered them to be 
‘pluck, and truth, and frank manly behaviour’; the Leeds Express ‘firmness of 
character and build’.140 The Bradford Observer favoured ‘daring and 
endurance’, and the Bradford Review ‘the tenacious pursuit of great aims’.141 
The Halifax Guardian considered them to be ‘intellectual energy… 
commercial activity… [and] indomitable spirit’, and Reverend Gervase Smith, 
speaking at Hull, thought it was readiness ‘to suffer for, rather than abandon 
the truth’.142 The readers of the Rotherham Advertiser, meanwhile, were 
offered a variety of explanations. The paper itself thought it was the ability to 
maintain its national character overseas, which stemmed from ‘cricket, 
yachting, boxing, wrestling, and other English pastimes’.143 However, Henry 
Vincent – speaking in the town – believed it was ‘that they loved work’ and 
Mr H. Harrison considered it to be ‘our invaluable political constitution, 
favoured by the insular position of the country, and the natural courage and 
nobility of the race’.144 Many elements of this variety of national 
characteristics may have contributed to British success in maintaining liberal 
institutions, as the Yorkshire Gazette acknowledged when praising ‘the good 
sense, the moderation, the intelligence, the practical ability, the persevering 
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industry, and the right principle’ of the English.145 However, there was little 
indication that those listing them felt that Britain was exceptional in a way 
other countries and races could not mimic. 
 Catherine Hall argues that the biological racist Robert Knox 
established that ‘Civilisation depended… on the separation of races, not on 
their harmonious integration.’146 However, the British understood the Anglo-
Saxon ‘race’ itself not as a pure strain but as a mixture. In Barnsley, Rev. R.A. 
Redford MA of Hull emphasised the blending of Saxon, Teutonic, Danish and 
Norman characteristics, while Mr Applebee attributed British greatness to 
‘Celtic imagination, Danish pluck and fire, Roman love of order and of law, 
and Norman self-sustaining command… grafted on the trunk of Saxon 
plodding, industry and endurance’.147 Henry Vincent at Rotherham told his 
audience that ‘The English people were built of the odds and ends of the 
entire universe. There never was such a queer mixture (laughter)’, and when 
the American Elihu Burritt described the British union of Latin, Teutonic, 
and Norman elements, ‘he wished his audience to bear in mind the equal 
importance of each element that was combined’.148 This sense that Britain 
was a fusion of races was even more pertinent in Yorkshire, with its sense of a 
distinct Danish heritage, strengthened through lectures on topics like ‘the 
Danish occupancy in Cleveland, and the traces it has left’, which dwelt ‘upon 
the old manners and customs still kept up in Cleveland, especially in the 
Dales’.149 
 Although the British were broadly clear that the original Anglo-Saxons 
were a mixture, there was a smaller degree of consensus on whether this 
distinction could be lost. The Eastern Counties Herald argued that it already 
had been, as the Union victory represented ‘a motley host of Yankees, Irish 
and Germans… [triumphing] over a race which can boast of a pure Anglo-
Saxon origin’.150 However, the Herald was already unclear on racial terms: it 
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had previously called ‘the Americans’ ‘a nomad agricultural race’, and the 
Poles ‘a community of the ablest representatives of our race’.151  
Perhaps influenced by Hunt’s thoughts on racial degeneration, there 
were suggestions that the Americans were falling away from British 
standards. A.R. Wallace FRGS argued that their ‘peculiar characteristics’ 
demonstrated ‘physical change in a people… dependent on material and 
moral causes’.152 In the absence of a full understanding of how racial 
characteristics developed and were communicated, these moral suggestions 
were common. The Barnsley Chronicle, for instance, noted the suggestions of 
physiologists ‘that the Americans have gradually acquired something of the 
Red Indian caste of countenance’ and wondered if the violence of the 
American civil war indicated that they had also acquired ‘the spirit of the 
savage’.153  
However, too much can be made of this issue of degeneration. For a 
start, papers were as changeable on this fundamental topic as on other issues 
of daily interest. In July 1862, for instance, the Leeds Times felt it was ‘still 
an open question’ if the Anglo-Saxon race could ‘maintain itself unimpaired 
in the New World’; by October, though the theory was ‘countenanced by 
many notable scientific names,’ the paper was ‘disposed to reject’ it.154 More 
importantly, the idea of an Anglo-Saxon Confederacy construed on racial 
lines appears to have received little contemporary support in the Yorkshire 
press.155 When the Leeds Times speculated about Anglo-Saxon degradation, 
it based this on ‘unmistakeable symptoms of both bodily and mental 
degeneracy… discernible in the native Americans of the Northern and 
Southern States’.156 Meanwhile, when the Bradford Observer lamented the 
passing away of the close ties between British and American political life, it 
did so by citing both the Pilgrim Fathers and Virginia’s connection ‘with the 
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patrician descent of families sprung from the adventurous companions of 




During the period of the American Civil War, then, there was a fundamental 
continuity in British attitudes towards race. Scientific attitudes may have 
been changing, but Hunt’s complaints about ‘the profound ignorance which 
exists in the minds of even the semi-scientific public on the Negro race’ 
suggests that this was a slower process than has been characterised. 
Mainstream attitudes, however, remained fixed on the civilizational and 
religious approach, in which all races shared a fundamental equality of 
foundation and potential – though this approach, of course, left room for 
stereotypes and discrimination.158 Moreover, there was optimism about the 
potential for other European nations to follow the British path towards 
liberty. It was the potential to expand liberty, rather than the mere question 
of nationality, which tended to be the ultimate determinant of whether 
Britain supported nationalist movements. So how would the British respond 
when faced with movements clamouring for liberty in territories which they 
controlled? 
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Chapter 7: Colonies and Empire, 1865-7 
 
So far, the examination of racial thought in the 1860s has focused on views of 
areas outside British control. However, as the world’s foremost imperial 
power, the practicalities of colonial government often tested British theories 
about race and civilisation to destruction. It was easy to proclaim 
fundamental human unity when criticising American backwardness on racial 
questions, but substantially more difficult when such proclamations 
threatened to weaken Britain’s hold on its own colonial possessions. How far, 
then, were British proclamations consistent across the globe? 
 To understand this, this chapter examines three imperial hotspots. In 
New Zealand, where the native Maori clashed with settlers in order to protect 
both their land and their way of life, British governors struggled not only to 
win the war but to create a lasting settlement between the two sides. In 
Jamaica, the long stagnation of the black community after emancipation 
combined with the anxiety of the white colonial elite following the Indian 
Rebellion, resulting in riot and bloody suppression. In Ireland, meanwhile, 
tensions of language, religion, culture and race spilled over in a transnational 
movement for independence which threatened British dominance in Canada 
as well as Ireland. 
Developments in these three areas have been seen as key to Britain’s 
pathway towards imperialism in the later nineteenth century. However, they 
have also been understood as spurring forward ‘scientific’ racism, and 
contributing towards the increasing subdivision of the human race – not 
solely based on skin colour, but also strengthening earlier divisions between 
‘Celts’ and ‘Saxons’.1 To what extent did popular attitudes towards self-
government show this to be a primarily Anglo-Saxon phenomenon?  
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The growth in racism has been connected to changes in Britain’s colonial 
relations, and the balance between colonists and the indigenous inhabitants. 
As Catherine Hall put it, ‘The Colonial Office and public opinion in Britain 
were moving away from the influence of the humanitarian lobby, with its 
emphasis on native welfare, and were increasingly preoccupied with settler 
development and self-government.’2 The policy of responsible government 
therefore reflects British reluctance to shoulder the financial burden of 
empire, and willingness to hand policy on the ground over to local settlers – 
either heedless or actively in favour of negative effects on the indigenous 
population. 
However, this does not seem to be borne out by the New Zealand 
conflict. Instead, newspapers across the political spectrum remained 
sceptical about the motivations of colonists, and reluctant to support them. 
The advanced Liberal Leeds Times was ‘by no means satisfied that we have 
justice on our side’, while the Sheffield Daily Telegraph considered colonists 
‘too prone to disregard native rights and interests,’ hoping the ‘fine race’ of 
Maori could be spared the fate of other indigenous people.3 The Conservative 
Yorkshire Gazette, too, suspected ‘justice is not wholly on the side of the 
colonists’.4 This was also the stance espoused by the Aborigines Protection 
Society: S.J. Abington emphasised that the Maori had been reasonable 
during the land disputes, and if ‘the governor had acted prudently no 
difficulty would have been experienced’.5 
 Moreover, in some cases support for the settlers weakened with time. 
This often hinged on a difference in material interests between colony and 
metropole: whereas the settlers wanted land, the British wanted stability. For 
instance, the advanced Liberal Bradford Review initially saw the war as a 
‘brutal outrage on the part of the natives’ and believed they ‘have perhaps 
been treated with far too much consideration’.6 Yet when land confiscation 
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appeared likely, it trusted Britain would veto such acts even though ‘the 
colonists, who are accustomed to regard the New Zealanders as beings of an 
inferior species’ believed them ‘perfectly just’.7 Tellingly, as will be 
considered later, this suggests that seeing the Maori as inferior was viewed as 
a colonial prerogative. In general, the dominant view was that of the Leeds 
Times, which expected the New Zealand government to tell the Maori that  
Your Great Mother is not incensed; she is only sad because her white 
and dark children cannot live together… if you will try to live 
peaceably, you shall have fair-play and fair price for your lands when 
you want to sell them; for the Queen wishes the Maoris to live and 
prosper, and not to die before the face of her own people.8  
The settler press has been suggested as one of the main agents for defeating 
the humanitarian approach towards colonial governance, in a deliberate 
strategy of communication.9 If true, it should also be noted that by the 1860s 
at least some members of the British press were becoming sceptical of the 
accuracy of the views being provided to them: the Yorkshire Gazette ‘wished 
that the English public could have a clear and truthful statement of the native 
side of this unhappy question’.10 
 Elaine Musgrave has suggested that, in India, the figure of the sepoy 
was deliberately ‘invoked to rally the metropolitan and colonial British 
together’ when fair legislation threatened the privileged position of settlers.11 
In New Zealand, however, there was far less sympathy for the plight of the 
settlers: only one newspaper, the Leeds Times, accepted the inevitability of 
backing the settlers against their ‘savage’ foe. In less than a month, it moved 
from saying that ‘colonists must be left to bear the expense of native wars’ to 
believing that this stance was ‘useless,’ owing to the ‘decidedly material and 
earthly’ nature of the ‘loyalty of free-born Britons ten thousand miles away’: 
those colonies would ‘cease to care for the sovereignty of the British Crown’ 
as soon as Britain stopped paying for their wars, making the financial 
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sacrifice worth paying.12 Most newspapers, however, agreed with the York 
Herald that  
the best guarantee against a recurrence of these hostile encounters, 
would be to throw the expense of conducting them on the settlers 
themselves… by their aggressive spirit, [they] are constantly provoking 
the natives… They are those who gain by the wars, and, under these 
circumstances, it is hard that the mother country should be saddled 
with all the expenses.13 
It swung behind the war in the belief that the Maori objective was to 
‘obliterate all traces of civilisation and Christianity’ from the North Island, 
hoping ‘that the natives, who have needlessly provoked the war, will be 
taught a lesson which they will not soon forget.’14 However, once done, the 
government should ‘let the New Zealand colonists distinctly understand that 
any future fighting must be at their own cost’.15 Its neighbouring Yorkshire 
Gazette believed that ‘The colonists may be in the right, but, still, it is 
scarcely fair in them to ask us always to fight their battles… It sometimes 
makes men civil even to disagreeable neighbours, if they know they must get 
out of their own rows in their own way.’16 This accountability was one of the 
fundamental principles of responsible government in the colonies: as 
Gladstone explained to a Select Committee including the Sheffield MP John 
Roebuck, ‘no community… not primarily charged with… its own defence is 
really… a free community’.17 However, it was also the basis of demands for 
the extension of the franchise at home: that reposing decision-making power 
in the taxpayers was the only way to ensure fiscal responsibility. 
 Even those fighting were not universally favourable to the colonists. 
An officer of the 68th (Durham Light Infantry), which recruited extensively 
from Yorkshire, called colonial ministers ‘a lot of scoundrels’ in contrast to 
the Maori – ‘a very fine, plucky race,’ with ‘so far as I can see, right on their 
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side.’18 His colleagues did not all find the Maori so praiseworthy: one private 
letter talked about ‘atrocities committed by these warlike savages’ for whom 
the men felt only ‘utter contempt and disgust’.19 Yet others tempered their 
criticism: ‘A young officer whose parents reside in Beverley’ frequently called 
the Maori ‘niggers,’ but also described them ‘continuing the fight most 
gallantly’; Thomas Fall of the 68th felt that the Maori were ‘sly dogs’ and 
‘savages,’ but described the native fortifications as ‘the most ingeniously 
constructed affairs I ever met with… defended with a spirit which we cannot 
but admire’.20 Though views may have soured as conflict escalated, early 
praise for the Maori was never abandoned completely.21 Among those whose 
lives were not at stake, views of the Maori were generally favourable. A letter 
from Coromandel opined that ‘most of them are very dirty… [and] very lazy, 
but very civil,’ and a letter from Marlborough noted of one Maori employed 
on the harvest that he was ‘a good man to work, and very steady… I pay him 
20s a week, the same as white men get, and I would rather have him than 
most whites about the place.’22 A lady also felt that ‘The Maories [sic] here 
dress like gentlemen. Indeed, some of them you would scarcely know from 
any dark Englishman.’23  
 This idea that the Maori were exceptionally close to the British was 
also acknowledged by comparing them to earlier stages of British 
development.24 The Leeds Times noted they ‘have been called the English of 
the Southern Seas… superior in natural courage and intelligence to the abject 
human creatures found by the first settlers in Australia… not unlike the 
aboriginal Britons who encountered Caesar and his legions on our own 
shores.’25 Radical General Thomas Perronet Thompson described the 
question as being ‘whether a gallant race of aborigines, much resembling in 
many points those found in Britain by Caesar, could be moulded into British 
                                                   
18 LI, 1 October 1864 p. 3. 
19 HA, 28 October 1863 p. 4. 
20 BvR, 20 February 1864 pp. 4-5 (likely Lieutenant John Easther); SM, 30 July 1864 p. 4. 
21 In contrast to Christina A. Thompson, ‘“A Dangerous People Whose Only Occupation Is 
War”: Maori and Pakeha in 19th-Century New Zealand’, Journal of Pacific History vol. 32, 
no. 1 (1997), p. 114. 
22 LE, 16 May 1863 p. 6; WG, 20 August 1864 p. 2 
23 WG, 20 August 1864 p. 2 
24 James Bennett, ‘Maori as Honorary Members of the White Tribe’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History vol. 29, no. 3 (2001), p. 38. 
25 LT, 17 November 1860 p. 5. 
Page 212 of 312 
 
rule… The difference was not much more than with the Highland tribes in the 
’45.’26 Importantly, this suggested that ‘there seemed to be a fair chance of 
raising them to the level of western civilisation, and at the same time 
preserving the pristine vigour and the distinctive qualities of the race.’27 It 
also suggested the potential to integrate them in the British system: 
Thompson, for instance, blamed ‘hungerers and thirsters after the natives’ 
land’ rather than a clash of civilisations or the Maori themselves for the 
disputes. 
 Elsewhere, the Maori’s civilised characteristics were emphasised. The 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph complained that  
 “learned pundits”… assume that a race which numbers among its 
ranks farmers, shipbuilders, shipowners, fashionably-dressed 
horsemen, clever pleaders in the law courts, and soldiers who don’t 
object to face Europeans when the odds before them are three to one, 
is accurately described as a race of “savages”.28  
In fact, the Telegraph continued, they were ‘a race that manifests in bargain-
making the shrewdness and caution of the Scottish character… teachers, 
preachers, church-builders, owners of steam flour mills, shipowners, and 
shareholders in the colonial banks.’ The Barnsley Chronicle was a little less 
complimentary, but emphasised that the Maori had ‘manly gifts… reasoning 
powers of the finest quality…. good judgement, a fine person, great 
possessions,’ and were mature enough to deal with an open capitalist 
market.29 
 Catherine Hall has argued that the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
foundational contract between British and Maori which provided a basis 
other than conquest for British assumption of sovereignty over New Zealand, 
was ‘an experiment akin to emancipation – were the blacks capable of 
emulating the British?’30 As we have seen, however, the Maori defied the 
broad division between ‘black’ and ‘white’ – if such a stark, ungraduated 
division ever existed in the minds of the mid-Victorians. More importantly, if 
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this ‘experiment’ was focused on the possibility of the Maori adopting 
representative institutions, then by the 1860s the experiment seems to have 
determined that just like settlers, the Maori deserved self-government.  
Perhaps more importantly, this conclusion happened before the 
withdrawal of British troops forced pragmatic settlers to bring the more 
amenable Maori factions (the kupapa) within the tent of self-government.31 
When Sir George Grey planned to grant the Maori civil institutions, 
newspapers from the Conservative Leeds Intelligencer to the Liberal 
Barnsley Times endorsed his plan.32 Nowhere was there outright opposition 
to the plan, with the Sheffield Independent going furthest in its praise: 
The Maories [sic] might enjoy in certain districts of the country full 
municipal rights, send their representatives to the colonial parliament, 
and perhaps furnish from among themselves members of the colonial 
Ministry… If their readiness to acquire the arts of peace be equal to 
their quickness in learning to fight white men with their own weapons, 
we may augur great things for them.33 
This acknowledgement that the Maori were to be an integral part of the 
future settlement of New Zealand was a stark contradiction to the supposed 
belief that ‘the Maori was inevitably dying out as a result of contact with 
Europeans.’34 This idea, which Belich argues ‘received a fresh impetus… from 
Social Darwinism,’ was by no means unquestioned in this period. Though 
Dilke’s Greater Britain featured the belief, it was less Darwinistic than might 
have been presumed, and other educated opinions differed.35 More 
importantly, at the popular level it was far more common to suggest that ‘the 
Maori was both worthy and capable of assimilation into British civilisation,’ a 
belief which Belich suggests emerges later (from the 1885 book The Aryan 
                                                   
31 James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian 
Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Rosedale, N.Z., 2007), p. 265. 
32 LI, 18 January 1862 p. 6; BT, 18 January 1862 p. 2. 
33 SI, 18 October 1864. 
34 Belich, New Zealand Wars, p. 299. 
35 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order 
(Princeton, 2007), pp. 115-6; Miles Taylor, ‘Republics versus Empires: Charles Dilke’s 
Republicanism Reconsidered’, in David S. Nash and Antony Taylor (eds.), Republicanism in 
Victorian Society (Stroud, 2000), pp. 31-2; John Stenhouse, ‘“A Disappearing Race before 
We Came Here”: Doctor Alfred Kingcome Newman, the Dying Maori, and Victorian 
Scientific Racism’, New Zealand Journal of History vol. 30, no. 2 (1996), p. 127. 
Page 214 of 312 
 
Maori).36 After all, the Britons of the 1860s seem to have assumed that 
Macaulay’s New Zealander contemplating the ruins of London, who 
symbolised the inevitability of Britain following Rome’s route of imperial 
decline, would not be a Pakeha settler, but a civilised Maori.37 
The only prominent public figure in Yorkshire to both predict and 
welcome the Maori being exterminated was John Arthur Roebuck MP, whose 
position as an outlier among British public opinion may be becoming as 
familiar to the reader as it was to contemporaries. Roebuck felt that 
‘European civilization’ was ‘destruction to the brown man… the sooner the 
Maori was destroyed the better.’38 Yet Roebuck seems to have been as 
isolated in these beliefs as he was in others. In the House of Commons, his 
position was met with parenthetical shock: ‘They were about to dispossess 
the wild animals of New Zealand… the most mischievous [of which] is the 
wild man. [“Oh, oh!”] I knew you would cry “oh, oh!” but of that I am quite 
sure.’39 In his constituency, the electors shouted ‘shame’ when he repeated 
his argument, his opponent Thomas Campbell Foster made a detailed speech 
directly contradicting Roebuck, and the Sheffield Daily Telegraph mocked 
the comparison between the Maori – ‘fleet of foot, supple of limb, fluent of 
speech, stately of stature… sublimely brave’ – and Roebuck – ‘the little one,’ 
‘the lesser mortal, who… says with rasping voice, “Sir, I perceive you are 
brown, and therefore an inferior animal”’.40  
Clearly, then, the British did not by any means see the Maori as 
‘helpless and inferior,’ inevitably to be replaced by settlers, as suggested by 
the ‘Fatal Impact’ thesis.41 However, it was easier to have respect for the 
Maori as a race of ‘noble savages,’ than to treat the former slaves of Britain’s 
West Indian colonists with the respect they deserved. After all, though anti-
slavery activists may have encouraged sympathy with the slave, they did this 
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through an infantilising narrative that denied black agency.42 So how would 
Britain respond when the Jamaicans reacted angrily against the continued 





The historiography of the Morant Bay rebellion has focused on the concept of 
political division in Britain. On the one hand, we have the Jamaica 
Committee, representing the leading lights of intellectual and activist 
Liberalism, raising funds to privately prosecute all those involved in the 
violent and excessive suppression of the disturbances from the governor 
downwards. On the other, we see the arch-Conservatives of the Eyre Defence 
Fund holding banquets to praise the governor for his swift and decisive 
action against impulsive savages, including the judicial murder of mixed-race 
Assembly member and reformer George William Gordon under the dubious 
shelter of martial law, and looking with concern towards the potential 
extension of the franchise in Britain. In fact, both Eyre’s supporters and his 
opponents seem to have shared a surprising amount of common ground. 
In particular, both sides were committed to an investigation into what 
had gone on. In Huddersfield, the meeting held to condemn the violence also 
petitioned the government for ‘a speedy and strict enquiry’.43 At the same 
time, on the other side of the question, 150 ‘clergy, magistrates, merchants, 
and other influential gentlemen’ wrote to the colonial secretary requesting ‘a 
strict investigation,’ but withholding judgement on whether Eyre had used 
‘undue and excessive severity’ and calling such condemnation ‘unjust and 
premature’.44 Though the commitment to an investigation can fairly be 
ascribed to the fact that both sides thought they were right, it does show a 
degree of commitment to a nominal truth. Perhaps more importantly, it is a 
less hard-line stance than had been adopted in the case of China eight years 
earlier, where those who advocated sympathy for colonial governors forced to 
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make hard decisions had not suggested that an inquiry might be necessary to 
vindicate their judgement. 
The Liberal press were willing, perhaps even eager, to paint their 
Conservative rivals as supporters of Eyre and all his atrocities.45 Their 
position, however, was more nuanced than this. In Hull, for instance, the 
Liberal Hull Advertiser’s stance that the events reflected ‘disgrace upon the 
British name’ received more support from the Conservative Hull Packet than 
its fellow Liberal Eastern Counties Herald.46 From the very start, the former 
broadly endorsed the principle of the suppression while decrying its severity: 
it repeatedly declared Gordon’s execution to be a murder.47 The latter, 
however, vociferously supported Eyre, comparing the Jamaica Committee to 
the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee in its misguided activism, arguing 
that the goal of the insurgents was ‘the destruction of every white man, and 
the degradation of every white woman,’ and accusing those who opposed 
Eyre of having sided with the Sepoys.48 Needless to say, it also supported ‘a 
most searching investigation’ and intended to ‘reserve our judgment until the 
case against both parties has been fully heard.’49 
This willingness to revise views in the light of new evidence was not 
always a mere pretence, intended to make the newspapers appear more 
reasonable to their readers, only to be abandoned when the investigation 
proved unfavourable. In fact, the Royal Commission’s report does seem to 
have softened the position of some of Eyre’s supporters. The Leeds 
Intelligencer, for instance, refused to censure Eyre just because he was too 
severe for those ‘regarding the business from a distance and in safety’.50 The 
paper subsequently argued that the Commission’s report ‘completely 
disposes of the negrophilist version of the Morant Bay revolt’.51 Nevertheless, 
after a year or so, the paper felt safe to endorse the withholding of sympathy 
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from ‘certain acts which have appeared more vigorous than were absolutely 
required’.52 
The Leeds Intelligencer was not the only newspaper to make such a 
tactical withdrawal. The Yorkshire Gazette originally denounced ‘inhuman 
brutes,’ ‘negrophilism,’ and ‘sentimentalism’ displayed by those ‘sitting by 
safe firesides’.53 As the scale of the reprisals and the lack of resistance became 
clear, it continued to criticise Radical ‘howls’ but came to the conclusion that 
‘stringent inquiry’ was necessary before approving or condemning.54 By 
March, it felt it the duty of ‘every one with the least spark of manly feeling in 
his breast to… protest in the name of England and humanity’ against Eyre’s 
defenders.55 The Doncaster Chronicle, too, went from praising Eyre for 
giving ‘the red-handed murderer short shrift’ to describing the excesses as ‘an 
error in judgment, pardonable considering the exceptional circumstances’.56 
These were hardly wholehearted endorsements of rule by force in the 
colonies. 
If Eyre’s supporters tended to soften their position over time, we 
might well question why the Jamaica Committee’s endeavours to enforce 
what they considered a crucial constitutional protection were so 
unsuccessful. For a start, the government’s prompt action in removing Eyre 
from office and instituting an inquiry successfully quashed initial outrage. At 
York, a meeting requisition was abandoned after the government pre-empted 
all its significant desires.57 This probably saved it from the fate of the 
uproarious meeting at Hull, which fell apart after Joseph Harrison protested 
that the meeting would prejudge the royal commission and was, therefore, 
‘un-English and unconstitutional! (Loud applause)’.58 The Sheffield Foreign 
Affairs Committee chairman Isaac Ironside failed in a bid to have the council 
memorialise Government, after Alderman Beckett asked ‘what’s the good 
when Governor Eyre has been recalled’ and the mayor announced his belief 
                                                   
52 LI, 21 August 1866 p. 2. 
53 YG, 25 November 1865 p. 8. 
54 YG, 16 December 1865 p. 8. 
55 YG, 24 March 1866 p. 8. 
56 DC, 24 November 1865 p. 4; 19 April 1867 p. 5. 
57 YG, 23 December 1865 p. 7. 
58 HP, 22 December 1865. 
Page 218 of 312 
 
that ‘the Government will do all that is required’.59 The downward revision of 
the death toll from 2,000 to 400 is also likely to have deflated some of the 
enthusiasm for action, just as pro-repression outrage declined when it 
became clear how few whites had actually died. 
After the commission reported, the Jamaica Committee continued to 
pursue Eyre and his subordinates in the belief that the law had not been 
sufficiently clarified. However, their willingness to continue legal 
proceedings into the 1870s seems not to have been shared by the broader 
community of Eyre’s opponents.60 Lacking the Committee’s sophisticated 
legal background, many editorials concluded that the Lord Chief Justice’s 
intervention settled the question. It was ‘a noble vindication of the 
fundamental principles of the British constitution’, which left ‘little fear’ that 
a governor would ‘overstep the limits thus clearly laid down’ or ‘venture again 
to trifle with men’s lives’.61 
There was also a tension in the Committee’s campaign between the 
need to settle the abstract legal point of the rights and responsibilities of a 
colonial governor, and the personification of those issues in Eyre. Put simply, 
it was hard to differentiate between determination to settle the law and an 
individual vendetta. The number of times that newspapers which supported 
the committee felt it necessary to deny that the prosecution was motivated by 
‘partisan faction’ or ‘private animosity’, or that they wanted only ‘a decision 
by a competent authority upon a most important question of law’ and not 
Eyre’s punishment, suggests that they too were conscious of this image 
problem.62 The evolution of Eyre’s racism has subsequently been well 
examined by historians, but at the time those ‘personally acquainted’ with 
him were prepared to testify to his ‘humanity and kindly Christian spirit’ or 
the impossibility ‘that he would or did act from any motive of inhumanity 
towards the negroes’.63 Even those who criticised Eyre were often less 
passionate than John Stuart Mill, arguing that ‘the utmost that can be said is 
that he blundered terribly’, or that he was ‘terrified and panic-stricken… 
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when coolness was especially required.’64 His subordinates, such as the 
‘demoniac’ and ‘utterly fiend like’ Provost-Marshal Ramsay, might have been 
a better target: the Craven Pioneer excused Eyre, ‘respected for his integrity 
and humanity,’ but felt his ‘underlings who have desecrated every principle of 
justice and rejected every dictate of humanity, ought to swing as high as 
Haman.’65 
This choice of targets, however, goes to the heart of the Jamaica 
Committee’s change from an organisation focused on the plight of black 
Jamaicans to the legal issue of martial law.66 The Committee claimed that if 
Gordon could be executed then so could any other activist, a point 
occasionally repeated in provincial Yorkshire newspapers.67 For the most 
part, however, their opponents (and even many of their supporters) ignored 
this point – with the exception of ‘FM’, who endorsed bringing a hypothetical 
Radical MP from London to Leeds to be tried and hung for fomenting a 
rebellion of six-pound householders.68 The key to understanding mainstream 
attitudes seems to be the question of political culture. British institutions 
were protected not just by their precise legal forms, but by a broader culture 
of liberalism which permeated the country and made military dictatorship 
implausible in mainland Britain. Moreover, this was not just a racial 
question: as we have seen, a significant section of the British public 
recognised that the American constitution’s legal checks and balances had 
not sufficed to restrain the executive. It was the culture that underlay the 
system that counted. 
The other reason that the Committee struggled seems to have been the 
absolute predominance of reform in this period. Everything was finite, from 
the time of activists to space in newspaper editorial columns, and the 
extension of the franchise – which directly affected a larger proportion of the 
country – necessarily took precedence. Though historians draw intellectual 
                                                   
64 HxC, 4 August 1866 p. 4; HC, 29 September 1866 p. 5. 
65 RA, 10 March 1866 p. 5; LE, 24 March 1866 p. 5; CP, 31 March 1866 p. 4. 
66 Kostal, Jurisprudence of Power, p. 191; this contradicts J. Joseph Miller, ‘Chairing the 
Jamaica Committee: J.S. Mill and the Limits of Colonial Authority’, in Bart Schultz and 
Georgios Varouxakis (eds.), Utilitarianism and Empire (Lanham, 2005), p. 155, who sees 
Mill’s arguments as focused on the colonial sphere. 
67 HE, 25 November 1865 p. 6; LE, 9 February 1867 p. 4; J.H. Bridges in BR, 27 October 1866 
p. 8. 
68 LI, 9 December 1865 p. 8. 
Page 220 of 312 
 
links between rebellion in Jamaica and working-class enfranchisement, 
contemporaries were clear about which topic had to take priority. When 
Bradford constituents attempted to quiz W.E. Forster about the case, ‘a voice 
from the gallery’ protested: ‘We are not met to hear about Jamaica, but about 
reform’.69 Just as the Royal Commission checked the initial swell of outrage, 
the ongoing debate over reform in Britain took the wind out of the 
Committee’s sails. 
 
The dominant interpretation of the Jamaica rebellion is that of Catherine 
Hall, who concludes that it provided ‘further evidence for the Colonial 
Office… of the rebellious nature of “native populations”’70. The abolition of 
Jamaica’s representative assembly demonstrated that ‘a considerable body of 
opinion’ acknowledged that black and white were ‘essentially different’ and 
‘could not expect the same rights.’71 By contrast, Kostal argues that race is 
‘simply too narrow an aperture’ to interpret this question, and that this 
interpretation ‘ignores or minimises some important facts’ in a ‘sometimes 
overweening determination’ to illustrate ‘monolithic’ British ‘anti-black 
racism’.72 Here, we should once again distinguish between the official view 
and the popular view. It is entirely plausible that the Colonial Office, civil 
servants and governors took a particular series of actions for one motive, and 
the wider public endorsed their actions for a variety of different motives. If 
networks of intellectual geography failed to ensure that all shared a common 
view of the events in Jamaica, then conclusions drawn largely from elite 
sources are unsafe to project nationally. 
 It was Conservative newspapers which predominantly interpreted the 
events in Jamaica through a racial lens. These generally argued that black 
people had been given ‘pretty nearly equal civil and political privileges with 
the educated and civilised whites’, with ‘the privilege of the franchise within 
their reach,’ and ‘almost every local office was filled by the blacks’.73 Other 
newspapers, however, fitted the Jamaica question into an alternative 
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interpretive framework: ‘whenever a dominant class has the administration 
of the law entirely in its own hands… either the lower class is ground to the 
very dust, or rises in despair’.74 They blamed not black people, but the white 
elites who had failed to ‘adhere to the spirit of their bargain’ made at 
emancipation, and had erected ‘the most cruel obstacles… such as no other 
race in the world could be expected to overcome’.75 Though this framework 
was particularly congruous to the Liberal mind-set, the Conservative 
Sheffield Times concurred in the belief that ‘Jamaica has long been 
misgoverned, [and] that the negroes were oppressed’.76 
This narrative is all the more striking because it seems to have come 
about as a result of the Eyre controversy. The emphasis before the outbreak 
had been on there being ‘no legal disabilities in reference to colour’ and the 
black population being ‘a hard-working, moral, and sober people’.77 Despite a 
single exception, using the planters’ shortcomings to deny that black people 
were ‘a brutish and irredeemably lazy race,’ the bulk of commentary focused 
on the progress that the freed slaves had made.78 Metropolitan intellectual 
opinion may have been more open to statistical calculations intended to 
demonstrate that emancipation had been a failure.79 However, the dominant 
narrative in the provinces was the moralising anecdote of the fundraising 
missionary, which could brook no such suggestion. The fact that this 
narrative of elite betrayal became so popular so rapidly tends to suggest that 
it was more satisfying to contemporary newspaper opinion than blaming the 
inherent flaws of the slaves. 
 The dominant historiographical interpretation also tends to see the 
abolition of the Jamaican House of Assembly as a removal of black voting 
rights, ‘highly significant… at a time when black male suffrage was being 
hotly debated in the USA.’80 However, most contemporaries seem to have 
viewed the abolition as a punishment for the ‘small constituency’ which the 
House represented: ‘the remnants, perhaps we ought to say the refuse, of that 
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planter population whose brutality and debauchery were so notorious’.81 The 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph would not acknowledge that ‘the blacks of Jamaica 
were fit for the suffrage’: however, ‘under the late system of rule’ they were 
‘the governed and not the governors’.82 The Beverley Recorder saw 
disfranchisement not just as a punishment for black people, but as a 
reflection of the fact that ‘Neither white, mulatto, nor black is fit to have any 
share in the government.’83 The British government’s positive duty was to 
amend the constitution to stop the planters ‘making the black people even 
more miserable than when they were actually in a state of slavery.’84 This 
attitude seems unlikely to have been shared at the Colonial Office, despite the 
comments of newly-minted Under-secretary of State W.E. Forster, who 
argued that the Assembly ‘necessarily represented only one portion of the 
community’ and ‘the elections fell almost inevitably into the hands of the 
white portion of the community’.85 
 In the 1840s, Britain had responded to rebellion in Canada by 
extending representative government to the colony. The fact that rebellion in 
Jamaica saw not the extension of electoral privileges but their abolition 
immediately suggests an underlying racial motivation – perhaps the drawing 
of a ‘global colour line’ between self-governing ‘white men’s countries’.86 
However, the ‘global colour line’ thesis is rooted in an ‘assertion of whiteness’ 
intended to ‘enshrine the white man as the model democrat’: this wholesale 
acceptance of democracy, and faith in the suitability of a substantial 
proportion of the population for the franchise, was demonstrated in chapter 
5 to be a fringe proposition as of 1865. Furthermore, as we proposed in 
chapter 2, we should acknowledge that material motives may affect attitudes 
at sites of contact and confrontation (such as the United States, South Africa, 
New Zealand and Australia), while more detached approaches may have been 
possible elsewhere. The man in 1865 Great Britain who acknowledged the 
potential for black suffrage faced much less immediate repercussions than 
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his counterparts in the US, South Africa, or Jamaica – or, indeed, the Great 
Britain of the 1890s, which now owned much of sub-Saharan Africa and 
where the vote united classes rather than dividing them. However, it is the 
attitudes of the former that interest us here. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the idea of Jamaica reflecting 
the drawing of a ‘global colour line’ is that (contrary to the broad trend of the 
historiography) Yorkshire reactions tended not to support the premise that 
black people in Jamaica were ‘beyond all hope of improvement’ and should 
be barred from the franchise permanently.87 For a start, condemnation of the 
existing state of affairs in Jamaica had necessarily required the admission 
that ‘nothing is done to raise them to their real position’.88 ‘Ignorance’, 
‘barbarism, and ‘imbecility’ were not inherent characteristics of the black 
population, but ‘the essential attributes of slavery’: however, ‘enlightenment’, 
‘self-restraint,’ and ‘moral and physical purity’ were necessary for ‘true 
beneficent liberty’.89 The effects of the ‘tyranny and oppression’ of the 
planters, which had perpetuated ‘some of the worst disadvantages of slavery,’ 
would take time to efface. 90 Until sufficient ‘guiding and training’ had been 
provided under ‘some system of education,’ and ‘mutual trust and 
confidence… between whites and blacks’ had been restored, extending the 
franchise would create more problems than it solved.91 This would not be 
swift – after all, ‘it takes three generations to make a gentleman…we cannot 
rationally hope to find the far greater and larger work of civilisation 
accomplished in a shorter time.’92 However, ‘when that period arrives we 
have no doubt that the negro will be found fully qualified’.93 
Events, from the initial confrontation at Morant Bay to the subsequent 
bitter reprisals, had not only highlighted Jamaica’s divisions but 
strengthened them. Victorians were sceptical of the potential of 
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representative systems to cope with such a starkly divided society – just as 
they had been when they warned that the South could not be kept in the 
Union by force, a prognostication which remained to be disproven. While in 
the United States there had been the possibility of a neat territorial division 
between the opposing interests, such a step was impossible in Jamaica. 
Expanding the franchise in a society divided as Jamaica would give license to 
demagogues, whose populist measures would worsen divisions. Furthermore, 
granting the vote to even the upper echelons of a population whose had only 
just been absolved because of their lack of moral and intellectual education 
would be inconsistent at best, given the emphasis on responsibility and 
education in franchise extension in Britain. The planters could not be left in 
charge, yet the Assembly could not be recast on a broader basis because the 
populace were – through no fault of their own – not ready for the 
responsibility. In the absence of innovation on the scale of Lord Durham, 
reversion to Crown Colony status won by default. 
At the time, such a reversion did seem to be a sensible policy based on 
other colonial examples. Jamaica was the only one of Britain’s West India 
colonies where exports were failing and where peace could not be 
maintained, and also compared unfavourably to the Indian Crown Colony of 
Ceylon.94 The cause of this decay was not race, but ‘downright bad 
government’ which necessitated a ‘thorough organic change’.95 Moreover, 
Crown Colony status was endorsed by men like T. Burrows of Denby Dale, 
who ‘spent fourteen years as a Wesleyan missionary there.’96 Indeed, it is 
tempting to suggest that the reversion marked the last spark of the 
traditional humanitarianism in which the interests of the natives took 
precedence over the concerns of the settlers.97 As the existing planter elite 
had failed in their duty to elevate the ex-slaves for which they had 
responsibility, Britain would take over. Unfortunately, domestic opinion 
seems to have had little conception of how this elevation might work in 
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practice, beyond a vague endorsement of Roundell’s suggestion of ‘paternal 
despotism’.98 When future governors did nothing to implement such policies, 




Just as the dominant view of the Eyre case sees it as a stage towards Britain 
accepting the permanent racial inferiority of its colonial subjects, the 
dominant view of Ireland in this period sees Britain concluding that its Irish 
subjects were incapable of coping with the British system of liberal self-
government. Immediately after the 1865 election, there was a flurry of Fenian 
disturbances, from abortive risings in Ireland to an attack on Chester Castle 
and, further afield, the invasion of Canada by an army of Civil War veterans. 
In response, the narrative of ‘Celts versus Saxons’ developed, with the 
‘impulsive, imaginative, violent and somewhat childish Celt’ mirroring many 
characteristics of ‘savages of the non-western world’.99 However, we have 
already challenged the interpretation of the Jamaica question by reiterating 
the continued dominance of the ‘civilizational’ model of racial characteristics. 
As such, it seems only appropriate to extend this to Ireland, to understand if 
the model held up under the direct threat of violence. 
 For a start, it should be noted that the Celt/Saxon dichotomy was not 
solely one used by the British to justify their rule: it was also adopted and 
advanced by Irish Nationalists themselves, to justify their struggle for 
independence.100 As such, when British observers talked about the struggle 
between Celt and Saxon, they were not necessarily explaining their own 
world view. Mentions of Saxons and their ‘hoof,’ ‘iron yoke,’ or ‘domination’ 
were in fact echoing Fenian rhetoric.101 In these cases and others, it is 
practically impossible to identify whether the British agreed with the 
dichotomy they presented, or found it so risible that they presented it intact. 
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Equally, it is impossible to identify whether the constant repetition of this 
dichotomy embedded it in the public mind. 
 At the very least, it must be acknowledged that thinking about race 
within the British Isles was highly confused. The Rotherham Advertiser 
could suggest that ‘the bulk of the nation’ was ‘an amalgamation of five or six 
separate races’, identifying ‘The Celts of Wales, Scotland and Ireland’ and 
‘the comparatively unmixed remnant of the old Saxons’ in the form of 
English agricultural labourers.102 At almost the same time, the neighbouring 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph argued that Scots were Saxons: ‘mere 
Yorkshiremen and North countrymen with a little harder brogue’.103 As noted 
previously, Cornhill Magazine detected racial differences within Yorkshire 
itself, with Saxons populating the North Riding and Celts the West.104 Under 
these circumstances, it was difficult for British newspapers to draw the kind 
of hard and fast lines between England and Ireland that Irish Nationalists 
found useful. 
Moreover, the attitude that nations were built by tradition rather than 
blood persisted. The Leeds Mercury argued that it would be impossible to 
persuade the Saxon of Sussex, the Briton of Cornwall or the Norseman of 
Yorkshire of their difference: ‘Community of language, of laws, of history, of 
traditions, has made them one nation centuries ago’.105 The ‘semi-simious 
types of Celts’ illustrated by Punch (and highlighted by Catherine Hall) were 
misleading, the effect of ‘poverty… mingled with a cankering sense of wrong’ 
and not racial inheritance – demonstrated in the ‘physical improvement’ 
among Irish labourers in England.106 Elsewhere, even Fenian supporters in 
England were informed that ‘their sons will have as much right to call 
themselves Englishmen, after old associations have passed away, as they now 
have to call them Irishmen’: the profusion of ‘family connections’ meant the 
two were ‘of one kindred, but not of one tongue.’107 If Fenians could become 
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Englishmen – if only ‘old associations’ prevented this – then it is hard to 
conclude that Englishness was particularly exclusive. 
Indeed, some newspapers which seemed to be moving to a racial 
conception of the nation found older ideas hard to shift. The Bradford 
Observer featured the Celt/Saxon dichotomy in concluding that the ideal 
Irish civilisation would be closer to France than England – ‘less of freedom 
than of enjoyment’ – and suggested, as the existing government was 
‘unsuitable to the Irish national genius,’ that ‘they should be governed not as 
Saxons, but as warm-hearted, impulsive Celts’.108 However, it later suggested 
that English constitutional liberty stemmed from the ‘magnanimity of the 
English mind’ and that ‘Celts and Spaniards and the late American Seceders’ 
needed to be ‘trained to the same habit of tolerance’.109 If such habits could 
be trained, then amending Irish government was expedient but not essential. 
 
The argument that Fenianism changed British views of Ireland is also 
predicated on the assumption that ‘Irishness and Fenianism went 
together’.110 However, Fenianism had a significant American component to it, 
from funds to volunteers. As such, it is possible that the British could 
decouple Fenianism from Ireland, leaving it as more than an Irish 
phenomenon. Making it an external development would also have had the 
benefit of removing the requirement for deep soul-searching about Ireland’s 
plight. 
 Needless to say, the majority of Yorkshire newspapers – thirteen of 
the twenty-four which expressed a view – chose to see Fenianism as 
‘essentially an American notion’.111 The reason they considered it ‘a plant of 
foreign growth’ was not just because Irish-Americans were providing ‘men 
and money to revenge their old grudges’.112 Instead, the very aims of 
Fenianism were explicitly denounced as not Irish. Its republicanism was 
‘foreign to the Irish,’ ‘peculiarly clannish… ruled by kings or chiefs… not by 
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senators or parliaments’.113 The whole movement was a rebellion against 
both ‘Saxon rule’ and ‘the social laws and usages of Ireland’.114 Its means 
were also alien, reflecting ‘the practices of American rowdyism,’ nurtured in 
‘the land of liberty [and] the government of mob violence’.115 Only ‘the spawn 
of a civil war,’ imbued with all ‘the vices of war,’ could be capable of Fenian 
terrorism.116 Even George Sneaton, a Royal Naval Reservist who attacked 
‘four peaceable and unoffending Irishmen, declaring they were all Fenians,’ 
was believed to have developed his aversion during four years in America.117 
Fenianism was therefore not ‘decisive proof’ of ‘a greater Ireland beyond the 
seas’, but an entirely different development.118 
 Uprisings in Ireland and among the Irish community in Britain 
changed only a few editorial stances. The Leeds Intelligencer, for instance, 
originally felt that ‘disaffection in Ireland has ceased to be part of any widely 
extended national movement’; in the aftermath of the Clerkenwell attack, 
however, it acknowledged that ‘a large section of our Irish population’ would 
‘condone the wickedness of any atrocity directed against’ Britain.119 Yet it was 
the only newspaper to change in this direction, whereas two others which had 
previously recognised Irish roots in Fenianism transferred the responsibility 
to America. The Doncaster Chronicle had originally linked Fenianism to Irish 
predilections for ‘secret societies, and flaunting banners, and processions’ – 
though still attributing this to religion rather than race – but subsequently 
decided Fenianism was ‘of American growth… fostered there for a political 
purpose.’120 The Halifax Guardian, meanwhile, had originally located the 
strength of Fenianism in the ‘Celtic race’ being ‘more impulsive than 
reasoning’ and ‘the innate repulsion in Celtic blood towards the Danes and 
Angles’.121 When the uprisings failed, it concluded that the Celts had been 
persuaded by ‘the logic of events’ that ‘public tranquillity and individual 
industry’ were its only chances at progress, identifying the ‘only difficulty’ as 
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‘the shameless license’ the New York Fenians enjoyed from the Federal 
government.122 The paper did not explain how the Irish had been persuaded 
by logic if ‘the chance of a fight’ robbed the Irishman of ‘more than half his 
reason, and of all his discretion’.123 However, the contradiction is a salutary 
reminder of how flexible racial thinking could be. 
The other significant interpretation of Fenianism was that it was a 
hybrid, in which both the American and Irish components were essential. For 
the Beverley Recorder, it combined ‘the worst phases of American rowdyism’ 
with traditional Irish rebellious solidarity; the Huddersfield Chronicle called 
it ‘an Irish growth,’ but one that sprang from both American and Irish 
Anglophobia; and the Leeds Times felt it was ‘an American production’ that 
grew from Irish ‘disaffection… revengeful feelings, and… mad expectation’.124 
There was also circumstantial evidence to support Fenianism’s hybrid nature, 
identified both contemporaneously and historiographically.125 For instance, 
Patrick O’Rafferty, described variously as ‘a sanguinary Fenian’ and ‘a dirty, 
rough Irishman,’ wielded ‘a shoemaker’s knife, ground in similitude of a 
bowie knife’ – the quintessential weapon of the American rowdy.126 
Nevertheless, this hybrid interpretation suggested that, had Ireland been left 
to itself, Fenianism might not have developed.  
 
The belief that Fenianism was external to Ireland was strengthened by the 
response within Ireland to the phenomenon, or at least the way that 
Yorkshire newspapers described the response. Around a third of newspapers 
placed unbroken emphasis on Fenianism’s lack of support, even among 
groups which might have been expected to endorse the movement. In the 
view of the Bradford Observer, for instance, ‘the priesthood and the 
respectable classes of the Catholic community’ provided an ‘eager display of 
loyalty’.127 Only ‘the very lowest classes and the rabble,’ ‘clerks, shopmen and 
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agricultural labourers,’ displayed disaffection, while ‘the bulk of the nation… 
are loyally disposed.’128 
The lack of support for Fenianism perhaps best explains why the 
British might have endorsed the national aspirations of the Confederacy and 
Poland but denied those of Ireland – other than nakedly hypocritical self-
interest, of course. Both the Confederacy and Poland had seemed to be able 
to count on the support of most classes in their campaigns for independence. 
Irish independence, by contrast, struggled to mobilise even its traditional 
supporters, failing to inspire the ‘intensely anti-Saxon’ peasantry of Kerry to 
rebel.129 For many, this confirmed earlier suspicions that the Irish Nationalist 
movement had ‘sunk to a whisper and then died away.’130 
This unbroken confidence in Irish loyalty, however, was not universal. 
A third of newspapers tended to favour the narrative of Fenian popularity, 
with half adopting the view from the start and half coming to it over the 
course of the period. Those who adopted the view from the start formed a 
particularly eclectic group: on the one hand, the Advanced Liberal Leeds 
Express and Bradford Review; on the other, the Conservative Yorkshire 
Gazette, which grounded its belief of widespread Irish dissent in memories of 
‘1640 and 1798,’ proving ‘what savages they had for neighbours’.131 
Around a third of newspapers seemed unable to come to a definite 
conclusion about the popularity of Fenianism. For example, in December 
1865 the Leeds Times proclaimed confidently that ‘The overwhelming 
majority of every class and party’ had nothing but ‘abhorrence and contempt’ 
for Fenianism.132 In January 1866, it feared that Fenianism was both ‘more 
widely disseminated’ and ‘more deeply implanted in the hearts of the Irish’ 
than previously, as the priests had ‘abated much of their former vehemence 
against Fenianism’.133 In March of 1867, only ‘the lowest and least intelligent 
class’ had even a ‘languid passive sympathy’ with Fenianism; in May, it was 
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only ‘compulsion’ that kept Ireland in the Union.134 None, however, changed 
their views as swiftly as the Huddersfield Examiner, where Fenianism went 
from ‘a mere sectional movement’ to enjoying the support of ‘great numbers 
of Irishmen’ and back again, all in the matter of a month.135 
 This anxiety suggests that at least some of the press may have been 
putting on a front, proclaiming Irish loyalty in which they themselves did not 
believe in the interests of shoring up domestic harmony. At times the mask 
may have inadvertently slipped – for instance, when the Doncaster Chronicle 
criticised Lord Russell’s support of self-determination by arguing that 
Ireland would leave the Union as a result.136 Unfortunately, it is no longer 
possible to draw firm conclusions on what the editors or proprietors thought 
personally. However, other private communications from public figures do 
suggest that they genuinely saw Fenianism as a fringe movement. Writing to 
his son in early 1866, the former York MP J.G. Smyth felt Fenianism ‘seems 
to be dying out’ and ‘will not be heard of in another month’.137 
 This belief in Fenianism’s unpopularity tends to be supported by its 
manifestations within Yorkshire. There were only two significant outbreaks: 
one real in Bradford, where a Fenian mob assembled at White Abbey and 
attacked passers-by with bludgeons, and one potential in Leeds, where the 
military was assembled to prevent a funeral procession honouring executed 
Fenians.138 For the most part, Fenianism was an assertion of Irish identity 
usually associated with drunkenness, brawling, or other disorder. Patrick 
O’Grady was ‘charged with being drunk and riotous’ while ‘shouting at the 
top of his voice that he was a Fenian’; Michael Rhodes threw a stolen 
drinking glass at a witness while professing his Fenianism; John Robinson, 
arrested for ‘drunkenness and begging’, ‘vented some unfriendly wishes 
anent the Queen’s life’ and ‘declared that he would be a Fenian again as soon 
as he got out.’139 There were at least some enthusiasts for the cause: Mary 
Glynn, for instance, ‘was ready to take up arms for the Fenians… [and] die in 
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their cause’ (or at least to break the windows of Wesleyan ministers at 
Tadcaster), and an anonymous Fenian made an ‘ostentatious and 
declamatory’ speech at Wetherby.140 However, in many cases the term 
‘Fenian’ was taken as insult rather than compliment. In York, John McAnally 
felt ‘compelled to fight’ as a result of being called a Fenian, as did John Mack 
at Heeley; fortunately, ‘a respectably-attired young woman’ at Hull only 
applied for a summons against the man who had ‘called her a “d–– 
Fenian”.’141  
 Yorkshire’s balance of evidence suggests that Fenianism remained a 
relatively fringe movement, but that many in Britain were deeply concerned 
about emigrant Irish support for the movement. There were panics across the 
county about potential Fenian uprisings. In the East Riding, ‘large numbers 
of Irish drovers’ arriving for cattle fairs resulted in ‘a state of Fenian dread, 
probably totally unfounded,’ and Volunteers were called out, served with ball 
cartridges, and patrolled the towns.142 Rumours of Fenian drilling circulated: 
300 were said to have congregated in the ‘Green Lane’ at Middlesbrough, 150 
at Sheffield, unknown numbers at Dawgreen and Heckmondwike.143 When 
telegraph wires were cut at Selby, it was blamed on Fenians, who had earlier 
been reported to have bought revolvers and concealed powder outside the 
town.144 In the light of this anxiety, it is hard to conclude that Yorkshire 
contemporaries really thought that Fenianism was as unimportant as they 
pretended. Nevertheless, it was only later in the century that the popular 
strength of Irish separatism would become apparent.145 
 
With Jamaica, many chose to see events through the lens of the traditional 
struggle against an overbearing governing class rather than adopt a racial 
interpretation. Similarly, the disturbances in Ireland could be interpreted not 
as irreconcilable differences between Celt and Saxon, but as standard 
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problems to be corrected in the conventional Parliamentary way.146 In 
Huddersfield, where the townspeople had been fighting a long legal war 
against the influential Liberal landlord Sir John Ramsden, W.R. Haigh drew 
a direct comparison: Sir John’s proposal to live closer to his estate would 
lessen the town’s ‘urban Fenianism’.147 Indeed, linking Ireland to the British 
domestic political sphere offered considerable potential advantages for the 
Liberals, when the new Reform Act meant that ‘the Irish element in English 
boroughs’ could, ‘in large manufacturing towns, pretty much hold the 
balance’.148  
Conservatives tended to denounce this as disloyalty: for instance, 
Working Men’s Conservative Associations criticised the Reform League for 
‘sympathy with the disloyal and murderous class known as Fenians’.149 
Though they also tended to be more sceptical about correcting the problems 
of Ireland through legislation, they still proposed such legislation. The 
Sheffield Times blamed ‘the habits of the people, the dampness of the 
climate, and the absence of manufactures’ as well as ‘defective laws’ for the 
‘poverty and discontent which prevails’: at the same time, it felt that 
Parliament was prepared to treat Ireland with ‘a fair and considerate spirit’ 
and to ‘do all that is reasonable and proper’ to ‘remove any real or supposed 
grievance’.150 The Hull Packet originally thought that ‘there is nothing 
Ireland wants so much as freedom from political agitation and a release from 
demagogues’, but later highlighted ‘the necessity for real legislation,’ 
including remodelling the Church, reforming education, and treating land 
tenure in a ‘cautious and gradual manner’.151 The Leeds Intelligencer thought 
‘a moderate bill to guarantee the tenant his improvements and, on certain 
conditions, his holding, would assist to crush out the spirit of Fenianism’.152 
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If legislation could compensate for these differences, they could hardly be 
irreconcilable.153 
The blurred lines of Victorian thinking about race make it difficult to 
disentangle the various components of inherited characteristics, culture, 
language, and religion. However, at least some of the blame for Fenianism 
was put down to the Irish being Catholics rather than Celts. The Doncaster 
Chronicle thought the disparity in ‘religious formularies’ underlay the 
dispute.154 ‘A True Irishman’ railed against the Catholic church, which had 
supported as ‘just and lawful – nay, holy’ any organisation to eradicate 
Protestantism and overthrow ‘the so-called tyrannical Saxon yoke’.155 The 
Sheffield Times, meanwhile, thought that it was essential to have ‘some 
centres of British and Protestant influence to promote and spread the idea of 
unity’.156 If the Irish could be pacified through changes in laws, or even 
through a more significant change of religion, it is hard to conclude that the 
British thought that inherent characteristics lay at the root of their 
difficulties. 
The example of the Conservative Yorkshire Gazette is particularly 
instructive. In 1864, it had compared the West Indies to the ‘indolence’ and 
‘intemperance’ in Ireland, speculating that a shared ‘weakness in the 
abdominal regions’ affected both societies.157 In 1865, it highlighted the ‘old 
feud between the Celtic and Norman race,’ concluding that the Celt hated 
law, order, and settled government, and wanted ‘the fruits of labour without 
toiling’.158 In 1866, it felt that the true Celt, found in France or Ireland, was 
‘exceedingly vindictive and blood-thirsty’.159 However, it subsequently 
determined that laziness was not ‘inherent in the Irish race,’ as in England 
they undertook ‘the most laborious employment’; the only conclusion that 
could be drawn was that ‘the insecurity of life and property in that country 
has created a want of capital and a consequent dearth of employment’.160 ‘It 
needs only religious and political quietude,’ the paper argued, to ensure ‘the 
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rapid increase of prosperity and happiness’ there.161 This abandonment of a 
racial interpretation in favour of a political one, at the very time when 
opinion was meant to be shifting in the other direction, from a Conservative 
newspaper that supported the Confederacy and Governor Eyre – periodically, 
at least – suggests that the intellectual links between these positions may well 




These three imperial hotspots provide little justification for the argument 
that this was an era of tightening racial thinking. Instead of finding a new 
racial narrative to link the three together, contemporaries seem to have 
incorporated them into existing narratives: the slow spread of civilisation, 
the misgovernment of elites, or a need for reform to resolve sectional 
tensions. In all three areas – New Zealand, Jamaica, and Ireland – it was 
widely accepted that the population were by no means irreconcilably 
incompatible with British-style self-governing representative institutions. 
This explains the relative absence of race from discussions of reform in 1866-
7, and the suggestion of one contemporary writer ‘that in Britain… black 
people and Hindus were qualified to exercise the franchise’.162  
In New Zealand and Ireland, the locals were more or less ready to take 
on the responsibility immediately; in Jamaica, things might take longer. 
However, even the latter case was not because of inherent racial or cultural 
inferiority, but because the elites had not taken their duties towards those 
around them seriously. Perhaps it was the assumption that progression 
towards self-government was the natural course of all humanity that led the 
British to the rather facile and misguided belief that taking power out of the 
hands of the House of Assembly would automatically restart the process of 
advancement. 
However, in all three cases the criteria were much the same: that the 
right to the franchise was earned gradually and through self-improvement. 
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The next chapter brings this perspective back to the domestic sphere, by 
examining the events of 1866-7 and the unexpectedly radical extension of the 
franchise that they produced. 
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Chapter 8: Reform, 1866-7 
 
Any attempt to study the events of 1866-7 through a regional lens will almost 
certainly attract the pertinent objection that the Second Reform Act is 
unquestionably a national event. The historical discipline has changed 
dramatically since it was possible to explain the passing of the Act almost 
exclusively through high politics.1 However, the key events in the Act’s story 
remain wedded to the Parliamentary and metropolitan theatres: the defeat of 
the Liberal government in 1866, on basing the borough franchise on rent 
paid versus the valuation for local rates; the Hyde Park riots, which tested the 
issues of popular sovereignty and the commitment of the working classes to 
an orderly society; the debates of 1867, which broke the unity of the Liberal 
party but not of the Conservatives, and resulted in a Conservative Prime 
Minister passing an Act more radical than all but the most extreme earlier 
proposals. 
 However, any truly national story can also be told regionally. 
Yorkshire MPs were an integral part of the bill’s passage, whether 
Conservatives filing loyally through the lobbies in support of Disraeli, or 
Liberals breaking ranks to enfranchise every householder who paid their own 
rates, rather than Gladstone’s preferred option of a ‘hard and fast’ line of 
valuation below which the franchise would not extend. The mass meetings on 
Woodhouse Moor, just outside Leeds, were reported nationally, though it was 
the traditional emotional levers of dialect and county history which 
summoned a quarter of a million people there.2 Moreover, Yorkshire was the 
heartland of the Working Men’s Conservative Association movement, which 
– if nothing more – was a vital propaganda component of Disraeli’s push for 
an extended franchise. This chapter does not fully divorce itself from the 
national story, but uses the regional lens to focus and sharpen our 
understanding of national events. 
 It also maintains the study’s overall focus on the racial and political 
definition of the nation. As such, this chapter does what most contemporary 
observers did and takes the figure of the voter as male as a given, considering 
                                                   
1 Smith, Second Reform Bill; Cowling, Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. 
2 WYAS Bradford, DB19/C19/6, ‘Johnny Reight to Tim Politic’. 
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instead the particular characteristics of independent ‘manliness’ which 
delimited the bill’s boundaries. Similarly, it glosses over some of the debates 
around the bill which, though important both at the time and 
historiographically, do not directly pertain to the topic of the thesis. Ballots 
and voting papers, minority representation in the new ‘three-cornered’ 
constituencies, and the representation of currently unenfranchised 
communities – as well as the abolition of existing seats – were all discussed 
at this time. Deprioritising these debates, while still acknowledging their 
existence, allows us to focus on the fundamental question: why were so many 
admitted to the franchise in 1867, despite – or indeed thanks to – the 
collapse of Liberal unity in 1866? 
 
1866: Liberal failure 
 
Russell and Gladstone’s proposed reform of 1866 had three significant flaws. 
Two of these – not bringing forward a redistribution scheme, and basing the 
borough franchise on the gross estimated rental value of the property instead 
of its assessed value for the purposes of laying local rates – were the 
proximate causes of the bill’s failure, and the Parliamentary debates over 
them have been well studied. The third significant flaw, however, has 
attracted less attention: the proposed level of the borough and county 
franchises.  
During the fallow years of reform before 1865, the ‘single-barrelled’ 
reform bills of Baines and Locke King had resulted in the £6 borough rental 
and £10 county occupation franchise becoming a Liberal talisman. As 
detailed in chapter 5, most Liberal candidates had framed their support for 
reform in the context of these figures, giving them considerable symbolic 
significance. However, Cabinet wrangling ultimately resulted in a £7 borough 
rental franchise, and £14 county occupation.3 Although the extension of the 
franchise in boroughs had always been the Liberal preoccupation, and the 
government expected the £7 rental to approximate a £6 rating franchise, the 
decision to abandon both figures should not, perhaps, have been taken as 
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lightly as it was. Even the veteran Bradford MP Henry Wickham, hardly a 
Radical, considered it ‘a milk and water affair’, containing ‘the basis for 
mischief and none for real good’.4 
From their statements before the bill was brought in, the Liberal 
provincial press was clearly expecting the government to follow through on 
these pledges. Advanced Liberal newspapers expected anything short of £6 
rental to ‘produce universal discontent,’ be ‘a suicidal course,’ or ‘not be 
worth having.’5 However, even more moderate Liberal newspapers 
acknowledged disappointment with the bill. The Bradford Observer 
‘accept[ed] the measure for the sake of the men,’ though the Conservatives in 
1859 could have been pushed to a similar level; the York Herald praised it 
mutedly as ‘go[ing] as far perhaps as is warranted by political prudence.6 The 
bill even required some newspapers to revise earlier positions. In the space of 
a week, the Doncaster Gazette had to amend its stance that £6 rental was 
‘practicable in the existing state of public opinion,’ and praise the new 
Reform Bill as ‘a wise, liberal and practical scheme’.7 
This minimal enthusiasm was reflected in the meetings called to 
support the bill. In Bradford, speakers admitted that the bill was ‘not what 
most of them had been asking for’ and ‘expressed regret that… they could not 
obtain a bill embodying something better’.8 A Scarborough meeting resolved 
that the bill was ‘a substantial measure of reform’ even though it ‘falls short 
of what the unenfranchised classes might reasonably have expected’.9 In 
most cases, however, those who considered themselves reformers were 
prepared to unite behind the bill. The sole exception was in Sheffield, where 
the formerly pro-Confederate Alderman Saunders proposed the Council 
petition the Commons in support of the bill. He was foiled by the formerly 
pro-Union Councillor Ironside, who ‘denied that the bill was an honest 
measure’ and then, when nobody agreed with him, ‘seized his hat and bolted 
from the hall, amidst general laughter’ to deny the meeting a quorum.10 
                                                   
4 WYAS Bradford, 68D82/18 (Henry Wickham to Matthew Wilson, 14 March 1866). 
5 LE, 13 January 1866 p. 4; BR, 17 February 1866 p. 4; WFP, 13 January 1866 p. 5. 
6 BO, 15 March 1866 p. 4; YH, 17 March 1866 p. 8. 
7 DG, 9 March 1866 p. 8, 16 March 1866 p. 8. 
8 BO, 22 March 1866 p. 5. 
9 SM, 7 April 1866 p. 3. 
10 SI, 12 April 1866 p. 3. 
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 During the 1865 election, constituency activists had punished 
representatives unwilling to bring forward a further reform bill.11 In 
Yorkshire, the lukewarm press reception of the 1860 bill had been matched 
by an unwillingness to turn out and campaign for the measure, and the 
resulting failure had taken reform off the table for five years. There was 
clearly little desire to jeopardise the bill this time: the activists were willing to 
engage in the necessary provincial political theatre to give the measure the 
required legitimacy.  
In general, during this period, the moderates were well in control of 
the reform movement. At Sheffield, when Alderman Saunders held a meeting 
to support the bill, the former Union advocate Samuel Jackson’s motion for 
‘manhood suffrage’ received only four supporters among four hundred 
present in the hall, with his accusation that ‘radical friends’ had deserted the 
working class being met by denunciations of ‘silly obstructive schemes of 
universal suffrage’.12 Even at ‘a large open air-meeting of working men’ in 
radical Bradford, only two out of 3,000 could be found to support the 
proposition ‘that the bill did not meet the intelligence of the working 
classes’.13  
Robert Saunders highlighted the concept of permanence as a critical 
one in determining whether a measure would be successful.14 At this time, 
however, a few activists did suggest that pressure for franchise extension 
would restart shortly after the passing of any bill. At Doncaster, George 
Hatfield expressed his belief that agitation would continue ‘until the elective 
franchise is assimilated to the municipal one. (Loud applause)’; in 
Huddersfield, Wright Mellor considered a £6 rental ‘a beginning’.15 Rhetoric 
around every ‘intelligent, respectable, virtuous, and well-conducted’ taxpayer 
being entitled to the franchise, with £6 being ‘a sort of rough-and-ready 
measure’ below which ‘it would be perfectly hopeless to attempt to go… at 
                                                   
11 Zimmerman, ‘Palmerstonian Delay’, pp. 1179, 1194. 
12 SI, 20 February 1866 p. 6. 
13 BO, 12 April 1866 p. 6. 
14 Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, p. 187. 
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present’ perhaps fed into Conservative beliefs that the reduction was only a 
stepping-stone on the way to universal suffrage.16 
 
As the Conservatives noted, there was a certain amount of opportunism in 
reformers attempting to push through a measure they considered 
inadequate.17 This opportunism perhaps explains the vehemence with which 
reformers denounced those voting against the government on two key 
confrontations: the first being the government’s refusal to present 
redistribution schedules alongside the franchise bill, and the second – which 
ultimately doomed the bill – the question of rating against rental. However, 
closer examination of the views of these opponents suggests that they were 
not merely opportunistically attempting to shelve reform. Instead, it reveals 
aspects of the way in which views of the franchise’s nature and purpose 
differed both between and within parties. 
 The specific details of redistribution go beyond the scope of this 
chapter, which focuses on the question of reform in its relation to concepts of 
citizenship and nationality. However, those Liberals who interpreted 
Conservative insistence that the scheme be brought forward as ‘political 
hypocrisy,’ or one of ‘the intricacies of strategy which the craft of the Jew can 
devise’, seem to have been incorrect.18 In the Commons, the Hon. William 
Duncombe (Conservative MP for the North Riding) complained that ‘it was 
impossible to estimate the full scope and extent of the reduction’ without 
redistribution proposals.19 Yorkshire Conservative newspapers expressed a 
similar belief: it was the overall composition of the measure, the extension of 
the franchise plus the effect of redistribution, which mattered. The franchise 
was merely ‘a single wing’, while ‘the opposition ask for… a glimpse of the 
whole building’: Parliament could not ‘judge what extension of the franchise 
was proper and necessary’ without seeing what redistribution was planned.20  
                                                   
16 LI, 27 January 1866 p. 6. 
17 HxG, 14 April 1866 p. 4. 
18 LT, 24 March 1866 p. 5; SI, 2 June 1866 p. 6. 
19 HC Debs 183, c.70, 27 April 1866; not to be confused with the contemporaneous East 
Riding MP Admiral the Hon. Arthur Duncombe, or William’s predecessor and successor for 
the North Riding Colonel the Hon. Octavius Duncombe, who were his uncles. 
20 HP, 20 April 1866; ST, 31 March 1866 p. 8. 
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This organic view of Parliamentary reform was coupled with other 
motives, with self-interest among MPs threatened by redistribution 
undoubtedly being a significant one. Outside the Commons, there was also a 
fear that an extended electorate would push a ‘more democratic’ Parliament 
into a wide-ranging redistribution that would overthrow whatever balance 
had been achieved.21 The Doncaster Chronicle congratulated Parliament on 
avoiding ‘being taken by surprise by… one of Mr Bright’s schemes for 
redistribution… [to] completely change the character of Parliamentary 
representation and throw predominant power into the hands of the 
representatives of labour alone.’22  
Liberals did recognise the importance of redistribution: for instance, 
when John Dent MP argued that franchise extension had ‘comparatively little 
value’ without ‘a judicious redistribution of seats.’23 However, their support 
for it was framed in the context of expected partisan advantage. The 
Richmond and Ripon Chronicle’s argument that a ‘reformed Parliament’ 
would still ‘deal gently with representative centres’ was somewhat weakened 
by its subsequent admission that ‘With a reduction of the franchise, a Liberal 
majority would be so far secure as to enable the country to do without any 
redistribution bill at all.’24 On balance, despite the Liberal focus on ‘single-
barrelled’ reform bills, the evidence does not support a differing view of the 
franchise between Conservatives and Liberals in this respect. It is perhaps 
truer to say that although the Conservatives were sincere in their insistence 
on seeing a redistribution scheme alongside the franchise reduction, this 
came from both partisan and principled motives. 
 
The ultimate downfall of the 1866 reform bill was not over redistribution, but 
the question of whether rented value or rated value should be taken as the 
basis of the franchise. The government defeat brought condemnation from 
many Liberal newspapers, arguing that those who supported rating did so to 
                                                   
21 ST, 17 March 1866 p. 8. 
22 DC, 4 May 1866 p. 5. 
23 SM, 7 April 1866 p. 3. 
24 RRC, 2 June 1866 p. 4, 9 June 1866 p. 2. 
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limit the extension of the franchise or ‘to destroy the bill’.25 However, they 
overlooked the fact that other Liberal newspapers had expressed their 
preference for rating over rental before it became a party issue. The Bradford 
Observer, disclaiming allegiance with ‘the enemies of Reform,’ supported 
rating for its tendency to counteract ‘the excesses of centralisation’ and 
‘corrupting trickery,’ while the Huddersfield Chronicle argued against the 
‘less satisfactory evidence’ available to support rental valuations.26 The logic 
used to justify rating as the basis of the franchise was just as solid as that 
justifying rental.27 However, though committed reformers may have been 
sincere in their support of rating, the question remains as to whether the 
Conservatives were merely attempting to derail reform. 
 At first glance, the rhetoric of the Conservative press seems to support 
this more cynical interpretation. Any reduction of the borough franchise was 
‘unnecessary and impolitic’; ‘one step in the downward and democratic 
movement, which is to hand over to the working classes the preponderance 
of political power’; ‘a step downwards towards republicanism’.28 However, 
this outright opposition to any reduction in the franchise was not universal 
among Conservative newspapers, despite the Liberals bringing forward their 
measure. The Wakefield Journal stuck to its earlier proposal for household 
suffrage with plurality of votes; the Yorkshire Gazette similarly advocated 
plural voting; and the Hull Packet, ‘not only pledged to Reform, but anxious 
for reform,’ supported a £6 rating franchise as the point at which the 
occupier also paid the rates.29 The intricacies of Conservative proposals for 
franchise reduction will be considered later in the chapter, but it is clear that 
not all Conservatives felt it necessary to die in the last ditch opposing a 
reduction of the borough franchise. However, the Conservative minority in 
Parliament could not have blocked the bill by themselves: it was only through 
Liberal defections that the government was defeated. 
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 All twelve Yorkshire Conservatives voted for the amendment, 
including the Hon. Egremont William Lascelles, sworn in for Northallerton 
just over a month earlier. Of the twenty-seven Yorkshire Liberals, however, 
there were three who failed to support the government. Though the Radical 
John Roebuck was one of the three, it was illness rather than contrarianism 
which led to his absence without pair. Earlier in the month he had held 
himself in readiness to be summoned to the House, but at the time of the 
division he was unable to leave his room.30 The other two MPs, Colonel 
Thomas Pearson Crosland of Huddersfield and the Hon. Charles Wentworth-
Fitzwilliam of Malton, voted against the government. 
 The vote of Wentworth-Fitzwilliam is perhaps the easier of the two to 
unpick. As we have seen, it was clear by the 1865 election that Wentworth-
Fitzwilliam opposed the £6 borough franchise: however, he also voted 
against the Liberal party in every significant division on the bill. His support 
for Grosvenor’s amendment requiring the redistribution scheme to be 
brought forward may be explained as him protecting the family investment in 
the borough of Malton, but his voting on Conservative lines over reductions 
in the county franchises tends to suggest that it was opposition to reduction 
in the franchise which motivated him in supporting the rating requirement. 
 Robert Saunders has framed Crosland’s vote as purely motivated by 
rating, arguing that ‘he would have preferred a lower qualification than £7, 
but thought “a ratal test much safer than a rental”.’31 Perhaps 
unintentionally, this implies that Crosland would have accepted a lower 
rental qualification than £7. However, Crosland’s actions leave open the 
possibility that he voted against £7 rental not just because it was a rental 
franchise, but because it was too low. In his explanation of his vote, he 
restated his support for rating as a measure, and justified his vote against an 
amendment setting the county franchise at £20 rating because it ‘not only 
affirmed the rating principle but fixed the amount... at a figure so 
incompatible with the views I had expressed to my constituents that I could 
not support it.’32 Yet Crosland did not explain his earlier vote against a 
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second amendment designed to set the county franchise on a rating basis, 
whose sponsor emphasised that ‘The question, however, was not so much 
whether the amount should be raised to a higher figure, as whether the 
Committee should adopt the principle of rating’33 
On the hustings, Crosland had insisted he would vote for £6 rating 
over £6 rental and invited his constituents to ‘note it, because I would not 
enter the House of Commons on the shoulders of a falsehood or a 
misunderstanding – (cheers)’.34 However, he was equally clear that this was 
his absolute limit – ‘I am not “squeezable” (Much laughter and applause)’ – 
and that he considered income tax, lodger and educational franchises 
essential to avoid ‘an isolated measure that only operates one way… that 
would transfer the power from those that have it to the masses’.35 With most 
of these ‘fancy franchises’ lacking from Russell’s bill, Crosland would have 
been all the more insistent on the higher £6 rating qualification. 
Both Yorkshire Liberals who voted against the bill, therefore, seem to 
have done so not because of the difference between a rating and rental 
franchise – in other words, to maintain the link between taxation and 
representation – but in large part because they wished to maintain a higher 
qualification. The more taciturn Conservatives may well have done the same. 
However, outside Parliament there was a sufficient body of opinion to make 
rating an entirely valid basis for the franchise. The Pontefract Advertiser’s 
belief that Gladstone’s decision to resign was ‘most infatuated’ was not 
entirely without grounds.36  
Regardless, the fall of the government and the accession of the 
Conservatives to power led to a period of intense agitation intended to secure 
an extensive measure of reform. But how genuine was this agitation? Did the 
Liberals in the country change their views about the franchise? Or was the 
goal to pressure the Conservatives into delivering a moderate offering, 
instead of nothing at all? 
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1866-7: extra-parliamentary interlude 
 
The importance of extra-parliamentary pressure in the passage of the 1867 
Reform Act is debated, but most historians now play down its significance.37 
Certainly, the scope of demonstrations in Yorkshire was impressive. In the 
earlier phase, the largest event involved between six and fifteen thousand 
people – and even then, ‘an Elector’ claimed the hall ‘was not half filled’ and 
the meeting lacked enthusiasm.38 By contrast, the Reform League organised 
two monster demonstrations on Woodhouse Moor (one in October 1866 and 
a second in April 1867), each attracting several hundred thousand 
individuals.39 Though these were the centrepiece demonstrations for the 
West Riding, there were smaller local demonstrations, with the largest 
perhaps being the 12,000 in Sheffield who listened to Edmund Beales.40 
Though the monster demonstrations were generally regarded as successful, 
others were less well-attended: a subsequent Sheffield meeting ‘with the 
thermometer about freezing point and three inches of snow dust under foot’ 
attracted just over 7,000, and a Hull demonstration was reported as fewer 
than 1,500, including ‘a considerable number of women and boys’, with 
‘dingy and shabby’ banners.41  
Numbers alone were never the deciding factor in the success of 
popular protest movements: short of revolution, it was always their ability to 
influence Parliament that counted. In this case, as high political studies have 
concluded that this movement was ineffective, it seems inappropriate to 
challenge this overall conclusion through a regional study. Yet this thesis can 
offer some counterpoints and insights to better contextualise the extra-
parliamentary campaign for reform. 
Firstly, the ineffectiveness of these popular demonstrations should not 
be allowed to overshadow the intensity of anger in this period. This anger 
was growing even before the defeat of the Government: complaints about 
Conservative tactics in 1866 were far more furious than in 1860. The 
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Sheffield Independent’s comment about ‘the craft of the Jew’ was mild in 
comparison to the Wakefield Free Press, which denied that the Tories were 
gentlemen because they deferred to ‘a mongrel Jew barely naturalised… a 
Jew mountebank, whose very features suggest… the inevitable tiara of old 
hats in the Minories’.42 This sudden outburst of antisemitism is striking, 
given that his Jewishness ‘was not an aspect of Disraeli Liberals had taken 
great pains to exploit’ until the 1870s.43 As in 1878, however, accusations of 
conspiracy were in the air: ‘Quasi’ even went so far as to claim that the 
Fenian outbreak was a Tory false flag designed to distract from reform.44 This 
angry rhetoric extended from the Tories themselves – a ‘blind, brainless class 
of men’ – to Liberals ‘who have proved false to the principles of Reform,’ 
whose ‘factious opposition’ would be punished at the oncoming dissolution.45  
A certain amount of this anger was justified in the light of Robert 
Lowe’s comments about the morality of the working classes: similar 
comments by Roebuck had been received equally poorly in 1864. However, 
while Roebuck’s comments were brought up spontaneously by the crowd at 
an 1866 Sheffield reform meeting, Lowe’s words were deliberately exploited 
by those pressing for agitation.46 Not only did their rejection form the first 
resolution at the October Woodhouse Moor meeting, but the advanced 
Liberal Leeds Express printed copies of Lowe’s speech and advertised them 
‘for free distribution amongst the working classes’ shortly beforehand.47 The 
‘men of Bingley’ were also urged to ‘show the “Lowes” and “Elchos”… they 
must not slander you with impunity’ by attending a meeting at the 
Oddfellows Hall.48 The reaction to these comments has been understood as 
vindicating working-class respectability, and certainly this must have been a 
significant motivation among the rank-and-file of the movement.49 However, 
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the deliberate exploitation of the statement by the campaign’s leaders 
suggests that it may have been a tactic, as well as – or perhaps even more 
than – a motivation for them. The melodrama of Victorian politics needed a 
villain, and Lowe – who ‘disclaimed the utterance of the language originally 
imputed to him’ – provided a suitable candidate.50  
This question of tactics raises a further problem. Was there a genuine 
shift among more prominent activists and the Liberal press, which reflected 
them moving towards a more radical point of view – abandoning the ‘hard 
and fast line’ in favour of household or manhood suffrage – as a result of 
popular agitation? Or was the fostering of this anger solely a tactic to 
pressure the Conservative government into greater concessions, or even just 
to get the Liberals back into office – as the Conservatives alleged of 1859, and 
would allege again in this period? 
It seems significant that, for the most part, the newspapers which 
demanded a greater instalment of reform in late 1866 were those which had 
already been demanding a larger instalment. The Wakefield Express, for 
instance, argued that ‘Reformers are no longer bound by their [previous] 
offer’ and ‘Whether it be manhood suffrage or household suffrage… the 
constitution must now be opened.’51 However, earlier in the decade it had 
already been sceptical about the power of ‘even a £6 rating franchise… [to] 
remedy the evils complained of by Mr Bright’52 It was hardly surprising that 
other advanced Liberal newspapers, like the Bradford Review and the Leeds 
Express, supported similarly radical measures.53 In this respect the agitation 
seems to have been preaching to the converted. 
The bulk of regional press opinion seems to have encouraged the 
agitation as a tactic for forcing through a moderate measure, rather than 
having been convinced by it. The Leeds Mercury, the county’s most 
prominent Liberal newspaper, never swayed from its belief that neither 
manhood nor household suffrage was ‘prudent or practical’, or ‘juster and 
more beneficial than… that now prevailing’.54 The campaign’s only value 
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seemed to be to ‘teach those timid people whose disastrous fears caused a 
moderate settlement of the question to be rejected… what is the meaning of 
“swamping the present constituencies”.’55 The Pontefract Telegraph 
complained that the agitators were ‘virtually playing into the hands of the 
Tories’ with their insistence on ‘impracticable crotchets’.56 Many of these 
moderate newspapers switched to support of household suffrage not during 
the reform agitation, but in early 1867 when the Conservative party began to 
discuss limited household suffrage.57 In private, other Liberals remained 
considerably less enthusiastic: the recently-elected Knaresborough Liberal 
Isaac Holden was informed by a correspondent that ‘I do not approve of 
Household Suffrage and think a Five Pound Rental quite low enough.’58 
The second insight provided by a regional study is the way in which 
existing tensions within the Liberal party were exacerbated by the existence 
of two formal organisations both campaigning for different measures of 
franchise extension. The belief that the Reform League and the Reform 
Union ‘readily collaborated’ with ‘compromise on tactical grounds’ tends not 
to be borne out by the struggles which went on in Yorkshire, or indeed 
Wolverhampton.59 The Bradford Review’s hope that there would be ‘no 
antagonism, no jealousy, indeed no rivalry’ proved false, and instead the 
‘common tradition’ broke down spectacularly: radical reformers pushing for 
the largest measure possible, and moderates stuck between the Scylla of 
Conservatism and the Charybdis of manhood suffrage.60 
It was relatively simple to patch over ideological differences between 
Union and League: as the Wakefield Free Press pointed out, ‘when the 
Household and Lodger franchises of the Union are fully carried out… the 
difference between the result and “registered residential manhood suffrage” 
would be very little.’61 However, battles at the constituency level were of 
organisation as well as ideology. In the provinces, elections required 
                                                   
55 LM, 8 February 1867. 
56 PT, 8 September 1866 p. 4, 29 September 1866 p. 4, 13 October 1866 p. 4. 
57 LM, 6 March 1867; RRC, 25 May 1867 p. 4; YH, 2 March 1867 p. 8. 
58 University of Bradford Special Collections, Isaac Holden Papers, 1/1/24 (Richard Park to 
Isaac Holden, April 1867) 
59 Chase, ‘Popular Movement’, pp. 27, 22; Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, 
Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 85, 87. 
60 BR, 1 September 1866 p. 4; Parry, Liberal Government, p. 19. 
61 WFP, 16 February 1867 p. 4. 
Page 250 of 312 
 
committees, canvassers, and the ability to support a candidate from selection 
to poll. In many cases, the Reform League acted not as an aid to the existing 
Liberal organisations but as a potential replacement for them. When 
discussing Wakefield reformers, T.H. Holdsworth had to clarify that he 
meant ‘the old original Reform party (cheers), not the new establishment 
which has just been set up in opposition to us (laughter and cheers).’62 
Moreover, the expansion of the electorate in itself posed a threat to the 
existing borough and county elites. At a Bradford open-air working men’s 
meeting, one speaker predicted the £7 franchise would mean ‘the working 
men of Bradford would be able to “lick” all comers, and would not have to go 
down on their knees to the Whigs to ask them to accept their candidate, as 
they had in the case of General Thompson’.63  
In Hull, the South Myton Reform Association had been ‘the only 
organised body of Reformers in the borough,’ managing both candidate 
selection and registration.64 It funded delegations to various reform 
conferences, and subsequently became an auxiliary branch of the Reform 
Union.65 In early 1866, a general Liberal association for the town was set up: 
however, the local Reform League branch claimed the right to nominate 
seven members to the committee, purporting to have secured the town’s 
second Liberal MP at the 1865 election.66 League and Union disagreed on the 
behaviour of the local MP James Clay, particularly on his vote against the 
Liberals in support of an amendment against the corrupt payment of rates.67 
In March 1867, members of the Reform League threatened to ‘act 
independently’ of the Reform Association if it delayed in calling a public 
meeting, suggesting also that ‘they would perhaps not feel bound to support 
the lead of the Association in future, in supporting at an election any 
candidate that they might bring forward, or in other ways.’68 
In Sheffield, the tension crystallised around the town’s long-standing 
member John Roebuck. Roebuck had continually professed that he would 
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accept a reform bill from whatever party it issued, and supported the 
Conservative measure in both 1859 and 1867. Coupled with harsh language 
to Gladstone over compounding, this earned him the Reform League’s ire. He 
was blamed for ‘the apathy of the old Liberal party in Sheffield,’ with 
speakers claiming he had done nothing for the working classes, and was told 
to ‘go to some Tory borough more consonant with his feelings.’69 Even the 
Sheffield Independent commented ominously that ‘Sheffield men do not 
lightly desert the member they have chosen… We hope it is not too late for 
Mr Roebuck to repair the mischief that he has done’.70 The enlarged Sheffield 
electorate did desert Roebuck in 1868, though with characteristic 
contrarianism he returned in 1874 to top the poll.71 
Perhaps the most significant battle between moderates and radicals 
came in Leeds, the home of the Reform League’s Yorkshire Department. 
Malcolm Chase characterises the attendance of Edward Baines at the Easter 
rally on Woodhouse Moor as securing ‘The foundations for viable co-
operation’ between the two.72 In reality, it might better be described as a 
capitulation. In June 1866, a meeting of advanced Reformers had been asked 
if they ‘would allow the Leeds Whigs thus continually to sell them as they 
were doing. (Great applause).’73 A new association was needed to ‘get rid of 
the milk-and-water men’, and the Reform League became this association.74 
Though Leeds had generally run a Radical and Liberal in tandem, previously 
the Radical had been selected by the mainstream Reform Registration 
Association.75 In February 1867, the Reform League decided to bring forward 
its own second candidate at the Leeds election.76 In April, the Leeds Express 
became ‘the medium of communication in all matters concerning the Reform 
League Party in this district’, just as the Baines family’s Leeds Mercury had 
acted for the Liberals.77 
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There were some attempts at a rear-guard action, such as when a 
meeting of Leeds Liberals in the Stock Exchange voted 20-18 in favour of 
Gladstone’s £5 rental rather than household suffrage.78 Immediately 
afterwards, the Leeds Express accused them of trying to ‘stultify the wishes of 
nearly the entire community’ and printed a letter from ‘No Whig’ urging the 
‘Men of Leeds’ to ‘plump for the Radical’ at the next election.79 The electoral 
logic was inexorable: a month later, Baines attended the Reform League rally, 
and in July negotiations about an alliance between the Reform League and 
Reform Association had begun.80 Though each nominated a candidate to a 
joint Leeds ticket in 1868, there was no doubt who was in charge.81 The 
moderate Liberal Sir Andrew Fairbairn, who stood unsuccessfully, 
subsequently condemned a Registration Association where ‘moderate Liberal 
views were not regarded as they ought’ because ‘three-fourths of the working 
members of that association were also members of the Reform League’.82 
The likely effect of this pressure on Liberal parliamentarians was to 
increase the necessity to find a suitably radical settlement, though for 
practical rather than ideological reasons. It had previously been possible to 
manage the Radical threat, but the creation of the Reform League as a viable 
campaigning organisation outside the existing party structure changed this. 
Even if the leadership of the League did not instruct their branches to oppose 
mainstream Liberal candidates, their inaction would harm the Liberal cause. 
Yet the Liberal members, out of office, could only do so much to affect 
the Government bill. Ultimately, it was the willingness of the Conservative 
party to trust their leader and support a measure of reform which they would 
unquestionably have rejected from another party, coupled with the 
determination of independent Liberals to see reform passed regardless of 
party considerations, which decided the ultimate shape of the 1867 Reform 
Act. 
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1867: Conservative success? 
 
A number of factors complicate understanding the motivations of backbench 
Conservative MPs in supporting the reform bill. For a start, they seem to 
have been far more willing to submit to discipline than the Liberal party, 
though whether this was innate or due to the talent of Conservative whips is 
unclear.83 Across thirteen key divisions, 0.79% of votes from Yorkshire 
Conservatives were given against their party, compared to 5.7% of Yorkshire 
Liberal votes. Secondly, although they were not necessarily ‘booby squires, 
who valued Westminster simply because it was “the best club in the land”,’ 
they were certainly far more taciturn than their Liberal counterparts, and 
therefore provide significantly less evidence for why they voted the way they 
did.84 
James Lowther, MP for York, ‘championed the uncompromising 
principles of conservatism,’ and gave his maiden speech in support of Earl 
Grosvenor’s wrecking amendment on the 1866 reform bill.85 In 1867, he 
insisted that ‘no great party’ wanted ‘pure and simple household suffrage’, 
making ‘sufficient safeguards’ like dual voting essential.86 As the bill was 
currently ‘not a Conservative measure’, and seemed unlikely to become any 
more Conservative, ‘he should hold himself at liberty’ to vote against it and 
reject the ‘felo de se’ in which his party seemed to be engaged. Despite this 
trenchant standpoint, most of his Parliamentary contributions were about 
academics voting for borough members at Oxford and Cambridge. Though 
this may indicate a desire to prevent members of ‘the educated classes’ being 
‘deprived of the suffrage,’ it tells us little about his wider views on the 
franchise.87 
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Lowther was positively loquacious compared to his fellow MPs, many 
of whom gave little indication of whether they actually supported the bill or 
not. Like Lowther, the newly elected Colonel the Hon. Octavius Duncombe 
went to Parliament believing that a long residence, lateral extension and 
‘duality, if not plurality, of votes’ were also ‘certain necessary requirements if 
a household suffrage were adopted’.88 However, as the Commons demolished 
each of those safeguards, Duncombe said nothing. That he ended the year 
praising Disraeli as a ‘distinguished statesman’ who ‘had swept away all 
opposition’ may be put down to partisan loyalty, but did he ever doubt the 
wisdom of the bill which he had supported?89 
It is understandable that Conservative MPs held to the party line, 
rather than admit the Reform Bill was going too far. What is intriguing, 
however, is that Conservative newspapers – with much less incentive to keep 
their concerns to themselves – did the same. Some of their positivity must be 
ascribed to the relative speed with which the changes were made: in effect, 
due to the weekly schedule of most of the newspapers in question, the 
safeguards were gone before they knew it. However, when it came to a final 
evaluation of the measure, only the Sheffield Times hedged its welcoming of a 
measure containing ‘all the elements of finality’ with a refusal to ‘predict 
what will be the issue’.90 Ultimately, Disraeli’s triumph must lie not just in 
having persuaded the Commons to pass a Reform Bill, but in persuading the 
wider party to accept it without splitting as it did over Corn Law reform. 
Some of the enthusiasm must also be ascribed to glee, in seeing the 
Conservatives not just in office but actually out-manoeuvring the 
opposition.91 The Pontefract Advertiser was positively glowing when it 
invited its readers to ‘Mark how cleverly Mr Disraeli checkmates his 
opponents… [with] a majority of 66 notwithstanding the bitterest and most 
envenomed hostility of Gladstone, Lowe, and Bright’.92 The Doncaster 
Chronicle forecast shifts in party structure that would ‘keep at the head of 
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affairs men whose patriotism… never will be questioned.’93 Similarly, the 
Yorkshire Gazette gloated at the way that ‘the gigantic efforts and surpassing 
ability of Mr Disraeli and the Tory party’ had dispelled Liberal delusions 
based on ‘prejudice’ and ‘self-conceit’.94 However, if it had only been the 
prospect of an extended tenure of office which enthused the Conservatives, it 
seems likely that they would have treated the bill itself in more muted terms. 
As such, we must understand what merit the newly extended franchise may 
have held from a Conservative perspective. 
 
By early 1867, Conservative rhetoric on reform centred around three 
fundamental principles. Firstly, it must not swamp the constituencies; 
secondly, it must enfranchise merit; and thirdly, it must provide a lasting 
settlement. These fundamental principles led fairly naturally onto the 
proposals for rated household suffrage with a long qualification period, 
plurality of votes and ‘fancy franchises’ which, in effect, were forced on an 
uncertain Cabinet by their internal logic.95 These proposals differed only 
from the demands of the reformers in the safeguards which lay around them. 
However, these safeguards were for the most part abandoned in the interest 
of the third principle – finality. 
Although Disraeli had announced his 1859 bill to be a complete 
measure, Conservatives seemed to be much more anxious for finality in 1866 
than they had been previously. The insistence that the bill should ‘settle the 
question,’ ‘establish a barrier against renewed agitation,’ or be ‘much more 
complete’ than the offered measure may well have stemmed from tactical as 
well as the obvious ideological reasons.96 Conservatives had alleged that the 
popularity of Palmerston’s government lay in its essentially Conservative 
nature; at the same time, the Liberals had also been able to use Reform as a 
party cry at elections. Removing both Palmerston and Reform would, in 
theory, level the electoral playing field. 
Of the safeguards attached to household suffrage, plurality of votes 
had been the most important. Conservative newspapers had struggled to 
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understand the importance of personal ratepaying when it was proposed to 
abolish it in 1860, but whenever a newspaper had proposed household 
suffrage it had always been coupled with plural voting as a safeguard. 
However, the very reasons that Conservative newspapers suggested in 
support of plural voting may also explain why they abandoned it. It offered 
no partisan advantage either in theory – ‘where parties are so evenly 
balanced, there would be quite as many Liberals as Conservatives who would 
have the double vote’ – or in practice, as the fact that plural voting had ‘long 
been in operation in every parish in England’ did not stop the Liberals 
dominating municipal government.97 In the end, the Conservative party 
clung to the single plank of personal ratepaying. 
Disraeli’s framing of the bill as restoring to the working classes the 
votes that the Whigs had taken from them in 1832 was successful, playing to 
a Conservative weakness for tradition which Disraeli himself, as an outsider, 
tended to lack. It also negated the critique of ‘Americanising’ the 
constitution, though the Liberals did have a point when they pointed out that 
this ‘for years has been propounded and advocated by Mr Bright.’98 The 
framing had direct appeal in boroughs like Pontefract, where those who 
qualified under the ancient franchises had been dying off.99 However, even in 
Wakefield (enfranchised in 1832) such a comment could raise a cheer at 
public meetings.100 
 Some Conservatives also claimed to detect a partisan advantage in 
reaching beyond the Liberal upper urban strata to the honest, solid 
Conservatives below. However, we should distinguish this from Disraeli’s 
wish to appeal to lower working class ‘resentment,’ given the whole-
heartedness with which most Conservatives rejected class warfare.101 It was 
not resentment but stability that they warmed to: unlike shopkeepers, ‘the 
working man, upon the whole, is contented with his social position’.102 This 
quest for stability perhaps explains the emphasis on long residential 
qualifications, which would tend to rule out the ambitiously mobile as well as 
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‘flitting hordes of characterless labourers’.103 Support for ‘beer-barrel 
influence’ against the ‘puritanical prig’ was suspiciously absent.104 When the 
Leeds Intelligencer granted a vice to ‘the simple working man of the old 
school,’ it was not that he drank but that he ‘smokes his pipe in the summer 
evening’.105  
If the bill offered such an advantage to the Conservatives, however, 
why were Liberal newspapers so certain that they had got the best of things? 
Disraeli had been ‘doing the work of the Liberal party so well,’ passing what 
was ‘in reality Mr Gladstone’s bill’ after Liberal amendments had ‘changed a 
sham into a reality’.106 Dissent from this view clustered in east and central 
Yorkshire, where credit was given to the independent Liberals, or the 
weakness of the party’s position highlighted.107 Nevertheless, the majority 
Liberal view was that they had triumphed. 
This view was only tenable when the Conservatives’ last remaining 
safeguard, the personal payment of rates, was excluded. The Leeds Express, 
which also supported personal payment, argued that no ‘radical reform 
advocate… demands the vote for a man without the performance of some 
personal duty’.108 Yet the Liberal emphasis had always been on removing 
impediments to the exercise of the franchise wherever possible. The Liberal 
reform bill of 1866 had proposed to remove the ratepaying clauses, and 
Liberals had praised it for doing so.109 When the bill of 1860 had not done the 
same, Liberals – including the future Alderman Carter, Reform League 
leader and part-owner of the Leeds Express – had complained that these 
clauses would ‘prove fatal to the just claims of a very large proportion’.110 
When Isaac Holden, Liberal MP for Knaresborough, sent a copy of the bill to 
an acquaintance, it was returned with the observation that ‘I quite object’ to 
personal payment.111 
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Though Liberal intellectuals recognised the concept of ‘participatory 
citizenship,’ Liberalism at large tended to focus on the franchise as a tool of 
self-actualisation and individual empowerment: establishing the individual 
as a full member of the community, or permitting them to hold the executive 
to account for the use of their taxes.112 By contrast, Conservative justifications 
for the restricted franchise had focused on the vote being a trust to be 
exercised on behalf of the whole community. This led relatively naturally to 
proposals to link the franchise to other civic duties. For instance, as the Leeds 
Intelligencer highlighted, the former Conservative cabinet minister Walpole 
had supported a £6 borough and £20 county franchise both in 1859 and 1866 
because these figures harmonised with both direct taxation and 
compounding.113 The voluntary payment of taxes had often featured in 
Conservative proposals for franchise extension: as the Sheffield Independent 
commented, ‘We have often heard a stout Conservative say he should not fear 
to enfranchise every man who would voluntarily pay a tax of 5s a year.’114 
Rating provided a more solid basis than other taxation because, as the 
Liberal Sir Roundell Palmer pointed out, ‘there was no reason to expect the 
time would ever come when local burdens would be dispensed with’.115 
Ultimately, this question of civic responsibility managed to sustain the bill in 
Conservative eyes despite its many contradictions. When the Wakefield 
Express argued that enfranchising lodgers abandoned the ‘talismanic test of 
ratepaying’, the Doncaster Chronicle responded that they had ‘other duties to 
perform’ including jury service, which ‘The lower class of lodgers will 
probably shrink from’.116 
Civic responsibility was not solely a Conservative concern, however. 
The Liberal Hull Advertiser considered a proposal for allowing a voluntary 
income tax payment franchise worthy of publication, was requested to re-
publish it a month later, and printed a letter from Bolton urging ‘the 
Reformers of Hull’ to distribute the scheme to ‘every newspaper in the United 
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Kingdom’.117 It was not just the restriction in the terms of debate that led to 
reform being passed: Disraeli’s chosen basis provided sufficient cross-over 
between Conservative and Liberal opinion to allow a consensus, temporary 
and faltering as it was, to be reached.118 As such, we should consider the 
opinions of the ‘Liberals and so-called Radicals… ready to catch at anything 
in the shape of a Reform bill’ who joined the loyal Conservative minority to 
pass the measure.119  
There were two deciding moments in the passage of the bill, both 
related to Gladstone’s attempts to weaken the bill’s insistence on personal 
ratepaying. The first came on 8 April, when Liberal MPs gathered in a 
Commons tea-room and resolved to confront Gladstone about his proposal to 
enfranchise all ratepayers (personal or compound) above £5 and disfranchise 
those under it. The second, on 12 April, saw Liberal MPs vote with the 
government to defeat Gladstone’s attempt to enfranchise householders who 
did not pay their rates personally. 
The Yorkshiremen among the tea-room group were an eclectic bunch, 
yet their motivations are perhaps comprehensible.120 Edward Akroyd of 
Halifax gave the clearest exposition of his motives: as an independent 
Liberal, elected ‘to exercise an honest and independent judgment,’ he 
supported personal payment of rates because it excluded ‘the least 
independent portion of the householders’.121 He concurred with Sir Francis 
Crossley of the Northern West Riding that all householders over £5 rating 
should be forced to pay rates personally, and those under £5 should be 
required to demonstrate their worth by opting out of compounding.122 
Both Hull MPs, Charles Norwood and James Clay, seem to have 
emphasised the measure’s permanence. Norwood used the phrase 
‘satisfactory and permanent’ twice in his response to the Hull Reform 
League.123 Clay also felt that £5 ‘would not be a settlement… for five years’, 
and had tired of ‘lowering the qualification by £2 or £3 at a time… a peddling 
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and poor way of going to work’.124 However, Clay seems also to have favoured 
some demonstration of worth for new voters. In 1866 he had introduced his 
own private member’s bill offering an educational franchise to those passing 
‘some examination as a working man of ordinary intelligence might master 
by the sacrifice of his leisure hour at night for, say, six months’, claiming it 
was a test ‘not for his little smattering of learning, but for his earnestness’.125 
Clearly, a similar demonstration of earnestness would be the personal 
payment of rates. The greatest difficulty lies in understanding the 
motivations of John Dent of Scarborough, but we know that at the 1865 
election he expressed a preference for ‘a large and liberal’ government 
measure and insisted on being allowed ‘to use his own judgment’.126 
The motives of the three Liberal defectors on the 12 April vote are also 
understandable. The Hon. Charles Wentworth-Fitzwilliam was secure not 
just from family interest, but because the Malton Conservatives were 
prepared ‘to bring him in at all hazards,’ and he voted against the Liberals in 
almost every significant division in the session.127 Edward Akroyd stuck to his 
guns in supporting the personal payment of rates, in which John Roebuck 
evidently found his ‘test of the worth, the intelligence, the virtue,’ the ‘sieve 
which should separate [out] the respectable and trustworthy’.128 Though civic 
responsibility was not as important to the Liberals as to the Conservatives, it 
was sufficiently resonant for both to form the basis of a measure – a fact 
which Disraeli recognised earlier than most.129 
Most importantly, a ratepaying franchise was an explicitly anti-
democratic measure. Many critiques of democracy had focused on the way 
that the lower classes dominated the electoral system but paid no taxes. By 
making the electorate and taxpayers as coterminous as possible, despite the 
logistical difficulties caused by upheavals in the compounding system that 
now forced householders to pay their own rates, the reform act effectively 
institutionalised a corrective to the flaws of democracy in America. The 
enthusiasm across the political spectrum for this institutionalised 
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requirement for responsibility, even after the Union victory in the American 
Civil War, strongly suggests that support for reform did not equate to a 
favourable view of democracy. 
 
An essential corollary of the Conservative decision that the country would be 
safe in the hands of the working classes was for the working classes to show 
an interest in protecting it. At the time, that interest was demonstrated most 
clearly by the Working Men’s Conservative Association (WMCA) movement. 
They have played little part in the historiography of the national debate: the 
indices of Smith, Cowling and Saunders do not contain a single entry for the 
associations between them. Yet their role, though limited, should not be 
overlooked. 
 Though the 1846 split is traditionally seen as marking the end of 
‘efforts to foster a broad organisational bond between Conservatives and 
social groups from the lower classes,’ this first phase of organised popular 
Conservatism died out in Yorkshire only in the 1850s.130 In Bradford, the 
society was ‘increasing in numbers’ with ‘funds in a flourishing condition’ in 
1854, yet it held its last annual meeting the next year.131 In Leeds and 
Beverley, societies simply petered out.132 Only the Hull society survived into 
the 1860s, though as the sectarian Protestant Operative Conservative 
Association.133  
The new phase of popular Conservatism began shortly afterwards, 
with the foundation of the Leeds WMCA in 1862.134 However, it was not until 
the accession of a Conservative government in July 1866 that a second 
Yorkshire association was formed in Bradford. Halifax, Huddersfield, 
Cleckheaton, and Wakefield societies were created in a flurry towards the end 
of the year, perhaps in response to the growing agitation for reform and the 
Reform League’s Woodhouse Moor meeting.135 By March 1867, when Leeds 
held a Conference of Working Men’s Conservative Associations, five more 
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societies had been set up: Pudsey, between Leeds and Bradford; Shipley, to 
the north of Bradford; York; and Dewsbury and Batley, in the heart of the 
woollen district east of Huddersfield.136 
 
 
Figure 8: Yorkshire WMCA foundations 
 
As can be seen, Working Men’s Conservatism did not originate in ‘the month 
before the Second Reform Bill was finally passed’: its roots were deeper.137 
The outward forms of its banquets, for instance, strongly echoed earlier 
manifestations of popular Conservatism.138 Indeed, the particular strength of 
Working Men’s Conservatism in Yorkshire may well stem from its earlier 
tradition of Tory Radicalism. The leading figure in these newly-created 
societies was William Busfeild Ferrand, former associate of Richard Oastler, 
a regular fixture at inaugural banquets and the first president of the 
Yorkshire Union.139 Ferrand’s brand of ferocious rhetoric, which appealed to 
‘the enemies of Popery, the supporters of the monarchy, and the friends of 
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native industry’ to defeat ‘Whig thraldom’ and the ‘conspiracy of cotton 
lords,’ had made him ‘admirable for the mob’ in the Bradford election of 
1837.140 Now, he made a direct appeal to the history of popular Conservatism 
in Yorkshire, claiming to ‘see my name honourably associated on that flag 
(pointing to a banner on the wall) with Oastler, Ashley, Bull, and Fielden,’ 
and praising the earlier Operative Conservative Associations as ‘Sir Robert 
Peel’s right arm, by which he fought the battle of the Constitution’.141 
Attempts to organise a national structure within which to fit these 
local organisations were faltering.142 Proposals for an association of only the 
six northern counties were defeated by a single vote, despite the presence of 
delegates from Birmingham, London and Reading.143 Though a second 
meeting proposed county associations, to send delegates to ‘a national 
conference when united action is necessary,’ a Blackburn delegate apparently 
left with the impression that no national organisation whatsoever had been 
agreed.144 It is perhaps telling that Liberal campaigning organisations such as 
the National Reform Union could be formed in the provinces, but that a 
series of London meetings created the National Union of Constitutional and 
Conservative Associations.145 
In fairness to the capital, it should be noted that the meetings which 
adopted the provincial structure were dominated by Yorkshire associations – 
eleven out of sixteen at the first, and seven out of nine at the second – and 
therefore fundamentally reflected local preoccupations. The executives of 
Yorkshire WMCAs were clearly passionate about county identity: they 
immediately formed their own Union with secretary, president, and 
committee, ‘to establish an association in every town and village of this 
important county’.146 The Yorkshire Union sent delegates to the London 
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meetings alongside the town associations, and held its own convention at 
York.147 Based on the ultimate structure of the National Union, Yorkshire 
seems to have been alone in this county sentiment.148 
Malcolm Chase argues that these organisations were ‘frail’, and that 
‘The Reform League targeted public meetings convened by operative 
Conservative groups… passing manhood suffrage resolutions’.149 However, 
both his examples are incorrect. At the London meeting he cites, the Reform 
League did not pass resolutions but rioted to disrupt the meeting.150 This 
suggests either that the League’s commitment to working-class respectability 
lapsed, or (as is most likely) that not enough tickets had been obtained to 
enable the dissidents to pass their own resolutions.151 
Furthermore, though the Reform League did successfully take over a 
meeting of the Huddersfield WMCA, there is more to the story.152 For a start, 
the meeting was held at Berry Brow, where ‘not long since… they only had 
one man who was thought to be a Conservative on the register’.153 Perhaps 
more importantly, it was the newly-formed Huddersfield WMCA which 
initially disrupted a Reform League meeting. The two bodies first clashed at a 
formal debate on manhood suffrage, though we cannot determine which got 
the better of the discussion as no vote was taken.154 The real battle started on 
15 March, at the town of Golcar, where the Huddersfield WMCA packed the 
room at a Reform League meeting and defeated a resolution in favour of 
manhood suffrage by two to one.155 Four days later, in a League meeting at 
Huddersfield, the WMCA ensured that ‘a good deal of confusion prevailed’; 
three days after this, the League disrupted the Berry Brow meeting reported 
in the Leeds Mercury.156  
However, the WMCA did not accept their defeat. At Lockwood, their 
amendment calling the government bill ‘liberal, comprehensive and honest’ 
                                                   
147 YH, 3 August 1867 p. 10. 
148 YG, 4 May 1867 p. 2; YH, 3 August 1867 p. 10. 
149 Chase, ‘Popular Movement’, p. 22. 
150 Globe, 18 June 1867 p. 4. 
151 McClelland, ‘England’s Greatness’, p. 77; Saunders, Democracy and the Vote, p. 228. 
152 LM, 25 March 1867 p. 4. 
153 LI, 9 December 1867 p. 3. 
154 HC, 22 December 1866 p. 5. 
155 HC, 23 March 1867 p. 8. 
156 HC, 23 March 1867 p. 5. 
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was defeated only by ‘a trifling majority’.157 At Moldgreen, they voted one of 
their own members into the chair and then ‘hooted, yelled, and interrupted 
the speaker’ without defeating the resolution.158 The rematch at Golcar saw 
the show of hands ‘so evenly balanced… the chairman was heard to say that 
he did not know which party had it’.159 Clearly, the two sides were closer in 
strength than Chase’s isolated incident suggests. 
Like the Huddersfield WMCA, the Hull Conservatives also seemed to 
show greater confidence (or a willingness to adopt the opposition’s tactics) by 
intervening in a Reform meeting.160 There, they claimed ‘the Conservative 
party always had in view a Reform Bill (Oh, oh, applause, and “Speak the 
truth”)’, and called personal ratepaying ‘a guarantee that a man was an 
honest and industrious citizen. (Uproar).’ In the end, however, only a sixth of 
the meeting supported their amendment. 
We should be careful not to overstate the WMCAs’ effect. They were 
far less widespread than Reform associations; they could not carry opposing 
motions at Reform meetings; and they failed to form an organised and 
effective national movement.161 Nor, however, should we write them off. For 
a start, the fact that Conservatives were daring to disrupt their opponents 
was a mark of growing confidence: previously, ‘No Conservative working 
man dared to raise his voice up’ for fear of being ‘denounced as “tag-rag”. 
(Hear, hear, and laughter)’162 Furthermore, the very existence of 
Conservative associations showed progress, whether at Berry Brow, or at 
Cleckheaton ‘considering what Cleckheaton had been (laughter and cheers),’ 
or in towns ‘so thoroughly overrun with rampant Radicalism as Batley or 
Dewsbury’.163 Though the Liberals could hold larger meetings, it was 
spectacle and not politics which drew at least some of the audience: the 
advanced Liberal Huddersfield Examiner was forced to acknowledge that the 
                                                   
157 HC, 6 April 1867 p. 8; HE, 30 March 1867 p. 7. 
158 HE, 6 April 1867 p. 5; HC, 6 April 1867 p. 8. 
159 HC, 13 April 1867 p. 8. 
160 HA, 23 March 1867 p. 5; ECH, 28 March 1867 p. 7. 
161 Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 126. 
162 LI, 27 January 1866 p. 8. 
163 LI, 27 April 1867 p. 9; WE, 27 July 1867 p. 5. 
Page 266 of 312 
 
‘greater part’ of a Morley meeting had vanished part-way through to watch ‘a 
feat at arms… [at] a beerhouse’.164 
Thirdly, the importance of WMCAs may lie not in their effectiveness as 
campaigning organisations, but as agents of propaganda.165 In many 
respects, the size of a meeting mattered less than the number of column 
inches it generated. It was not just reform meetings that were ‘widely 
reported beyond their immediate locality’, but WMCA banquets.166 Moreover, 
they were often reported in gross disproportion to their actual importance: 
the London Evening Standard, for instance, devoted almost an entire 
column to the Cleckheaton WMCA banquet, and more than two to 
Wakefield.167 Audiences with the Conservative leadership helped to generate 
publicity, not just in the provinces but also in metropolitan papers, which 
could report Disraeli meeting ‘very numerous deputation[s]… which outraged 
the etiquette of such receptions by cheering the right honourable gentleman 
vociferously.’168 
Moreover, Liberal newspapers simply could not resist complaining 
about WMCAs. Paradoxically, they lambasted them for being ‘working men 
who glory in seeking to exclude their class from the rights of citizenship’, and 
also as ‘retired gentlemen and persons owning property’ or ‘lawyer’s clerks, 
town and government officials… general servants or occasional workers’ 
operating under false colours.169 Correspondence columns were filled with 
letters from ‘An Operative Konservative’, ‘A Real Conservative,’ or even 
‘Dizzy’ himself, expressing their gratitude ‘to our Conservative leaders for 
keeping us in our proper place’ or explaining how they had convinced their 
neighbours ‘that I was not fit to have a vote; nor any other working man who 
goes to a Conservative banquet’.170 In the light of this publicity blitz, any 
                                                   
164 HE, 20 April 1867 p. 7. 
165 Cragoe, ‘Conservative Associations’, p. 600, for the earlier period. 
166 Chase, ‘Popular Movement’, p. 29. 
167 Evening Standard, 26 April 1867 p. 3, 25 April 1867 p. 6. 
168 Pall Mall Gazette, 9 April 1867 p. 6; see also LM, 9 April 1867 p. 5, Morning Post 9 April 
1867 p. 3, Dundee Courier 9 April 1867 p. 3, Standard 9 April 1867 p. 3, Newcastle Daily 
Journal 9 April 1867 p. 3, Western Times 9 April 1867 p. 5, Liverpool Daily Post 9 April 
1867 p. 6, Aberdeen Journal 10 April 1867 p. 6, Royal Cornwall Gazette 11 April 1867 p. 6, 
North Wales Chronicle 13 April 1867 p. 2, Hampshire Telegraph 13 April 1867 p. 4, and 
others. 
169 BR, 24 November 1866 p. 4; WE, 2 February 1867 p. 8; HE, 26 January 1867 p. 5. 
170 BO, 15 November 1866 p. 3, 29 November 1866 p. 7; HE, 23 February 1867 p. 7. 
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Conservative would be forgiven for concluding that the long looked-for 
‘Conservative reaction’ was beginning to manifest itself, and that the working 
classes were more reliable than previously feared. 
The language of these Working Men’s Conservative Associations also 
sheds valuable light on the new appeal made to the expanded electorate:  
 
Figure 9: Words used in reports of Yorkshire Working Men’s Conservative 
Association banquets, sized by frequency. 
 
There are some surprises contained within this overview. Disraeli would no 
doubt have been disappointed at being overshadowed by both Lord Derby 
and John Bright: moreover, the Church also enjoyed greater prominence 
over the Constitution and the Crown. Perhaps the biggest surprise is that, 
despite the atmosphere of boozy bonhomie at the gatherings, the supposed 
Tory staples of ‘beer’/‘ale’, ‘beef’, ‘plum pudding’, and ‘Merrie England’ made 
no appearance.171  
It seems that, as with newspaper opinion, at this stage there was no 
appeal to a ‘popular culture of “cakes and ale”,’ or to the beer-barrel against 
the reformer.172 Rather, the accusation (originating with Ferrand) was that 
                                                   
171 Each guest at York received one pint of wine and half a pint of ale: YG, 2 November 1867 p. 
4. 
172 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, p. 107; Joyce, Work, Society and Politics p. 292; 
Roberts, ‘"Villa Toryism” and Popular Conservatism in Leeds, 1885-1902’, pp. 220, 222. 
Page 268 of 312 
 
the Whigs had unjustly labelled the working classes as drunken and 
uneducated in order to disenfranchise them.173 The Conservatives were 
righting this wrong, extending the franchise to those ‘whose education and 
talents qualified them,’ ‘steady, earnest and sober-minded men’ with ‘regard 
for order and good government’.174 Though WMCAs met in pubs, they 
aspired to reading rooms.175 
The constant reiteration of the Tories’ previous history of social 
reform, the lambasting of Bright for failing to support local charity, and the 
emphasis on the Church being the ‘poor man’s church,’ might all be seen as a 
thinly-veiled bribe to the new electorate: an economic reward for political 
support, in line with the traditional exercise of landlord influence in rural 
districts. However, taken in context with comments about the purpose of the 
British constitution being ‘to bring justice to every man’s door’, or the 
working class being denied ‘no degree of honour or prosperity’, there is an 
alternative interpretation.176 The aim was to reverse Liberal portrayals of 
government as a battle for political power between the productive and 
parasite classes. Instead, WMCAs emphasised that the working classes were 
now part of the responsible in-group entrusted with the defence of the 
constitution, who should view their votes as a duty and use them selflessly in 




Looking into the justifications for reform within Yorkshire strongly suggests 
that its ultimate success was not due to a dramatic change in the attitudes of 
the parties towards the franchise. Instead, Disraeli managed to win over 
dissident Liberals by rephrasing the terms of Reform, but avoided 
Conservative splits by maintaining the foundation of civic responsibility. 
Coupled with the biggest manifestation of working-class Conservatism since 
                                                   
173 LI, 7 January 1865 p. 7, 27 January 1866 p. 7, 4 July 1867 p. 3; YH, 3 August 1867 p. 10. 
174 LI, 27 April 1867 p. 9; YH, 3 August 1867 p. 10; YG, 2 November 1867 p. 5. 
175 LI, 17 August 1867 p. 8, for Bradford meetings at the Stanley Arms, Hare and Hounds Inn, 
and Wharf Hotel; HP, 4 October 1867. c.f. Cragoe, ‘Conservative Associations’, p. 590. 
176 LI, 7 January 1865 p. 7; YG, 2 November 1867 p. 4. 
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the 1830s, amplified by supportive and hostile press alike, this held the 
reform coalition together until the bill passed. 
This emphasis on civic responsibility, however, shows the extent to 
which the successful measure was framed in opposition to American 
democracy despite the Civil War’s outcome. Neither party accepted that self-
government was an inherent British capacity, but instead that the 
performance of civic duties either demonstrated or developed such capacity. 
The development of racial solidarity followed rather than preceded franctise 
extension, perhaps related to the abandonment of impractical anti-
compounding safeguards post-1867.177 
Though hopes of ‘Conservative reaction’ might have been delusive, so 
too were Liberal beliefs that expansion of the electorate would wipe out the 
Conservatives. At the 1868 election, the Conservatives only lost a single seat 
in Yorkshire, with William Henry Gladstone capturing Whitby. Though they 
also lost a seat through redistribution at Knaresborough, the creation of the 
new Eastern West Riding constituency left them with twelve seats to twenty-
eight Liberal. Like the national vote share, this was more or less the result at 
the 1865 election.178 
 Yet the Act had changed both parties substantially. The Conservative 
establishment had survived more or less unscathed, but they had been forced 
to broaden their appeal: to abandon the defence of a narrow electorate in 
favour of a wider body united by a sense of civic duty. The Liberal party, 
meanwhile, could look beyond the extension of the franchise to the other 
aspects of its programme of civil and religious liberty, spurred on by an 
increasing proportion of Radical MPs like Alfred Illingworth, A.J. Mundella, 
and the former Alderman Robert Meek Carter. However, this Liberal 
‘faddism’ created casualties: Abraham Holroyd of Bradford, who had ‘twice 
trudged through the mire and dirt to Woodhouse Moor,’ returned his Reform 
League membership ticket because the separation of Church and State was 
                                                   
177 Hall, ‘Nation Within’, p. 233; Mandler, English National Character, p. 59; Saunders, 
Democracy and the Vote, p. 257. 
178 Matthew Roberts, ‘Popular Conservatism In Britain, 1832-1914’, Parliamentary History 
vol. 26, no. 3 (2007), p. 391. 
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‘the greatest calamity that could befall my country’.179 In this respect, the 
Conservative desire to remove franchise reform as a Liberal rallying cry 
seems to have succeeded. 
                                                   
179 WYAS Bradford, DB16/C33/10 (Abraham Holroyd to S.C. Kell, 12 November 1867); 
Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics (Oxford, 1982) pp. 27-8. 




The purpose of this thesis was to reconcile the dramatic changes happening 
around the world with the seeming inactivity in domestic British politics. The 
explanation for this disparity lies not in the fact that these events went 
unnoticed, as they were reported and discussed lavishly across the country. 
Instead, this thesis demonstrates how contemporaries found it easier to fit 
events into existing intellectual frameworks than to undergo immediate, 
substantial and far-reaching changes in their attitudes. Even before we 
consider questions of intellectual geography, and the difficulty encountered 
by those who attempted to disseminate new ideas – those who ventured into 
the provinces to do so, that is – we should acknowledge that, when they 
change at all, mentalities tend to change slowly. 
 The thesis also clearly demonstrates that it is essential for the study of 
popular attitudes to be as wide-ranging and broad-based as possible. 
Historians of history may well trace the last survival of the ‘great man’ school 
of history in the way that studies of race nearly constantly return to Carlyle’s 
1849 Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question. Some of the new 
techniques applied in this thesis will facilitate these broader studies: for 
instance, the coupling of corpus analysis with the growing range of digitised 
newspapers may enable future historians to trace the process by which the 
British abandoned their use of prophylactic quotation marks around the 
word ‘nigger’. 
Although the title of this thesis encompassed race, democracy and the 
American Civil War, the Civil War was always intended to act as a nexus for 
the strands of race and democracy. However, its findings on reactions to the 
war hold significant repercussion for the large body of literature on Anglo-
American relations during the conflict. In contrast to the historiographical 
emphasis on Southern sympathies, this thesis illustrates how support for 
British interference was sporadic, offered tentatively, and withdrawn quickly. 
When compared to other national movements, or to other potential 
international interventions, the Confederacy mustered much less sympathy 
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than the putative British sense of solidarity with the underdog would 
suggest.1 
 The only factor that explains this lack of enthusiasm is the ‘peculiar 
institution’ of slavery. Historiographically, British support for the 
Confederacy has been used as an indicator of the decline in anti-slavery 
sentiment. In fact, the relative insignificance of such support demonstrates 
the institutionalised ubiquity of anti-slavery. Although the majority of 
newspapers studied were Liberal, opposition to slavery was shared across the 
political spectrum with remarkably little variance. Furthermore, anti-slavery 
underlay not just British distaste for the Confederacy, but distrust for the 
Union. 
 The persistence of anti-slavery also highlights the persistence of 
traditional attitudes towards race identified by this thesis. Racial differences 
continued to be interpreted through culturally differentialist rather than 
biologically essentialist terms throughout this period. At the start, the Indian 
Mutiny was blamed on heathenism; in the middle of the period, 
commentators showed a general expectation that fair treatment should be 
afforded to black Americans and Maori alike; and at the end, a new narrative 
about the failings of planters was invented for the purpose of explaining the 
Jamaican rebellion. Without this growth in biological essentialism, coupled 
with factors such as the downward revision of Confederate support, the 
evidence for ‘hardening’ racial attitudes appears much sparser. Lamentable 
as contemporary British racial prejudice was, it does not seem to have been 
noticeably worse at the end of this period than it was at the start. 
Consideration of intellectual geography also shows that whatever 
progress the new ‘scientific’ racism was making in the academic sphere, it 
made little on the ground in Yorkshire. This is striking because of the 
provincial significance of Yorkshire cities like Leeds, Sheffield and York: we 
might well have expected these areas to be early adopters of the latest 
theories, but no such thing took place. Moreover, this regional study of 
Yorkshire is probably more representative of attitudes in the bulk of the UK 
                                                   
1 A propensity acknowledged by those involved in the debate: LM 25 January 1864, YH 28 
February 1863 p. 10, 6 February 1864 p. 10, HP 26 September 1862, 1 May 1863, SI 29 July 
1862 
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than studies of high politics, the views of academics, or the attitudes of 
colonists.  
Studies which treat the British world as a cohesive whole are valuable, 
but we should acknowledge that pressures on the ground affected attitudes 
towards other races as much as did shared discourses on race. The changing 
post-Rebellion policy towards India, and indeed the policy towards 
representative assemblies in Jamaica, reflected the practicalities of power 
and consequently differed from domestic opinion as to the course that should 
be taken. When exactly racial attitudes in provincial Britain shifted is 
unclear, but the dismantling of the anti-slavery lecture circuits after the 
American Civil War is a likely candidate for the catalyst in a decline in the 
traditional, religiously based view of foundational equality. 
Similarly, changes in fundamental attitudes towards the British nation 
seem to post-date the 1867 reform act. This thesis demonstrates how the 
concept of democracy failed to muster support across the political spectrum, 
and how Union victory in the American Civil War did not resolve mainstream 
concerns about democracy’s flaws. 1867 was an explicitly anti-democratic 
measure, framed to negate one of its most significant deficiencies by 
institutionalising taxpayer hegemony. Impractical and unsustainable though 
this was, such a concept mustered support from across the political 
spectrum. 
When we disentangle democracy from reform, we can acknowledge 
that the Conservative party in Yorkshire was more willing to see the franchise 
expanded than is normally acknowledged. In 1859 they made proposals 
which went beyond Disraeli’s limited measure; in 1867, they held firm to his 
more radical bill despite the abandonment of the safeguards which they had 
considered essential to its passage. However, their steadfastness was due in 
part to the evidence, provided by the WMCAs, that the working class could be 
trusted to defend the pillars of the British constitution. My analysis of their 
rhetoric shows that it was responsibility and not irresponsibility which they 
sought in the expanded electorate: the cornerstone of the appeal was to make 
the working classes part of the in-group, rather than to turn them against 
moralisers and temperance advocates. 
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Though Disraeli’s measure went further than previous ones, it also 
had the internal logic which other proposals lacked. It was in the 
requirement for responsibility that the Conservatives and Liberals found 
sufficient common ground to pass reform. However, this thesis also 
illustrates that conceptions of the franchise differed between parties. While 
Conservatives focused on the use of the franchise as a tool of government, 
Liberals were much more eager to see it as a form of self-actualisation. 
Popular Conservatism is a woefully understudied phenomenon in this period, 
but the difference is likely to result from greater Conservative willingness to 
accept hierarchical distinctions. It may also have stemmed from a broader 
conception of nationality which went beyond the political sphere to 
incorporate institutions such as the Church of England. As Liberals were 
prevented from acknowledging the Church’s potential uniting role by their 
affinity with Nonconformity, they placed much greater emphasis on the 
franchise.  
Biagini’s assertion about the ideological coherence of Gladstonian 
Liberalism presumably was not intended to apply to this period.2 From this 
study of local parties in Yorkshire, however, it was not a lack of ideological 
coherence so much as the ‘narcissism of small differences’ which blighted 
Liberalism. Throughout the period, members of the party were continually 
bickering over what, in hindsight, seem relatively minor policy 
disagreements. Yorkshire Conservatives were much less liable to such 
fallings-out, perhaps because they were conscious of their minority status, or 
perhaps because conservatism tends to stress a greater sense of value for 
loyalty and respect for authority.3 Liberal bickering culminated in the 
formation of the Reform League: in essence, an independent Radical party in 
embryo, under the threat of which the mainstream party submitted. 
 
By bringing together these two strands of race and democracy, this thesis 
highlights the glacial pace of change before 1867. It emphasises how the 
Second Reform Act marked the end of an era, reflecting the culmination of 
earlier attitudes towards the racial and political nation rather than stemming 
                                                   
2 Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform, p. 4. 
3 Haidt, Righteous Mind, pp. 161-9, 212-4. 
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from newly emerging ideas. In this respect, it also revives the view of the 
Second Reform Act as a significant turning point on Britain’s route towards 
both democracy and imperialism – turning points which few of those 
involved in its passage could have predicted. 
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Appendix A: Corpus analysis methodology 
 
The corpus of Working Men’s Conservative Association events was taken 
from a range of banquets across the country between 1865 and 1867. A full 
list of those selected, and the sources, is at the end of this appendix.  
To obtain the corpus of election addresses, William Wardell Bean’s 
Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties was used to 
provide a starting list of candidates.1 Candidates who withdrew before the 
poll were also included in the list, on the grounds that they may still have 
produced an address. Addresses for as many candidates as possible were 
subsequently obtained from a range of digitised and hard copy newspapers. A 
full list of candidates and addresses, along with the sources from which the 
addresses were taken, is at the end of this appendix. 
In some cases, candidates retired before issuing an address, or an 
address could not be found. These individuals have been highlighted with red 
text. Coverage increases from 67% in 1857 to 79% in 1859 and 86% in 1865: 
however, the poor early figures are due in part to a large number of 
candidates not standing. 
Most candidates described as ‘Liberal Conservatives’ by Bean could 
relatively easily be categorised as either one or the other. The party to which 
they have been assigned for the purpose of analysis has been underlined in 
their description. 
The AntConc software was used to investigate the corpus, and a 
graphical representation of the top 100 words was provided through 
wordle.net. To make these images more pertinent to the discussion, some of 
the more common words were excluded from the analysis: 
 Working Men’s Conservative Association banquets: ‘Mr.,’ ‘hear’, 
‘Cheers’, ‘loud’.  
 Election addresses: ‘Parliament,’ and the close of the address (e.g. ‘I 
beg to subscribe myself, gentlemen, your obliged and faithful servant’ 
or ‘I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your obedient servant’).  
                                                   
1 William Wardell Bean, The Parliamentary Representation of the Six Northern Counties of 
England (Hull, 1890). 
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To allow a comparison between the full and reduced corpuses, images 
of both have been included. 
 
Figure 10: Most commonly used words from the full corpus of Yorkshire 
Working Men’s Conservative Association banquets 1865-7, sized by 
frequency 
 
Figure 11: Most commonly used words from the reduced corpus of Yorkshire 
Working Men’s Conservative Association banquets 1865-7, sized by 
frequency  
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Figure 12: Most commonly used words from the full corpus of Yorkshire 
election addresses, 1857-65, sized by frequency 
 
Figure 13: Most commonly used words from the reduced corpus of Yorkshire 
election addresses, 1857-65, sized by frequency 
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Working Men’s Conservative Association banquets 
 
Leeds, January 1865.2 
Leeds, January 1866.3 
Bradford, November 1866.4 
Bramley, December 1866.5 
Huddersfield, January 1867.6 
Wakefield, April 1867.7 
Cleckheaton, April 1867.8 
Pudsey, July 1867.9 
Shipley, July 1867.10 
Halifax, September 1867.11 
York, November 1867.12 
Slaithwaite, November 1867.13 
  
                                                   
2 LI, 7 January 1865 pp. 7-8. 
3 LI, 27 January 1866 pp. 7-8. 
4 BO, 22 November 1866 p. 5. 
5 LI, 20 December 1866 p. 3. 
6 HC, 26 January 1867 pp. 6-7. 
7 LI, 27 April 1867 p. 9. 
8 LI, 27 April 1867 p. 9. 
9 LI, 4 July 1867 p. 3. 
10 LI, 11 July 1867 p. 3. 
11 LI, 25 September 1867 pp. 2-3. 
12 YG, 2 November 1867 pp. 4-5. 
13 HC, 16 November 1867 p. 6. 
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Lists of candidates 
1857 
Constituency Candidate Party Source 
North Riding Hon. Octavius 
Duncombe 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Edward Stillingfleet 
Cayley 
Liberal York Herald, 14 
March 1857 p. 7 
Hon. John Charles 
Dundas 
Liberal York Herald, 14 
March 1857 p. 7 
East Riding Lord Hotham Conservative Hull Packet, 13 
March 1857 p. 4 
Hon. Arthur 
Duncombe 
Conservative Hull Packet, 13 
March 1857 p. 4 
West Riding Edmund Beckett 
Denison 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Viscount Goderich Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Beverley Hon. William Henry 
Forester Denison 
Liberal Hull Packet, 13 






William Wells Liberal Hull Packet, 13 
March 1857 p. 4 




Leeds Mercury, 21 




Liberal Bradford Observer, 
26 March 1857 p. 8 
Titus Salt Liberal  
Halifax Francis Crossley Liberal Leeds Mercury, 14 
March 1857 p. 1 
Rt. Hon. Sir Charles 
Wood, Bt. 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 14 
March 1857 p. 1 
Major Henry 
Edwards 
Conservative Halifax Guardian, 
14 March 1857 p. 4 
Huddersfield Edward Akroyd Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Richard Cobden Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Kingston-
upon-Hull 
James Clay Liberal Hull Packet, 20 
March 1857 p. 5 
Lord Ashley Liberal 
Conservative 
Hull Packet, 20 
March 1857 p. 5 
Lord William 
McLeane Compton 
Liberal Hull Packet, 20 
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 
Hon. W.H.F. 
Denison 
Liberal Hull Packet, 13 
March 1857 p. 414 
Knaresborough Basil Thomas Wood Conservative  
Thomas Collins Conservative  
Robert Campbell Liberal  
Leeds Matthew Talbot 
Baines 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Robert Hall Conservative Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
John Remington 
Mills 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 24 
March 1857 p. 1 
W.E. Forster Liberal  
Francis Carbutt Liberal  




James Brown Liberal  






Pontefract Richard Monckton 
Milnes 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
William Wood Conservative  
Benjamin Oliviera Liberal Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Richmond Henry Rich Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 21 
March 1857 p. 1 
Marmaduke Wyvill, 
jun. 
Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 21 
March 1857 p. 1 
Ripon John Greenwood Liberal  
John Ashley Warre Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 21 
March 1857 p. 1 




Mercury, 14 March 
1857 p. 1 
Earl of Mulgrave Liberal Scarborough 
Mercury, 7 March 
1857 p. 1 
Dr. Augustus F. 
Bayford 
Conservative Scarborough 
Mercury, 21 March 
1857 p. 1 
Thomas Moore Not given  
                                                   
14 Not included in Bean, Parliamentary Representation, p. 858. 
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 




March 1857 p. 1 
George Hadfield Liberal Sheffield 
Independent, 14 
March 1857 p. 1 
William Overend Conservative Sheffield 
Independent, 14 
March 1857 p. 1 
Thirsk Sir William Payne 
Galloway, Bt. 
Conservative  
Wakefield John Charlesworth 
Dodgson 
Charlesworth 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 21 
March 1857 p. 4 
Whitby Robert Stephenson Conservative  
York Joshua Proctor 
Brown Westhead 
Liberal Yorkshire Gazette, 
21 March 1857 p. 3 
John George Smyth Conservative York Herald, 14 
March 1857 p. 7 
Malcolm Lewin Liberal  
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1859 
Constituency Candidate Party Source 
North Riding Hon. William Ernest 
Duncombe 
Conservative York Herald, 16 
April 1859 p. 7 
Edward Stillingfleet 
Cayley 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
East Riding Lord Hotham Conservative York Herald, 9 
April 1859 p. 7 
Hon. Arthur 
Duncombe 
Conservative York Herald, 9 
April 1859 p. 7 
West Riding Sir John William 
Ramsden, Bt 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
Francis Crossley Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
Rt. Hon. James A. 
Stuart Wortley 
Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, 
16 April 1859 p. 4 
Beverley Ralph Walters Liberal  
Major Henry 
Edwards 
Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, 
9 April 1859 p. 4 
James Robert 
Walker 
Conservative Hull Packet, 8 April 






Bradford Henry Wickham 
Wickham 
Liberal Bradford Observer, 
21 April 1859 p. 4 
Titus Salt Liberal Bradford Observer, 
21 April 1859 p. 4 
Alfred Harris Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, 
16 April 1859 p. 4 
Halifax Rt. Hon. Sir Charles 
Wood, Bt 
Liberal Halifax Courier, 16 
April 1859 p. 4 
James Stansfeld, 
jun. 
Liberal Halifax Courier, 16 
April 1859 p. 4 
Huddersfield Edward Aldam 
Leatham 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 28 
April 1859 p. 1 
Edward Akroyd Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
Kingston-
upon-Hull 
James Clay Liberal Hull Packet, 8 April 
1859 p. 5 
Joseph Hoare Conservative Hull Packet, 15 
April 1859 p. 5 
John Harvey Lewis Liberal Hull Packet, 8 April 
1859 p. 5 
Knaresborough Basil Thomas Wood Conservative  




Leeds Edward Baines Liberal Leeds Intelligencer, 
16 April 1859 p. 4 
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 
George Skirrow 
Beecroft 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
William Edward 
Forster 
Liberal Leeds Intelligencer, 
16 April 1859 p. 4 
John Shaw Not given  
Malton Hon. Charles 
William Wentworth-
Fitzwilliam 
Liberal Malton Messenger, 
23 April 1859 p. 1 
James Brown Liberal Malton Messenger, 
23 April 1859 p. 1 
Northallerton William Battie 
Wrightson 
Liberal  
Charles Henry Mills Conservative  
Pontefract Richard Monckton 
Milnes 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
William Overend Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, 




Telegraph, 16 April 
1859 p. 1 
Richmond Henry Rich Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 23 
April 1859 p. 1 
Marmaduke Wyvill, 
jun. 
Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 23 
April 1859 p. 1 
Ripon John Greenwood Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 
April 1859 p. 4 
John Ashley Warre Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 23 
April 1859 p. 2 
Alfred B. Richards Liberal  
Scarborough Hon. William H.F. 
Denison 
Liberal Scarborough 
Mercury, 23 April 
1859 p. 4 




Mercury, 23 April 
1859 p. 4 
John Dent Dent Liberal Scarborough 
Mercury, 23 April 
1859 p. 4 
George John Cayley Liberal  




April 1859 p. 1 
George Hadfield Liberal Sheffield 
Independent, 9 
April 1859 p. 1 
Thirsk Sir William Payne Conservative  
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 
Galloway, Bt. 
Wakefield William Henry 
Leatham 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 9 




Conservative Leeds Intelligencer, 
23 April 1859 p. 4 
Whitby Robert Stephenson Conservative Whitby Gazette, 23 
April 1859 p. 4 
York Joshua Proctor 
Brown Westhead 
Liberal Yorkshire Gazette, 
9 April 1859 p. 7 
John George Smyth Conservative York Herald, 9 
April 1859 p. 7 
Austen Henry 
Layard 
Liberal York Herald, 16 
April 1859 p. 7 
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1865 
Constituency Candidate Party Source 
North Riding Hon. William 
Ernest Duncombe 
Conservative Yorkshire Gazette, 
3 June 1865 p. 6 
Frederick Acclom 
Milbank 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 10 
June 1865 p. 8 
William J.S. Morritt Conservative Yorkshire Gazette, 
3 June 1865 p. 6 
East Riding Lord Hotham Conservative York Herald, 1 July 
1865 p. 6 
Hon. Arthur 
Duncombe 
Conservative York Herald, 1 July 





Liberal Leeds Times, 1 July 
1865 p. 4 
Sir Francis 
Crossley, Bt 
Liberal Leeds Times, 1 July 
1865 p. 4 
Southern West 
Riding 
Viscount Milton Liberal Leeds Mercury, 8 
July 1865 p. 9 
Henry Frederick 
Beaumont 
Liberal Leeds Mercury, 8 
July 1865 p. 9 
Christopher Beckett 
Denison 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 24 




Conservative Leeds Mercury, 24 
June 1865 p. 8 
Beverley Colonel Henry 
Edwards 
Conservative Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 4 
Christopher Sykes Conservative Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 4 
David Keane, QC Liberal Beverley Recorder, 
24 June 1865 p. 4 
Bradford Henry Wickham 
Wickham 
Liberal Bradford Observer, 
29 June 1865 p. 1 
William Edward 
Forster 
Liberal Bradford Observer, 
29 June 1865 p. 1 
Halifax James Stansfeld, 
jun. 
Liberal Halifax Courier, 8 
July 1865 p. 1 
Edward Akroyd Liberal Leeds Intelligencer, 
10 June 1865 p. 4 





Liberal Leeds Mercury, 8 
July 1865 p. 9 
Kingston-
upon-Hull 
James Clay Liberal Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 5 
Charles Morgan 
Norwood 
Liberal Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 5 
Joseph Somes Conservative Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 5 
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 
Joseph Hoare Conservative Hull Packet, 30 
June 1865 p. 5 
Knaresborough Basil Thomas 
Woodd 
Conservative Knaresborough 
Times, 21 June 
1865 p. 1 
Isaac Holden Liberal Leeds Mercury, 10 
June 1865 p. 8 
Thomas Collins Conservative  
Leeds George Skirrow 
Beecroft 
Conservative Leeds Mercury, 24 
June 1865 p. 8 
Edward Baines Liberal Leeds Mercury, 24 
June 1865 p. 8 
Viscount Amberley Liberal Leeds Mercury, 24 
June 1865 p. 8 




Liberal Malton Messenger, 
8 July 1865 p. 2 
James Brown Liberal Malton Messenger, 
8 July 1865 p. 2 




Pontefract Hugh Culling 
Eardley Childers 
Liberal Pontefract 
Telegraph, 3 June 




Telegraph, 3 June 
1865 p. 1 
William McArthur Liberal Pontefract 
Telegraph, 3 June 
1865 p. 1 
E. Brefitt Liberal Leeds Intelligencer, 
1 July 1865 p. 415 
Richmond Sir Roundell Palmer Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 8 
July 1865 p. 2 
Hon. John Charles 
Dundas 
Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 8 
July 1865 p. 2 
Ripon Rt. Hon. Sir Charles 
Wood, Bt. 
Liberal Richmond and 
Ripon Chronicle, 1 




John Greenwood Liberal York Herald, 1 July 
                                                   
15 Not included in Ibid., p. 986. 
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Constituency Candidate Party Source 
1865 p. 4 




Mercury, 10 June 
1865 p. 4 
John Dent Dent Liberal Scarborough 
Mercury, 10 June 
1865 p. 4 
George John Cayley Liberal  
Sheffield John Arthur 
Roebuck 
Liberal Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 8 July 
1865 p. 1 
George Hadfield Liberal Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 8 July 
1865 p. 1 
Hon. James F. 
Stuart Wortley 
Conservative Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 8 July 
1865 p. 1 
Thomas Campbell 
Foster 
Liberal Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 8 July 
1865 p. 1 
Thirsk Sir William Payne 
Galloway, Bt. 
Conservative Yorkshire Gazette, 
1 July 1865 p. 7 
Wakefield William Henry 
Leatham 
Liberal Wakefield Journal, 
7 July 1865 p. 1 
Sir John Charles 
Dalrymple Hay, Bt. 
Conservative Wakefield Journal, 
5 May 1865 p. 2 




York James Lowther Conservative York Herald, 1 July 
1865 p. 6 
George Leeman Liberal York Herald, 1 July 
1865 p. 6 
Joshua Proctor 
Brown Westhead 
Liberal York Herald, 1 July 
1865 p. 6 
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Appendix B: Political affiliations of newspapers 
 
By and large, papers were assigned a political affiliation in accordance with 
the self-reported designations given in Mitchell’s Press Directory for 1861 
and 1866.1 Where those designations were not adopted, an explanation has 
been provided below.  
 
Note that the statistical breakdown of 67 newspapers given in chapter 1 refers 
to all publications listed in the directory. The list below refers only to the 34 
newspapers cited in chapter 4, and counts the shared editorials of the Craven 
Pioneer and Pontefract Telegraph as a single newspaper. 
 
Newspaper Political affiliation 
Barnsley Chronicle Liberal 
Beverley Recorder Liberal 
Bradford Observer Liberal 
Bradford Review Advanced Liberal; Liberal per Mitchell, 
but its consistent advocacy of radical 




Liberal; Mitchell gives the Pioneer as 
Independent and the Telegraph as Liberal, 
but their shared editorials broadly support 
the Liberals.2  
Doncaster Chronicle Conservative 
Doncaster Gazette Liberal 
Eastern Counties Herald Liberal 
Halifax Courier Liberal 
Halifax Guardian Conservative 
Harrogate Advertiser Conservative; Neutral per Mitchell’s, but 
the paper’s stances (including opposition 
to reform) support a Conservative 
identification.3 
Huddersfield Chronicle Liberal; owned by Colonel T.P. Crosland, 
later Liberal MP for the town. 
Huddersfield Examiner Advanced Liberal; listed as Liberal but 
also ‘represents what is considered the 
advanced section of the Huddersfield 
Liberals’.4 
                                                   
1 C. Mitchell, The Newspaper Press Directory (London, 1861; 1866). 
2 Mitchell, 1861 Press Directory pp. 69, 74; 1866 Press Directory pp. 68, 74. 
3 Mitchell, 1861 Press Directory p. 53. 
4 Mitchell, 1861 Press Directory p. 55; 1866 Press Directory p. 53. 
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Hull Advertiser Liberal 
Hull Packet Conservative 
Leeds Express Advanced Liberal; ‘independent Liberal’ 
per Mitchell’s, but strongly associated with 
the radical Alderman Carter and the Leeds 
Working Men’s Parliamentary Reform 
Association.5 
Leeds Intelligencer Conservative 
Leeds Mercury Liberal 
Leeds Times Advanced Liberal; ‘Liberal’ per Mitchell’s, 
but advocates ‘complete suffrage’ (among 
other positions).6 
Malton Messenger Neutral 
Pontefract Advertiser Conservative 
Richmond and Ripon Chronicle Liberal 
Rotherham and Masbro' 
Advertiser 
Neutral 
Scarborough Mercury Liberal; ‘Independent’ per Mitchell’s, but 
in practice supports the Liberal party. 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph Neutral; later notably Conservative, but in 
this era disregards party affiliations. 
Sheffield Independent Liberal 
Sheffield Times Conservative; ‘Independent’ per Mitchell’s, 
but actually supports the Conservatives 
both locally and nationally. 
Tadcaster Post Neutral 
Wakefield Express Liberal 
Wakefield Free Press Advanced Liberal; ‘Liberal’ per Mitchell’s, 
but in practice adopts more radical 
positions than the neighbouring Express.7 
Wakefield Journal Conservative 
Whitby Gazette Neutral 
York Herald Liberal 
Yorkshire Gazette Conservative 
   
                                                   
5 Mitchell, 1861 Press Directory, p. 58. 
6 Ibid, p. 58. 
7 Ibid, p. 79. 




Unpublished primary sources 
 
East Riding Archive, Beverley (ERA) 
 
Journal of Edmund Crosskill (YB/CRO/BEV) 
Letter from Samuel Clark (DDCL/3331/7) 
Nelson family correspondence (DDX1659/3/1) 
Letters of Hugh Robinson (DDHV/73/23) 
Letter from Mrs Johnson to Mrs Mosley (DDX960/2) 
Letters of Private John English (DDX1052/1) 
Anti-slavery speech delivered by Reverend Thomas Galland 
(DDX1282/38/5) 
Letter from Henry Blundell, Lucerne to Henry Blundell (DDML/9/32) 
Notice to the electors of Beverley from Charles Winn on slavery 
(DDX1290/13/66) 
Beverley election posters and pamphlets (DDBC/11) 
Letter from Sara Blundell on the Hull election (DDML/9/25) [1842] 
Miscellaneous Beverley electoral ephemera (DDX24/25) 
Correspondence of Harry Denison (DDSA/1077) 
File of research notes relating to the American Civil War (DDX1408/5/3) 
 
North Yorkshire County Record Office, Northallerton (NYCRO) 
 
List of letters to, from and concerning emigrants in America (CRONT668) 
Letter from James Holiday, formerly of Drax (CRONT 1746) 
Lund family papers (Z378) 
Alderson family letters from America (ZSC) 
Henry Scrope’s letters ZPT/5/16 (CRONT 670) 
HM Havelock family correspondence (ZDG) 
Miscellaneous political papers (ZFL) 
Thomas Place land purchase (ZJX) 
Northallerton reform meeting (Z.860) 
Letter of Sir George William Denys, junior re: NR election (4 March 1862) 
Election posters (Z.66) 
Election card for Brigg (Z.316) 
Northallerton election proceeding (Z.320) 
Northallerton election records (ZLD) 
Fitzwilliam family of Malton election papers (ZPB/XI) 
 
West Yorkshire Archive Service (WYAS), Bradford 
 
Francis Sharp Powell's visit to America (94D85/18) 
WE Forster to F Thompson (WYB578/1) 
Broadsides (DB3/C4/2) 
Printed letter to the mayor of Bradford (DB3/C50) 
George Smith re: Indian Mutiny (60D91) 
Letter about life in India (68D82/25/c/9) 
Native petitions (68D82/25/e/3) 
Page 292 of 312 
 
Bradford Reform Society records (DB4/C1) 
Bradford and Shipley political papers (DB13) 
Abraham Holroyd correspondence (DB16/C33/10) 
Political telegrams (DB16/C39/1) 
Reform Union correspondence (DB17/C19/1) 
Woodhouse Moor reform demonstration (DB17/C19/6) 
Pamphlet on parliamentary reform (DB32/C2/3) 
Miscellaneous broadsheets and cuttings (DB65/C4/4) 
Letter of Perronet Thompson on slavery (DB6/C5/3) 
Letters of Nathan Haley (DB39/C36/5) 
Letters of Joseph Craven of Stanbury (3D77) 
Political papers (11D74/3/70) 
Election posters (41D76) 
Political papers of the Busfeild Ferrands (51D79) 
Political papers of Matthew Wilson (68D82/18) 
Bradford election documentation (BBD1/1/54) 
Bradford election cartoons (DB13/C51) 
Election handbills (DB17/C23/8) 
Election cartoons (DB39/C28/8) 
Bradford parliamentary election papers (10D76/3/166) 
 
West Yorkshire Archive Service, Halifax 
 
Lister family of Shibden Hall: 
Letter from Thomas Staley to Dr John Lister (SH:7/DRL/183) 
Letter from Dr John Lister (SH:7/DRL/5-19, 25-6) 
Letter from Dr John Lister (SH:7/DRL/14) 
Anne Lister to Lady Vere Cameron (SH:7/ML/997) 
Letter from London correspondent about trade (SHA:22) 
Letter concerning Charles Wood, former Union soldier (FW:59/30) 
Letter from John Chambers (MISC:931/3) 
Diary of Richard Hooker Gillmor (RMP:1106) 
Letter from R J Richardson to John Fielden M P (FLD:988) 
Armytage paper on the West Riding election (KMA:338) 
William Sutcliffe letters relating to the 1841 election (SU/D:184) 
 
West Yorkshire Archive Service, Huddersfield 
 
Letters from Joseph Castle in America (KC39) 
Letters from America to the Beaumont family (DD/BE) 
Letters from Kentucky to John Broadbent, (KC2/7/3, KC2/9/1, KC2/9/5, 
KC2/9/3) 
Heeley collection broadsheets (KC43, KC174) 
George Marsden scrap and cuttings book (KC391/1/1) 
John Pearson Prisoner of War certificate (KC918) 
Letters from Stephenson family, 1838-1970 (KC592/1/1) 
Letter from G. Baildon, soldier, 1863 (KC312/2/1) 
Stoff family correspondence (WYK1189/5/1) 
Letter from Sarah Ann Bilton (WYK1581/1/150) 
Tomlinson collection pamphlets (KC174/83) 
Letters from Joe Kay (KC312/10/1) 
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Willians correspondence (KC312/17/6) 
Correspondence of Sir John Ramsden (DD/RA/C, WYL109) 
 
West Yorkshire Archive Service, Leeds 
 
Townend Glover letters (WYL36/2/4/16- 17) 
Diary of journey in America (WYL893) 
Journal of an infantry officer in Barbados 1827 (WYL692) 
Political correspondence of Edward Baines the younger (WYL383) 
Reform League, Yorkshire Department, Minutes of General Council and 
Executive Committee, 1866-1870 (WYL22/Acc 188) 
The Owls (Leeds Debating Society) Minute book, 1865-1866 (WYL22/Acc 
739) 
 
West Yorkshire Archive Service, Wakefield 
 
Briggs and Shaw family papers, letter about the civil war (C3/1/10) 
Milner Roodhouse’s notes and correspondence on America (C605/7) 
David Tattersall letters (C558/5-6) 
Sharp family correspondence (C617/4) 
Chitty family correspondence (Z86) 
Letters of John and Hannah Wood of Sykehouse (Z109) 
Correspondence of John George Smyth (C547/3) 

















Letter from Washington, America (WWM/G/83/528) 
Letter from the Boultons in Alleghaney county (X5/1) 
Two letters from Cherry Township (SY/377/B19/1, 2) 
Wharncliffe Muniments: 
Letters and printed matter about the SIA (WHM/460) 
Letters about the civil war (WHM/461) 
Letters from New Zealand (WHM/457a) 
Diary from India and Egypt (WhM692) 
Notes made by Lucy Jowitt on a trip to America (MD7421) 
Drabble family correspondence (MD7153) 
Papers of William Bragge (MD7801) 
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Letters of William Greaves Blake (MD8100) 
Letters of Major W.G. Blake (StepC) 
Account of Samuel Coar (PhC/499) 
Lea family correspondence (X105) 
Letters to Miss Martha Skelton (Wil D/7/4/5-6) 
Letters and papers relating to the anti-slavery movement (MD5690/11) 
Letter of Rev. C. A., Pohlman, of Mirfield (SLPS/36[c]) 
HJ Wilson papers (MD5889-6034) 
Rev Henry Batchelor lecture (46/1996) 
Anti-slavery papers (MD2019-2025) 
 
Wakefield Local Studies Library 
 
‘A Working Man's Opinion on the Wakefield Borough Election and 
Parliamentary Reform’ (Box 6, A17) 
Liberal Party treat at Hemsworth Hall, 1852 (Box 6, A21) 
Election poems and songs (Box 6, A57) 
Miscellaneous lectures (Box 22, 19/20) 
 




University of Leeds Special Collections 
 
Correspondence of Isaac Holden (BUS/Holden/10) 
 
Whitby Literary and Philosophical Society Library and Archives 
 
Percy Burnett Papers 
Election Squibs (E2.6, books D and G) 
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Richmond and Ripon Chronicle 
Rotherham and Masbro' Advertiser 
Scarborough Mercury 











These newspapers were accessed through the Gale Cengage 19th Century 
British Newspapers website (http://find.galegroup.com/bncn/) and the 
British Newspaper Archive (http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com) as 
well as in archives, local studies departments, and the British Library 
Reading Room at Boston Spa.  
 
The weekly Leeds Intelligencer became the daily Yorkshire Post and Leeds 
Intelligencer in July 1866, but has been described as the Leeds Intelligencer 
(LI) throughout for reasons of consistency. 
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Adams, Henry, The Education of Henry Adams (Washington, D.C., 1907) 
Baines, Thomas, Yorkshire, Past and Present, a History and a Description of 
the Three Ridings of the Great County of York from the Earliest Ages 
to the Year 1870; with an Account of Its Manufactures, Commerce 
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Eardley-Wilmot, Sir John E., A Letter to Lord Brougham, President of the 
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the Coming Session. (London, 1857) 
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Distribution, Extension and Purification of the Elective Franchise 
(London, 1853) 
———  Parliamentary Reform: A Second Letter to Richard Freedom, Esq., 
on the Re-Distributions, Extension and Purification of the Electorial 
Franchise. (London, 1858) 
Gathorne-Hardy, Alfred Erskine, Gathorne Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook, 
a Memoir, vol. 1. (London, 1910) 
Green, Jacob D., Narrative of the Life of J. D. Green, a Runaway Slave, 
from Kentucky, Containing an Account of His Three Escapes, in 1839, 
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Hicks, J.D. (ed.) The Journal of Joseph Robinson Pease, 1822-1865 
(Driffield, 2000) 
Robinson, C. Clough, The Dialect of Leeds and Its Neighbourhood, 
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